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**Estructuras del discurso ideológico en los artículos de opinión:
estudio cultural comparativo**

**Ideological discourse structures in opinion articles:
a cross-cultural study**

**MEMORIA PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE DOCTORA
PRESENTADA POR**

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Madrid, 2015

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OPINIÓN: ESTUDIO CULTURAL COMPARATIVO**

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CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY**

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English Linguistics

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Samira Allani

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To JoAnne, Soukeina and Inés

IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE STRUCTURES IN OPINION ARTICLES: A CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY.

Abstract

The present cross-cultural investigation analyzes critically the ideological structures in the discourses produced by foreign policy experts about the Iraq war. It explores the discursive practices of a presumably powerful group of opinion leaders in two nations/cultures bounded by war and hostility. Drawing upon the theoretical stance of CDA and Argumentation Theory, the study aims at achieving two goals. First, it attempts to examine the contextually-controlled production of the op-ed discourses in the two cultures and the discursive decisions guided by the experts' context models, being the cognitive interface between discourse and society (van Dijk 2008). Second, it seeks to uncover the kinds of ideologies that underlie and play a major role in the experts' performance of argumentative strategies in their debate on Iraq. Two corpora, of 30 op-ed pieces each, issued in American and Arab newspapers are analyzed in relation to the discursive constructions of the Iraq war and the ideological resources sustaining them. The study combines analytic tools from Pragma-dialectics, classical rhetoric and CDA, in examining (i) the selection of topics and the discursive construction of contextual features, namely setting, participants' identities, roles and purposes and (ii) the strategic maneuverings performed revealing of the arguers' attempt to maintain balance between the dialectical and the rhetorical goals. The findings from the cross-cultural study show that the patterns in the discursive practices of each group of policy experts indicate ideologically-biased strategies prompted by the power positions of their respective nations and their dispositions on the international conflict.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

This thesis focuses on the discursive strategies used by foreign policy experts in op-ed pieces discussing war related policies. The cross-cultural research explores the underlying ideologies guiding the discursive and argumentative practices of expert groups belonging to two nations involved in an armed conflict. Drawing upon the stances of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) and Pragma-dialectics, a critical analysis was conducted on the discourses of American and Arab op-ed pieces with the purpose of examining the ideological structures constraining the discursive constructions of the Iraq war performed by the two groups of foreign policy experts as well as the argumentative strategies employed in their discussions of the policies and situation of the war in Iraq. The ideologically controlled discourse has been critically approached from a sociocognitive perspective in which ideologies are regarded as “the basis of the social representations shared by members of a group” (van Dijk, 1998a: 8). The sociocognitive approach emphasizes the role of cognition in the study of ideology and is based on the belief in the cognitive interface mediating discourse and society. The current cross-cultural study of op-ed discourses adopts this multidisciplinary approach to CDS in the examination of the foreign policy opinion discourses and draws on its positions in the study of power, domination and resistance. Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren & Grootendorst. 2004) has brought forth a systematic analysis of argumentative strategies and some significant insight into the kinds of ideologies governing the op-ed pieces in the two cultures. This study hopes to draw more attention to the discourse of foreign policy experts as powerful political groups and key instruments defining international relations and to contribute with an empirical account to the examination of the role of ideologies in the communication processes of these leading international political actors.

1. 1. Statement of the problem

Understanding the world politics in a period of rapid change may result challenging. In times of international crisis and war, crucial political decisions and actions take place following extensive domestic and international interactions between chief foreign policy (henceforth, FP) actors. This complex process takes place within the global conditions prevailing at the time of decision making and is the product of many international actors' interactions such as states, groups, individuals and transnational actors. Indeed, these actors manage their conflicts over different interests through processes involving debate, argument, disagreement, compromise and cooperation (Bloomfield, 2003: 10). Within their discursive practices, the relationships among nation-states and the realities of the global system are shaped.

The op-ed pieces regularly appearing in newspapers offer a major forum for public debate. They bring together politicians, government officials, policy experts, and journalists to discuss the expediency of particular policies while putting forward their opinions about policy actions and decisions. In matters which are hard for the general public to access and directly experiment, however, such as foreign policy, an expert's opinion takes a special status, as it helps the public understand what is at stake in international relations. Here, the boundary between personal opinions and expertise views gets blurred. As a matter of fact, since experts are assumed to possess the right skills to evaluate complex political situations, predict their future outcomes, determine policy options and offer solutions to problems, their contribution to op-ed sections may not be perceived as merely a personal opinion. There is always an added value to this contribution owing to their cognitive authority (Wilson, 1990) and their positions as knowledgeable people that secure their legitimated power. Indeed, no matter how educated citizens/audiences are on their nations' foreign relations, they understand the need for experts to explain to them the functions of vital decisions which involve such complex elements as the character of foreign relations and the intentions of various international players and enemies along the estimation of policy options, interests and risks. Nevertheless, their interpretation of political and world events become the "fact" resource from which citizens and politicians adopt their attitudes and make political decisions. The cognitive authority of policy experts is evidenced by one's acceptance-as-legitimate of the validity or utility of the authors' definition, description or

explanation of reality (Gieryn & Figert, 1986: 67). The problem lies in that what is *agreed to be fact* is the product not of open debate but of the authority of experts and even more, the public is more or less under the cultural or intellectual control of the experts (Turner, 2001: 126, italics in original)

The discourse of FP experts as a powerful political group deserves more scholarly attention in CDS, as not only do they offer analysis and assessment to foreign affairs, but they also monitor the processes of policy planning, negotiations and executions through discursive practices leading to ultimate policy decisions that have important if not doomful international consequences. Within these interaction-based professional practices, the policy experts also define the terms of the public debate on policy positions and very often become opinion leaders influencing the public attitudes and decisions. Their opinion pieces issued in print or electronic media reveal how these experts operate in media channels to establish debate on controversial and high-stakes issues and to achieve their goal of mobilizing public opinion for desired political actions.

The circulation of political opinion in the media is widely perceived by scholars in political sciences and related disciplines as an essential part of political communication. According to McNair, political communication includes all forms of political discourse “whether 1) undertaken by politicians and other political actors for the purpose of achieving specific objectives, 2) addressed to these actors by non-politicians such as voters, or 3) maintained about these actors and their activities, such as the one held in news reports, editorials, and other forms of media discussion of politics” (McNair, 2011: 4). At first sight, an op-ed piece falls under discourse type three identified by McNair, as it is generally categorized as the expression of opinion and criticism to policies and political actors as part of the democratic duty of holding politicians accountable. Nonetheless, it may rather belong to type one, since it is open for politicians to participate and also to political actors disguised under the label of columnists whose “opinions are social, institutional or political” (van Dijk, 1998b: 22)

In democratic political systems, publishing political opinions aims at conducting a debate that seeks to engage the citizen into the political decision process based on the deliberative model offered by the system. As Habermas sustains, “the deliberative

paradigm offers as its main empirical point of reference a democratic process, which is supposed to generate legitimacy through a procedure of opinion and will formation (Habermas, 2006: 413). Even though it belongs to a public sphere (in the Habermasian sense), the op-ed in practice is reserved to the elite, at least to those who are eligible to participate in political debates based on their recognized status as experts in political matters. Van Dijk argues that the elites control or have preferential access to the major means of public communication (1993: 179). Even more, in any type of political communication in the media, access is much more critical when, in Habermas' words different social actors struggle for access to and influence on the media.

Those actors enter the stage from three points: Politicians and political parties start from the center of the political system; lobbyists and special interest groups come from the vantage point of the functional systems and status groups they represent; and advocates, public interest groups, churches, intellectuals, and moral entrepreneurs come from backgrounds in civil society.

(Habermas, 2006: 417)

Deliberation on political decisions guarantees the application of democratic principles and offers the politicians the opportunity to cultivate public support for political negotiations. In fact, politicians use the media to address their citizens in order to state their political aims, put forward their policy decisions and get to defend them. Citizens' participation is supposed to be brought together after a complex process of opinion formation through political actions such as voting. Because public opinion is important in democratic political systems and may affect the shaping of the state policies, the elite take advantage of the mass media channels to cultivate public support for negotiations and "sustain different loyalties towards distinct political communities" (Sampedro, 2011: 432).

In the case of authoritarian regime, however, the situation is extremely different. Political communication is monopolized by the ruling person or group who tends to exclusively administer its instruments for the promotion of its decisions. In the current age of political ethical imperatives of international relations, these regimes attempt to maintain a politically correct communication and make use of the same media supports

used in democratic societies in order to shed democratic facade on their monolithic political behavior. Decision-making is often performed by the regime's small circle; hence citizens usually have no real or fake participation in the deliberation process. Like all political communication tools, publishing opinion pieces is part of the politicians work and their spokesmen engaging in explaining their decisions to the public assuming their inherent righteousness.

The difference in political communication practices between democratic and authoritarian societies creates hence different paradigms in which political opinions are produced in the press and points to major cultural and contextual differences between the two types of political systems in conducting political debate in the media. However, the production of American and Arab op-ed piece discourse is not only constrained by two different political systems, but also by two crucial macro contextual conditions. The first is the environment of world politics which defines the relationships among nations and the amount of power they internationally enjoy. The second condition is the critical bilateral relation America and Arab states uphold within the growing ideological conflict over interests, threats and world views and which are perpetuated in the Iraq war and other conflicts in the Middle East.

This opens up for a number of questions. First, it would be quite interesting from a CDS perspective to see FP communication practices within this context of the armed conflict issued in mass-circulating newspapers which create communicative situations involving global readership and conditions bolstering up an internationally wider public sphere. Second, the FP opinion pieces are often credulously regarded as a democratic forum open for free policy debate and as used by columnists acting as social critics of politicians' views and decisions. These assumptions are highly questioned not only for the alleged "link between the policy experts' views, the editorial stands of the media outlets and the processes of policy actions (Page, 1996: 21), but also for the repercussion of these opinions on the collective mind of nations, namely their perceptions of national interests, their positions from international issues and their actual political actions. Third, as a communicative situation, the debate on FP issue in the press has an indirect relation with discourse which is maintained by a "cognitive interface" (van Dijk, 2009: 64) and that the study of discourse requires attention to the makeup of these mediating mental mechanisms. Based on these views which are in line

with the axiomatic belief of Constructivism – one of the major theories in international relations- that “the international reality is socially constructed by cognitive structures which give meaning to the material world (Adler, 1997:319), researchers still have a long way to go in the interdisciplinary exploration of how social cognition impinge on the discourse of policy makers and its impact on world politics.

The complex design and product of the policy actors’ interactions need to be addressed within cognitive theory paradigms and to take into consideration the complex global macro-context defined by international relations’ actors, the bilateral relations of their state-nations and their power positions in the global arena. The cognitive groundwork for debates on FP along with its manifestation in discourse are noteworthy for critical analysis mainly by taking into consideration different cultural perspectives and practices pertinent to the dynamics of global relations. In fact, there is much to explore in this political media discourse type and further interesting revelations may be achieved in comparing the political opinion production not only of two different political systems, but also of two political groups holding conflicting and inimical relations within a complex international order.

1. 2. Purpose of the Study

To claim that a “political problem exists only if political groups say it exists (Kristol, 1979) may sound an exaggeration even for those adopting a critical approach in their investigation of human behaviors. However, when the momentous decisions made by powerful foreign policy elite do not only affect the common national interests, but the common fate of entire peoples and nations, their behavior deserves not only critical inspections but also an active political posture. Policy decisions and actions involving war and peace maintain people all over the globe alarmed. They are certainly the product of the decision makers’ deliberative practices and negotiations as well as their struggle over power positions. In these influential discursive practices the attention was drawn in the current research work, mainly to the cross-cultural dimension of these practices, in an attempt to understand how the differences in the nations’ power positions and in their ideologically governed perceptions of the course of events shape the discursive and argumentative strategies of these social groups.

Many variables are involved in the negotiations processes undertaken by foreign policy experts in their communicative practices including their contributions to policy debates in op-ed pieces. Foreign policy experts tend to work within a collective enterprise shared mainly with the extended community of policy makers, including -ideally- citizens, and based on more or less common (and different) national and historical heritage. The political dispositions of these policy makers stem from all the surrounding cognitive setting of their professional practices: their socially shared cognition, such as their values, attitudes, beliefs, collective identities, political cognitions (goals and values) and ideologies, among other elements constituting the ground for their behaviors. These dispositions are reflected in the op-ed pieces they publish and the argumentative practices they undertake to justify, legitimize, authorize, or condemn policies but more dangerously to put to actions crucial political decisions with fateful political consequences. This thesis was especially motivated by interest in the power of the argumentative work of FP experts and its sociocognitive backdrop as indicative of their political and ideological agendas. As a powerful elite, their discourse has generally been investigated in CDA scholarship as part of the political or elite discourse (van Dijk, 1993; 1995), but little has been explored in the depth of their culturally and ideologically constrained reasoning processes.

CDA has always been interested in examining the discourse of powerful social actors mainly those working in the political domain. Remarkable theories have been developed from the research dedicated to political discourse in its various institutional settings both at the state domestic level (see Chilton 2004; Chilton & Schaffner, 2002; van Dijk, 2002; Wodak, 2009) and within the domain of foreign policy (Chilton 1985; 1996; Musolff, 2004). Yet, relatively little attention has been paid to the argumentative discourse of FP actors (see Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012) and mainly to those working in the backstage (to use Wodak's (2011) term). Opinion leaders in general deserve more attention as they interpret and disseminate political messages for the public to help them understand complex political issues. However, in the domain of world affairs, these leaders are politically purposive people, even if some of them are not perceived as such, and the upshot of their business is undeniably immense. Their social impact or abuse might not be recognized as crucial as that of politicians, who

have always dominated the attention of CDA scholars and have been perceived as the actual political actors. FP experts as opinion leaders undertake a crucial role in the political arena and exercise significant influence on the international relations maintained between different nations and the key policies regularizing these relations.

This cross-cultural critical study aims to explore and contrast the ideologies underlying the discourses of the foreign policy (FP) experts in the American and Arab op-ed pieces discussing the Iraq war during the period referred to as “the Surge” in the time period between late 2006 and September 2007. More specifically, the study focuses on two issues in the discourses of the experts groups in the two cultures: 1) the ideological dimension of the decisions made by the experts in their discursive constructions of the debate on Iraq, namely their selections of topics, their definition of context and their expression of the purposes in actions, and 2) the ideological strategies underlying the argumentative practices, more specifically the reason that could explain the kinds of strategic maneuverings they perform and the role of their power positions in the international conflict and group shared cognitions in the discursive choices they make. The study draws on the stance of CDA and the work of van Dijk (1998a) on ideological discourse, his sociocognitive approach to the study of the elite discourse role in reproducing ideologies of dominance or resistance and his theory on context. The analysis and evaluation of the op-ed argumentative strategies and the characterization of the nature of the debate maintained among FP experts are based on the systematic Pragma-dialectic method developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) and draws, more specifically, on the notion of strategic maneuvering which may be regarded as a powerful analytic tool for the study of ideologies in argumentative discourse.

1. 3. Research Questions

The interest in the discourse of FP experts in the op-ed pieces started with the uncertainty with which this kind of discourse may be classified in the common lay understanding as well as from an academic and formal perspective. The paradoxical character of this discourse lies in the fact that while it is probably regarded as subjective and personal, it also reflects an expert position bearing all the assumptions of authority and informed knowledge that is normally credited to these people. The current research

project endeavors to study and contrast the ideological structures in the discursive practices of foreign policy experts in two cultures bounded by bilateral relations characterized by hostility and warfare. The study seeks to critically explore the strategic construction of the experts' discourses in each culture and to uncover the kinds of ideological resources they draw upon in this practice. In order to achieve these goals, a series of questions is addressed.

1. What strategic choices do FP experts in the two cultures make in their discursive construction of the debate on Iraq? This question focuses on the discursive choices of the op-ed authors and their ideological backdrop. Three sub questions are addressed under this main question:
 1. How do their selections of topics reveal their ideologically motivated goals and decisions?
 2. How do they enact the construction of context in discourse?
 3. To what extent do their argumentative moves indicate ideologically driven decisions?
2. What kind of conditions for argumentation does the context of FP op-ed pieces create? Here attention is paid to the constraints created by context, mainly ideologically ingrained practices, that shape the argumentative and discursive choices made by the FP op-ed authors.

To answer these questions an integrated framework was set up to critically analyze the FP discourses and argumentation in the two groups of op-ed corpora. The discursive constructions would help reveal the strategic choices enacted by the experts and their ideological groundwork assisted by their social cognition, and probably determine whether this groundwork is primarily professional, political, and national or a combination of these.

1. 4. The debate on the Iraq War

The opinion pieces under study were published between late 2006 and September 2007 during the period known as the "Surge" and they discuss the US military policies in Iraq

and its counter-insurgency strategies. The main focus in this debate was the US Security plan, launched in January 2007 by President Bush who officially dubbed it “The New Way Forward”. The plan aimed primarily at an increase in the number of American troops in Iraq in order to provide security, contain violence and continue the reconstruction project undertaken since the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003.

The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 with the main aims to knock down the regime of Saddam Hussein, free the Iraqi people from dictatorship, establish democracy and help the country into its reconstruction. The US troops were supposed to stay until a democratically elected Iraqi government could effectively run the country and establish peace and security. However, instead of achieving the claimed objectives of bringing peace and democracy, the sectarian division in Iraq aggravated the situation and the Bush Administration remained incapable of dealing with the ascending violence and the rising costs of war.

Opponents of President Bush along with public opinion were highly critical of the administration mismanagement of the war and wary of the high death tolls in troops and the excessive costs of the war. Earlier in 2006, the escalating “sectarian” violence in Iraq provoked even more negative reactions to the US intervention as well as both domestic and international calls for retreat. Even more, many of the previous war supporters turned into critics of Bush ineffective strategies and called for troops’ withdrawal from Iraq before the looming defeat.

The state of extreme violence in Iraq was allegedly triggered by a sectarian strife between the Sunni and the Shiite leading to a state of “civil war” in the country. This assumption which is widely accepted internationally and even considered to be a fact is not shared by most Arab media mainly those from independent sources. In fact, there is a clash between Americans and Arabs in their perspectives and opinions about the evolution and the circumstances of the rising violence in Iraq. The American and international mainstream debates revolved mainly around the belief that sectarian conflicts and ethnic strives for power was slowing down the democratization and peace process and therefore, making it difficult for coalition forces to withdraw from the Iraqi territory. The Arab prevalent positions on the other hand, primarily focused on blaming the U.S. presence and colonization for the rise of a sectarian conflict and refused to

consider the conflict a case of “civil war”, but rather a product of the US occupation and policies. There was, of course, a certain divergence of opinions among Arab political experts and mainly among those supporting the official positions of their governments and protecting their interests. Some of these were fully in favor of the US intervention and presence in Iraq and believed in its role to prevent terrorists from creeping into their countries.

While in most U.S and international media the political and public debate about the policies in Iraq turned by and large into a debate on whether the US troops should leave or stay the course in Iraq, in the Arab World, however, the public debates in many countries were generally focused on the disastrous outcomes of the US occupation and the worries about the fate of the whole region. Even though opinion leaders were divided between those supportive and those skeptical of the US mission in Iraq, the massive media coverage of the daily killings horrified the public opinion and reinforced its anger and negative attitudes towards the US. The media coverage of the Iraq war the world over identified the situation as an international crisis, as the increase in violence gave way to more terrorism threat and more insecurity in the world. Within this wavering situation, the foreign policy experts offered the international community diverse assessments through a internationally circulating media channels. Their op-ed pieces regarded as a contribution to the international debate on the US policies in Iraq, may be perceived by critical scholars in various disciplines, for instance CDA (Wodak, 2009), Constructivism (Wendt, 1999), to name only a few, as having a crucial role in the bilateral relationships (and tensions) maintained between the two sides of the conflicts. Policy experts involved in the debate on Iraq do not only explain and justify their own positions on Iraq but their discourses also shape the international understanding and assimilation of such a complex political situation as war.

The current cross-cultural study explores and at the same time contrasts the discourse of American and Arab FP experts. The two groups have been referred to in this thesis as cultural groups. By this reference, the cultural dimension of their difference is considered in the sense used by Bourdieu (1990) and as “habitus” or more precisely as “structure of the mind characterized by a set of acquired schemata sensibilities, dispositions and taste” (Scott & Marshall, 2009). Furthermore to justify the expediency and validity of contrasting the US (a country) with the Arab world (many countries) the

thesis draws on definitions from the field of International Relations (IR) to categorize the two expert groups as belonging to two nations rather than belonging to states. Kegley & Blanton (2011: 11) define...

A state as a legal entity that enjoy a permanent population, a well defined territory and a government capable of exercising sovereignty, whereas a nation is a collection of people who on the basis of ethnic, linguistic or cultural commonality, so construct their reality as to primarily perceive themselves to be member of the same group which define their identity

Based on this understanding, the two FP groups are examined within the underlying frameworks of their respective nations and cultures: the American and the Arab.

5. Structure of the thesis

This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter, in chapter 2 the key concepts of the thesis are introduced and a review of the most relevant research work is reported. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first one starts with a summary of the main theories related to the notion of ideology in discourse and then gives an outlook on its role in political and media discourse within a review of major research work from various disciplines. The second part of chapter 2 focuses on the argumentative dimension of discourse. It is devoted to outlining the major premises in contemporary argumentation theory and some of the critical approaches in the analysis of argumentation in media and political discourses.

Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical frameworks of the current research study, first by outlining the major theoretical tenets of CDA and particularly the socio-cognitive approach adopted by van Dijk and then by introducing Pragma-dialectics, its method and analytic tools for the study of argumentative strategies. This is followed by an explanation of how these research frameworks are made relevant to the main research questions, namely the exploration discursive decisions prompted by ideologies such that the selection of topics, construction of context and the performance of particular argumentative strategies. The final section expounds the advantage of combining the

socio-cognitive approach and Pragma-dialectics in the study of opinion leaders' discourse and its underlying ideologies.

In chapter 4 the methodology adopted in the study of the op-ed discourses is outlined. After reiterating the purpose of the study, the main research questions and sub-questions are advanced. Following this, a description of the data is presented, including the criteria for selection and the formation of the two corpora, the American and the Arab, along an exploration of the institutional conditions for the production and a description of the authors' profiles. The final section provides a detailed account of the research method and various steps pursued in handling the data. It starts with explaining the preliminary analysis carried out which is based on the Pragma-dialectical model. Then, it moves to the combined analytic tools used in the examination of discursive constructions and decisions, from CDA and rhetorical theory. The final part indicates the way strategic moves are handled in the discourse with the use of the notion of strategic maneuvering along the four critical stages of the Pragma-dialectical model.

Chapter 5 focuses on the macro-context relevant in the production of the argumentative discourse of the op-ed pieces within the two cultures under study. The chapter aims to follow a relatively new research trend in Pragma-dialectics in which the possibilities for strategic moves are explored in light of institutional conventions set up for the discourse an argumentative activity type. The exploration prepares for a more informed interpretation of the strategic maneuvering enacted by discourse participants. The conventions creating the preconditions for strategic moves in op-ed discourse are explored, including the institutional purposes of the different participants, and then a characterization of the op-ed activity type based on the ideal model of critical discussion. The final section explores the mindsets of participants as one of the major precondition for strategic maneuvering. The nation-state political orientations play a major role in creating the participants' commitments and constrain the main material starting points for their argumentative exchanges.

Chapter 6 and chapter 7 present and discuss the findings from the cross-cultural analysis of ideological structures in the discourses of op-ed pieces. Chapter 6 presents the findings from the analysis of FP experts' discursive construction of the Iraq issue in the

two op-ed corpora. By drawing on the CDA sociocognitive approach, the focus is placed on the selection of topics and on the construction of contexts. In topic selection, the semantic macro-structures, the macro-speech acts, the stases and the oratory types are identified along with the disagreement spaces from which arguers select their positions. The discursive construction of context is explored in the schematic categories of setting and participants. Finally, the discursive construction of purpose in actions and the arguers' modes of representing social actions are examined based on the framework proposed by van Leeuwen (2008). Chapter 7 reports the findings from the analysis of ideologies in the argumentative strategies of the op-ed discourses while drawing on the notion of strategic maneuvering put forward by Pragma-dialectics. The findings show the kinds of strategic maneuvers identified in the four dialectical stages and the ideological motivations behind the performances of each cultural group. The final section focuses on the cases of maneuvering derailments, namely the occurrences of fallacious moves and role of ideologies in their production.

Finally, chapter 8, the conclusion, summarizes the main findings and contributions and discusses directions for future research.

CHAPTER 2: IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL ARGUMENTATION IN THE MEDIA

2. 1. Introduction

This chapter explores the main concepts in focus in this thesis, namely ideology, political discourse in the media and argumentation and provides a review of some of the most prominent research studies related to these key notions. Adopting a CDA approach to the study of ideology in the discourse of FP experts in newspapers implies recognizing the multidisciplinary dimension of the research object and the importance of the insights that could bring about the multifarious theories from philosophy, cognitive theories, political and international relations theories, among others, to the critical endeavor.

Studying the ideological structures manifest in the strategies and the discursive practices of political groups acting within the mass media needs an understanding of how ideology, argumentation, political and media discourse are defined in the social sciences and what kinds of relationships are typically established between them. Indeed, the undeniable relationship between these various notions is certainly due to a number of reasons. First, FP discourse, as a type of political discourse, is commonly mediated by the mass media as is the case for the op-ed pieces under study. Both the media and the political institutions jointly constrain the discursive practices of the op-ed authors and shape their roles in discursively constructing political public opinion. Besides, the authority of FP experts grants them the opportunity to be opinion leaders in matters related to international relations and to enjoy both social and institutional power. Second, FP discourse in the op-ed is an argumentative discourse, one that is based on the discussion of policy-related issues along with the evaluation and/or the proposal of policy decisions. Consequently, theories on argumentation are regarded crucial in this study. Third, social interactions, including policy debates, involve the exchange of opinions, attitudes and the use of facts and reasonable evidence. This leads us to the area of the socially and culturally-shared cognition. In other words, the arguments are typically derived from the collection of beliefs, values and knowledge which rely on the belief systems members of a given social group assume and share in their culture. Based

on the interconnectedness of these notions and their relevance in the study of the FP opened discourse, these are explored in the section below within the general frameworks of social sciences and particularly in relation to the discipline of critical discourse analysis.

The review is divided into two parts. The first part examines ideology as a central concept in the study and then explores the contributions of the most influential works carried out on political discourse in the media and the role of ideologies in shaping them and in building their argumentative character. The second part is devoted to the state of the art of argumentation theory and to the most crucial notions relevant for critical analytical approaches

2. 2. The concept of ideology

One cannot proceed with defining the notion of ideology without taking into consideration the variety of disciplines from which it is approached. This means that a definition of ideology should be multidisciplinary, drawing from theories of cognition, social psychology, sociology and discourse analysis. The notion of ideology was first used by the rationalist philosopher Destutt de Tracy in the late 18th century to denote the ‘science of ideas’. This notion has acquired a more pejorative sense in the philosophical tradition and become recognized as a ‘false consciousness’. Ideological studies in the social sciences have taken as a starting point Marx’s critical notion of ideology as “the systematic distortion of social reality, of illusions perpetrated in order to sustain unjust and inhuman economic, social and political orders” (Marx & Engels, 1976: 52). In line with the Marxist views, Gramsci defined ideology as ‘a conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in the manifestations of individual and collective life’ (Gramsci, 1971: 328). Within his influential work in sociology, Mannheim (1936) examined ideology with more extensive research perspective and not focusing exclusively on its relevance to politics. He criticizes Marx's notion that ideologies involve the conscious intention to distort reality, and considers ideology to have “no moral or denunciatory intent.”(238). The Marxist views have widely been challenged by post-Marxism and post-structuralism scholars, particularly Foucault who argues “the trait of distortion in ideology presupposed some

notion of ‘truth’ beyond discourse” (Foucault, 1991: 60), while truth is the product of social interaction.

For Althusser (1971), ideology exists in actions rather than being the product of representations in the mind. Building on the work of Jacques Lacan and attempting to refine the Marxist interpretation of ideology, he sustains that ideology is a structure (with no history) that always manifests itself through behavior. Althusser (1971) examines ideology within the social and political institutions which he coins them the “Ideological State Apparatuses”. He argues that individuals (and groups) internalize and act in accordance with these state ideologies that are sustained by a “Lacunar Discourse” consisting of “a number of propositions, which are never untrue but suggest a number of other propositions which are” (1971: 95). The essence of this practice is what is not told, but suggested. In more recent philosophical debates, ideology remains a hot central issue for theorists, for instance, those interested in understanding how ideologies contributed throughout history in shaping the human rationality and in equipping power politics with “idealism” to hide their hegemony (see Vietta, 2012). With the revolutionary theoretical insight from neurosciences and cognitive psychology, the concept starts to lose its negative charge and to be open for more elaborate interpretations. Indeed, philosopher and social theorist Žižek contends that ideology ‘regulates the relationship between the visible and the invisible, between the imaginable and the non-imaginable, as well as changes in this relationship’ (Žižek, 1999: 55). He also argues that the critique of ideology must be sustained in order to contribute successfully to ‘every emancipatory struggle’ (Žižek, 2008: 682).

Cultural studies, which focus on the investigation “of ideas, attitudes, languages, practices, institutions and structures of power,” (Grossberg et al., 1992), see that the media and other institutions formulate the dominant ideology. In his extensive work on culture, media and ideology, Hall offers an analysis of the signifying practices of the mass media from the perspective of Marxist culturalist theory inflected through Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, and an Althusserian conception of the media as an ideological state apparatus largely concerned with the reproduction of dominant

ideologies (Hall *et al.*, 1978). Furthermore, he argues that the media appear to reflect reality whilst in fact they construct it. For Hall, the mass media do tend to reproduce interpretations which serve the interests of the ruling class, but they are also 'a field of ideological struggle' (Hall 1996: 40). In the last two decades, critical studies of media and their impact have grown within many disciplines and have taken part of the intercultural negotiation and condemnation of power and hegemony reproduced through discourse (see Fishman, 1980; Said, 1997; Chomsky, 1988 and 1992).

Most recent work on ideology in the social sciences reflect a value-neutral approach in which ideology refers indiscriminately to any belief system, any configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of functional interdependence (Converse, 1964: 206). Larrain (1979) admits that ideology may be conceived in negative or positive terms and that to this extent one can talk of ideologies as the opinions, theories and attitudes formed within a class in order to defend and promote its interests. Larrain (1994) offers an analysis of the debate about ideologies in the context of the dialogue between Western thought and the third world and their conceptions of each other exploring at the same time the notion of cultural identity. Hall (2000) defines ideology as those “images, concepts and premises which provide the frameworks through which we represent, interpret, understand and make sense of some aspects of social existence” (Hall 2000: 271). Ideologies, indeed, define the relationships between members of a society, members of a culture and also their relationship with others societies and cultures.

In politics, ideology acts as an organizing device as well as a rationalizing device (Jost et al 2009). Indeed, political and other belief systems, such as ideologies, are seen as assisting people in the belief that they have value in a meaningful universe providing a sense of existential security (Greenberg et al. 1997). Even more and the context of international relations in times of war, this rationalizing device has an existential motive. According to Jost et al. (2009), research shows that mortality salience, being the awareness of threats (war, conflicts and crime), “appears to produce greater patriotism and hostility towards critics of one’s nation” and (...) a stronger preference for

aggressive responses to individuals and groups who are perceived as threatening to the cultural worldview” (Jost et al., 2009: 320). Moreover, political ideologies in particular, have a rationalizing device that is “system justifying”, which have the power of supporting the social order *status quo* (p. 321).

2. 2. 1. The study of ideology in discourse

Ideology as the basis of the social representations of groups has always been a central notion in the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a research program or as more recently referred to as Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) in its struggle of tracing the dialectic relationship between text and process. Drawing on a variety of theoretical traditions ranging from Western Marxism to critical theories (Habermas, 1975; 1989) who dominated most social theorists’ views by considering ideology as a “form of systematically distorted communication” (Habermas, 1989), CDA approaches have shared the fundamental aim of critical analysis of raising awareness regarding the strategies performed through discourse to create, maintain and reproduce unbalanced relations of power between social groups. The weight that ideologies have in the creation of social systems is stressed by the most prominent CDA scholars as a modality of power relations tied to the problem of legitimacy in class societies (Fairclough 2008: 134).

The early work in the critical linguistics approaches referred to ideology as “a systematic body of ideas, organized from a particular point of view” (Kress & Hodge, 1979: 6). Later works started to recognize the complexity of such a notion and the fact that ideology is inherently contradictory, where “contradictions come from the process of struggle” (Hodge, 2012: 5). It has often been stressed that ideologies find their clearest expression in language at its different levels: at the lexical-semantic level and at the grammatical-syntactic level (e.g. Hodge & Kress, 1993). Numerous researchers have studied the semantic and pragmatic levels to detect ideologically relevant aspects in discourse. Harris (1994) shows that ideological processes in court operate both at the propositional level (such as choices of modality and choices of lexical items) and at the pragmatic level (interactive rules with regard to speaker rights and the use of particular speech acts). Van Dijk (1998a, 2006) examines some of the discursive structures that

typically exhibit underlying ideologies. These are more likely to exist in semantic meaning, general schemata such as argumentation and style, rather than morphology and syntax (2006: 42). Most scholars agree that the analysis of ideological discourse should rely on social context and meaning since struggle in discourse is struggle over meaning and over the representation in language of the real world of production (De Goede 1996)

Fairclough (1995) assumes ideology to be often connected with class power and domination. These views are inspired by Gramsci's belief that ideologies are 'tied to action, and judged in terms of their social effects rather than their truth values' (Gramsci 1971: 324). Within the same line, the discourse historical approach has treated ideology within the process of analyzing the relationship between discourse and identity, discrimination, knowledge, power, institutions, etc. Fairclough & Wodak (1997: 258) argues that since CDA sees "discourse -language use in speech and writing- as a form of social action", discursive practices may have major ideological effects- that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between social classes". Van Dijk takes a sociocognitive perspective and defines ideologies as the "fundamental beliefs of a group and its members" (2006: 7). He adds that it is a form of self- (and other) presentation that summarizes the collective beliefs and hence the criteria for identification for group members. For van Dijk (1998a), ideologies are representations of who we are, what we stand for, what our values are, and what our relationships are with other groups, in particular our enemies or opponents, that is, those who oppose what we stand for, threaten our interests (van Dijk, 1998a: 276). In this sense, an ideology is one of the basic forms of social cognition that at the same time define the *identity* of a group and hence the subjective feelings of social identity (or belonging) of its members (Van Dijk 2006: 18 emphasis in original).

Most CDA researchers recognize the importance of the lexis as a basic level in the analysis of ideological discourse before proceeding to other dimensions of texts. A lexical analysis allows for a shift from lexicon to meaning, that is, to the semantic level. Opinion statements are ideologically controlled propositions which are first detected through the very selection of lexical items (van Dijk 1995). The ideological semantics

underlying such lexical selection follows a rather clear strategic pattern characterizing in-groups and their members in positive terms and out-groups or enemies in negative terms. Hackett & Zhao (1994) inspected explicit choices of nouns, verbs and adjectives in op-ed texts written about the protesters against the Gulf War. Lexical choices helped frame these protesters as the enemy. Additionally, lexis is the primary support for the analysis of the ideologies organization in terms of groups' self-schemas and the examination of patterns of polarization.

From a cognitive linguistic perspective, ideologies are generally recognized as socially shared representations and viewed as cognitive structures organizing knowledge about the world. Cognitive approaches to the analysis of discourse in the media offer added insight into the link between language and ideological implications. Lakoff (1992) analyzed the metaphors of war in the US media following the Gulf War in 1991 and identified strategies used to justify war on both moral and pragmatic grounds (470) and invoking on frames or scenarios that would, through the use metaphors, obscure realities. Lakoff (1992: 462) assumes that understanding complexities and abstractions, including international relations, requires the extensive, unreflective use of a system of metaphor. In the same line, a number of interesting studies examined the metaphors of war used in the media coverage of wars (e.g. Pancake, 1993) and found out that the WAR IS A GAME metaphor, among others, may be responsible for American people's acceptance and support for the war. It was not until very recently, however, that the work on Cognitive linguistics (CL) and CDA have been put together to approach ideologies in discourse by a number of researchers who urged for incorporating the study of the conceptual processes that underlie thought into the analysis of discourse from a critical perspective (See Nuñez Perucha 2011). Studies on ideology from this interdisciplinary approach devoted attention to cognitive structures such as metaphor and image-schemas and their impact on reproducing ideologies of consensus and resistance (see Charteris-Black 2005; Goatly 2007; Hart 2014; Hart & Lukes 2007; Nuñez Perucha 2004). This research trend has consolidated the CDS approaches with its cognitive theoretical insights on the study of abuse and manipulation in political, media and gender discourses.

2. 2. 2. Ideology in political and media discourses

Political discourse as defined by Wilson (2007: 398) is “concerned with formal/informal political contexts and political actors, that is, *inter alia*, politicians, political institutions, governments, political media, and political supporters operating in political environments to achieve political goals”. Political discourse should be defined by its functions, according to van Dijk 2008: 176), that is “by who speaks to whom, as what, on what occasion and with what goals”. According to Schäffner (1996), political discourse, as a sub-category of discourse in general, can be based on two criteria: functional and thematic. It fulfills different functions due to different political activities and it is thematic because its topics are primarily related to politics such as political activities, political ideas and political relations. As politicians are widely believed to use language for their own ends, political discourse commonly focused on the way politicians use the linguistic system and rhetorical means to influence voters. Indeed, language does not merely convey the political message, but creates for the listener a cognitive environment from which any interpretation is manipulated (Edleman 1978).

Political discourse analysis has recently generated remarkable research works drawing on a variety of approaches, namely discourse analytic (Faiclough & Fairclough 2012; Van Dijk 2002; Wodak 2009), pragmatic (Wilson 1990), cognitive (Charteris-Black 2005; Chilton and Lakoff 1995; Lakoff 2008) and a combination of these (Chilton 1985, 2004; Chilton and Schaffner 2002; Goatly 2007; Musolff 2004). Most work in critical approaches address a number of issues which are closely associated with political practices and realities such as the issues of power, discrimination, and the representation of social groups and the construction of identities, among others. Indeed, CDA particularly focuses, as van Dijk (1997: 11) puts it, on “the reproduction of political power, power abuse or domination through political discourse, including the various forms of resistance or counter-power against such forms of discursive dominance”, which is reflected in research on institutional political discourse and rhetoric (Bloommaert 2005; Richardson & Wodak 2009; Wodak 2009). There is equally a growing interest in the (socio) cognitive aspect of political practices namely the role of ideologies, values and cultural “knowledge” in shaping political actions. Political ideologies are “the basic belief systems that underlie and organize the shared social representations of groups and

their members” (Van Dijk 1997: 17), and, hence they constitute the basis for the political discourse practices.

Media discourse refers to “interactions that take place through a broadcast platform, whether spoken or written, in which the discourse is oriented to a non-present reader, listener or viewer” (O’Keeffe 2011: 441). The media offer a public space for the elite to expose their views, hence hegemonic ideology, according to Gitlin (1978), is reproduced in the media through media practices that stem from the ways journalists are socialized from childhood and then trained, edited, and promoted by media. Gitlin focuses on the struggle between the media, which uphold the dominant ideology, and groups out of power, which contest the ideology. He maintains that the media balance, absorb, marginalize, and exclude to manage opposition or turn it into a commodity (Gitlin 1978: 56). Furthermore, Van Dijk (2006: 28) explains that media ideologies of journalists similarly control their ways of writing or editing news, background stories or editorials. In other words, ideologies not only may control *what* we speak or write about, but also *how* we do so.

Research on political and media discourses as a kind of public discourse has interested scholars from various disciplines in the social sciences, inspired by the influential works of some of the most prominent social theorists such as Jurgen Habermas (1962, 1975) and Bourdieu along with ancient and contemporary political philosophers, namely Aristotle, Confucius, Dewey and Foucault, among others. Bourdieu (1991) claims that media networks are part of the political landscape, because they compete with one another to capture the same audiences, they become “mirror images of one another” (Bourdieu 1991: 72). There is, indeed, a growing interest in political discourse in the media is due to its recognition as a complex phenomenon. Lauerbach and Fetzer (2007) uphold that this kind of discourse is at the same time institutional, media, and mediated political discourse.

As institutional discourse, it differs from everyday conversation in being subject to institutional goals and procedures. As media discourse it is

different from other types of institutional discourses by being, above all, public discourse addressed to a mass media audience. This sets it apart from the discourse of other institutions, such as medicine, the law, or education. As mediated political discourse, it is the outcome of the encounter of two different institutional discourses – those of politics and of the media. Just what constitutes the goals and purposes, subtypes, genres and discursive practices of this hybrid discourse, is the question pursued in political discourse analysis. auerbach & Fetzer, 2007: 14)

Edelman (1976) used the term “symbolic politics” to refer to such discourse in the mass media, as an attempt to distinguish the instrumental –or production- dimension from the expressive-presentation- dimension of politics. However, and based on Chilton & Schaffner 2002 views, any type of politics is done through language and, thus, symbolically constituted.

In any case, it is important to recognize the role the media play in the public understanding of political events, and most of its related discourse and the crucial notions of representation or construction and interpretation. In fact, the dominant presence of the media in political arenas and their privileged access to them may be interpreted, according to van Dijk (2008: 53) as a manifestation of political power. Due to certain constraints such as limited space and readership, the media tend to reduce complex political processes to brief spotlight or images (Wodak, 2011: 18). By the same token, political actors reinforce their power within the public spaces offered by the media, since the media institutions provide them, according to Wodak (2011) with a “front stage” kind of political practice. These institutions assume the role of offering the public authoritative voice that will speak to them directly. Fairclough stresses the mediating and constructing role of the media by arguing that political discourse “is mediated by institutions which in turn, position readers and writers, speakers and listeners in different positions of power and knowledge” (1989: 36). When writers are viewed as an authority in their field of knowledge, such as FP experts, they enjoy even more powerful positions in society, as they “are not democratically accountable, but they nevertheless exercise authority-like powers over questions of true beliefs” (Turner,

2001: 128). They equally play a role in the transition of concepts of control, which flow directly through discursive strategies and by repetition (De Goede, 1996).

Researchers from various disciplines who have looked at the relationship between media and ideology have mainly pointed out at such notions as power, access, influence and manipulation. Indeed, elite groups such as politicians, journalists and writers who are in control of most influential public discourses play a special role in the reproduction of dominant knowledge and ideologies in society (Van Dijk, 1993). The elite are also identified as the “opinion leaders” and their roles in influencing public opinion is widely recognized (see Weimann 1994; Holsti 2006). The discourse of the powerful elite has been explored from various research disciplines ranging from conversation analysis (Greatbatch, 1998; Hutchby, 2006), socio-pragmatics (Fetzer 2004); cultural studies (Allan, 1998), structural discourse analysis (Bell, 1991) to CDA from both a socio-cognitive (van Dijk, 1993) and discourse practices perspectives (Fairclough, 1998), and also from a discourse- historical approach (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). The critical approaches to discourse analysis have developed with a special interest in media and political discursive practices of the elite and their representation of (other) social groups as responsible for violence and deviance. The studies share a concern with the role of language in the construction of social relations, in particular those of unequal distribution of power and discrimination.

From the perspective of communication and political sciences disciplines, the focus has been on the way these elite people set the agenda in public debates and frame the issues for the general public. Agenda setting research typically aims at establishing correlations between findings about issues addressed, namely what the media focused on and the audience reception of them. However, the study of how some key political debates are structured and defined throughout an extended range of media channels is limited, despite the fact that it represents a resourceful tool to explore and contrast political belief systems at a national level. More typically, the connections between the elite ideologies and their agenda setting have focused on the local political ideologies of a social environment, such as liberal or conservative influences on framing debates and topics. Since setting the agenda is an exercise of power (Reese, 1991: 310), research on

elite agenda setting may take up the aim of exploring belief systems of powerful nations as they are enacted by their elites.

The discursive practices of the elite such as their agenda setting have been regarded crucial in CDS. Indeed, selecting news and debates topics may powerfully reflect the nature and the implication of the discursively strategic practices of powerful political actors (Fowler, 1991; Hackett 1991). Furthermore, picking a topic for discussion does not mean that the participants are willing to solve their conflicting views on certain issues, but more importantly it points to their motives for undertaking this effort in the first place, mainly dictated by political interests and institutional routines (see Fairclough, 1992). In most political and cultural contexts, the elite exercise of argumentation is perceived in the same respect, as a need for resolution of conflicts over political and social groups' interests and a struggle to gain or to maintain power. Through their discursive strategies, experts reproduce their political visions in the media and enact the goals for their anticipated actions (Van Dijk, 2000). The examination of topic selection strategies particularly aims at uncovering the political and the ideologically governed goals of the elite and the impact of their most crucial discursive practices and decisions.

The types of journalism which have most attracted critical studies are the news reports and news stories along with the implication of news styles for the media business and for society. Interesting explorations of the semantics and the discourse structures of news pieces have yielded a rich insight on the language of news in its various channels (Bell, 1991; Scollon, 1998; van Dijk, 1988). Some studies offer a cross-cultural exploration of news discourse and hence give insight into, for instance, the notion of agency in news texts and its connection to ideological and rhetorical realizations in discourse (Marín Arrese, 2002). However, until very recently, little research has been devoted to the examination of opinion articles in editorials and op-ed sections in CDS (see Hackett & Zhao, 1994; van Dijk, 1995; Hidalgo Downing, 2006). The complexities of opinion discourse has been, however, the focus of interest in a number of research works interested in evaluative language (Martin & White 2005; Bednarek, 2006) computational linguistics (Asher et al. 2008; Somasundaran et al. 2008) and cultural studies (Shi-xu, 2007). Furthermore, compared to the amount of space dedicated to political discourse in

its institutional setting such as political speeches, interviews and press conferences, little CDA attention has been given to the op-ed piece as a genre pertaining to political actors (see Wilson et.al., 2012). Analyses are rather framed under the general studies of media or elite discourses in general (see Chouliaraki, 2000; Fairclough 1992; Van Dijk, 1993; 1998).

The discourse of foreign policy has not been of particular interest to critical discourse analysis theorists even though it has been part of their research product as a political discourse potentially carrying inequality, manipulation and struggle. However, some interesting insight has been provided by a number of scholars, namely Chilton (1996; 1998; Chilton & Lakoff, 1995) with pioneering work on discourse in foreign policy context and conflicting and war settings. From a Poststructuralist stance, building on Foucault (1991) and Laclau & Mouffe (1985), Hansen (2006, 2012) proposes a methodological framework for the study of foreign policy and its constitutive relationship with the notion of identity. This approach investigates how policymakers address the public as an attempt to “institutionalize their understanding of the identities and policy options at stake” (Hansen, 2006: 1). Certainly, Hansen has been inspired by research insight from political sciences and more particularly International Relations and foreign policy studies; along with many important others (see Fischer & Forester, 1993). Her work opens up new questions for CDA scholars and invites them to see more into the discursive practices of foreign policy people and their potential to define the world order and the fate of humanity in times of conflicts. Not only notions such as identity, manipulation, ideology are relevant here to this political discourse type, but also, opinion, expertise and argumentation, as they are crucial aspects of foreign policy discourse in particular.

2. 2. 3. Ideology in the opinion discourse

Van Dijk (1998b: 29) defines opinions as “evaluative beliefs” and a special form of mental representations which acquisition, usages and functions are social, and their expression often discursive. He believes that any satisfactory theory of opinions should be located in the triangle that relates *cognition*, *society* and *discourse*. Opinions are

typically used, expressed, acquired and changed by discourse in communicative, interactional contexts (van Dijk 1998a; van Dijk, 1998b).

Typically, when people are giving their opinions, they are not claiming to make reports of internal states, but they are arguing on matters of controversy (Billig 1991). In his extensive work about ideology and opinions Billig (1991) explains that in taking stances on controversial matters, speakers will be engaged in an inherently complex and rhetorically dilemmatic business. They will be presenting their opinions' as 'theirs', but they will also be arguing for those opinions; as such they will be criticizing rival opinions, and justifying their own. In this rhetorical business, they will not merely be declaring their own 'subjectivity' but will be implying that their position is 'better' than the counter-views (Billig 1995: 164).

In his more recent version of the study of ideology, van Dijk (2006)) hypothesizes that within the group, "typical group opinions and attitudes may also be taken for granted, and therefore no longer asserted or defended, and since these group opinions are social, we also prefer to associate them with social memory" (2006: 14). Opinions are mental, whereas much of their acquisition, uses and functions are social, and their expression and reproduction often (though not always) discursive. That is, opinions are mostly formed within contexts of social interaction in general, and through text and talk in particular.

Opinions production and consumption may certainly be examined by applying an ideological discourse analysis framework. According to van Dijk (1998a: 7), "ideologies are the fundamental beliefs of a group and its members". Opinions statements involve a great deal of knowledge management because, in many cases, they rely on knowledge resources to persuade and manipulate. In his study of the concept of beliefs, van Dijk (1998a: 19) identifies properties of opinions within their comparison to knowledge: Though he subsumes both notions under the general category of beliefs, he argues that knowledge is *relative* to socio-culturally shared commonsense or scientific truth criteria or verification instances, whereas opinions, are generally defined as those beliefs that do not pass the test criteria of knowledge. That is, they may be beliefs some people have but which are *false*, or more generally beliefs about which we or others may *disagree* (van Dijk 1998a: 20).

In a growing information society in the post modern life, where the reach of journalists and columnists opinions to readers is bound by political power, ideology should be examined taking into consideration at the same time its various institutional, cultural and political manifestations. Various question addressed in political theories, mainly from Constructivism also need to be inspected from a CDA perspective. Issues like the interaction of political actors in the international environment and the shaping of state identity (Wendt, 1996) deserve more attention, for instance, from research lines such as the sociocognitive approach to collective identities (see Koller, 2012). Cultures, however, may have a shared “Common Ground”, as well as shared norms and values, but not a generally shared ideology. Western- and Non-Western, Christian and Muslim cultures would be defined in terms of political or religious ideologies, rather than as "cultural ideologies". Contrary to what is commonly assumed, van Dijk (2006: 8) claims that “in the same way as ideologies need not be negative, they need not be dominant”. Hence, in the present study, structures of both ideologies underlying the Arab opinions and the American one will be analyzed and referred to as ideologies in a primary phase regardless of the degrees of power or argumentation strength each writer holds.

It is a crucial endeavor, though, to attempt to discern the traits of the ideologies of all the writers in this study, even though knowledge about the involved institutions’ ideology maybe sometimes (but not always) of a help. Writers from the same culture and from the same newspaper may adhere to different groups of opposed ideologies and interests. Besides, considering the authors’ political practices within the field of foreign policy, the manifestation of ideology may be easier to discern in the construction of cultural and national identities. Indeed, identity is a property of international actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions (Wendt, 1999: 244) and provides the basis of the policy makers’ narratives on national interests.

2. 3. Argumentation analysis in Argumentation Theory

Opinion pieces published in newspapers, like editorials and commentaries, are argumentative kinds or modes of discourse. An opinion piece - whether an individual op-ed or a column – is meant to promote a point of view by argument. It seeks to win people over to a particular viewpoint or opinion. Therefore, the strength of the argument is the

key factor in determining the effectiveness of the piece. Iedema et al. (1994) affirm that both the print and broadcasting media are the sites where a great number public disagreements and challenges are waged, and are the public spaces where debate is promoted to settle social or political disputes. Disputes, according to Plantin (2002: 360) can be “staged (...) in highly institutionalized situations (in court, in houses of parliament), as well as in spontaneous everyday situations (family arguments), as vile propaganda as well as in the most noble educational or scientific activities”. Hence, argumentation is found in many discourse genres which explain the interest of the most diverse academic fields in its research and the fact that it has even become a discipline of itself.

The most important advances made in contemporary argumentation theory are owed to two influential but distinct works both published in 1958, that of Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca and that of Stephan Toulmin. The appearance of the *New Rhetoric* written by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca marked a new era in the study of argumentation mainly in Europe. The authors’ critical positions towards logic-based theories and the traditional separation between rhetoric and dialectics inspired most of the influential informal-logic philosophers and argumentation theorists, namely Johnson and Blair (1994), Anscombe & Ducrot (1983) and their theory of “argumentation in Language”, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1990) and Walton (2007). The theory of *New Rhetoric* does not propose a methodology to argumentation analysis but attempts to give a different perspective from which the analyst should depart. Indeed, it urges to tackle arguments and detect them prior to any established schemas of analysis and to paying due attention to audience in argument interpretation given the role they play in the argumentative process. In fact, for Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the most important rule of rhetoric is to adapt the discourse to the audience as what crucial in argumentation is its particular audiences and not the universal audience assumed by logicians. The *New Rhetoric* is regarded innovative in its rejection of the traditional separation between discourses acting on the will (rhetorical) and those acting on the reason (dialectical), arguing that their use depends much on what effect they aim to have on their particular audience.

The task of the philosopher, inasmuch as he is addressing a particular audience, will be to silence his audience's particular passions in order to

facilitate the "objective" consideration of the problems under discussion, the speaker aiming at a particular action, to be carried out at an opportune time, will, on the contrary, have to excite his audience so as to produce a sufficiently strong adherence, capable of overcoming both the unavoidable apathy and the forces acting in a direction divergent from that which is desired

(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 47)

This entails that the *New Rhetoric* addressed and tried to prove what, nowadays, seems common assumption. Indeed, it argues that depending on the goals of the arguer and the role the arguer wants the audience to play, this audience is conceptualized in different ways. This view of the audience is linked to the theory criticism for positivist position and its search for absolute truth, rejecting thus, the belief in a “universally accepted objectivity, of a reality binding on everybody” (510). Furthermore, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explicitly rejected absolutism prevalent in argumentation evaluation while they have never been attributed any relativist position on the matter.

In his book the *Uses of Argument* (1958), Toulmin developed what he named the “practical argument”, a different type of argument which instead of focusing only on the inferential function of argumentation explores the justificatory function. In other words, whereas theoretical arguments make inferences based on a set of principles to arrive at a claim, practical arguments first find a claim of interest, and then provide justification for it. Toulmin is also known for his work on the notion of argument structure. He proposed a model of six interrelated components for analyzing arguments which are the following: a claim, grounds for the claim, a warrant that connects the claim to the grounds, backing, rebuttal, and qualifiers. The first three elements “claim,” “data,” and “warrant” are considered as the essential components of practical arguments, while the second triad “qualifier,” “backing,” and “rebuttal” may not be needed in some arguments. There have been many revisions to the Toulmin model, however it is still the one widely used for argument analyses. Walton & Krabbe (1995) have extended Toulmin’s work by distinguishing a number of primary discourse types of argumentation, namely persuasion dialogue (critical discussion), negotiation, inquiry (scientific research investigation), deliberation (means-ends discussion) and eristics (quarrel).

An argument is defined as “a connected series of statements or propositions, some of which are intended to provide support, justification or evidence for the truth of another statement or proposition” (McKeon, n.d.). This commonly referred to type of definition reflects the traditional approaches to argumentation and their focus on propositions and their truth rather than on the communicative aspect within which arguments are produced or on their function. Arguing in contemporary and current theories is more perceived within its social and communicative context. For Walton (2007) an argument is a social and verbal means of trying to resolve, or at least contend with, a conflict or difference that has arisen between two parties engaged in a dialog by eliciting reasons on both sides. Arguing is commonly understood as having two different meaning: arguing as to give reason, which can be constructed with a singular or plural subject and is followed by ‘that’ clause, hence presumed to be a monological activity, and arguing as to have a disagreement, which refers to a vast domain of interaction and is a dialogical activity. This distinction between the two types of activities is probably due to the polysemous meaning of the term “to argue”, but does not support effectively the claim about dialogicity in one sense and the lack of it in the other. Indeed, whether in written or in spoken contexts, the activity occurs in a socio-cultural environment and implies the presence of some audience. Arguing consists of addressing this audience by constructing, presenting, interpreting, criticizing, and revising arguments for the purpose of reaching a shared rationally supported position on some issue (Johnson 2000). Accordingly, arguing is considered a rhetorical activity (Plantin, 2002: 356), as persuasion is widely seen as its ultimate goal.

Even though argumentation seems easy to recognize in any everyday social discursive context, there are considerable differences in the way this notion is regarded across academic disciplines. Van Dijk (1980: 118) argues that argumentation is a superstructure of discourse, that is, the textual schemata that organize and represent the conventional forms that characterize a specific discourse genre. For such reason, he rejects the view that argumentation is a speech act (van Dijk, 1992: 246) as it is claimed by the Pragma-dialectic theory which defines argumentation in terms of a complex speech act treated as part of a discussion aimed at resolving a dispute. Indeed, viewed pragmatically, van argumentation according to Eemeren, Grootendorst (2004:1) is “a

verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint". Within the French argumentation theories influenced by Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca and later on Ducrot, discourse itself is regarded as intrinsically argumentative, drawing in this respect on the work of Grize (1990: 40) postulating that to speak is to act upon an addressee by modifying (or strengthening) his representations of the surrounding world. Accordingly, Amossy (2006) proposes a theory based on the assumption that argumentativity pervades and partly regulates all verbal exchanges, claiming that it is a constitutive feature of discourse. Even though, he does not share this notion of argumentativity, Van Dijk (1992) asserts that a theory of argumentation is a sub-theory of a more embracing theory of discourse, and "that properties of argumentation are inherited from more general properties of discourse" (245). Argumentation can be confronted through both written and oral discourse, which may occur in a large variety of (institutional or private) settings. This heterogeneity, in Plantin's views, must be taken into account in the constitution of corpora for argumentation analysis, as well as "facing complex data, coming from a variety of social or intellectual fields for interdisciplinary case analysis" (Plantin, 2002: 360).

2. 3. 1. Argumentation analysis in media and political discourse

Whether in broadcast or print mass media, argumentation may be found in many media genres, mainly in those involving social and political issues, such as commentary, opinion pieces and debates. Indeed, media debates are typically aimed at bringing opinions into a public space for discussion, thus contributing to the construction of the link between the citizenship and the sphere of decision makers (Burger, 2006). There is a notable increasing interest in these public and political debates, hence in argumentation, in recent research studies in the social sciences which are supported with a vast literature of theories from philosophy, logic and communication to sociology, psychology and pragmatics. Analyzing argumentation in political and media discourse requires awareness of the most influential theories and analytic tools developed within argumentation theory discipline (Toulmin, 1958; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 2003; Walton, 2007), as well as those in pragmatics (Johnson, 2000; Wilson, 1990).

These theories provide some useful methods and analytic tools to assist a more systematic analysis of an argumentative text, and have inspired and assisted the work of a number of recent studies in discourse analysis (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; van Rees, 2007; Ihnen & Richardson, 2011; Greco Morasso, 2012)

Media argumentation “is a powerful force in our lives (...) and can mobilize political action, influence public opinion, market products and even enable dictator to stay in power” (Walton, 2007: 5). By “media argumentation”, Walton means the familiar types of argument found in publications, movies, and broadcast media, which are aimed at a mass audience that has limited opportunities to respond (hence excluding the new media from his theory). Walton (2007) develops a theory for media argumentation analysis named “Persuasion System” in which he identifies the structures of media arguments and how they interact in context. Central to this theory is the claim that media argumentation works based on the simulative reasoning used by the participants. Simulative reasoning helps arguers “judge how the audience is thinking, what their commitments are, what inferences they are likely to draw, and generally, how they are likely to respond” (Walton, 2007: 353). With this system Walton attempts to show how argumentation is typically structured in the media context and what kind of schemas and strategies are characteristic to this activity type. He distinguishes two classes of media argumentation. The first is “direct” argumentation where arguments are based on the commitment of the audience, for instance the appeal to pity or fear kind of argument schemes. The second class of media arguments is referred to as the “indirect” type. In this type, the arguer must first figure out a plausible account of what the respondent’s commitments are likely to be, or at any rate how they can be plausibly portrayed. Then he must work with these data using an argumentation scheme to try to influence the audience (p. 330).

Some of the research works in linguistics particularly focusing on argumentative media discourse is the one carried out within the Australian Functional Systemic School. Iedema, Feez & White (1994) propose a typology of media argumentation meant to guide analysis. They identify at least three sub-types of journalistic argument genres, those of Media Exposition, Media Challenge, and Media Discussion. The first two

differ in that Media Expositions simply argue for a proposition, while Media Challenges argue by refuting a counter position. Media Discussions differ from both in that they merely tell us about the different views available and convincing the readers is not at least explicit. In the Challenge type of argumentative texts the writer usually summarizes the position he/she wants to challenge, then proceeds to offer a counter-argument. Iedema et al. (1994: 9) recognize this type to be more reserved to opinion sections than any other genre, as this exactly where writers do not try to preserve any institutional intonations of objectivity, but rather adopt a more persuasive and conversational forms.

Not only do politicians such as candidates for political office or government officials use political arguments but also media pundits, academics and also citizens in ordinary interactions about political events. Zarefsky (2008: 318) argues that political argumentation is “about gaining and using power, about collective decision-making for the public good, about mobilizing individuals in pursuit of common goals, about giving effective voice to shared hopes and fears”. For Van Dijk (1997: 29) argumentation is a typical superstructure of textual schemata which systematically organize of political discourse through structures and strategies. Some of the CDA approaches which have traditionally focused on political discourse as a discourse of power and emphasizing the notion of representation, seem now to shift attention to its argumentative nature arguing that analysis of discourses should be subsumed within analysis of argumentative genres (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Nevertheless, determining the way the structures and strategies characteristic to political argumentation does not seem a simple task for argumentation theorists. According to Zarefsky, for instance, not every kind of political argumentation is problematic for analysis, but rather the larger and more open-ended sense of political argumentation is the most challenging, namely the sorts of “disagreements and predicaments that engage entire political units, societies, or cultures, and that are addressed either by representative bodies or by a loosely structured and ongoing circulation and modification of ideas and standpoints” (2008: 318). The concern about defining the boundaries of political discourse argumentation is shared among argumentation scholars, as they recognize the complexity of such discourse type and the difficulty to characterize in general terms the structures and the strategies of its

argumentation (Morris and Johnson 2008; Tonnard 2008 and Iețcu- Fairclough 2009). In fact, what is challenging in political argumentation is the fact that political actors have the opportunity to appeal to different audiences, to choose the subject which best suits their goals, to appeal to opposing values and systems of beliefs, while freely using figures and tropes. In sum, political domain seems to allow people to argue in a way that makes it difficult to mark the precise boundary between their sound strategic behavior and their fallacious one (Morris and Johnson 2008: 285).

Political argumentation in the media has been regarded in CDA approaches as a crucial factor in the reproduction of power abuses in discourse, even though argumentative patterns has not been particularly the main focus of political discourse analyses, at least not in the work of the main theorists of CDA. Argumentation has been commonly approached as part of (groups) discursive practices (Fairclough 1992: 71) or as a kind of discursive strategy in the discourse-historical approach, that is typically used to establish positive-Self and negative-Other representation (Reisigl & Wodak 2001: 44), or as an ideological discursive strategy (van Dijk 1998a). More recently however, and focusing not only on the pragmatic and interactional dimension of discourse but also on the role of cognition in discursive processes, argumentation started to gain much attention in a number of notable research works such as that of Atkin & Richardson (2007), Hart (2012, in press), Oswald (2011) and Ihnen & Richardson (2011). This innovative research carried out on argumentative strategies and their effects on discourse calls for more synergy between a number of crucial theories in cognitive linguistics and argumentation in CDA research. Furthermore, Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) have recently proposed a new approach for analyzing political discourse which views “political discourse as primarily a form of argumentation, and as involving more specifically *practical* argumentation”(p.16 emphasis in original). This approach focuses on political deliberations where politicians make policy choices and decisions about how to act in response to circumstances and goals. They argue that analysis of political discourse should center upon practical argumentation (p.17). This initiative may probably open up for more theorizing and more interest in argumentation in general within the CDA different approaches even though the work is recognized or rather criticized for being “particularly influenced by Pragma-dialectics” (Finlayson 2013:

316). However, this is not probably an issue for the theory, but instead the fact that it is restricted to the analysis of the deliberative kind of political discourses ignoring in effect the other equally common argumentative types such as the judicial among others.

2. 3. 2. Analysis of argumentation: basic concepts

It is widely recognized that modern approaches to argumentation are inspired by the ancient disciplines of dialectics and rhetoric and the work of classic scholars such as Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. Even though Classical approaches focused on limited types of discourse such as the syllogistic and monological ones and was basically interested in examining logically-oriented fallacies, some of the main notions related to arguments construction and analysis remain relevant for modern theories and may offer guidance to argumentation studies. Current theories agree that argumentation is based on reasoning mechanisms which are believed to respond to some set of common norms for their construction, such as reasonableness which is associated with a “critical rationalist” philosophy taking as its guiding principle the idea of critically testing all claims that are made to acceptability (van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels 2012: 34). There is also a generally shared assumption that an argument is “a set of statements (propositions), made up of three parts, a conclusion, a set of premises, and an inference from the premises to the conclusion (Walton 2009: 2). Moreover, an argument can be supported by other arguments, or it can be attacked by other arguments. Studying argumentation typically consists of carrying some basic tasks which, depending on the approach adopted, may differ in their procedures. These tasks are: identification, analysis, evaluation and invention. Invention is more concerned with pedagogy and teaching how to construct new arguments that can be used to prove a specific conclusion, but it offers the analyst insightful tools on argument composition. Below, the focus goes to some of the analytic procedures and the definition of its most important and relevant concepts, namely arguments schemes, *topoi* and fallacies.

Both identifying and analyzing arguments involve understanding the reasoning process of the arguers. Regardless probably of the method or approach adopted, they are concerned with implementing a number of operations necessary for analysis and

evaluation. The most important operation is to locate the basic components of an argument. The first task would be to find implicit premises or conclusions in an argument that should be made explicit (Walton 2009: 1) which should help evaluate the argument properly. Implicit premises are very common in argumentation and they are omitted as they are assumed to be intuitively inferred by language users. Such missing assumptions are traditionally called enthymemes. Finding implicit premises in Pragmatics is part of the reconstruction task that has to be carried out by the analyst and through which implicit premises are added to each argument to make evaluation easier. Once the argumentative text is reconstructed and the parts are identified, the analysis may proceed according to the goals set and to the method adopted in this endeavor.

Another crucial operation is to examine the construction of this reconstructed argumentation, mainly argumentation structures and composition. Argumentation theorists have regarded the study of argumentation structures as a key point in the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse (Snoeck Henkemans, 2001; Walton, 1996), in which arguments are inspected in terms of their organization and the relationship between arguments. As for argumentation composition (the nature of the claim's support), it is important for any method to determine whether the argument fits a known form of argument, i.e. "argumentation scheme" and to identify the kind of reasoning pursued (*loci*) and/or the types of evidence resorted to (*topoi*) which may be helpful in arguments interpretation and evaluation. Once arguments organization is determined, evaluation as a final operation is carried out. Evaluation involves determining the soundness of an argument by raising critical questions about it and making judgment based on some established logical or other normative or social criteria.

Examining the arguments' structures, schemes and premises is commonly carried out for the purpose of evaluating arguments' coherence and soundness. Nevertheless, the critical stance adopted in the current study, definitely finds the analysis of schemes and *topoi* insightful for tracking ideological structures in discourse, since it elucidates the sources of arguments construction and helps identify the building blocks of arguments,

namely the premises on which arguments stand. According to van Dijk's socio cognitive approach, ideologies- as systems of basic social beliefs- may exhibit in virtually all structures of discourse, but they may be more typical for some structures than others. Among the most typical discursive structures to carry ideology is argumentation. Hence, argumentation is considered to bear powerful signals of the underlying ideological structures in discourse, given the link between standpoints and shared group attitudes (Van Dijk 2006: 57). Consequently, arguments building blocks may be considered significant indicators of ideological belief structures expressed in discourse, as they represent a reflection of the reasoning system of an individual which in turns stems at least partly from a socially shared cognition.

Argument schemes, topoi and loci

The notions of scheme, *topoi* and its Latin translation *loci*, which for some scholars, may refer to the same things and, for some others, refer to different concepts, have been central in argumentation theories. While *topoi* was a notion used by Aristotle in his two books *Topics* and *Rhetoric* and translated by Cicero as *loci*, argument schemes emerged in 1960s and has become a crucial notion in modern argumentation theories. Argument schemes refer to the recurrent patterns of reasoning in arguments. The way these notions are currently used by different theories reflects the particular perspective regarding the relation between logic and pragmatic aspects of argumentation (Walton & Macagno, 2006). Schemes are commonly recognized as originating from *topoi* or *loci*, the precursors of the modern theories and models on human argumentative patterns, which some researchers even contend that they (*topoi*) are the forerunners of arguments schemes (Kienpointner, 1986; Rubinelli, 2009).

Argumentative reasoning patterns or the notion of schemes were first used by Hastings, who categorized schemes into three groups: semantic procedures (as arguments from example, definition or classification), causal connection (as arguments from signs, cause or circumstances) and arguments supporting either semantic or causal conclusions (arguments from comparison, analogy and testimony) (Hastings, 1962: 55). A little later, Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca (1969) presented a long list of arguments schemes

which they classified in two main categories: arguments by associations (arguments which attempt to bring separate elements together such as analogy) and arguments by dissociations which entail some level of differentiation. Currently, most argumentation scholars bring into play schemes in their theories. Walton (2007: 26) defines argumentation schemes as “premise-conclusion inference structures that represent common types of arguments used in everyday discourse as well as in special contexts such as those of legal or scientific argumentation”. Walton identifies a long list of commonly employed schemes from which one may highlight the most prominent ones namely, those arguments from expert opinion, practical reasoning arguments such as those appealing to fear or pity, and arguments from values, to name only a few.

Within similar pragmatic approaches to argument schemes, the pragma-dialectical approach distinguishes three (main) types of argumentation each having their scheme of argumentation: argumentation based on causal relations, argumentation based on comparison or a relation of analogy and argumentation based on symptomatic relation (Eemeren van et al, 2007: 137). In causal argumentation, the argument is presented as the cause of the standpoint or the opposite the standpoint is the cause of the arguments. Eemeren van & Grootendorst (1992) define this scheme type as “an argument which is presented as if what is stated in argumentation is a means to, a way to, an instrument for or some other kind of causative factor for the standpoint or *vice versa*” (Eemeren van & Grootendorst, 1992: 97). In analogy schemes, argumentation is presented “as if there were resemblance, an argument, a likeness of parallel, or correspondence or some other kind of similarity between that which is stated in the argument and that which is stated in the standpoint”(van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992: 97). This argument scheme is commonly used to generalize a particular judgment, to predict something, to appeal to the rule of justice or to appeal to the principle of reciprocity. Symptomatic argumentation is the type of argumentation which is presented as if it is an expression, a phenomenon, a sign or some other kind of symptom of what is stated in the standpoint (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992: 2). When reconstructing arguments though, the analyst should examine the whole arguments structure in order to decide for a symptomatic scheme since the mere expression of symptoms such as saying “X is

characteristic of Y” may be simply descriptive and may not in fact be used for any argumentative end.

Topoi and Loci in search of the common places

Within rhetorical invention, the topics or *topoi* are basic categories of relationships among ideas, each of which can serve as a template or heuristic for discovering things to say about a subject. This and its significance in the analysis of argumentation is owed to Aristotle, but the fact that he did not define this notion resulted in conflicting views about what *topoi* exactly are. A topos (singular of *topoi*) literally designates a “place” in Greek, which is frequently translated as “commonplace” to refer to a location or space in art where a speaker can look for “available means of persuasion” (Kennedy 1991). The term *topoi* was translated to Latin as *loci* and was picked up and exploited by Cicero (Roman philosopher) as categories or logical ways in which a rhetor can relate thought and ideas together. In modern application of argumentation theories, the notion of *topoi* (and *loci*) has been used to refer to two different phenomena: 1) the place where to locate arguments patterns, reflecting types of reasoning or 2) the place from which arguments are built, such as common ground concepts and ideas which support an argument. Hence, *topoi* are either a ‘place’ where arguments can be found or a pragmatic procedure (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 38). In the current study, the two meanings of this notion are exploited as analytic tools for the study of the argumentative strategies of FP op-ed authors. In order to avoid confusion, the Latin term for *topoi*, *loci*, is used to refer to the first meaning -a place to locate arguments- and the word *topoi* is used to refer to the second meaning- a place from which to build arguments-. Further explanation is given below on *topoi*, while trying to maintain the same delineation of the two uses of the term by using two distinct terms.

The *loci* which are the location under which the different arguments fall are also referred to in rhetorical theories as the Topics of inventions. Modern theories of argumentation adapt this notion to their studies of the arguments schemes. A *locus* is a category or a logical way in which a rhetor can relate ideas and thoughts together. Aristotle divided these topics into two categories: the “common” more general and the “special” which are

related to the three branches of oratory judicial, deliberative and ceremonial. Table 2.1, below, illustrates the list of common and special topics (*loci*) proposed by Aristotle and used in the analytic process of the current data corpora.

Common <i>loci</i>	Special <i>loci</i>
-Definition: genus/ species	- Judicial : justice (right)/injustice (wrong)
-Division: whole/part, Subject/adjunct	
-Comparison: similarity/difference, degree	- Deliberative: the good, the unworthy, the advantageous, the disadvantageous
-Relationship: cause/effect, antecedent/consequence, contraries, contradictions	
-Circumstances: possible/impossible, past fact/future fact,	- Ceremonial: virtue (the noble), vice (the base)
-Testimony: authorities, witness, documents, law, the supernatural, etc.	

Table 2.1. Categories of argument *loci* (topics of invention) adopted from *Rhetoricae* (2003)

According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), *loci* are “premises of a very general nature” or “headings under which arguments can be classified”. Furthermore, they argue that...

Aristotle made a distinction between the *loci communes*, or “common places, which can be used indiscriminately for any science and do not depend on any, and the special topics, which belong either to a particular science or a particular type of oratory. Originally, then, *loci communes* were characterized by their extreme generality, which made them available for use in all circumstances. But the degeneration of rhetoric...[leads] to the unexpected result that oratorical expositions aimed against luxury, lust, sloth, and the like, after endless repetition in school exercises, were classified as commonplaces

(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 83-84)

The second meaning of *topoi* is concerned with the content of arguments and to how argumentation is constructed from premises. *Topoi* in this case are those premises (concepts) which support a claim but do not need justifications themselves because they are regarded as common ground by the social community. As “places” (literal translation from Greek), systems or construct arguments, *topoi* are the common themes or the warrants in syllogistic reasoning (Aristotle, 196:16). *Topoi* play a “guarantee function” for arguments (De Pater, 1968), as they provide arguers with the means they need to connect their premises with their conclusions or claim (see Zompetti, 2006). They are regarded as the issues pertaining to an argument and include the most commonly used forms of arguments, specifically, the “generally accepted opinions as those commend themselves to the wise” (Walton 2010a: 135). This is the sense of *topoi* that has been exploited in CDA, mainly in the Discourse Historical Approach (Reisigl & Wodak 2001; van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999). Van Dijk (2007) describes *topoi* as the common sense reasoning typical for specific issue analysis of typical content-related strategies used in arguments for discrimination. They are those arguments which become standardized and publicized. Van Dijk (2006: 58) identifies *topoi* and fallacies as somehow crucial kind of arguments to the analysis of ideological discourse structures.

Fallacies

Most argumentation theories focus on identifying fallacies in their evaluation of arguments. A standard definition of fallacy is that it is an argument that seems valid but it is not (Hamblin 1970: 12). Johnson (2000: 56) defines fallacy as “an argument that fails to provide adequate logical support for the truth of its conclusion, yet appears convincing or persuasive in some other way”. These kinds of definitions have been widely criticized for not covering all types of fallacies, as in such case a fallacy is commonly regarded from a logical perspective and identified as a mistake in reasoning. Within this logico-centered tradition, arguments are assessed for their validity. However, contemporary argumentation theories have come to recognize a wider range of fallacies and become concerned not only with the validity but also with soundness or cogency of arguments as in informal logical or pragmatic approaches. Fallacies may include any type of mistake or may not even be arguments and they cover any discourse

move which “damages the quality of argumentation” (Van Eemeren 2001: 21). Within this perspective, Johnson defines a fallacy as “an argument that violates one of the criteria/standards of good argument and that occurs with sufficient frequency in discourse” (1987: 246). Studies of fallacies in argumentation and informal logic have mainly taken a normative approach, as Walton (2010b: 160) affirms, by seeing fallacies as arguments that violate standards of how an argument should properly be used in rational thinking or arguing. These standards are widely identified as relevance, sufficiency and acceptability (Tindale 1999: 164). Pragma-dialectics sees a fallacy as a violation of the rules for critical discussion which are stipulated in the ideal model as norms for the resolution of the difference of opinion.

Argumentation theorists have proposed various ways of categorizing fallacies. The most common distinction made is that between formal (related to deductive reasoning) and informal (related to inductive reasoning) fallacies. Formal fallacies display a logical mistake, while informal fallacies may appear as valid forms of reasoning and still are considered unacceptable. Fallacies are also commonly grouped according to the consequences they generate or the type of appeals they make and are classified into the following categories: relevance, ambiguity and presumption.

Arguments that commit fallacies of relevance rely on premises that are not relevant to the conclusion such as weak analogy and those which generally rely on irrelevant appeals, such as appeal to (irrelevant) authority *ad verecundiam*, appeal to pity *ad miserecordiam* and appeal to fear. Irrelevant arguments are also those that attack the person (instead of the argument) *ad hominem*, and make a distorted, misrepresented or exaggerated version of the opponent’s position, as in the *Straw man* fallacies or *red herring* in which irrelevant topics is used in order to divert the attention from the original one.

Ambiguity arises generally from a vague or imprecise use of language which causes misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the argument. Fallacies of ambiguity all involve confusion, such as in the fallacy of equivocation where a word or phrase is used to evoke two distinct meaning, or the fallacy of amphiboly which is the use of two sentences which can be interpreted in multiple ways with equal justification. These

types of fallacies usually result in misunderstanding caused by incompatible definitions and different interpretations.

Arguments that commit fallacies of presumption contain false premises, and so fail to establish their conclusion. False dilemma, false cause, complex questions and begging the question fallacies are perhaps the most commonly examined. A fallacy of false dilemma is committed when there is an attempt to force a choice, typically by presenting two options as unique while they may actually be part of a wide spectrum of choices. False cause fallacies occur when one erroneously attempts to establish causal correlation between events simply because they occur in succession as in *Post hoc ergo propter hoc* fallacies (literally “after this, therefore because of this”) or *non causa pro causa* (literally “no cause for a cause”), the fallacy of making a mistake about the ascription of some cause to an effect. The complex question kind of fallacy is committed when a question contains a presupposition, a proposition presuming something is true while it that has not been proven or accepted (at least by participants). Finally, begging the question is a fallacy where the conclusion to be proved is included in the initial premises of an argument and taken as evidence of the claim.

2. 4. Summary

This chapter reviewed the theories on the notions of ideology and research on political, media and argumentation discourse relevant to the analysis of the op-ed ideological discourse in the American and Arab newspapers. These areas are considered relevant for both a comprehensive understanding and a systematic analysis of FP discourse in the media from a critical and cross cultural perspective. Ideological structures manifest themselves powerfully in argumentative discourse and mainly in political discourse where communication has an existential function aiming at gaining, maintaining or challenging power and authority. In order to critically analyze the discursive strategies of the op-ed authors as a particular political group type, the current study draws both on the theory of argumentation and on the interdisciplinary CDA perspective on ideological structures in political discourse. The need to combine these theories is regarded necessary simply because the insights offered by argumentation theory are believed to

adequately complement the critical analysis of ideology in political discourses. In the following chapter, the two main theoretical frameworks of the study are presented along with an argument for the benefit of bringing them together in a cross-cultural study of the ideological strategies in the debates of FP experts' within the media channels.

CHAPTER 3: CDS AND PRAGMA-DIALECTICS IN THE STUDY OF OP-ED PIECES

3.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the theoretical framework guiding the present cross cultural study of the ideological structures underlying the discourses of FP experts in op-ed pieces. By combining CDS with Argumentation Theory, this research work draws upon van Dijk's sociocognitive approach to the study of ideology and context (1998, 2008), the analytic framework proposed by Van Leeuwen (2008) and Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004) as a method for argumentation analysis to explore the discursive practices of two groups of Foreign Policy (FP) experts and opinion leaders debating the Iraq war in the US and in Arab countries.

The current cross-cultural research on FP op-ed discourses relies on the multidisciplinary character of critical discourse studies mainly advocated by the socio-cognitive approach and attempts to combine a number of relevant theoretical frameworks estimated to be useful in tackling specific research points. Indeed, the study draws on analytic frameworks proposed by van Dijk and van Leeuwen while exploiting the systematic analytic tools proposed by Pragma-dialectics and rhetoric. From a critical discursive analytic stance, a special attention is paid to argumentation, and to the need for argumentation theory to assist the analysis and evaluation of the argumentative discourse of FP experts in op-ed. Pragma-dialectics is believed to be compatible with a critical stance, as its pragmatic perspective based on Speech Act Theory is shaped by the belief that language is a social practice and "partly matches the goals of discourse analysis, where discourses are seen as 'corpus wholes' and studied in terms of their structures" (Oswald 2007: 152). Besides, Pragma-dialectics offers a systematic method along with analytic tools for inspecting argumentative strategies which usefully prepare the ground for its critical analysis. This Chapter presents an outline of the general features of the theoretical frameworks employed in the study followed by an account of the specific ways these theories are relevant for the various research questions. Accordingly, this outline attempts to explain how these frameworks inform both the analysis of the arguers' discursive decisions -topic selection, context and the way they

recontextualize some social practices- and the analysis and evaluation of their respective ideological argumentative strategies. Finally, the last section argues for the benefits of bringing the socio-cognitive approach and pragma-dialectics together and discusses the assumptions they share in the study of discourse within its communicative dimension.

3. 2. CDS and the sociocognitive approach

In his extensive and invaluable work in Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), Van Dijk proposes a sociocognitive approach to the study of the way discourse (re)produces social domination and injustice. By doing so, Van Dijk urges a multidisciplinary orientation within CDS which accommodates an “explicit study of structures of text and talk with an analysis of their social and cognitive contexts as a basis for problem-oriented critical discourse analysis” (van Dijk 2006: 161). Crucial to this approach is the relationship between discourse, cognition and society. This entails the approach’s special interest in the sociocognitive interface of discourse, that is, the relations between mind, discursive interaction and society (van Dijk 2009: 65). Building on the work of Van Dijk & Kintsch (1983) on discourse strategies, and major cognitive theories of discourse processing mechanisms, the approach takes up the concept of mental model as a crucial element in any discourse comprehension or production processes to explain how language users subjectively represent events along with their social interactions in discourse. This approach examines the relations between these cognitive phenomena, namely the processes of discourse production and comprehension and socially shared beliefs on the one hand and discourse and societal structures on the other hand. Accordingly, Van Dijk argues that the study of relevant knowledge, ideologies and other socially shared beliefs is central in defining many of the properties and social functions of discourse. Likewise, both these cognitions and the discourses based on them need to be studied in relation to the relevant structures of institutions, groups, power and other aspects of society and culture. This approach urges for focusing concurrently on linguistic, cognitive, social and cultural aspects of text and talk in context to be carried out from a critical, socio-political perspective

Cognition, understood as the set of functions of the mind, such as thought, perception and representation (van Dijk 2009: 64) may present a powerful explanation of the discursive practices of language users. Van Dijk pays special attention to the interplay between social cognition and discourse, where cognition is considered a fundamental component in the society, discourse and cognition triangle forming the sociocognitive approach to CDS. The cognitive mechanisms involved in mental representations and in the processes of discourse production and comprehension are regarded as the interface between discourse and society and the very element mediating their relationship. Central to this approach is the notion of mental models and theories of reasoning in cognitive sciences (Johnson-Laird 1983, 2004; Garnham and Oakhill 1996). Below, the outline of the theory of mental models explains their relevance to discourse processing along the role they play in connecting social actions to discursive actions.

The sociocognitive approach to the critical study of discourse relies on the theory of mental models in its account of the link between societal and discourse structures. Mental models are cognitive representations of external reality (Jones et al. 2011) that form the episodic memory of individual people and organize their understanding, interpretation and subjective definition of social situations. A basic premise in this theory is that the cognitive processes and representations taking place in the Short Term Memory are mental models constructions. The models are believed to be individuals' subjective construction of specific events by drawing from the Long Term Memory which is composed of Episodic Memory (the stored results from information processing) and Semantic Memory (the stored socially shared information). These complex cognitive processes embodied in mental models are the representation of specific events and are believed to be dynamic and ongoing in any social and communicative event. They act as the reference point of basic social practices such as discourse comprehension and production. Language users draw on the mental models they constantly construct for events and experiences in their communications.

3. 2. 1. The sociocognitive view of ideology

When establishing the theoretical foundations of the notion of ideology within CDS, Van Dijk takes cognition as a basic notion in defining such a versatile concept. He argues that ideologies form the foundation of the social beliefs shared by a social group and that they “are represented almost as axioms of a formal system, consisting of a more general and abstract social beliefs that control or organize the more specific knowledge and opinions (attitudes) of a group” (van Dijk, 1998a: 151). Ideologies are defined as the basis of the social representations shared by members of a group (van Dijk, 1998a: 8). Inspired by the work of Cognitive scientists and related disciplines, Van Dijk contends that the mind or at least some of its parts such as memory, “is a storehouse of beliefs (...) (which) may be constructed, stored, reactivated, organized in larger units and such processes take place in the accomplishment of all cognitive tasks”(van Dijk, 1998a: 21). Ideology, as a system of socially shared beliefs, is part of the complex composition of the human cognition and the study of which should account for a cognitive dimension.

As a kind of belief system, ideologies, van Dijk (2006: 118) argues, need some kind of organization in order to be used and acquired. They have a general schema consisting of some basic categories defining the self-identity of the ideological group as follows:

1. Membership devices (gender, ethnicity, appearance, origin, etc.): Who are we?
2. Actions: What do we do?
3. Aims: Why do we do this?
4. Norms and Values: What is good or bad?
5. Position: What is our position in society, and how do we relate to other groups?
6. Resources: What is ours? What do we want to have/keep at all costs?

These categories defining ideologies may be perceived in discourse more precisely through its contextual construction. Indeed, van Dijk contends that ideologies contextually control variable discourse structures such as meaning. Context is regarded

as the individual cognitive construct of participants in a given communicative event that is based on -among other components- the belief systems shared by this individual's group, which in many cases may be identified as ideologies and in other cases only as cultural common ground knowledge.

Within this perspective, van Dijk (2002: 24) affirms that political discourse and its properties are controlled by one or more underlying ideologies, possibly through more specific (but still general) social attitudes and by context models (as subjective mental models) of the communicative situation. Therefore, critically analyzing political discourse from a socio-cognitive perspective involves detecting in text and talk the expression of ideologically-based opinions from the collection of socially shared opinions (van Dijk 2002: 25). Furthermore, the analysis of ideological strategies in discourse should consider the organization of ideologies in terms of groups' self-schemas and the examination of patterns of polarization.

In ideological terms, the polarization schema defined by the opposition between *us* and *them* suggests that the social groups construct an ideological image of themselves and others in such a way that generally *we* are presented positively whereas *they* are represented negatively (Van Dijk, 2006: 44). Thus, *us* is generally self-evaluated as holding better values that are particularly relevant to *us*, whereas *they* are perceived as 'bad' in the process of social comparison. In this line of reasoning, the strategy employed for the construction of the discourse for ideological communication typically consists of four moves:

1. Express/emphasize information that is 'positive' about *us*.
2. Express/emphasize information that is 'negative' about *them*.
3. Suppress/de-emphasize information that is 'positive' about *them*.
4. Suppress/de-emphasize information that is 'negative' about *us*.

These four moves constitute the well-known 'ideological square' which performs a specific role in the contextual strategy of *positive self-presentation* and its out-group counterpart *negative other-presentation* (Van Dijk 1997). In this connection, the notion of the ideological square provides insight into the study of the contextual strategies in the

op-ed discourses of American and Arab FP experts and in signaling the different ideological frameworks guiding the production of their opinions about the war in Iraq.

3. 2. 2. Ideology in discursive constructions: topic choices and context models

3.2.2.1. Topic choices: semantic macrostructures

Van Dijk emphasizes the importance of examining topics as a major step in identifying ideologies in discourse structures mainly from a sociocognitive perspective. Ineed, topics represent the semantic macro-structures which reveal the discourse global meanings. He argues that the notion of macrostructure not only refers to the various notions of global meaning, such as topic, theme, or gist, but it should also account for the “various cognitive aspects of discourse processing at this macrostructural level: production, reading and comprehension, storage in memory, retrieval, reproduction, and hence recall and recognition of textual information” (van Dijk, 1980: 10). This means that in order to plan, execute, control discourse in production, a macro-level of processing must be postulated. Semantic macro-structures are also characterized in terms of propositions, where “the notion of macro or global structure is of course *relative* and may be defined only with respect to *local structures*” (van Dijk, 1977a: 101, italics in original). Macro-structures are obtained by semantic mappings (transformations) applied to the local, sentential meanings of the discourse. These mappings are called macro-rules. (see van Dijk, 1977a; 1980).

The multidisciplinary orientation of this theory which accounts for a sociocognitive interface in discourse, that is, the relations between mind, discursive interaction and society, maintains that topics as “thematic structures are (mentally) selected from event models providing a speaker’s definition of the situation” (van Dijk 2000: 100). In other words, the selection takes place within the subjective representation of events or situations which form what is referred to as a semantic mental model. Van Dijk urges for the priority of examining topics in a critical analysis upholding that since they are “mostly intentional and consciously controlled by the speaker, they express the overall ‘content’ of mental models of events and perhaps most importantly, they represent the

meaning or information most readers will memorize best of a discourse” (van Dijk 2009: 68).

Political elite select topics based on their ideologically controlled definitions of the situation, which are derived from the mental models they construct of events. These constructions are largely believed -in cognitive theories- to stem from personal interpretations of events monitored by socially shared beliefs and attitudes.

3.2.2.2. Discursive construction of context in the sociocognitive approach

The notion of context has been revised in the sociocognitive approach and also considered as emblematic in CDS. Van Dijk argues that discourse and society are mediated by context models which stand for the “cognitive device that is able to represent the relevant structures of the social situation, both locally (micro) as well as globally (macro), and that at the same time is able to control discourse” (van Dijk 2009: 73). He defines context models as “specific mental models, represented in episodic memory” which function is to adapt discourse to the social situation and to guarantee its appropriateness. Van Dijk contends that “the combined cognitive and social dimensions of the triangle define the relevant (local and global) *context* of discourse” (van Dijk, 2009: 65, *italic in original*). This explains their control of discourse structures and their definitions of the genre and style of text and talk in general.

Context models are a type of mental models, which are defined as “the cognitive representations of our *experiences*” (*italics in the original*, van Dijk, 2009: 61). According to this theory and with relevance to discourse processing, these models are language users’ mental construction of “the events texts are *about*, that is, the situation they denote or refer to” (p. 58) and exerts control. Mental models provide a “starting point” for the production of discourse: if people represent situations in subjective mental models, these mental models at the same time form the basis of the construction of the semantic representation of the discourses about such events” (van Dijk 2008: 59). However, language users not only create or update models of events or situations they talk about, but also those models of the communicative event in which they participate. Consequently, “as mental constructs of relevant aspects of social situations” (van Dijk 2006: 165), the arguers’ context models examined in the current corpora are their

definitions of the Iraq war situation and issues as discursively produced in the discussions.

As a specific type of mental models, context models have a relatively simple schematic structure with the following basic categories:

- Spatiotemporal Setting
- Participants
 - roles, identities and relationship between participants
 - knowledge
 - goals and intentions
- Communicative social actions

These schematic categories of the cognitively constructed models reflect a socially oriented approach to discourse analysis in which discourse is part of complex social events. Hence, societal structures such as setting and participants' positions and relations are subjectively defined along with cognitive structures such as knowledge and beliefs.

Context schematic category of Setting

As a schematic category, Setting refers to the construction of place and time in the context models of events. The focus here has been limited to the examination of arguers' definitions or constructions of space /place with the aim of finding out where the Surge debate, as a communicative situation, is construed by the two groups of political experts. The concern is the pragmatic dimension of place, which is the interpretation of the arguers' sociopolitical, cultural or geographical place in relation to the event constructed. Taking into consideration the fact that the foreign policy experts' Surge debates are mediated by the newspapers in which their op-ed pieces are published, these debates are assumed to be controlled by models conditioned by the physical properties of newspapers as a public media space. Hence, they are expected to be contextualized by participants, namely, the experts as writers, and, the public as audience, within the setting of the media support itself. Moreover, most of the newspapers from which op-ed pieces are selected score high circulation rates internationally and their columnists are expected to address international audience.

However, an initial examination of the contextual manifestations in the corpora discourse structures makes ostensible the arguers' tendency to locate the communicative event not exactly within the boundaries of the newspaper but within a general public debate on Iraq Surge. Some arguers do not seem to consider participants in this debate to be the international audience presumed by newspapers' conditions. This variation in the scope of debate participation may have an immediate impact on the construction of space, since the inclusion and exclusion from participation determines the position of participants and their interpretations of the space in which the communicative event takes place.

The variety in the models' space setting expressed in discourse may not be surprising for some political communications types which are generally monitored by the media and do not maintain an "actual" direct interaction with the public but, instead, tend to simulate "directness" by other means. Since op-ed arguers, as any political actors, typically seek to win the hearts and minds of the public, they are hence inclined to produce context models which move them the closest possible to the public. While in "direct" political public spheres, such as parliaments, press statements, or TV interviews, the physical context property of the space may qualify as dominant feature in the participants' models construction, in the case of our written political debate, the print media space seems to have blurry boundaries and offer the participants the opportunity to imagine a relevant setting for their interaction. This could explain the reason why the policy op-ed authors in the current study attempt to keep their written contributions synchronized with an ongoing political set of contributions in diverse channels. The two discourse domains (politics and media) overlap and intertwine and hence create a hybrid situation from which participants tend to subjectively construct their models depending on their positions, goals or even on the situation properties itself such as the institutional norms and professional *raison d'être*. Based on these preliminary assumptions, discourse is examined to determine the kinds of spatial setting the two arguers groups seem to construct for this debate.

Context category of participants

Participants are a central category in the context model schema, as they are “the defining components of social situations” (van Dijk 2009: 65). They are the ones who – through cognitive mechanisms- subjectively construct the relevant aspects of a communicative situation while processing discourse either in production or comprehension. Processing is crucial for the effective communication of participants and so are the positions they take in this social situation, namely the way they self-define, interconnect and go about establishing consent and settling their differences. For a given communicative situation, according to Van Dijk, participants generally construct in their context models the relevant social actors’ identities, mainly self identity and their roles and relationship with others.

The Constructions of self are regarded central in participants’ context models. Self is construed on the basis of personal experiences represented in episodic memory (Van Dijk 2009). Self is a personal but socially based construct hence the op-ed authors very probably possess some common features which they enact in their context models as a representation of their identities. They share the same condition of being involved in a communicative situation that is based on their expertise in the field as the supposedly “official” reason why they are invited to contribute to public debate in a given newspaper. Consequently, they would perhaps explicitly choose to enact the identities that are consistent most with their respective institutional or political conditions which could be constructed from a number of contextual properties such as the very publication of the opinion piece and the display of the authorship in the byline usually listed below the article. Indeed, the general expert identity should be jointly interpreted by all discourse participants owing to the universally shared and perhaps abstract knowledge of who experts are and what roles they have when they publish an informed opinion about some political issues in the international arena. Nevertheless, there is more in the models of the op-ed discourses than this specific construction of self (as experts). In fact, the op-ed discourse as any political discourse is generally controlled by a complex model of self identity which politicians aim to make relevant and potentially compelling for their target audiences despite their substantial variety. Given the fact that there is a political intent behind the opinion contributions of these foreign policy experts, exploring the construction of self and of others in the current text corpora

should help determine the social and political identities that are being acted out in the arguers' models. More notably, not only may the construction of identity reveal some patterns specific for each different cultural group, but also possibly clarify the arguers' standing in a public space where it is hard to tell an analyst's "objective" opinion from a (subjective) political opinion or the boundaries between objective policy analysis and political posturing.

Participants' roles and relationships are as crucial as identity in the construction of the participant's model schema, since the very structure of Self is realized through a process of definition of one's and others' positions in the interactional event. Furthermore, language users discursively represent goals of the communicative event's participants – of self and others- by referring to the actions they instantiate. Goals or purposes are defined by van Dijk (2008: 81) as "mental representations of the desired consequences of an intended (planned) activity". This means that purposes allocated to participants' actions whether of self or others are part of the context model participants construct of a given social or communicative situation. Hence in text, these expressions of purposes are certainly controlled by "cognitive" related categories in language users' context models, namely goals, knowledge or ideologies.

3. 3. Discourse as recontextualization: a CDA analytic framework

Within the same discipline of critical discourse studies, and very much attuned to the sociocognitive perspective of discourse, the current study draws on the work of van Leeuwen and his theory on discourse viewed not only as an act of representation but also as an act of recontextualization of social practice. Van Leeuwen (2008) proposes an analytical framework for the study of discourse whereby discourse is conceived as social cognition, that is "as socially constructed knowledge of some social practice developed in specific social contexts and in ways appropriate to these contexts" (p. 6). The central assumption in this framework is that all discourses recontextualize social practices. Recontextualization is a process by which elements of social practice such as participants and their eligibility conditions, actions, and performance modes among others, are transformed in discourse. For Van Leeuwen, with this recontextualizing principle, discourses are used as resources for representing social practices in text. However, they "not only represent what is going on, they also evaluate it, ascribe

purposes to it, justify it and so on, and in many texts these aspects of representation become far more important than the representation of the social practice itself" (Van Leeuwen 2008: 6). Recontextualization is a process in which the following transformation occurs: substitution, rearrangement and addition. Van Leeuwen identifies those elements added to recontextualize social practice basically as repetition, reactions, purposes, legitimations and evaluation. The current work draws on the analytic tools proposed in this framework to examine the construction of purposes in discourse as part of the transformation mechanisms employed in the process of recontextualization of social practices.

The discursive construction of purposes, according to Van Leeuwen's theoretical framework (2008), is based on the belief that some social actors recontextualize or transform actions into purposeful by adding an element of purpose to them. Van Leeuwen takes the view that a social action is not inherently purposeful, but rather "constructed, interpreted and negotiated in discourse" (2008: 124). Constructing this additional element for actions is based on information constructed from mental models (instantly retrieved during communication) on participants, their roles, status and hence powerfully points to the social cognition they are associated with, namely values, attitudes and ideologies.

Van Leeuwen recognizes three main ways with which language users construct purposes for actions in English. These are the goal-oriented, the means-oriented and the effective action kind of construction. Each of these purpose constructions when chosen reveals the way social actors are positioned in discourse and their degree of control on the actions or activities represented. This is mainly realized through the way actions are represented and the kind of relationship established with their agents, depending for instance, on whether they are objectivated or nominalized, among other factors. In most cases, the effect of these constructions may be discursively suggestive of "the distribution of power in concrete social practices" (van Leeuwen, 2008: 135) and may (or not) point to another level of discursive construction namely, legitimation of social actions.

In the goal-oriented type, actions are explicitly constructed as purposeful and their actors are “discursively empowered as intentional agents- as people who can decide to and then succeed in, changing the world, whether in minor or major ways, or as people who can set a goal and then determine, autonomously, how to achieve it” (2008: 127). It is essential that the action and its purpose have the same agent and is typically formulated by an explicit purpose clause with “to”, “in order to”, etc. The following example from the corpus data illustrates this type of purpose construction:

- (1) The US invaded Iraq in order to secure a permanent military base in the Middle East, former US president Jimmy Carter argued. (Nassar 2007, *Al Ahram*)

There are also specific goal-oriented constructions, such as the precaution kind of construction consisting of a purpose of preventing something from happening or from being done (realized with hypotactic clause with “in case”, or because otherwise”) (see example 2 below). Another specific strategy is referred to as “the preparation” where purpose is to be prepared for something (with “ready to”).

- (2) They hunt Shiite death squads in Baghdad to keep them from rounding up random Sunnis (Charles Krauthammer, *Washington Post*)

The means-oriented construction actions are objectivated and represented as a means to an end with built-in purposes. The purposeful actions may belong to two categories: the instrumental and the technological action. In the instrumental type, the action becomes either a method (as in example 3) and human agency is preserved, or a means to achieve a purpose (as in example 4).

- (3) By de-authorizing the original use-of-force resolution this year, we would put a stop to the President's failed strategy (Clinton & Byrd, *Daily News*)
- (4) Amending the bill to de-authorize the war would do exactly that. (Clinton & Byrd, *Daily News*)

The technological types construct purposes as built in actions which are nominated or realized by means of a process pronoun. There are three sub-categories in this kind of constructions: use (“can be used to” or “is useful for”), function (typically realized by identifying clause as in X is something to do Y) or potentiality (actions as having the potential for serving a purpose, with verbs like “facilitate”, “allow”, “help”, etc.)

Finally, the effective type which emphasizes the outcome of actions, constructs actions as having purposes coming about as effects. Social actors, in this construction, are not fully in control of the action (do not plan them), and the purposes are represented as not theirs. There are two subcategories of this type: 1) result, where the purposeful action enables or causes the actions of other people, 2) effect, (as in example 5) in which the purposeful action is itself agent or initiator of the purpose action.

- (5) The Security Council and the civilized world should rearrange their priorities from the bottom up, from the earth to the space, so that internationalization will not be falsification in the name of the US (Kseibati, *Dar Al Hayat*)

3. 4. Pragma-dialectics: a method for argumentation analysis

Pragma-dialectics is a prominent argumentation theory developed by *Frans H. van Eemeren* and his colleagues at the University of Amsterdam during the last three decades or more. This theory views argumentative discourse as an exchange of verbal moves ideally intended to resolve a difference of opinion (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999: 480). This exchange is interpreted with an ideal model referred to as a critical discussion, which is both dialectical and pragmatic. The dialectical dimension of this model assumes a methodical exchange of the argumentative moves between two or more parties for the purpose of resolving their difference of opinion. The pragmatic dimension regards these moves as speech acts performed in specific situations and contexts. Pragma-dialectics offers interesting analytic tools for critical discourse studies, as it offers a systematic method for analyzing not only the structural but also the strategic dimensions of argumentative discourses.

Pragma-dialectics draws on research insights from both normative/formal logic models and empirical socially oriented discourse analysis. According to this theory, the normative idealization combined with findings from empirical descriptions makes the study of argumentation a branch of what is referred to as “Normative Pragmatics” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 10). Pragma-dialectics stresses the importance of a multidisciplinary orientation in argumentation studies that relies on the expertise of both analytically minded philosophers and the empirically minded linguists and social scientists, especially those engaged in discourse analysis and communication studies

(pp. 40-41) and hence argues for equally employing standardization and observation analytic tools resulting in a systematic approach to the critical analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse in practice.

Argumentation in Pragma-dialectics is considered a purposive act taken up as a rational means by language users to convince others to accept their claims. The theory ascribes to the view that acceptability relies on reasonableness where rationality and reasonableness are viewed from the anthropological stance as dynamic, relative and culture-bound concepts. Reasonableness is also viewed from a critical perspective in Pragma-dialectics which explains the proposal for a discussion model with rules for rational discussants. Pragma-dialectic adopts a critical-rationalistic view of reasonableness where the validity of arguments is based on two criteria: problem validity and inter-subjective validity, according to which “reasonableness need not be universal (...) but depends on human judgment and is related to a specific group of people at a particular place and time” (p. 17). This assumption is in line in a sense with the sociocognitive approach to CDA, since the notion of reasonableness is based on group consensus and on what is considered true and acceptable, reasonableness, thus, could be considered knowledge. For pragma-dialectics, maintaining social knowledge-based reasonableness is a dialectical aim which is considered an important context construct of participants in the discussion. Knowledge within a communicative event in the sociocognitive approach is a crucial context category which is subjectively and cognitively constructed by participants. What is dialectically reasonable thus could be what is socially and cognitively shared by a group and eventually shaping their cognition and controlling their discursive and social practices.

Four principles are at the core of the research object of Pragma-dialectics and these are functionalization, externalization, socialization and dialectification. They are referred to as “Meta theoretical” principles and represent the foundation for integrating the normative and the descriptive dimensions into the study of argumentation. According to Pragma-dialectics, these principles should be taken as methodological guidelines for an argumentation theory which aims at providing an accurate framework for the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse and texts. The functionalization principle is based on the assumptions that argumentation is a purposive act advanced in reaction to or in anticipation of a difference of opinion and aimed to resolve a disagreement.

Functionalization is realized in pragma-dialectics by considering the “verbal expressions used in argumentative discourse and texts as speech acts and specifying the conditions for identity and correctness that apply to the performance of these speech acts” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 54). The analysis of the speech acts performed in the text and their functions makes possible to determine the communicative and interactional purposes the utterances serve in resolving the difference of opinion. Determining these purposes is not concerned with the psychological or internal dispositions of language users, but the positions they express or externalize. Externalization, as a second principle, focuses on language users’ commitments as they are externalized in, or can be externalized from, the discourse or text (p. 54). By examining the kinds of obligations explicitly or implicitly created from the use of certain speech acts in a specific context, language users’ commitments such as acceptance or challenge are determined and accounted for as externalized, thus becoming public and making part of a communicative process. The third theoretical principle in pragma-dialectics is socialization and focuses on the interactional context of the argumentative exchange. This principle proposes recognizing the different roles played in the interaction and the positions adopted by the parties involved with regard to the resolution of the difference of opinion. Analytically, roles and positions are identified within the interactional functions fulfilled with the different stages of the critical discussion. This means that the meaning to be attributed to the speech acts depends on the positions activated by the involved parties’ interaction and the resolution stage they are at. Finally, the fourth theoretical principle is dialectification and is concerned with the rules to be adhered to in the performance of the speech acts in the argumentative exchange and ideally aiming at the resolution of the difference of opinion. These rules come together to represent a dialectical discussion procedure which in turn systematically indicated the structure of the process of resolving a difference of opinion (p. 57).

3. 4. 1. The model of critical discussion

The op-ed pieces constituting the current study corpora are examined from the pragma-dialectical perspective using the “critical discussion model” the theory proposes for the

analysis and evaluation of argumentation (see van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). Pragma-dialectics starts with the assumptions that speakers or writers engage in “a critical discussion” for the purpose of resolving a difference of opinion and delineates an ideal model aimed at facilitating the systematic assessment of argumentation. This model indicates the different stages involved in an ideal process of a difference of opinion resolution. By advancing a standpoint, two or more people engage in an argumentative process through which they have to reach settlement over the acceptability or not of this standpoint. In this process, the acceptability of the claim has to be tested by following a dialectical procedure in which the parties: the protagonist (the one advancing the standpoint) and the antagonist (the one casting doubt on it) seek to decide whether the standpoint is defensible in light of critical reactions (p. 58). The dialectical procedure in the critical discussion focus on the speech acts leading to the dispute resolution rather than the formal relations between parts of argumentation units as it is commonly used in traditional approaches. The model of critical discussion has two functions: 1) heuristic, as a guide in the identification and theoretical interpretation of every element in the argumentative exchanges, and 2) critical, as a standard in the evaluation of argumentation.

Ideally, a critical discussion proceeds in four stages in order to resolve the difference of opinion. These stages are distinguished analytically as follows (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 59-62):

- The confrontation stage, where the two parties identify a difference of opinion
- The opening stage, where the parties establish starting point for the discussion and agree upon the rules and the propositions they can use in their argumentation.
- The argumentation stage, where the protagonist defends his/her standpoint by putting forward arguments to counter the antagonist’s objections or doubt.
- The concluding stage, where the discussion parties evaluate to what extent their initial difference of opinion has been resolved and in whose favor.

The model of critical discussion is not only applicable to the face- to-face argumentative exchange type but also to the written type such as in the op-ed pieces under study. An

op-ed piece coming about as a monologue, according to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) is a “specific kind of critical discussion” where the audience as the antagonist takes an implicit role and the writer as a protagonist attempts to counter the antagonist’s (potential) doubt (p. 59).

Pragma-dialectics takes the identification of participants’ communicative roles as an important step in the analytic method of argumentation. In a typical communicative situation (critical discussion), argumentation participants may take the roles of either protagonist (the one who advanced a standpoint) or antagonist (the one(s) who expresses doubt about the validity of the protagonist’s claim) depending on their positions in respect to advancing argumentation. In a face to face argumentation then, participants may normally take turns on both roles if they interactively engage in argumentation exchanges on a specific issue. As for the written argumentation type, the writer, by default, takes up a protagonist role and assigns the audiences an antagonist role. Despite the assumed dialogical nature of this communicative situation, indirectness gives the protagonists in this case the freedom to initiate claims, defend them and to conclude without “real” interruption or intervention from the communicative event’s participants. Such is the case of the op-ed arguers, who by performing their protagonist role; they define the roles of other participants which they typically choose to construe as mere antagonists in a position of doubt. Antagonists in positions of doubt normally require the protagonists to corroborate their claims with reasonable argumentation while antagonists who take the role of opponents generally hold a counter-position and potentially advance counter-argumentation. On the whole, one expects the authors of op-ed pieces to assign their audience the role of antagonist with doubt. This kind of role distribution decision is naturally more interaction-friendly, as it supposes less confrontation challenges and it better supports their communicative endeavor.

Whatever the discussion type is, it is crucial to pragmatically characterize the speech act at each critical stage, that is, the moves that are performed in the different stages for the purpose of resolving the difference of opinion. Along with the identification of discussion stages and the moves relevant to each critical stage, a reconstruction of argumentation is realized for the purpose of identifying unexpressed statements or

premises and facilitating the reorganization of the critical stages according to the Pragma- dialectical ideal model.

3. 4. 2. Method and tools for argumentation analysis

Pragma-dialectics as a theory of argumentation proposes a systematic method for critically analyzing argumentative discussions which the current research study of foreign policy op-ed pieces argumentation draws on. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) present the theoretical foundations of Pragma-dialectics and the analytic methods they put forward based on them and explain the essential tools to use for a systematic and normative analysis of any type of argumentative exchange. The method for analyzing and evaluating argumentation is outlined in this section first by indicating the main analytic procedures, namely obtaining an analytic overview after reconstructing the discussion, and second by describing the means supporting the evaluation of the strategic maneuvering efficiency of arguers, namely by characterizing the activity type and surveying the degree of compliance with the critical rules established by Pragma-dialectics.

The Reconstruction

After determining the different stages of the critical discussion, a pragma-dialectical analysis of argumentation proceeds with a reconstruction of this discussion. The reconstruction is aimed to identify the process parties have followed in their attempt to resolve their difference of opinion. Its function is to “reveal as clearly as possible, without paying attention to any sidetracks or detours, which route is followed to fulfill the purposes of arguers and eventually bring about an analytic overview of all the discourse elements that are relevant in to the resolution of a difference of opinion (van Eemeren& Grootendorst 2004: 96). Reconstruction involves the use of procedures aimed at placing the focus exclusively on language users’ argumentative purposes and coming as follows. First, the analyst examines the points at issue and the procedural and material points of departure chosen. Second, he or she identifies the arguments whether explicitly expressed or left unexpressed and determine their schemes and overall structures. Third, a transformation is realized to the text applying different transposition means. This transformation consists of making necessary deletions, additions,

substitutions and permutations in the text. Deletion is the removal of irrelevant parts of the discussion. Addition consists of the inclusion of the relevant parts made implicit by the arguer like the unexpressed premises or standpoints. Substitution corresponds to replacing vague formulations by clear ones while permutation is rearranging parts of the text that best bring their relevance to the resolution process. These transformations yield a reconstructed critical discussion allowing for a basic requisite for the analysis and evaluation of the argumentative exchange. This requisite is the analytic overview.

Analytic Overview

The analytic overview constitutes the basis for any pragma-dialectically approached critical evaluation of the argumentative discourse and is adopted to do the following (after Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004: 118):

- Clarify the difference of opinion at issue and the positions of the participant(s)
- Identify the premises which serve as the starting point
- Identify arguments and criticisms which are implicitly or explicitly advanced
- Determine argument schemes employed
- Recreate the argumentation structure constructed
- Identify the conclusion reached

This list consists of the different points to be accomplished in the analytic work which should guide towards a more methodical assessment of the argumentative endeavor under study. These procedures represent the basic aspect of the argumentative analysis that would be reinforced by the normative scrutiny of the argumentative discourse moves and strategies and the inspection of the arguments structures and schemes. Indeed, it aims at substantiating the critical function pragma-dialectics hopes to achieve in its systematic inquiry of argumentation. A crucial and meticulous task to do to implement the complete analytic list involves the identification of the line of arguments in a critical discussion (schemes or *loci*), the arguments' interconnectedness (structures) and strategies (strategic maneuvering). The evaluation of these mechanisms should help

clarify the soundness or fickleness of arguments and their normative assessment according to ten rules of critical discussion.

3. 4. 3. Argument Evaluation

After analysis, argumentation is evaluated for soundness and for the congruity of its strategic layout. This means that it must be checked for logical and pragmatic inconsistencies. Fallacies along with standardized types of arguments, referred to as *Topoi*, may be identified and discussed in terms of their significance in the reproduction of ideologies in discourse. A fallacy is widely recognized as a mistake in reasoning; an argument that fails to provide adequate logical support for the truth of its conclusion yet appears convincing or persuasive in some other way Johnson (2000: 58). Under the Pragma-dialectical framework, however, fallacies are not considered to be exclusively logical errors. Instead, they are seen as wrong moves in argumentative discourse. A fallacy in the pragma-dialectical approach is defined as a speech acts that counts as a violation of one or more of the rules for critical discussion (van Eemeren et al. 2009: 20). Consequently, this approach (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984, 1992, 2004) considers fallacies a hindrance to the resolution of a disagreement and the specific nature of each fallacy depends on the exact manner in which it interferes with the resolution process. In order to evaluate argumentation in Pragma-dialectics, argumentation should be scrutinized and fallacies identified according to the rules for critical discussion.

Rules for a critical discussion

The pragma-dialectical model specifies ten rules participants in an argumentative discussion have to abide by and accept inter-subjectively in order to argue effectively. These ten rules have been discussed in various works mainly, Van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans (2002: 182-183) and Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) and have even been extended to fifteen rules. These rules represent a heuristic tool for the reconstruction of argumentative discourse according to the critical discussion model and assist the analyst in the evaluation of arguments. In their book presenting a comprehensive view on Pragma-dialectics, Van Eemeren and

Grootendorst (2004) devote a whole chapter entitled “Code of conduct for reasonable discussants” on illustrating and explaining the ten rules arguers need to observe in order for their argumentation to be acceptable. The violation or non-violation of these rules is regarded to be *instrumental* in the pragma-dialectical critical evaluation of arguments. If argumentation participants prevent the reasonable resolution of the difference of opinion, they are considered then as violating these rules. Violations of the discussion rules are considered as fallacies. Recently, and with the pragma-dialectics more extended focus on argumentative strategies, infringing the normative process of argumentation through fallacies is regarded as a derailment of the strategic maneuvering. The ten rules for a critical discussion are illustrated in the discussion of van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 187-196) as follows:

- 1- Freedom Rule: Parties must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from casting doubt on standpoints. Violation of this rule typically occurs in the confrontation stage by placing limits on the standpoint or by restricting a party’s reaction such as by threat (*argumentum ad baculum* fallacy) or appeal to pity (*argumentum ad misericordiam*), or by attacking the other party character or credibility (*argumentum ad hominem*).
- 2- Burden of proof Rule: A party that advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked by the other party to do so. In a non-mixed difference of opinion, as it is the case of opinion articles, only one party puts forward a standpoint, so according to the Pragma- dialectical approach there is only one party who has anything to defend.
- 3- The Standpoint Rule: A party’s attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has indeed been advanced by the other party. This rule may be violated when the standpoint attacked is not the standpoint originally put forward by the protagonist.
- 4- Relevance Rule: A party may defend a standpoint only by advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint. Violation of this rule typically occurs in the argumentation stage and may be of two types: irrelevant argumentation (such as distorting the opponents’ standpoint) and non-argumentation (the recourse to persuasion through emotion (*ethos and pathos*)).

- 5- Unexpressed premise Rule: A party may not deny a premise that he or she has left implicit or falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other party. Violating this rule may occur during argumentation stage and involve exaggerating the unexpressed premise or denying it. Checking arguments with respect to this rule means a deeper study and knowledge of the socio-political context in which they are produced.
- 6- Starting point Rule: A party may not falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point nor deny a premise representing an accepted starting point. In practice, explicit agreements about starting points are rare: parties normally operate on the assumption that they share certain starting points. When the arguer acts as though a certain proposition was accepted as starting point when, in fact, it is not the case, there is certainly a violation of this rule. A commonly used strategy to make this use hard to perceive is done by presenting the controversial proposition as a presupposition.
- 7- Argument scheme Rule: A party may not regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the defense does not take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly applied. Violation of this rule occurs during the argumentation stage leading to fallacies such as the *populist fallacy* (claiming standpoint should be accepted because many people agree with it), the *secundum quid* (making hasty generalization), the *argumentum ad consequentiam* (when confusing facts with value judgment), the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* (reasoning that one thing is true because it precedes the other), the slippery slope fallacy (arguing that adopting a certain course of action will inevitably be going from bad to worse without having any proof of that) and finally a fallacy referred to as False Analogy is one which erroneously applies analogy aimed as argument.
- 8- Validity Rule: A party may only use arguments in its argumentation that are logically valid or capable of being made logically valid by making explicit one or more unexpressed premises. The pragma-dialectical theory does not consider the violation of this rule as the most important of the fallacies due to the belief that invalid reasoning is not the most important cause of failure to reach a resolution of a difference of opinion. Two common faulty ways of reasoning are *affirming the consequent* and *denying the antecedent*; these are invalid counterparts of the *modus ponens* and *modus tollens* types of reasoning.

- 9- Closure Rule: A failed defense of a standpoint must result in the party that put forward the standpoint retracting it and a conclusive defense of the standpoint must result in the other party retracting its doubt about the standpoint. In the case of written argumentation (non-mixed), the protagonist may not conclude his/her antagonists' standpoint to be false only because they did not show the opposite, as in practice, the antagonist's standpoint is not defended (yet). If the protagonist makes such a claim in the concluding stage, he/she commits the fallacy of concluding that a standpoint is true because of the opposite has not been successfully defended (*argumentum ad ignorantiam*).
- 10- Usage Rule: A party must not use formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous. The other party in turn must interpret the other party's formulations as carefully and accurately as possible and should not deliberately misinterpret them. The rule is set to avoid and minimize misunderstanding which may obstruct their mutual effort to resolve the difference of opinion.

The critical discussion rules play an important role in the analysis and evaluation of argumentation as they systematically sustain the decisions on the validity or acceptability of arguments. Investigating argumentation normatively in a critical discussion is useful for the evaluation of the strategic performance of arguers, namely their strategic maneuverings. The present study of op-ed pieces argumentation draws upon the Pragma-dialectics notion of strategic maneuvering in the analysis of the ideological structures in the opinion discourse on FP. The notion of strategic maneuvering is thus characterized in the following sub-section.

3. 4. 4. The notion of strategic maneuvering

In their attempt to bridge the traditional gap between dialectic and rhetoric in the study of argumentation, van Eemeren & Houtlosser (1999) introduce the theoretical concept of strategic maneuvering. Strategic maneuvering is defined as the “efforts arguers make in argumentative discourse to reconcile aiming for rhetorical effectiveness with maintaining dialectical standards of reasonableness” (Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2006: 383). Hence, the notion is taken up as a connecting point between the dialectical

purpose of the arguer and his/her rhetorical aims. The integration of strategic maneuvering into the theory is due to Pragma-dialectics' eagerness to extend the traditional normative-logical approach of evaluating arguments by creating standards for reasonableness that have a functional, rather than a structural, focus. An argument is evaluated in terms of its usefulness in moving a critical discussion toward resolution rather than concentrating on the relationship of premises to conclusions as it has been traditionally the case in argumentative analysis research. Strategic maneuvering is the "methodical designs of moves, or 'blue-prints', for influencing the result of a particular dialectical stage to one's own advantage, which manifest themselves in a systematic, coordinated and simultaneous exploitation of the opportunities afforded by the (dialectical) stage (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999: 485-486).

Maneuvering can occur at any stage of the critical discussion, and this explains the reason why the rhetorical aims of the participants in the discourse are presumed to take place according to the dialectical stages. The study of strategic maneuvering consists of a systematic integration of a rhetorical insight into a dialectical framework of analysis. Indeed, strategic maneuvering indicates the way arguers handle the opportunities presented to them along the discussion stages to achieve their rhetorical goals. As Van Eemeren & Houtlosser (1999: 484) explain:

Each stage in the resolution process is characterized by a specific dialectical aim. As the parties involved want to realize this aim to their best advantage, they can be expected, to make strategic moves that serve their interest best. The dialectical objective of a particular discussion stage always has a rhetorical analogue. And since the kind of advantages that can be gained depends on the dialectical stages, the presumed rhetorical objectives of the participants must be specified according to stage.

Three levels of strategic maneuvering, topic potential, adaptation to audience and presentational devices, are distinguished in Pragma-dialectics for analytic purposes while in practice it is believed that they act together and synchronize to realize the

argumentative goals of the argumentative discussion participants. These levels are outlined below.

Three levels of strategic maneuvering

Argumentative strategic maneuvering operates in discourse by making an appropriate choice from the “topical potential” presented at each dialectical stage, producing the most adequate adaptation to the “audience demand” and putting together effective “presentational devices”.

The first level of maneuvering is concerned with the Topic Potential of a particular critical stage in the discussion. This involves choosing topics from the ones available depending on the argumentative goals at each stage. At the confrontation stage, the aim is to make the most effective choice among potential issues for discussion –restricting the disagreement space in such a way that the confrontation is defined in accordance with the speaker’s or writers’ preferences (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999: 484). By choosing or dismissing a particular topic the arguer opts for a specific line of defense of his/her standpoint. This “involves a selection from the available *loci* that best suits the speaker or writer” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2005: 30). *Loci* or literally “places” to find arguments, which are also referred to as topics of invention in traditional rhetoric and sometimes schemes in contemporary argumentative work stand for a method humans use to store items related to the same topical area for future retrieval. The selection from available *loci* fulfills the dialectical duty of confronting opponents within some norms and the rhetorical aim of fashioning the discussion issue and its focus according to one’s interests. At the opening stage, arguers strive to establish the most beneficial starting points for their discussion by selecting the kinds of assumptions which strengthen consensus and generates agreements with their interlocutors. At the argumentation stage, the most favorable *loci* for the defense of the standpoint advanced are selected; hence, some commonly used and socially established *topoi* acting as an ally in the strategic line of defense are typically adopted. At the concluding stage, topical potential is employed in getting the best outcome for the resolution process.

The second level of strategic maneuvering relates to the effective adaptation to audience demands. This maneuvering is typically realized through the attempt to create empathy or “communion” with the audience at each dialectical stage. At the confrontation stage, the arguers seeking effective adaptation to audience demands tend to avoid evoking unresolved issues and would probably agree with the audience’s potential concerns. At the opening stage, the starting points are established in accordance with the audiences’ values, beliefs and expectations about how things should be approached and resolved. As it is generally hard, if not impossible, to satisfy a large audience it is typical for arguers to make disagreement over values look like disagreement over facts. At the argumentative stage, arguments may be supported by premises which are easy to agree with and accept by the audience. Finally, at the concluding stage, arguers may frame the audience difference resolution decisions as having high affinity with theirs, projecting by this strategy a prominent resolution to their own favor.

The third level of strategic maneuvering consists of making the most effective use of presentational devices appropriate for each dialectical stage. This involves the way moves are formulated and how they are assigned a presence. The use of rhetorical figures is strategically crucial as they have the potential according to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca of “bringing about a change of perspective” (1969: 119) (quoted in van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999: 485). Based on most rhetorical theories, what is said and how it is said are viewed as one and only divisible for analytical purposes (Burton, 2007; Kennedy, 1980). This may be noted in the continuity between the topics of inventions (as basic categories of relationships among ideas) and the figures of speech, which have sometimes been used to refer not only to means of expression, but to strategies of argument (Rhetoricae, 2003). Commonly employed figures for argumentative purposes such as *conciliatio* (adopting opponents’ arguments to support one’s position) and rhetorical questions assist the adaptation to audience strategic maneuvers by creating a sense of consensus with audiences. These figures, among others may be exploited based on the requirement of each critical stage, for instance at the opening stage reinforcing the starting points, say by rhetorical questions and establishing the basic assumptions which prepare for the argumentative stage.

3. 4. 4. 1. Strategic maneuvering throughout the critical stages

These three levels of strategic maneuvering typically operate together in a single argumentative text as to achieve the goals of the arguer. The identification and analysis of these strategies may be carried out separately for each of the four critical stages. In fact, once a stage is identified in a given discussion, it becomes easier to determine the arguer's dialectical goals, as they can be interpreted based on the critical stage functions. For instance, the confrontation stage is the stage where the arguer externalizes a standpoint and his/her goals are interpreted as advancing a position for defense. Examining the maneuvering strategies in each stage hence involves estimating how the arguer's dialectical motives are being coordinated with the rhetorical and persuasive goals within the whole critical discussion. The analysis of strategic maneuvers across the stages generally proceeds as indicated below.

Maneuvering at the Confrontation stage

Confrontation is the dialectical stage in which the issues at the origin of the conflict are identified. Arguers establish their difference of opinion by advancing their standpoints and contextualizing their positions. Building the issue in the confrontation stage is crucial for arguers. Indeed, they have to place their views within the disagreement space they believe it belongs to and even though in some cases this remains implicit, they definitely set the stage in some way. The dialectical aim of advancing standpoints goes hand in hand with the rhetorical aim of gearing audience towards accepting this standpoint. To attain these aims, arguers maneuver strategically essentially by making the most effective choice among the potential issues for discussion, efficiently adapting this choice to the audience and optimally presenting them. The topic choice is strategic in essence and reflects the decision made about what is worth discussing and what is not and the way the chosen issue is crystallized for the audience. Furthermore, sometimes arguers resort to the use of some specific strategies in order to maximize their persuasive chances by, for instance, evading the task of presenting a clear definition of the difference of opinion. Such strategies are more widely used in written argumentation, where the protagonist is the only one to present the positions of all the participants in the discussion (some of which may be real opponents). It is expected that

by reporting the views of others and mainly of one's opponents, one tends to charge the wording with an inevitable distortion of the actual positions existent.

Strategic maneuvering at the opening stage

In the opening stage, the participants decide to resolve the difference of opinion; hence they determine their points of departure and agree upon the rules of the discussion (van Eemeren et al, 2002: 25). This means that in this stage, common assumptions are established by the participants as starting points or as the accepted rules for argumentation process. This consists of reminding participants of the ideas which are agreed upon by everyone. The agreement is supposed to be shared and accepted by participants in the discussion, though in the case of written argumentation the protagonist is the one who decides which issues are considered assumptions and which others are to be argued for or against. Equally important in this stage is that the roles of the protagonist and antagonist are assigned in a mixed discussion. In the case of written/supposedly non-mixed discussion these roles are assumed to be distributed in this manner: the writer is the protagonist advancing a position and is obliged to defend it and the audience is the antagonist since they are in a position of doubt. However, if the protagonist is advancing a claim which is already of received widely by rejection the audience in this case may hold the position of active antagonists (not only of doubt) but of holding a counter argument and the discussion in this case is to be considered a mixed one. Some specific strategies used in favor of the protagonist are creating a broad zone of agreement which means that constructing antagonists as agreeing with some issues or doing the opposite: creating a "smokescreen" and represent issues as highly polemical as possible.

Strategic maneuvering at the argumentative stage

Determining the maneuvering strategies at the argumentative stage means identifying which strategic "line of defense" is pursued from the available potential of arguments that suits the party best in the dialectical situation at hand (Van Eemeren, 2010: 96). This consists of examining the standpoint(s) and the status *topoi* or *loci* associated with it (them), namely the type of argument (scheme) and the content of the premises that are used in the argument in order to track down the range of topical options available at a

certain point in the discourse. This has a role similar to that of *loci* in the classical rhetorical doctrine of invention. For Van Eemeren topical potentials are aggregates of options for maneuvering strategically and they differ from *loci* in the fact that “so far no ready-made system to choose from exists and that choices generally have to be made from relatively open and fluid categories of possibilities” (2010: 98). This implicates that the analyst should rely on the discussion content and his/her knowledge of its context and activity type constraints in order to locate the arguer’s maneuvers.

Strategic maneuvering at the concluding stage

The dialectical function of the concluding stage consists of determining the outcome the discussion which ideally is based on the aim to resolve a difference of opinion. In the case of an op-ed piece, the outcome in practice is not established within the discussion space, but deferred to research institutions on public opinion and to the institutions’ estimation of the impact the claim has on audience/citizens political attitudes and actions. However, the arguer as the active participant in this communicative event usually takes the initiative to close the debate with moves that enhance his/her position by, for instance, presupposing the audience acceptance of his resolution process or restating the proposal to ensure favorable reception. These strategic moves should be explored as they consist of the routes pursued by the arguer in the positioning of the proposed position.

Derailment of strategic maneuvering

Strategic maneuvering is believed to derail if the arguers mishandle the balance to be maintained between their goal to persuade and their commitment to the dialectical norms. Van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2006) contend that since the “derailments of strategic maneuvering always involve a violation of a rule for critical discussion; they are on a par with the wrong moves in argumentative discourse designated as fallacies (387). A fallacy is widely recognized as a mistake in reasoning; an argument that fails to provide adequate logical support for the truth of its conclusion yet appears convincing or persuasive in some other way Johnson (2000: 58). Under the Pragma-dialectical

framework, however, fallacies are not considered to be exclusively logical errors. Instead, they are seen as wrong moves in argumentative discourse. A fallacy in the pragma-dialectical approach is defined as a speech acts that counts as a violation of one or more of the rules for critical discussion (van Eemeren et al., 20: 2009). Consequently, this approach (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984; 1992; 2004) considers fallacies a hindrance to the resolution of a disagreement and the specific nature of each fallacy depends on the exact manner in which it interferes with the resolution process.

3. 4. 4. 2. The analysis of strategic maneuvering in critical discussions

In order to determine the strategic function for every argumentative move in a given discourse unit, the analysis must be substantiated by four parameters: results, routes, constraints and commitments. These parameters should be considered as indicated by van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2006: 385) for the following purposes:

- (1) The results that can be achieved by the argumentative move so to explain the kind of outcome aimed for by this kind of strategic maneuvering
- (2) The routes that can be taken to achieve these results by identifying the reasonable options are available when making the argumentative move so to explain the choice made by carrying out this particular kind of strategic maneuvering.
- (3) The constraints of the institutional context. This consists of identifying the conventional preconditions that the strategic maneuvering must meet in this type of discourse.
- (4) The mutual commitments defining the argumentative situation. These involve taking into account the actual argumentative situation in the discourse and determining how strategic maneuvering must respond to it. Recognizing the mutual commitment sets defining the argumentative situation generally requires information provided from parameter 3.

With the support of these four parameters considered during analysis the strategic function of a particular type of maneuvering can be interpreted and its realization in a

certain combination of topical choice, audience orientation and presentational design can be explained.

Pragma-dialectics draws on notions from argumentation theory and classical rhetoric in the analysis of strategic maneuverings and the evaluation of argumentation in general. Indeed, part of the basic tasks in the analysis of strategic maneuvering involves identifying the argumentative text oratory type and its stasis. These notions are useful in determining the strategic function of topic selection and may indicate the arguer's underlying ideological motivations for making certain decisions. The selection of topic as a strategic level of maneuvering is explored in Pragma-dialectics not only within the micro strategic moves of the critical discussion but also within the macro-rhetorical moves by examining the selection of standpoints from a disagreement space and the choices of oratory type and stasis.

Topic selection as a strategic move

In Pragma-dialectics theory, the selection of topic is considered one of the three levels within which discussion parties maneuver strategically within the four-stage critical discussion. According to van Eemeren (2010: 96), "topic selection has to do with the viewpoint, angle or perspective from which the arguer selects the argumentative move or moves he makes in strategic maneuvering". Hence based on this assumption, topics function in a similar manner as *topoi* in classical rhetoric seen as pointers to certain means the orator can use to solve a problem of choice and strategically fulfill rhetorical goals. Strategic maneuvering is a notion that explains how arguers attempt to reconcile two different aims: achieving "rhetorical effectiveness and maintaining dialectical standards of reasonableness" (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2006: 383). Pragma-dialectics has been criticized for regarding advancing argumentation as simply oriented towards the ideal goal of resolving a difference of opinion by arguing that "otherwise we become intellectually isolated and can ultimately even end up in a state of spiritual and mental inertia" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984: 1). More recently, however, and with the notion of strategic maneuvering, Pragma-dialectics has started to link the resolution goal with the arguers' benefits or interest and to recognize that this resolution process may be pursued with strategies controlled by their underlying ideologies.

Hence, arguers tend to “select materials from those available according to what they believe best advances their interests” (Tindale, 2009: 43). Among the main notions Pragma-dialectics consider in the analysis of topic selections strategies are the disagreement spaces, the oratory types and stases.

Disagreement spaces

By selecting topics from available choices Pragma-dialectics points also to the notion of disagreement space. A disagreement space consists of “all the commitments and understandings required for an utterance to take on its discourse function. These are virtual standpoints that can be called out for explicit argumentation” (Hampe, 2001: 135). Pragma-dialectics uses this concept in the analysis of strategic maneuverings realized at the confrontation stage of an argumentative text, as it clarifies the arguer’s decisions on topical choices. Hampe affirms (2001: 136) that the notion of disagreement space is “all that needs to be filled in for a full analysis”, referring here to an argumentation analysis based on pragma-dialectics which elucidates the notion as follows:

Among the materials available to a participant in an argumentative discussion is the discourse itself and the surrounding context of practical activity. From these two components it will always be possible to infer an indefinitely large and complex set of beliefs, wants, and intentions that jointly compose the perspective of one’s partner. Any component of this perspective may be ‘called out’ and made problematic within the discourse, if it has any sort of relevance to the underlying purpose of the exchange. When this occurs, the problematized element functions as a ‘virtual standpoint’ in need of defense. Any reconstructible commitment associated with the performance of a speech act can function as a virtual standpoint when it is in fact reconstructed and challenged by an interlocutor. The entire complex of reconstructible commitments can be considered as a ‘disagreement space,’ a structured set of opportunities for argument.

(Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs, 1993: 95)

Based on these Pragma-dialectics' assumptions, a particular standpoint is a selection from a particular disagreement space which in turn is a collection of the entire "virtual" standpoints related to a given issue. However, as van Eemeren & Garssen argue "whether to expand around one of the potential points of disagreement is a matter of strategy, for not all disagreements need resolutions" (2008: 17). This means that by deciding which perspective of the space is worth discussing, arguers leave evidence of their intentions, priorities in their political agendas and more importantly of their ideological positions. Even though arguers may apparently have the freedom to choose their topic of discussions, their selection in practice is bounded by the range of topics available for debate. Of course, this does not imply that they have the obligation to deal with some topics, but rather suggests that the advancement of a certain position generates other particular positions and that the collection of reactions constitute the limit of the positions involved in the debate, at least within some temporal and spatial debate boundary. Arguers may control the disagreement space by requiring attention to the standpoints they raise and establishing them as more relevant than others for discussion or even by preventing -whether intentionally or not- other possible points from being raised.

In the current study, the agendas setting strategies are regarded as similar to topicalization strategies in critical discourse studies. Therefore, by examining semantic macrostructures, rhetorical goals and categorizing them based on their recurrence in each corpus, each elite group agendas are located. Both topicalization and goals, indicating agenda setting practices, are useful in evaluating the arguers' ideological discursive decisions which they make through acts of selection, hence omission or exclusions, prior to the act of arguing itself. It is also insightful to attempt to see what topics each group of experts from two opposing sides of the conflict make most prominent. These decisions are believed to reflect the ideological background from which they are made and the kinds of motivations feeding them.

For Pragma-dialectics, as for most modern theorists, classical rhetoric has been an important source of inspiration and a starting point in the development and exploration of systematic sources for evaluating the selection of argumentative moves. Indeed, one of the five canons of rhetoric, "invention", is concerned with studying the common categories of thought from which orators select their "ideas". In invention, *special*

topics are referred to as “the places to find things” and are identified also as kinds of causes. Identifying the kinds of causes or issues exhibited before the audience to judge may give another dimension to the analysis of arguers’ constructions. The rhetorical perspective to topic selection proposes two main analytical approaches; the first is the oratory type or rhetorical genre of the speech and the second is the stasis.

The oratory types

Oratory, or the art of public speaking, is for Aristotle a genre of rhetoric. According to classical rhetorical theories this argumentative genre may belong to one of three branches: judicial, deliberative or epideictic. In the judicial type of argumentation, arguments are advanced to defend or accuse opponents based on their actions. Within the deliberative kind participants need to come to a compromise about an issue, so arguments aim at justifying decisions and solutions. Finally, in the epideictic oratory, arguments are meant to evaluate the character of some opponents (whether participating or not in the communicative situation), namely to praise or to blame them. Both judicial and epideictic types of oratory have the purpose of criticizing and evaluating issues, events and people, whereas the deliberative type rests on the aim of reaching a solution to an issue, so it is inclined towards future actions and relies on analysis and prediction.

The Stasis or finding the issue

Identifying the stasis of an argumentative speech is concerned with finding the different possible perspectives and options for issue identification. It is an analysis necessary for understanding how one will attempt to resolve an issue and form a conclusion. In order to examine the perspectives from which arguers may handle a general topic or issue and to recognize them as ideological strategies realized by these choices and selections of topic, one may make the following speech categorization so as to find out how arguers approach these topics. If the arguers make conjunctures in their discussion of the Iraq war, say by imputing fault in their opponents’ acts or charging them with offence, and then their topics are referred to as conjectural. When they attempt to define or redefine issues and facts as a form of contesting intended participants in the debate, this form of topic selection belongs to the definitional stasis type. However, if they engage in

defending or denouncing positions about already raised issues within the debate, their approach is identified as qualitative. Finally, when they decide that any resolution to the conflict of positions towards an issue should be translated to another entity for a more adequate judgment, the stasis is translative. Given the fact that the status (or position) is a sort of a design of the discourse strategy or line of argument, determining this design may represent an efficient resource to the understanding of the discursive and argumentative ideological strategies which motivate the arguers' choices when bringing an issue to discussion.

Pragma-dialectics encourages the study of contextual features of argumentative discourse for a more effective analysis of strategic maneuvers (to substantiate parameter 3 and 4). Context is crucial when looking at a pragmatic dimension of discourse and awareness of it affects local and macro interpretations. Therefore, Pragma-dialectics proposes the analysis of the argumentative "activity type" in order to determine the pre-conditions for strategic maneuverings. This consists mainly of investigating the institutional aims and conventions which could condition the strategic moves in a particular argumentative exchange.

3. 4. 5. The study of argumentative activity type in Pragma-dialectics

To be able to systematically describe the argumentative dimension of particular practices, van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2005) introduced the concept of argumentative activity type, to distinguish between particular institutionalized communicative practices in which argumentation plays a prominent role. The need to give a comprehensive account of communicative activities has encouraged researchers to look more closely at the environment of these events, more specifically, as Levinson sustains, at their "*structures*" (Levinson, 1992: 70; italics in original). As a specific category of Levinson's activity types, argumentative activity types are, likewise, controlled by rules and conventions that are adapted to advance the realization of the goals that the arguers have as they engage in argumentative interactions in a more or less formal institutional context.

Pragma-dialectics calls for the necessity of examining the activity type and the importance of the contextualized pragmatic analysis of discourse. This decision to link argumentation to its milieu is a reaction against the long and influential tradition of some disciplines such as logic and formal dialectics which by focusing on developing valid argumentation overlook the environments in which argumentation is generated and hence disregard the account of pragmatic provisions for the productions of arguments and positions. The aim is to give due consideration to the macro-context in which the communication takes place, namely the institutional purpose of holding such an activity and the norms and conventions that shape the participants' practices and precondition their maneuvering strategies. The characterization of the argumentative activity type generally determines the discourse domain of the activity, its genre (negotiation, deliberation, adjudication, mediation, etc.) and the institutional point it aims to realize in society (van Eemeren, 2010: 139). It then establishes the kinds of institutional conventions which constrain the strategic maneuverings of participants along the four stages of the ideal critical discussion.

The constraints on the discourse establish preconditions for strategic maneuvering in the sense that they create particular opportunities for and limitations on strategic maneuvering. The type of interaction or activity influences the kind of standpoints advanced in a discussion, who will participate in the discussion, which means they use to reach their dialectical and rhetorical goals, and what rules the arguers must comply with (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2005, 2006; van Eemeren, 2010). To give an argumentative characterization of op-ed piece, for instance, one needs to take into account how the resolution process develops in that particular communicative practice, and compare this with the ideal model. In this comparison, the following four focal points are taken into account, which correspond with the four stages of a critical discussion: the initial situation (confrontation stage), the procedural and material starting points (opening stage), the argumentative means (argumentation stage), and the outcome of the discussion (concluding stage) (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2005, 2006; van Eemeren, 2010: 146). Based on these four points, the argumentative discourse in op-ed pieces can be systematically analyzed.

Characterizing the activity type, according to Pragma-dialectics, facilitates the reconstruction of the argumentative exchanges and reconciles the institutional rules and

conventions with the ideal pragma-dialectic rules for reasonable argumentation. Indeed, for pragma-dialectics many features of argumentation may remain incomprehensible to an analyst without due contemplation of contextual conditions:

The pragmatic grounding of argumentation in broader conversational activities is quite common. Arguments are frequently performed through speech acts other than simple assertives, and the argumentative force they have depends on the characteristics of the speech events in which they occur. Likewise, the standpoints that get expressed and taken up for argument have their sense and relevance established by the purposes of the activity in which they occur.

(van Eemeren et al., 1993: 94)

Based on these assumptions, the analysis of argumentation moves needs wider resources than the arguments themselves in order to identify the strategies which highly reflect the arguer's rhetorical motives. Mohammed (2009) rightly points out, that "the integration of institutional considerations into the analysis of argumentative exchanges is essential for an empirically adequate account of these exchanges" (171). Since communicative practices are context dependent, they are thus determined by a number of institutional preconditions. It is very useful to examine not only the set of primary preconditions for strategic maneuvering "which are as a rule official, usually formal and often procedural, one should also distinguish secondary preconditions, which are as a rule unofficial, usually informal and often substantial" (van Eemeren, 2010: 157). Indeed, it is necessary to situate the analysis and evaluation of argumentative strategies in the macro-context of the "communicative activity type" in which the maneuvering occurs (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2009: 2).

By exploring the macro-context, background information is made available as a source of justification for argumentative analysis. This general background information includes knowledge of certain general rules, conventions and regulations that are instrumental in understanding the function of strategic moves (van Eemeren, 2011: 145). Indeed, the pragma-dialectical analysis and evaluation procedures start with identifying the function of the argumentative moves by determining how a particular

kind of speech acts creates certain sets of commitments for the participants from culturally shared resource of facts and values, which are mainly maneuvered with as starting points for the discussion and as premises for the arguments (see van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2006: 385, on the parameters for determining strategic functions of moves).

The importance of contextualization lies in the fact that strategic maneuvering for pragma-dialecticians takes place in the real multi-varied communicative practices of people rather than an idealized critical discussion. The notion reflects the functioning of actual argumentative exchanges in genuine communicative situation. Therefore, determining the kinds of institutional norms and conventions as the preconditions necessary for carrying out certain strategic maneuvers should contribute to a more effective analysis of the strategic routes pursued by arguers. This endeavor is carried out in Chapter 5 where a characterization of the activity type of op-ed pieces issued on FP issues is advanced within the discussion of strategic maneuvering constrained by the experts' different mindsets and the professional and ideological environments in which they operate in each culture.

3. 5. The socio-cognitive approach and pragma-dialectics: common assumptions

After expounding the theoretical frameworks informing the current research study, this section is aimed to account for the common assumptions these theories share and for the benefit of bringing them together in the current study of argumentative discourse. The two approaches agree on many basic theoretical issues despite the apparent differences they have and which are probably due to a difference in their research goals and focal interests. Pragma-dialectics specializes in argumentative discourse and picks up the traditional philosophical theories on argumentation in order to adapt them to the more contemporary research needs by integrating a pragmatic dimension into the traditional and purely dialectal approaches. The sociocognitive approach, by contrast, extends its focus to all discourse and text types, as is the case with most CDS approaches, and pays specific attention to the discursive practices of social group members, mainly those delineating (power) abuses. However, these two approaches have more in common than one can perceive at first glance. The most crucial common features are related to the multidisciplinary and the critical stance they both adopt in the analysis of discourse,

their emphasis on the pragmatic and interactional dimensions of discourse in their approaches and their agreement on the importance of the notions of context and relevance in the interpretation and the evaluation of the argumentative discursive practices of language users.

The two theories apparently have different outlooks on some basic concepts. Pragma-dialectics has very often defined argumentation as a “complex speech act”, something that may clash with the understanding of the main approaches to discourse studies. For the socio-cognitive approach, argumentation cannot be regarded as a speech act but rather as a superstructure of discourse. Superstructures are defined as the global structures that characterize a discourse type and depict its typical “schematic nature: They consist of conventional categories, often hierarchically organized, that assign further structure to the various levels of discourse” (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983: 236). Disagreement over this basic concept may be considered fundamental despite the fact that van Dijk in some earlier work did view speech acts as characteristic of some discourse types, arguing that “one of the bases for distinguishing different types of discourse such as narratives, argumentations, poems or advertisements, is the possibility of assigning one, simple or complex, macro speech act to the production of such a discourse” (van Dijk, 1977b: 243). The two positions, however, may not be incompatible but, probably, simply refer to argumentation from different perspectives, the semantic and the pragmatic. Indeed, van Dijk defines superstructures in relation to the semantic dimension of discourse postulating that they “are schemata for conventional text forms; knowledge of these forms facilitates generating, remembering, and reproducing macrostructures (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983: 54), therefore, they are regarded here in schematic terms and not necessarily in a pragmatic or interactional way. Viewed pragmatically and from the perspective of pragma-dialectics, that is, as a critical discussion, the study of argumentation accounts for the specific properties of interaction such as the social relations between participants, while the study of grammar and style specifically focuses on form, and semantics focuses on meaning (van Dijk, 2007). One may possibly argue, thus, that argumentation, or more precisely an argumentative exchange, points to a strategic implementation of a complex speech act (as in Pragma-dialectics), which participants perform purposefully and display within an

appropriate discourse “superstructure” or schema (as in the sociocognitive approach) recognizable as argumentation.

The sociocognitive approach to the critical study of discourse stresses the crucial role played by human cognition in discourse and regards it as the interface between social structures and discourse. For this reason, for van Dijk the major current theories of argumentation in general including pragma-dialectics delineate the “neglect of a systematic theory of persuasive discourse that goes beyond the somewhat haphazardly chosen discourse properties (...), as well as the lack of a detailed cognitive processing theory”(van Dijk 1990: 173). The lack of a cognitive dimension in argumentation theories makes the analysis then incomplete and the critical endeavor inconclusive. Nevertheless, pragma-dialectics despite this condition does not cast out insights from other disciplines that may be favorable for a more comprehensive study of argumentation. Indeed, van Eemeren & Grootendorst (2004) argue that even though "there is no need to have a detailed knowledge of all cognitive processes that play a role in the interpretation of a discourse in order to be able to carry out an analysis based on externalized textual characteristics, (...) some insight into these processes, can of course, deepen the analysis" (p. 74). This assertion does not only indicate the method's recognition of the significant contribution of other research approaches to the advancement of argumentative studies, but also to the adoption of an interdisciplinary approach. Indeed, and as it has been mentioned in the above section on pragma-dialectics, the theory combines normative idealization with insights emerging from empirical and socially oriented discourse analysis. This interest in the social dimension of discourse keeps it in tune with the sociocognitive approach which is particularly attentive to the ways discourse (re)produces social domination and injustice. The sociocognitive multidisciplinary approach to discourse draws on various theoretical and methodological tools from different disciplines, particularly the social representation theory (Moscovici, 2000) and cognitive theories (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; van Oostendorp & Zwaan, 1994; van Oostendorp & Goldman, 1999) in order to incorporate a detailed study of structures of text into an analysis of their social and cognitive contexts (van Dijk, 2006).

Under this context, both theories regard the contributions of other research disciplines as an advantage for a more grounded critical effort. Definitely, the critical mission undertaken by the sociocognitive approach is undeniably central in its long enterprise within the critical tradition of the problem-oriented CDS. The pragma-dialectical theory assumes a critical stance in the evaluation of argumentation and adopts a critical-rationalistic view on reasonableness drawing on work of the philosopher Karl Popper (1972). In spite of the fact that pragma-dialectics proposes an analytic framework which may have a heuristic or a critical function, the latter is prevalent in the research projects undertaken mainly in the late years owing to the growing interest in argumentative strategies and in uncovering the participants' intentions and purposes behind them.

One of the most prevailing common grounds in the two theories is their interest in discourse as a communicative event and their focus on the naturally occurring language use by real language users. Van Dijk defines discourse as a form of verbal interaction between participants (1997: 2). This definition, though it applies to any discourse type, is consistent with the pragma-dialectics view of argumentative discourse as "a verbal activity which takes place by means of language use (and) a social activity which as a rule directed at other people" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 2). Furthermore, van Eemeren and his colleagues reject the strictly logical approaches which focus on argumentation as a product and urge for the study of argumentation as a discourse activity which occurs as part of natural language activities and has specific communicative goals. The two approaches, thus, agree that discourse should be viewed as an interactional activity within a communicative event and acknowledge the importance of the pragmatic dimension to discourse in the interpretation of the participants' discursively strategic moves.

These common assumptions on discourse as a communicative event and its pragmatic dimension have generated more or less comparable results in the progress of the two approaches theoretical framework. These results may be interpreted through their growing interest in context as a fundamental analytical level in the study of discourse. Despite the huge difference between the two theories on how this concept is defined- due to the sociocognitive breakup with the traditional definitions of contexts and the foundation of an innovative cognitive based theory- their special interest in context points to their engagement with the problems of ordinary language and their belief that

critical analysis is inconclusive without due consideration of contextual conditions. Pragma-dialectics' interest in the rhetorical aspect of discourse consolidates the importance given to ordinary language use of argumentation and its strategic dimension (with the notion of strategic maneuvering). The theory extension to enclose the study of the strategic dimensions of argumentation allows for a more practical treatment of fallacies and more concern with the rhetorical motivations of arguers and their intentions and goals in adopting certain strategic routes. Therefore, context is integrated in the study of argumentation through the characterization of the activity types by identifying the institutional goals and rules which should precondition strategic maneuvering. This context is viewed as an "objective, material reality" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 11), which Van Dijk criticizes by arguing that contexts are not 'objective' or 'deterministic' constraints of society or culture at all, but subjective participant interpretations, constructions or definitions of such aspects of the social environment (2006: 163). Hence, the characterization of the activity types involves the study of those social situation properties affecting interaction, while the sociocognitive approach looks at context as the participants' subjective representation of the relevant aspects of situations and society which directly interfere in the mental processes of discourse production and comprehension (p. 163)

3. 6. Summary

This chapter introduced the main theoretical frameworks within which this research work was grounded, and these are the sociocognitive approach and social actor approach from CDS and the Pragma-dialectics from argumentation theory. The main tenets of these theories have been discussed. This was followed by an outline of these frameworks' theoretical positions from the main concepts focused on this study: topics, context purposes and discursive strategies and their contextual conditions. The sociocognitive approach proposed by van Dijk was outlined in relation to relevant notions in this study. Indeed, his theories on ideology (1998a) and context (2008) constitute the main theoretical foundation of our study of the discourses of experts in op-ed pieces. The main axioms of this approach lies in the cognitive interface between discourse and society. Discourse and social structures are believed to be mediated by human cognition where the notion of mental models subjectively constructed by individuals is

key to understand the mechanisms involved in the discursive practices of social actors. Discourse is monitored by these mental models which equally intervene in the construction of context. The context and mental models individually and subjectively construed by participants extensively draw on socially- shared cognition, namely beliefs, culture and ideologies.

All CDA approaches call for considering the multidisciplinary dimensions of discourse and the use of relevant methodologies to critically investigate various discursive practices in society. Pragma-dialectics was considered a valuable option in the study of the op-ed pieces argumentative discourse as it offers systematic analytic tools for the study of argumentative discourse and takes into consideration its pragmatic and communicative dimension which may be approached from a normative and descriptive perspective. Pragma-dialectics, as theory and method for argumentation analysis (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; 2004), views argumentation as ideally taking shape in a critical discussion in which argumentation aims at the reasonable resolution of a difference of opinion. The ideal model as a critical tool represents an instrument for the argumentation analyst when deciding about the communicative functions of speech acts and provides a standard for argument evaluation (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992: 36). The ideal model of a critical discussion distinguishes four stages involved in resolution of the difference of opinion: confrontation, opening, argumentative and concluding stages.

Van Eemeren & Houtlosser (1999) introduced notion of strategic maneuvering to bridge the gap between dialectic and rhetoric. Strategic maneuvering refers to the efforts arguers make in argumentative discourse to reconcile aiming for rhetorical effectiveness with maintaining dialectical standards of reasonableness (Eemeren & Houtlosser 2006: 383). The theory urges for the study of the macro-context of each specific discourse as an argumentative activity type. Pragma dialectics, the argumentative moves and their functions are inspected in the light of the institutional preconditions constraining discursive practices. The final section of the chapter was devoted to explaining the motivations behind combining CDA and the socio-cognitive approach with Pragma-dialectics in the study of the ideological structures in the argumentative discourse of foreign policy experts in the American and Arab op-ed pieces.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

4. 1. Introduction

Chapter three outlined the major research frameworks the current research work draws upon in the cross-cultural analysis of ideological structures in the foreign policy experts' media discourses. This chapter provides a detailed description of the methodology employed in the study which is organized as follows. Following this introduction, Section 4.2 presents the data, namely, the two op-ed corpora, the American and the Arab, the criteria for their selection. The section also outlines some preconditions for strategic maneuvering in op-ed argumentation in the two cultures, namely the newspapers' participation norms and conventions for the submission of op-ed pieces and the arguers' professional or political affiliations. Finally, section 4.3 outlines the method designed for the study and provides a detailed description of the analytic tools and the research procedures.

4. 2. The data

4. 2. 1. Data selection and collection procedure

To examine and contrast the FP op-ed discourses in these two cultures in conflict, it has been important to establish a comparable set of criteria for data selection. First, all texts are opinion articles exclusively retrieved from sections referred to as: "Op-ed" (opposite the editorial page), "Columns" "Commentary" or "Opinion" depending on the way each paper names the section in which an article states a FP expert opinion produced by a regular columnist or a guest contributor about current international events. Second, the op-ed topics revolve around the issue of the "Surge" in Iraq and more specifically, the so called "New Way Forward" American policy implemented from late 2006 up to September 2007, the date in which General Petraeus –the Commander-in-chief deployed in Iraq to control the insurgency- was scheduled to report to Congress. The third criterion is that the selection of newspapers is based on their circulation ranking as of the 2007 newspapers circulation figures. This means that only op-ed pieces from the

top ten newspapers scoring highest in circulation were selected. Some correlation is conventionally established between scoring high in circulation and enjoying wide readership and prestige among news institutions. This condition is relevant at least for American and Arab media. This criterion is observed in order to limit the study to those op-ed pieces supposedly written by the top brass people in foreign policy matters and that they are published in newspapers with the highest national and international reach, hence those regarded as the most influential channels on public opinion.

A total number of sixty op-ed pieces were selected from ten American and ten Arab newspapers with three op-ed pieces from each newspaper. They were retrieved from the “opinion”, “Op-ed”, or “columnists” sections of their electronic version, i.e. those which are made available for access through their official websites. Some of the texts were electronically collected from a website called “*Opinion Source*” dedicated to bringing its customers “national and world opinion” (cited from *Opinion Source* 2007). The site offers a free opinion article roundup through email membership and almost total access to full text articles. The op-ed pieces selected expose opinions and analyses of the Iraq war in the time period between late 2006 and September 2007. The sixty op-ed piece data were arranged into two corpora (an American corpus and an Arab corpus) each consisting of thirty op-ed pieces. The Arab corpus exclusively includes English version articles, since these are meant to reach wider readership than in Arabic and they reflect the Arab FP experts positions intended to be expressed within an internationally shared debate space. The texts in the two corpora display an average length of 900 words per op-ed piece. This amount is considered to be manageable by the researcher for conducting a detailed critical analysis of discursive strategies taken up by FP experts discussing the Iraq war. Table 4.1 and table 4. 2 below outline the data sources namely the American and Arab newspapers, which sum up to 20 newspapers (ten for each culture group. Three articles have been selected from every publication.

Newspaper/ Ranking	Place of Publication	Circulation figures
1. USA Today	Virginia	2,528,437
2. Wall Street Journal N.Y	New York City	2,058,342
3. New York Times, N.Y.	New York City	1,683,855
4. Los Angeles Times	Los Angeles, CA	915,723
5. New York Post	New York City	724,748
6. The Daily News –NY	New York City	718,174
7. Washington Post	Washington, DC.	699,130
8. Chicago Tribune	Chicago, Ill	566,827
9. Houston Chronicle	Houston, TX	503,114
10. The Boston Globe	Boston, MA	477,425

Table 4.1. Top rated US papers in circulation. Source: Audit Bureau of circulations figures for 2007

Newspaper/ Ranking	Place of Publication	Circulation figures
1. Asharq Al Awsat	Saudi/ London	248.482
2. Al Hayat	Lebanese/London	234,000
3. Arab News	Saudi/Riyadh	110,000
4. Gulf News	United Arab Emirates	91,980
5. Al Ahram	Egyptian/ Cairo	75.317
6. Azzaman	Iraqi/ Baghdad	75.000
7. Al Masry Alyoum	Egyptian/Cairo	50.000
8. Arab Times	Kuwaiti/Kuwait	34.000
9. Yemen Times	Yemeni/ Sanaa	20.000
10. Jordan Times	Jordanian/ Amman	15.000

Table 4.2. Top rated Arab papers in English. Source: World Association of Newspapers. Circulation Reports 2007

The following subsection summarizes the main aspects related to the production of foreign policy opinion pieces in newspapers. These are concerned with describing institutional conditions, mainly the requirements set by the twenty newspapers for op-ed submissions, the professional and political profiles of the authors in the corpora and the institutional norms under which they operate.

4. 2. 2. The authors' profiles and their institutional goals

Research was carried out on the arguers in the two data corpora in order to examine their respective professional background and political affiliations and to reach an essential understanding of the rules they go by in their activity. The following graph, (Figure 4.1) indicates findings from the inquiry undertaken on the authors' backgrounds and the kinds of institutions they work for in both the American and the Arab corpora.




Figure 4.1. The professional profiles of the op-ed authors in the two data corpora

As indicated in the graph, there is a significant difference between the two op-ed corpora in the participants' profiles. The most striking one is the rate of arguers working for think tanks in the American corpus. This dissimilarity between the two groups may denote cultural differences between the US and the Arab countries in terms of the state of the art of foreign policy debate participation. Indeed, whereas more than half of the arguers (53.3%) in the American corpus are think tank pundits, only 13.3% of the arguers in the Arab corpus work for any such institutions. This implies that the opinion section in US newspapers tend to be highly exploited by experts who work for what are referred to as policy institutes, which are organizations that perform research and advocacy and focus on addressing political questions of national and international interest.

In the Arab corpus, there are 6/30 analysts who are regular contributors for the opinion section on international affairs and 10/30 are guest contributors who in most cases are university professors. Indeed, international relations experts in Arab countries may be more commonly employed by news or academic institutions rather than by research institutes such is the case for American experts.

Another noteworthy difference between the two corpora is the involvement of Arab newspapers' editors in the foreign policy opinion pages. This phenomenon is quite peculiar since the very reason for having an op-ed section in a newspaper - with op-ed being "the opposite the editorial" page - is to display a perspective different from editorials which should have a reserved space in the publication. This is inexistent in the American op-ed corpora as newspapers publications make clear the difference between experts' opinion contributions and their own editorial views.

Regular columnists and opinion contributors hired by the newspapers have their share among both the US and Arab newspapers expert opinion cultures. Some newspapers tend to exclusively publish the opinions of only one columnist, usually proclaimed by the newspaper as *the expert* on international affairs related to some region or geographic area (e.g. the Middle East). This has been the case for the *USA Today* and *New York Post* from which the same expert is included more than once in the corpus due to this kind of institutional practice. Indeed, op-ed columnist Ralph Peters, a retired military officer and strategic analyst, is the only author of foreign policy-related issues and

seems to monopolize the opinion sections in both newspapers. Some other columnists are renowned for being regular analysts in the most prestigious newspapers all over the world. They are syndicated columnists and have established their own reputation through strong political views which proved popular over the years, such as Thomas Friedman (*NY Times*) and Charles Krauthammer (*Washington Post*) who have earned a highly regarded authority status on policy issues and are often consulted on extremely controversial and heated global issues. Other foreign policy experts are invited based on their knowledge in foreign relations, but more importantly sometimes on the privilege of holding first hand experiences in the matter through their trips to the battle fields in Iraq and their personal acquaintance or direct access to the facts. This institutional precondition is overtly declared by the *Washington Post* or *Al Ahram*.

A number of op-ed authors in the two corpora may be recognized to exercise what is widely known as “advocacy journalism”. Even though most contributors to the opinion sections are not considered journalists, some do share the journalists profile in terms of the frequency with which they participate in media debates and the weight of their contributions and degree of their involvement in public debates. This kind of experts generally named “pundits” may have different affiliations, but in the US they generally work for policy institutes, more known as Think Tanks. They seek to promote an image of themselves as one guided by the ideals of objectivity and public service and aiming at raising awareness, generating public debate, influencing public opinion, promoting policy and changes around specific issues.

4. 2. 3. The institutional conditions in the two corpora

The institutional conditions of the current data corpora along with the general institutional rules and conventions constraining FP experts’ debates in the media are expected to establish the preconditions for the discursive strategies and decisions undertaken by the experts in the policy debates and inform our interpretation of the data analysis (Chapters 6 and 7). These assumptions are based on the Pragma-dialectics’ call for the need to examine the institutional rules or conventions in each activity type and determine the kinds of opportunities or constraints they may create for the

argumentation/discussion participants when they strategically maneuver to maintain balance between their dialectical and their rhetorical goals. Such norms may be regarded as crucial conditions for the discursive construction of the political debate and particularly influential of the argumentative and pragmatic strategies adopted by the debate participants. Exploring the institutional preconditions for the productions of the op-ed pieces is as important as investigating the mindsets of the debate participants and the identification of the sociopolitical environment in which they operate. Both should provide essential insight and guidance to the interpretation of the kinds of cognitions interfacing their discursive practices and political actions. This section presents the information made available by the various institutions involved in the production of the op-ed corpora under study, namely the criteria established by the newspapers for op-ed submission, the mission statements of the policy institutes, as in the institutions' websites and the goals of the relevant political parties.

4. 2. 3. 1. Newspapers' criteria for FP op-ed submission

The newspapers' conditions are the guidelines or norms explicitly expressed by the newspapers or implicitly recognized from their respective editorial standards and orientations as conditions for op-ed admission for publication. Tracking the rules established by the ten newspapers institutions in each culture group helps to clarify the boundaries under which the op-ed discourses were produced and delineates one of the most important contextual clues on their respective ideological inclinations.

Guidelines for writing and for editorial acceptance of op-ed articles for publishing vary from an institution to another and more importantly from a culture to another. In the current data corpora, very few institutions make their opinion submission guidelines public or make other related rules visible in their websites. Indeed, most institutions in the two groups, especially the Arab ones, do not make their norms or selection criteria accessible to the audience. Three out of ten American newspapers expose their editorial conditions for opinion submission to their readers and these are the *USA Today*, the *New York Times* and the *LA Times*, while other newspapers either require readers to subscribe in order to learn about any editorial norms such is the case for *Wall Street*

Journal or do not disclose such norms to the public. As for the Arab corpus, only one newspaper, *Al Ahram*, states the prerequisites for op-ed admissions. All of the above mentioned newspapers in the two cultures articulate more or less the same aim for publishing FP op-ed pieces. They all emphasize the newspapers' commitment to offering a space for the world's top experts and practitioners from international affairs, global defense and national security areas to give insights into breaking global events and emerging trends. This practice is implicitly assumed by the remaining number of media institutions in the American and Arab corpora, as could be deduced from the biographical information usually provided on the op-ed authors denoting expertise in FP related careers. Information on the authors is usually included in the byline displaying their political or professional positions or the field of their exceptional experience.

Most media institutions openly disclaim any link between the contributors' views and their own views even if they seem to allude to their guests' objective handling of political issues despite the label "opinion" label bearing of personal and subjective touch. Some institutions are inclined to publish an op-ed that disagrees with their own editorial views such is the case for the *LA Times* and *New York Times*. The *LA Times*, for instance, asserts that "the page itself has no ideological bent or political agenda; we want to provide the broadest possible range of opinions — from the left, from the right and, we hope, from authors whose politics are much harder to pigeonhole". This policy may be appreciated in the three opinion pieces selected from this publication which are produced by experts exhibiting opposing positions over the policies to adopt in Iraq (related to different political party ideologies). Alternatively, some newspapers seek to attract readership by "clashing opinions" relying on authors' "ingenuity" (*New York Times*), provocative style or by "stimulating some kind of intellectual engagement with the subject" (*LA Times*). Other invite expert guests to offer solutions to highly controversial and heated global issues not only based on their expertise in FP but more importantly sometimes on the privilege of holding first hand experiences in the matter through their trips to the battle fields in Iraq and their personal acquaintance or direct access to the facts. This institutional precondition is overtly declared by some papers such as the *Washington post* or *Al Ahram Weekly*.

The three Arab newspapers with the largest circulation surprisingly follow an unexpected policy in publishing opinion pieces or columns about world current issues. Indeed, in *Ashraq Al Awsat*, *Dar Al Hayat* and *Arab News* largely known as the most widely read papers in the world, four out of nine opinion pieces are written by editors or chief editors, something considered contradictory and atypical in worldwide journalistic standards, since the editors' opinion is commonly produced in the editorial section. This is a peculiar phenomenon for the three newspapers which presumably enjoy the highest circulation rates and an international prestige as Arab media sources. They are published and distributed in London and many other major Arab and European capital cities. Both *Ashraq Al Awsat* and *Arab News* are among the huge media networks owned by the Saudi Kingdom Holding and funded by one of the richest Arabs in the world, namely Al Waleed Bin Talal, while *Dar Al Hayat* which is considered a rival paper to *Ashraq Al Awsat*, is the property of Prince Khalid Bin Sultan. Definitely, they are all owned and controlled by Saudi royal family members, a regime notorious for its censorship - mainly since the 1990s – and for the prosecution of newspapers and journalists in many Arab countries for any unfavorable coverage of Saudi affairs (World Audit, 2011).

4. 2. 3. 2. Think tanks' mission statements and politicians' goals

The rules and conventions constraining the op-ed pieces are not typically uniform and not only depend on the media institutions but also on the types of institutions and professional setting to which the experts are affiliated, namely political parties, think tanks and academic institutions. This sub section hence explores the norms established by the policy institutes, first in the American then in the Arab corpus. Think tanks turn out to be the very institutions in the two corpora which explicitly state their goals in producing the FP op-ed pieces. Even though not all think tanks provide equal opportunities for access to their norms for the general public, the rules and norms may in some cases be (informally) appreciated and interpreted from the discursive postures and behaviors of the FP practitioners.

Since more than half of the experts in the American corpus are employed by policy research institutions (think tanks), the mission statements of these major think tanks

were examined in order to learn about the key goals of the institutions for which a good majority of American authors in this corpus work. Below, Table 4.3 displays the most prominent op-ed pieces authors' associated institutions and a summary of the assignments they undertake as research institutions. These missions are stated in their respective websites and list the main tasks and concerns of the business they undertake.

Think tank / expert	General mission	Foreign policy mission/agenda
Brookings Michael O'Hanlon	conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations	secure a more open, safe, prosperous and cooperative international system
The Institute for the Study of War Kimberly Kagan	advance an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education.	improve the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives
Center for Strategic and International Studies CSIS Edward Luttwak	provide strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decision makers chart a course toward a better world.	dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Max Boot	be a resource for its <u>members</u> , government officials (...) other interested citizens help better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries.	takes no institutional positions on matters of policy
Heritage Foundation Peter Brookes	formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense.	promote America's role in the world "Because of its dedication to the universal truths of equality and liberty, this country has a responsibility to uphold the cause of freedom abroad"
Forum of International Policy Brent Scowcroft	strive to add their voice to public debate	address humanitarian intervention
The Hoover Institution Steve Huntley	generate and disseminate ideas directed at positive policy formation (...) converting conceptual insights into practical policy initiatives judged to be beneficial to society	dynamically point the road to peace, to personal freedom and to the safeguards of the American system.
International Crisis Group Robert Malley	work on conflict prevention and resolution by combining field-based analysis, practical policy prescriptions and high-level advocacy	assist policymakers determine how best to handle Islamist terrorism, nuclear proliferation, impunity for international crimes, trafficking in arms and drugs and problems associated with conflict-prone states.
Foundation for Defense of Democracies Clifford D. May	provide cutting-edge research, investigative journalism and public education - transforming ideas into action and policy.	help free nations defend themselves.
MIT Center for International Studies Barry P. Posen	conduct research in a wide range of international subjects, among them international relations, security studies, and international science and technology.	bridge the worlds of the scholar and the policymaker on issues related to military tactics and interventions, inter-state conflicts, sub-state violence (terrorism, insurgency and civil war)

Table 4. 3. American think tanks' mission statements and specific FP statements

In spite of their political diversity, the list of the mission statements produced by the think tanks in foreign policy displays a common goal- which is shared by virtually all institutions. This goal is the institutions' dedication to carrying out public debate on foreign policy projects and decisions. The reason behind the consensus about this goal is their commitment to holding themselves responsible in society for the accomplishment of democratic principles. Their responsibilities expressed in different ways such as "dissemination of information and analysis, "promoting constructive debate" and "clarifying world issues" certainly share the same feature, that of being a knowledge resource for citizens. Consequently, this goal seems to be shedding on their participation in the debate a sense of interest-free condition. In fact, being mostly non-profit and research oriented organizations probably exonerates them from a straightforward adherence to profit industry.

The audience of a FP debates (or the public) may more easily recognize the features of the politicians' duties than the work of FP experts in policy institutes or elsewhere. Indeed, these duties are perceived as political work and closely associated with the politician's party agenda and its creed. Those politicians invited to submit their opinions on foreign policy events and issues are expected to faithfully transmit their party's position and decisions on these issues. Even though their positions may equally be as scientifically founded as those of professional foreign policy, they are generally regarded as inclined by the political interests of the party leaders.

A highly significant rate in the American op-ed corpus is produced by politicians. Indeed thirty percent (30%) of the arguers are political figures from various political parties. Officially their opinions do not reflect the newspapers views or positions, which is why these newspapers tend to publish to politicians from diverse political parties and factions and hence guarantee the popularity and readership for their section. The current main disagreement point in the political debates of opposed parties was whether to stay in Iraq or to withdraw troops from it. The governing administration of G.W Bush partisans mostly call for staying the course in Iraq and continuing the fight to accomplish the foremost aim of eradicating terrorism. Politicians like Joseph Lieberman Tony Snow fervently support the Surge and the claim for progress in Iraq is easily interpreted as a reproduction of the ideological views of the Bush administration and their obstinacy for declaring victory in Iraq.

In the case of Arab opinion pieces in the media, the activity type undertaken by Arab experts seems to observe different rules and conventions which are generally less accessible and hard to define for outsiders, but probably easy to interpret from the political environment in which they are produced. The fact that 20% of the experts are state spokesmen is also revealing as well as the use of newspapers editors to the opinion sections. The authoritarian regimes provide a different panorama on the institutional rules and norms which may in this case be guessed as abiding by censorship. Analyst and guest contributors who are not officially recognized as state spokespeople are also suspected to be working under the same institutional conditions of censorship. These conditions have been more extensively explored in chapter 4 discussing the mindsets constraining the discursive strategies of experts in the Arab culture.

Apart from the experts directly and overtly working under the institutional rules and conventions of their respective governments, there are other institutions which are probably indirectly controlled by the authoritarian states. These are academic and research institutions such as policy institutes or think tank. This type of institution is a newly introduced phenomenon in the current time Arab world. Indeed, it is not until the late 2000 that such institutions have started to operate in Arab states and most are partnerships or franchises of American most powerful think tanks such as Saban Center for Middle East policy property of Brookings institution, the number one most influential American think tank and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Lebanon. These US linked think tanks are certainly not only expected to be abiding by American standards and rigor for carrying policy analyses but also suspected for obeying to the US visions and interests of inter-state relations in the Middle East or at least that what is widely deemed in Arab public opinion.

Further research on the current Arab op-ed corpus authors allows us to ascertain that no more than 4 authors (13.33% of the total experts) work for some policy institute. Indeed, three out of four think tank analysts are associated to the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) Egypt. The *Al Ahram*, being one of the oldest newspapers in the Arab world, has a prestigious position in the Egyptian and Arab media, even though working under a system of government control.

Think tank / expert	General mission	Foreign policy mission/agenda
Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) Egypt/ Galal Nasser Amr El Chobaki M. H. Khalesi	focuses on developmental issues of the international system, interactive trends between Arab countries and the international system	maintains complete independence in directing its research activities on international and strategic issues
Gulf Research Center Akif Jamal	Conducts objective and scholarly research bearing on political, economic, security, environment and science issues, as they relate to the geopolitical region of the Gulf in general.	Looks first at the critical issues for each program in the Gulf countries. Providing non-partisan, in depth and trustworthy research and knowledge about the region

Table 4. 4. Arab Think tanks mission statements and specific FP statements

Table 4.4 shows how the ACPSS (above mentioned) founded by Al Ahram publication house proclaims to make an effort to present the public information resources based on research studies on various domestic and international issues and following a more up-to-date state of the art news analysis. The Gulf research center also claims rigor and non partisanship in its analysis of the political events, and this rule is observed in Akif Jamal's op-ed piece to an extent that his contribution may be classified more as a piece of news than a piece of opinion as no standpoint may be identified along his opinion column.

4. 3. Research method and procedures

The study of the op-ed discourses adopts a CDA stance for examining the op-ed discursive constructions and argumentation strategies by drawing primarily on the Pragma-dialectical method and combining it with analytic tools from classical rhetoric and also from critical discourse analysis, those proposed by van Dijk (2008) for the study of context and by van Leeuwen (2008) to the analysis of discursive construction of purposes. Pragma-dialectics assisted in the management of the current study data and prepared them for the critical analysis. The research procedures consisted of the following steps, as illustrated in table 4.5 below. Based on Pragma-dialectics, in the first step a preliminary analysis was carried out. The next step consisted of analyzing the discursive constructions decisions of the arguers. This step consisted of examining: 1) the selection of topics and the enactment of context using the analytic tools proposed

by van Dijk (2008) and inspecting the construction of purposes following Van Leeuwen (2008). The last research step consisted of the identification of the argumentative strategies, their evaluation as discourse moves and the inspection of their ideological implications. This has integrally relied on pragma-dialectic model and its notion of strategic maneuvering.

Analytic step	Procedures
Step I Preliminary analysis	The critical stage Critical discussion reconstruction Analytic overview Preconditions for strategic maneuvering
Step II Analysis of discursive construction decisions	Topic selection Context Purpose in actions
Step III Argumentative strategies	Strategic maneuvering Fallacies

Table 4. 5. Analytic steps and procedures

4. 3. 1. Preliminary analysis of the corpora

Following the analytic framework of pragma-dialectics, a preliminary analysis to the data was initiated. This consisted of identifying the critical stages of each op-ed piece, reconstructing the critical discussions, elaborating an analytic overview and finally examining the institutional

The sixty text data corpora were examined taking the single opinion piece as a unit of analysis viewed following van Eemeren & Grootendorst (2004) as the “critical discussion”. In each critical discussion, the four discussion stages meant to resolve a difference of opinion were distinguished: 1) the confrontation stage commonly used to define the difference of opinion between participants; 2) the opening stage involving the starting points established by participants and the agreements they established upon the rules of the discussion along the propositions to be use in their argumentation; 3) the

argumentation stage: in which the protagonist defends his/her standpoint by putting forward arguments to counter the antagonist's objections or doubt; 4) the concluding stage is identified by locating where the discussion parties evaluate to what extent their initial difference of opinion has been resolved and in whose favor. After the identification of discussion stages, a reconstruction of argumentation is mainly realized for the purpose of identifying unexpressed statements or premises and facilitating the reorganization of the critical stages according to the pragma- dialectical ideal model.

The analysis proceeded with a reconstruction of the sixty critical discussions making up the two data corpora. The reconstruction involved the following: first, examining the points at issue and the procedural and material points of departure chosen; second, identifying the arguments whether explicitly expressed or left unexpressed and determine their schemes and overall structures; third, realizing the necessary transformation to each text. This transformation consisted in making necessary deletions, additions, substitutions and permutations in the text. Deletion is the removal of irrelevant parts of the discussion. Addition is the inclusion of the relevant parts made implicit by the arguer like the unexpressed premises or standpoints. Substitution is replacing vague formulations by clear ones and permutation is rearranging parts of the text that best bring their relevance to the resolution process. Reconstructing the op-ed pieces prepared the data for higher level inspections from the different theoretical frameworks.

The analytic overview constituted the basis for a critical analysis and evaluation of the discursive construction of the op-ed pieces and their argumentative strategies. Producing an analytic overview for each of the sixty op-ed pieces or "critical discussions" required doing the following: 1) clarifying the difference of opinion at issue, determining the standpoints and the positions of the participants (the op-ed authors and their audience); 2) identifying the premises which serve as the starting points and assumptions in the discussions, 3) identifying the discussion arguments implicitly or explicitly advanced, determining the argument schemes employed and categorizing them into their scheme types; and recreating the argumentation structure constructed, 4) finally, identifying the conclusion reached. Filling in an analytic overview template constituted a very useful research step since it provided a sort of an

outline or summary of the most important content of a critical discussion relevant to analysis.

Finally, the focus goes to contextualization in the institutionalized communicative activity type. By examining the institutions, we focus both on the professional – here foreign policy analysis in the media- and the broader socio-political ideologies relevant in both the American and the Arab cultural contexts. Drawing on Pragma-dialectical method, the macro-context of the FP op-ed pieces, namely the FP experts' mindsets and their institutional conventions forming the preconditions for the experts' argumentative strategies are explored focusing on three main points. First, the institutional point for publishing FP op-ed pieces and their discourse domain are discussed. Experts come from different professional backgrounds and have different aims, mainly those instantiated by their respective endorsing institutions. Second, the FP op-ed piece as a communicative activity type is characterized argumentatively by describing the distinctive features of the empirical counterparts of the four stages of a critical discussion in the activity type concerned. Third, the FP experts' mindsets and their nation/states' political and ideological resources are explored and their role in creating the preconditions for strategic maneuvering in each culture is determined. These mindsets create the main resources for the experts' strategic maneuvering with audiences' commitments and for maneuvering with starting points in the op-ed pieces.

4. 3. 2. Analyzing the discursive construction decisions

This part focuses on answering research question 1 concerned with finding out how the Iraq debate was defined by the op-ed authors. More specifically, the focus was on a number of discursive constructions which could be highly indicative of the ideologically based decisions of the op-ed authors, namely their selection of topics, their definition of context and their construction of purposeful actions. Examining the ideological underpinnings of the selection of topics in op-ed discourses draws in major part on discourse analytic and rhetorical tools while the analysis of discursive construction of context and purpose rely consecutively on van Dijk's theory of context models (2008) and on van Leeuwen's framework on the discursive recontextualization (2008). The

findings from this analysis are reported and discussed in chapter 6. Research adopted the following analytic procedures:

Topic selection

Based on Van Dijk's sociocognitive approach, the selection of topic as a prominent discursive construction decision was examined by looking at the op-ed piece semantic macrostructure (Van Dijk 2000). This involves locating the macroproposition derived from sequences of micro- propositions in each op-ed text. This requires the use of some rules for semantic inference for its extraction. This task was monitored in the "reconstruction" of the texts involving the transformation realized mainly that of adding the relevant parts of the made implicit by the arguers such as unexpressed premises, presupposed propositions and implicit assertions. In this process, the implicit propositions which constituted macro propositions were identified and verbalized: Given the argumentative nature of the texts, these macro-propositions making up the semantic macrostructures of texts were at the same the macro speech acts indicating the arguers' intended actions in the discourse such as warning, predicting or asserting. They were hence the standpoints, the arguers' main positions in advancing argumentation. These standpoints were tackled here from a semantic perspective that is, focusing on their semantic content by grouping them under similar themes. They were similarly looked at from a pragmatic perspective and they were categorized based on the goals realized in producing them. The op-ed standpoints were classified according to their goals and their frequencies in the corpora.

Both the variety of themes and goals are indicative of the scope of the disagreement spaces relevant in the debate on Iraq. This means that by classifying texts into similar themes, it becomes easier to delineate the range of positions addressed in the debate in general and not only those in the corpora, given the fact that the very standpoints evoke a number of counter positions. The classification of the semantic macro structures and their pragmatic dimensions all support the task of determining from which disagreement spaces the standpoints had been selected and which spaces did not take part in the debate. This step also allowed contrasting the disagreement spaces in the two arguers groups and determining what topics come high in the agenda of each cultural group.

The size of the corpora was considered empirically capable of determining the ideological explanation behind the arguers' main decisions in constructing the debate.

In order to reinforce the conclusions drawn from the op-ed themes and goals on the ideological dimensions of topic selections, the standpoints were handled from the perspective of classical rhetoric. Two analytic tools were used to inspect the perspectives from which topics were dealt with and explain the reason behind these positions. The first tool draws on the oratory type theory, according to which the macro propositions (or standpoints) in each data corpus were categorized into one of three oratory types: judicial (accusations), deliberative (decision making), or epideictic (moral evaluation). The oratory types in the two cultural groups were counted and the results were contrasted. The second analytic tool used to examine topics was based on stasis theory. This task involved finding the different possible perspectives and options with which the authors identified the issues for argumentation. Accordingly, the standpoints were classified into one of the four types of stases: conjectural (bringing the issue to judgment), definitional ((re)defining the issue), qualitative (defending or attacking some already contested issue) and translative (deciding the issue should be judged somewhere else). Based on the assumption that the stasis is a sort of vantage point from which an issue is viewed, determining the type of stasis in each critical discussion (text) offers reliable insight on the ideological strategies manifest in discourse and strengthens our understanding to the arguers' motive for making certain topical choices when bringing an issue to discussion.

The collection of these research tools employed to examine the op-ed topics, namely identification of semantic and pragmatic macro structures, oratory types and stases were used to identify the disagreement spaces from which the topics were selected and reveal the patterns in with which arguers in the two cultural groups define and construct the debates on the Iraq issue.

Analysis of context models

The next construction decision examined in the op-ed debate on Iraq is context as "the participants' subjective definition of the relevant dimensions of the social situation" (Van Dijk 2008). Contexts are cognitively constructed mental models and their analysis

is concerned with the pragmatic dimension of discourse. The current study focuses on two schematic categories of context, namely those of Setting and Participants. In setting, text analysis was carried out exploring the pragmatic dimension of place, which is the interpretation of the arguers' sociopolitical, cultural or geographical place in relation to the event constructed. Therefore, the texts were coded for those discursive structures indicating the arguers' definition of the debate location. The findings from the analysis of the two data corpora were later contrasted.

The contextual schematic category of participants was examined throughout the discourse in order to locate those structures in which the arguers enact their professional and political identities and their roles and relationships with other participants in the communicative event. Participants' self definitions are tracked down in those discourse properties signaling the arguers' expression of identities and those types of identities were counted and categorized into similar identity type groups. Those discursive structures or properties signaling roles and relationships as participants' context categories were examined in the same way. The pragmatic dimension of the textual structures was the focus and those structures in which arguers seemed to enact their relationships with others and their roles as participants in the communicative event were counted and categorized under similar category groups.

The research carried out on the arguers' professional backgrounds and official political and ideological affiliations points to the amplitude of opportunities the arguers have in terms of political identity owing to their multiple institutional affiliations or the variety of their political activities. For this reason, it becomes very interesting to examine their context constructions in discourse to determine the discursive choices they make which may be controlled by their ideologically biased mental models. Hence despite this variety and sometimes complex set of identities to choose from, the arguers seem to limit their identity enactment to an easily interpretable/ identifiable one or set of identities, probably the one(s) they judge most relevant to the current discussion. Therefore, the examination of these identity construction choices allows the recognition of the variations in self and the identification of the impact these choices may have on the discursive or more precisely argumentative strategies adopted by them.

Analysis of discursive construction of purpose in actions

The next area explored in the debate constructions realized by the op-ed authors in these data corpora are the purposive actions. A discursive analysis of how actions and their purposes were discursively constructed was carried out based on the framework proposed by van Leeuwen (2008). I used the tools proposed in this framework for critically analyzing modes of representing the purposes of social actions as they are controlled by the arguers' contextual models and the kind of social cognition they draw on in their discursive construction of purposes of these actions and of social practices in general. Actions as expressed in the main propositions of each text, namely the standpoints and sub-standpoints were examined and categorized into one of three main types of actions: 1) the goal-oriented type where actions have explicit agents and are activated. Agents in this type are "discursively empowered as intentional" Van Leeuwen (2008: 127) 2) the means oriented in which purpose is constructed as "in the action" and is generally objectivated mainly by the use of nominalization and 3) the effective type which are discursively constructed as results or as not controlled by those who perform them. After categorization, a critical interpretation of the results was meant to expose any patterns which might be manifested in the discursive constructions of the op-ed texts and point to any discrepancies between the two arguers' groups.

4. 3. 3. Analyzing the argumentation strategies

The final research stage focuses on answering the second main research question by inspecting ideologies within the argumentative strategies employed by the op-ed authors in their debate on Iraq. Adopting a critical discursive approach, the analysis was carried out on the two text corpora based on the Pragma-dialectic method and mainly drawing on the notion of strategic maneuvering. Strategic maneuverings in the corpora were identified, classified and evaluated following Pragma-dialectic normative method and the dialectic rules it established. The interpretation of ideologies enacted within these maneuvers was informed by the research carried out on the FP experts' institutional rules and conventions which might control and precondition the strategic fabric of their argumentative discourse. The findings are reported and discussed in chapter 7.

Identifying Strategic Maneuverings

The analysis and classification of strategic maneuvering picks up from the preliminary data preparation stage which consisted of identifying the four dialectical stages in the argumentative texts (critical discussions), implementing their reconstruction and elaborating their analytic overviews. These have been essential steps before proceeding to the task of determining the kinds of strategic maneuverings employed by the writers and through which they attempted to gear the text towards the most effective results and towards resolving the difference of opinion to their maximum benefits.

At this point, the data were examined for the kinds of strategic maneuvering performed. The notion of strategic maneuvering worked as a connecting point between the dialectical purpose of the arguer and his/her rhetorical aims. The reason for the integration of this notion relies on the fact that the pragma-dialectical perspective extends the traditional normative logical approach of evaluating arguments by creating standards for reasonableness that have a functional, rather than a structural, focus. An argument is evaluated in terms of its usefulness in moving a critical discussion toward resolution rather than concentrating on the relationship of premises to conclusions.

In the process of strategic maneuvering analysis, it was necessary to identify the dialectical and the rhetorical goals involved in the various stages of each critical discussion (that is each text). The identification of these goals relied on a number of analytic tools mainly that of reconstructing the main premises in each discussion. The reconstructed text helped identify the maneuvers used strategically in argumentation. This involved: 1) determining the discursive moves pertaining to each critical stage 2) identifying the moves which are advanced strategically by the arguers to fulfill their rhetorical and dialectical goals, 3) categorizing these moves according to their level of maneuvering, that is either as maneuvering of topical potential, adjustment to the audience or an attempt to make the best use of presentational devices. These operations were realized for each critical stage and strategies were identified as follows.

The confrontation stage

In the confrontation stage, maneuvering was examined basically by linking the confrontational topics into the general disagreement spaces from which they were selected to see how this particular choice was adapted to the audience as well as how it was verbalized.. This was made feasible thanks to the size of the data corpora- being sixty texts- which was estimated as sufficient for an empirical study and for tracking down the topical choices available to the debate participants. The analysis started with examining the collection of standpoints and identifying the background against which these positions were adopted. This involved grouping the positions which belonged to similar disagreement contexts and points of departure into a topic area. The collections of topic areas resulting out of this task gave a basic idea about the boundaries of the disagreement space for each group community. In the confrontation stage where arguers engage in introducing their positions within the relevant context and background, the collection of possible counter positions (referred to in Pragma-dialectics as the virtual positions) may be discerned thanks to an extensive inspection of the war debate from the data corpora themselves. In the case where an arguer refutes a counter argument, the space becomes even easier to determine for the analyst, since the standpoints are explicitly advanced against some opposing views hence stated within the discussion itself.

The opening stage

In the opening stage, strategic maneuvering was examined by looking at the way dialectical roles are distributed among the argumentation discussion participants and the kinds of assumptions established as starting points for discussion. The first task consisted of reviewing the analytic reviews elaborated earlier and annotating the roles adopted by the arguers and the roles they allocated to the participants. More important was identifying the audience addressed and the one(s) who seemed to be excluded from participation in the discussion and also detecting cases of manipulations of participants' roles. The second task was concerned with identifying the propositions (explicit and implicit) that function as starting points and which are meant to be common ground and non disputable. These propositions were then classified into themes in order to be linked

to the concepts (or values) meant to establish by such strategic choice. The themes under which these assumptions were grouped highly reflect the ideological reference point of the arguer and the shared beliefs his/her assumptions are drawn from.

The argumentation stage

In order to identify maneuvers in the argumentative stage, the focus was placed on the main arguments in the corpora for the aim to identify the most prominent strategies employed in argument invention (location) and disposition (building) according to the canon of rhetoric. The strategies examined were those developing the lines of arguments known as the *loci* and they entail finding out how arguments translate into ideas, while the analysis of arguments disposition/content involved looking at *topoi*, being the premises taken as common knowledge and employed to provide evidence for arguments. In the absence of a theoretical typology for the types of strategic maneuverings, the present study relied on the notion of *loci* in determining the categories under which the maneuvers should be classified. This decision was motivated first by the belief that “arguments begin by decisions regarding how to construct and present them” (Tindale, 2007: 8) and second by the fact that arguments *loci* are places from which arguments can be discovered or invented. They are basic categories of relationships among ideas, each of which can serve as a template or heuristic from which many individual arguments can be constructed (Rhetoricae 2003). The main purpose of this endeavor is to dissect argumentation procedures used by each group of arguers and identify the patterns- if possible- involved in their respective reasoning processes by looking at the routes they take in developing their arguments and the type of support they use in consolidating them.

The concluding stage

Examining maneuvering in the concluding stages required identifying the moves advanced to define the outcome of the difference of opinion resolution process pursued by the participants and in this case, determine the author’s appreciations and say on the matter. The moves may indicate the authors’ power positions as participants in the

debate and the judgment they cast on their own participation and impolitically or explicitly on other parties' roles and position.

After identifying the maneuvers at each of the four critical stages (confrontation, opening, argumentation and concluding) and determining the kinds of rhetorical goals prompting their use, the maneuvers were labeled based on the function of the goals pursued in using them. This task was particularly difficult to implement, as Pragma-dialectics does not offer any typology for strategic maneuvering and instead relies on labeling the strategies based on the goals meant to be achieved by such maneuvers. These goals were critically approached and linked to the kind of ideological goal pursued by the arguers. The two corpora strategic maneuvers were contrasted and their ideologically motivated strategic choices were critically interpreted.

Strategic maneuvering derailment

Finally, strategic maneuvering was evaluated for soundness to detect fallacies, regarded as derailment of strategic maneuvering. The argumentative moves were checked for logical and pragmatic inconsistencies and fallacies were identified and discussed in terms of their significance in the reproduction of ideologies in discourse. In order to identify fallacies, argumentation was scrutinized according to the rules for critical discussion proposed by Pragma-dialectics.

4. 4. Summary

This chapter has provided a discussion of the research methodology used in the study. It starts with outlining the main research questions addressed and the goals for carrying out in this research study. This is followed by an account on the data used for the study namely, opinion articles (or op-ed pieces) issued in American and Arab major newspaper dealing with the issue of the Iraq Surge during 2007 and the international debate on the US policies in Iraq. The section outlines the criteria for data selection and collection and the institutional conditions behind their production by providing a description of the newspapers' op-ed submission criteria, the arguers' professional profiles and the institutional rules under which they work. Information on the conditions

for the data production has been regarded useful for the analytic task related to strategic maneuvering (see chapter 7), as it sustains the interpretation of strategic maneuvering and regards the role of the institutional norms as the main pre-conditions for strategic choices in argumentation. Following that, there is a detailed outline of the research design and the analytic tools. Based on the two frameworks adopted in the analysis of some discursive decisions such as topic selection, context, and purposeful actions constructions and the inspection of ideological strategies of FP arguers, the research procedures are explained and the steps followed at each stage are stated. The methodology relied on the sociocognitive approach (van Dijk, 2008) and CDA as a main stance, pragma-dialectics as an reputable method for argumentation analysis and evaluation, as well as analytic tools from classical rhetorical theory (oratory types and stasis) and the social actors' approach proposed by van Leeuwen (2008) and his recontextualization of social practice theory on discourse.

The overall research endeavor exploited the systematic analytic tools of Pragma-dialectics and the socio-cognitive insights of CDA in the study of the most influential cognitive dimension controlling the discursive patterns (ideology) of two FP expert groups in their debate on Iraq. By this procedure, the study comes to its primary question and attempts therefore, to see how American and Arab op-ed writers construct their respective opinions and what kinds of ideological strategies are used in supporting those opinions.

CHAPTER 5: MINDSETS AND INSTITUTIONAL PRECONDITIONS FOR STRATEGIC MANEUVERING IN FP OP-ED PIECES

5. 1. Introduction

In this chapter, the focus is placed on the conventions applying to communication in the institutional contexts of the FP op-ed pieces. As an argumentative activity type, the op-ed pieces display communicative practices influenced by the participants' institutional conventions and rules. More specifically, the conventions governing the type of interaction constrain the kinds of strategic maneuvering conventionally used by the participants. In Pragma-dialectics, the characterization of the activity type and of its institutional rules as preconditions for strategic maneuvering has become a crucial step in the analysis and evaluation of the discourse argumentative strategies. This chapter exploits this analytic tool to examine how the FP experts' mindsets and institutional conventions predetermine the discursive strategies in this particular activity type within the two cultures.

Exploring the contextual conditions such as the institutional purposes, norms and conventions that shape the participants' discursive practices gives insight into their mindsets as the main preconditions for their argumentative strategies. The term mindset or the mental states is used here as in social psychology (Gollwitzer 1990, Gollwitzer & Bayer 1999), where the concept, originally advanced by early cognitive scientists at the German Würzburg School, refers to the cognitive procedures activated by individuals in the pursuit of goals related to solving a given task. Exploring the mindsets of foreign policy experts engaged in public debates involves, hence, taking a closer look at these powerful social actors, at their different professional conditions and aims, at the higher-level ideological outlooks in which they work such as their nation-states' FP orientation, and, at their views on the culture in conflict with their own. With these kinds of mindsets, the experts' debate on Iraq in 2007 was held. As will be seen in chapters 6 and 7, these mindsets form the preconditions for their strategic maneuvering and their characterization provides insight into the kinds of ideologies underlying the FP experts discourses.

Section 5.2 discusses the institutional point of FP op-ed pieces and the role of the participants' different perspectives in determining these institutional goals. Section 5.3 provides a characterization of the op-ed piece on FP as a particular argumentative activity type. In Section 5.4 the focus moves to the experts' mindsets and their nation/states' ideological frameworks as preconditions for strategic maneuvering. The foreign policy orientations in the two cultures are explored to identify, with examples from the corpora, the institutional conventions constraining the strategic argumentative moves and creating the resource for participants' commitments and starting points in the op-ed pieces.

5. 2. The institutional point of FP op-ed pieces

The op-ed pieces upholding foreign policy debates are governed by the rules and conventions of two institutional entities: the media (newspaper) and the political organization to which the participants pertain. The set of conventions of the two institutions form the constraints preconditioning the participants' argumentative strategies. However, the broad sphere in which the op-ed as a communicative practice takes place is the political domain. The institutional point, or rationale, of publishing experts' opinions in the press falls under the general universally-proclaimed political communication aim to preserve a democratic political culture. This is very general, indeed, and debatable given the fact that politics is a domain of power conflicts *par excellence*. Determining the *actual* institutional point(s) of the FP op-ed pieces as an argumentative activity type requires an examination of the different political institutions involved in this communicative activity and the identification of the kinds of overarching procedural conventions they work with to produce their argumentations. Such diagnosis enhances the identification of the preconditions regularizing the argumentative strategies of experts and the ideological structures controlling them.

In democratic political systems, publishing political opinion aims at conducting a debate that seeks to engage the citizen into the political decision process based on the deliberative model offered by the system. As Habermas sustains, "the deliberative paradigm offers as its main empirical point of reference a democratic process, which is supposed to generate legitimacy through a procedure of opinion and will formation

(2006: 413). Even though it belongs to the public sphere (in the Habermasian sense), the op-ed is in practice reserved to the elite, at least to those who are eligible to participate in political debates based on their recognized status as experts in political matters. What is more, in any type of political communication in the media, access is much more critical where, in Habermas' words:

different social actors struggle for access to and influence on the media. Those actors enter the stage from three points: Politicians and political parties start from the center of the political system; lobbyists and special interest groups come from the vantage point of the functional systems and status groups they represent; and advocates, public interest groups, churches, intellectuals, and moral entrepreneurs come from backgrounds in civil society.

(Habermas 2006: 417)

Deliberation on political decisions guarantees the application of democratic principles and offers the politicians the opportunity to cultivate public support for political negotiations. Citizens' participation is supposed to be brought together after a complex process of opinion formation through political actions such as voting. Because public opinion is important in democratic political systems and may affect the shaping of the state policies, the elite take advantage of the mass media channels to cultivate public support for negotiations and "sustain different loyalties towards distinct political communities" (Sampedro, 2011: 432).

In the case of authoritarian regimes, however, the situation is extremely different. Political communication is monopolized by the ruling person or group who tends to exclusively administer its instruments for the promotion of its decisions. In the current age of political ethical imperatives of international relations, these regimes attempt to maintain a politically correct communication and make use of the same media supports used in democratic societies in order to shed democratic facade on their monolithic political behavior. Decision-making is often performed by the regime's small circle; hence citizens usually have no real or fake participation in the deliberation process. Like all political communication tools, publishing opinion pieces is part of the politicians' work and their spokesmen engaging in explaining their decisions to the public assuming

their inherent righteousness. The FP English edition op-ed piece makes no exception in the sense that it is equally monitored to varying extents by the ruling person (people). Through this activity, the ruling regime aims at opening up for experts to voice its positions on international high stake issues to an international audience. Even though there is some slight difference between the political conditions of certain Arab states, the role of the ruling regime institutional goals have an essential impact on the proceedings of op-ed pieces discourse an argumentative activity type.

The FP op-ed pieces under study are produced within two different paradigms of political communication practices. Different institutional points are developed in both democratic and authoritarian societies, and this constitutes one of the major contextual constraints for the participants' discursive strategies. The institutional points of FP op-ed pieces as an argumentative activity type are also determined by the participants' respective professional perspectives. Indeed, the op-ed pieces' discourse is constrained by the institutional conventions of the media and the political institution from which participants make relevant interpretations while putting their maneuvering strategies into practice.

5. 2. 1. FP experts with different professional perspectives

This section examines the main professional profiles of political experts involved in FP debates in the media through their contribution in the opinion sections in newspapers. The op-ed pieces are commonly written by three different kinds of people: 1) a guest expert professionally trained in foreign policy analysis typically working for independent policy or research institutes or think tanks, 2) a politician invited occasionally for a contribution and 3) a columnist specialized in foreign policy and hired by the newspaper to provide political opinion. These experts have different professional predispositions and perspectives which may act as crucial variables that shape the institutional conventions constraining their discursive practices.

The foreign policy analyst

This group identified as the FP analysts and specialized in foreign policy analysis as an academic field may have different professional roles depending on the institutions they

serve. Since the second half of the twentieth century, examining policy issues has started to develop into a field of its own, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA, henceforth) by providing tools for more practical and systematic approaches to the study of interstate relations. FPA, defined as the subfield of international relations that seek to explain foreign policy, or, alternatively, foreign policy behavior with reference to the theoretical ground of human decision makers, acting singly or in groups (Hudson, 2012: 14). Those people or groups who specialize in FPA are expected to work within a scientific field which is generally based on five goals: assess political situation, explain events, forecast future outcome, determine policy options and make decisions (Frei & Ruloff, 1989: 3). In order to assess and explain situations, FP analysts are trained to apply systematic and scientific tools such as analogy-based conclusions, cognitive mappings in the analysis of motives and intentions and systems analysis and their causal relationships based on mathematical approaches such as System Dynamics. For the situation forecast task, the analysts make use of “systematic expert judgment” (Frei & Ruloff, 1989: 138), cross impact and trend analyses among other methods in order to predict future events and to enhance the effectiveness of decisions making. Analysts prepare for decisions employing econometric models or game theory approaches to problem analysis. The final decisions to be made are usually based on decisional matrices and trees.

FP analysts typically occupy policy consultancy positions in state agencies or work for research policy institutes (think tanks). Therefore, not only do they assist policymakers in the elaborations of their decisions, but also actively participate in the political communication processes necessary to put these decisions to work. The central functions they offer to the political institution are their interpretation of events along their well-informed judgment and their capacity to take the lead in decision-making. This means that based on their expert knowledge, FP analysts may be the first to seize the magnitude of some political events and know how to prioritize the handling of political issues. According to Frei & Ruloff (1989: 6), it is the task of the analyst to “select what is important and relevant out of the huge mass of information and separate it from the unimportant and irrelevant”. Their knowledge is indeed, a key element in the processes of international politics practices because their interpretation of events is characterized as “facts” which generally become the basis for argumentation activity within the processes of decision making and the elaboration of specific policies. Their

professional practices, mainly discursive and argumentative strategies whether public or private, would thus be controlled by this supposedly “objective and scientific” knowledge. This kind of knowledge, as the main asset of the basis of the policy makers’ shared cognition, is the product of the work of generations of professional analysts and their research and interpretation of politics. Furthermore, the assumption of objectivity, politically and culturally shared (at least in the US) reinforces their credibility where personal attitudes and judgments may be taken for expertise analysis.

FP analysts’ integrated knowledge is the actual definition of the political issues. Before getting to political communication procedures such as media debates and opinion contributions and within the processes of their research planning, analysts constantly engage in setting the agenda for political issues -depending on the culture- and arranging the political communicative mechanisms which are put to work to handle them. This should be regarded by far the very bottom of the foreign policy-opinion-iceberg, since these decisions are the ones that should generate the political public debate and consequently affect public opinion along with the political communication feedback. FP analysts should also employ skillful argumentation mechanisms in order to get their decisions through. George (1993: 21) sustains that “they have the difficult task of adapting the available general knowledge of a given strategy or foreign policy undertaking to the particular case at hand”. Definitely, in order to transmit to their audience -privately or in a public space- an appealing interpretation of events and a convincing view on the most reasonable decisions, they need to argue proficiently and extremely convincingly. This task becomes challenging within a very competitive political culture.

The politician

The contribution of politicians in newspapers with opinion pieces about domestic or foreign policies is considered to be one of the many instruments exploited by politicians in their political communication strategies. The discourse of politicians is generally mediated by media channels through which politicians use instruments such as public relations, reportage, advertizing and commentary (opinion pieces) among other means to “influence the decision making process” (McNair, 2011: 5).

In democratic societies, the politicians' opinions in the newspapers are associated with the politicians' duty to involve citizens in the political decisions by adjusting to an institutional design based on the citizens' exercise of their right to access public deliberation of political problems, as they see themselves as members of their political community. Whether they are government officials engaging in the promotion of their policies or opposition party's members assessing the government decisions and criticizing them, the politicians invited to contribute in opinion columns help the public understand the motives of political decisions. In the same manner, participation in op-ed sections tackling foreign policy issues also provides politicians with an opportunity to engage the general public into the deliberation processes on policy decisions and to spell out the transcendence of these policies in preserving common national interests. In practice, the purpose is rather to influence the public opinion and shape it in favor of prospective resolutions. Since public opinion is crucial in the process of policy implementation, where the citizen may, through the right to vote and alternative pressure groups, influence the course of political decisions, political communication takes up "support building" as a chief goal. In fact, public opinion research shows (in the US) correlation between the politicians' top foreign policy priorities and the general public (Pew Research Center 2007), which may be interpreted to be the creation of politicians' discourse.

In the authoritarian societies, the politicians' opinion piece in newspapers acts as a communication tool for the unique political voice of the state. In this type of media support, as is the case for any public communication, the political discourse typically speaks from a fatherly stance addressing citizens as dependent subjects to explain to them the benefits from adopting particular policies. The political system relies on a closed circle of actors who deliberate about crucial national and international issues in a non public sphere. Opinion pieces are generally used to perpetuate the political views and decisions made and legitimate them. In the case of the foreign language edition newspapers, politicians take advantage of the international reach the media offers in order to do diplomacy and manage international relations. They also use the space to promote or justify official attitudes to the international readership and persuade peer political figures of their positions and decisions.

In spite of the difference between the political systems, writing an opinion piece for politicians involves contributing to the debate on foreign policy issues and consolidating their public image as policy makers. In both political systems the participants attempt to make the most of such a powerful communication instrument (the op-ed piece) to do diplomacy and to legitimate their decisions and policies to a wider public. Indeed, “news management is one practical solution for governments to strategically communicate their messages and use the media to further their political and policy goal” (Pfetsch, 1999: 2).

The foreign policy columnist

Political columnists are those people hired by news organizations to write an opinion column on national political affairs. Political columnists have also been referred to as political pundits mainly if they become popular media personalities, who are “a loose collectivity of journalists, analysts, policy experts, and other specialists who voice their special knowledge in public forums” (Nimmo & Combs, 1992: 24). The culture of political opinion column has developed within the US media channels in the early 20thC, and adopted later worldwide. Owing to the need to include opposite views and to show balance in their editorial stance, some quality papers started to encourage different and provocative views on their pages. In domestic and international politics sections, columnists are sometimes referred to as pundits, who are considered to be “the interpretative elites of political journalism” owing to their “ability to interpret complex reality in ways which contribute directly to their readers’ evaluation of political rhetoric and action” (McNair, 2000:208). Even though this sounds as a quality, interpreting events has rather been very often criticized and regarded negatively. Some political columnists have even been labeled “punditocracy”, since they are regarded as a threat to the democratic ideal principles. Some critics define them as a “tiny group of highly visible political pontificators (...) It is in their debate rather than any semblance of a democratic one that determines the parameters of political discourse in the nation today” (Alterman, 1992: 5). Even within a more moderate view on the political columnists, McNair considers the column to be “the highest form of political punditry in press journalism” (McNair, 2011: 72). Therefore, given the fact that columnists are

professional journalists hired to write opinions, their share in developing the national (or international in some newspapers cases) the debate is estimated to be extremely high. This entails the power they exercise on choosing topics, framing the issue and promoting some common elite interests through argumentation mastery. This is at least relevant within the American media culture.

Rugh's (1979) and Hafez's (2001) analyses of the Arab press have shown that overall in the Arab world the state has managed to maintain control (albeit often indirectly) over the press. The result of this overall lack of independence from government has meant that media discourses, including FP opinion pieces, are associated with poor credibility, and that newspaper readers have generally been skeptical of what they read, assuming that there is a bias inherent in the content (Rugh, 1979: 12). However, this is mainly true for print media in Arabic addressed to Arab readership (p. 20). The foreign-language editions of print media, on the other hand, are widely agreed upon to have a very different status, since they are oriented to international readership. Arab media institutions develop foreign-language versions of their publications and make them electronically available with no charge; presumably to diffuse their political positions to the world and to secure foreign and Arab expatriate support. Pintak & Ginges (2008) point out that Arab journalists see themselves as having the mission of creating change in the international public opinion about Arab nations and the future and welfare of these nations.

All these FP experts have in common that they provide the public with a well-informed view on the policy decisions and aim at mobilizing actions to consolidate or challenge the proposed decisions. It is within the scope of the professional conditions of these participants that the op-ed piece on the FP and global events is produced.

5. 3. The op-ed piece on FP as an argumentative activity type

The op-ed piece discussing foreign policy serves the institutional goal of advancing an expert's opinion on policy issues that would maintain the debate among decision makers and the public and preserve democratic political culture. The effort made by FP experts to mobilize public participation on policy decisions and to influence their attitudes is achieved within the institutional conventions of this type of activity. To

identify the institutional constraints imposed on strategic maneuvering in op-ed pieces, the activity type is characterized from an argumentative point of view. This can be done by comparing the argumentative practice in this activity type with the ideal model of critical discussion and by following four focal points initial situation (confrontation stage), the procedural and material starting points (opening stage), the argumentative means (argumentation stage), and the outcome of the discussion (concluding stage) (van Eemeren, 2010: 146).

5. 3. 1. The Initial Situation

The initial situation goes in parallel with the confrontation stage of a critical discussion, where the participants externalize the difference of opinion. In written argumentation, the protagonist (author) expresses a standpoint to which the antagonist (reader) expresses at least doubt towards this standpoint. In the argumentative type of the FP op-ed pieces, the initial situation is that an authoritative arguer has identified policy problem of public concern and consequently engages in expressing a “position” on this topic on his/her own initiative. This initiative is generally prompted by the institution goals meant to be achieved through the author, namely the policy institute or think tank, the political association, the interest group or even the media institution. These goals depend on each author’s institutional affiliation.

The standpoints represent the strategic choice of the topical potential made at the author personal level and preconditioned by the institutional political agenda. The author typically advances a standpoint of either an inciting/prescriptive type or an evaluative type. The inciting standpoint is ultimately aimed to rally the reader in support or in opposition to a particular policy decision. The evaluative standpoint on the other hand seeks to judge the expediency or the legitimacy of policy decisions in order to promote or deter action in favor or against them. In both cases, the institution presupposes that a difference of opinion over the acceptability of the incitement or the evaluation may arise with the public and works towards the achievement of the goal of eliminating this difference of opinion through a planned series of discussions in support of the given claim. In this perspective, initiating a standpoint is regarded a collective political

decision carefully structured and implemented by the different members of the concerned political or media institution to achieve long-term policy objectives.

5. 3. 2. The starting points

The starting points in any critical discussion, such as the op-ed piece, are of two types: procedural and material. Procedural starting points refer to the discussion rules and the distribution of roles in the discussion. Material starting points are a collection of propositions about facts and values that can be used in the argumentation. There are relatively few explicit regulations concerning the procedural starting points, as most practices work with the conventions established over decades during which the op-ed piece culture has evolved. One of the main recognizable rules set by the media institutions for the discussions is their written form and their asynchronous flow or occurrence. This condition entails that discussions are non-mixed (involving non-interactive audience) and they generate other discussions upon their closure. The distribution of roles is established by institutional rules assigning the protagonist role exclusively to a FP expert. Only experts in the matter are authorized to participate as protagonists and they are expected conventionally to advance argumentation relevant to the on-going debate. Observing relevance also entails a certain amount of institutional restriction on choice of topics. The presumed doubt or opposition taken up by the audience as antagonists is institutionally constrained with the kinds of target audiences the newspapers aimed at reaching and to whom the arguer takes the obligation of responding by means of reasonable argumentation. Most of these procedural starting points remain implicit, except perhaps for some rules set by the media institutions in their guidelines for the submission and publication of op-ed pieces. Newspapers generally emphasize their preference for a provocative style. This starting point typically intervenes as a precondition for the maneuverings made with available means for argumentation. More precisely, this institutional convention influences the maneuvering strategies at the level of presentational devices (encouraging the use of more rhetorical figures and probably allowing certain “exaggeration” including derailment to happen). This condition also acts as a freedom card for arguers to make

the distributions of roles in the communicative participation the way that most suits their persuasive aims.

On the other hand, the material starting points, involve conformity over facts and values relevant for the performance of the communicative and professional practices. In the op-ed pieces debating FP, the collection of these institutionally established starting points are particularly crucial and decisive for the resolution of disagreement between participants, as they constitute the very vision created on a particular state of affair or problem. This means that a particular understanding of a social situation, for instance, an incident, a political negotiation, a policy, an act of terrorism, etc, results in a particular vision about this situation (a mental model as in the sociocognitive perspective) which later acquires a socially shared interpretation and qualifies as a fact. These facts have evaluative interpretation ascribed to them based also on the social norms identified as values. The facts and values established by the institutional conventions as the starting points for the op-ed piece activity type are not merely culturally bounded, but they are also related to each nation-state's power position in the international arena, its position in given conflicts and the essence of its political culture, namely the shared political cognition of its policy makers. In the American FP op-ed pieces, material starting points are made prominent in argumentative moves establishing commitment with targeted American audience, While in the case of Arab op-ed pieces, the English language edition is an institutional norm made to bridge the gap in terms of material starting points and assist the establishment of common ground with the targeted international or American audience. As in most mediated types of political communication, though, the institutionally constrained agreement about material starting points in the op-ed pieces generally remains presupposed (Van Eemeren, 2010: 242). Given the fact that these kinds of starting points represent the most crucial institutional preconditions for the strategic maneuvering in the op-ed discussions, they are examined in more detail in section 5.4.1 along with the commitment sets, which are the fourth parameter to consider when determining the strategic functions of the argumentative moves during analysis (See Chapter 3, section 3. 4. 4. 2).

5. 3. 3. Argumentative means

In the argumentation stage of a critical discussion, the protagonist advances argumentation to support the standpoint advanced and to overcome the antagonist's (presumed) doubts. In the context of the op-ed pieces, as in most cases of written (non mixed) argumentation, the protagonist exploits the starting points established in the opening stage in order to support the claim advanced and prove it to be part of the antagonist's set of commitments (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984: 165-166). This entails that the op-ed piece as an argumentative activity type expounds the argumentative means available to participants from their shared knowledge of a given political situation including events, interests, threats, opportunities and values, among other assumptions serving as the basis for the development of a particular argumentative line of defense of the position adopted. A general institutional rule in the op-ed piece is the use of expertise knowledge to warranty premises in argumentation. This is clearly the most standard precondition for maneuvering strategically, a condition that is put to use by arguers in order to mutually commit with audience both at the level of ethics (credibility) and content (propositions considered as facts). Indeed, their condition of authority in FP matters allows them to combine starting point resources (facts and values) and audience commitment to their trustworthiness to resolve the difference of opinion. As stated above in the starting point section, these kinds of commitments creating the preconditions for strategic maneuvering will be further expounded in section 5.4.1.

5. 3. 4. The possible outcome

In the concluding stage of the discussion, the discussants determine whether the difference of opinion is solved and, if so, in whose favor (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992). In the FP op-ed pieces, the outcome of the discussion may be established in differed setting (time and place) as it is determined by the institution (and members) from a set of research studies measuring public opinion reception, experts' degree of popularity and correlation of these findings with the policy decisions and resolutions reached. Outcomes are determined roughly following this complex process while in practice readers are left to determine for themselves whether the argumentation is

convincing or not and whether they will adhere to the proposal and claims and even adjust their behavior accordingly (through votes and other means of support to decision makers). In the end, the institution might reach agreement with some audience (may be measured in funding to think tanks and political organizations for instance), but this agreement is not explicitly expressed. Indeed, the institutionally imposed implicitness of the discussion puts great constraints on the possible moves in this stage, even though experts naturally frame the resolution as positive within the discussion itself. This lack of a conventionally established outcome accessible for the audience has weakened the popular perception of the actual persuasive power of the op-ed piece and made it hard to measure the persuasive impact it possess in comparison to other means of political communication. The characteristics of the communicative activity type of FP op-ed pieces are summarized in Table 5.1 below:

Communicative activity type	FP op-ed piece
Initial situation	Anticipated difference of opinion between experts and reader over the acceptability of policy actions in order to promote public participation in the political decisions
Starting points (rules, concessions)	Partly codified Rules (international relations, laws and facts) regulating the argumentative means. Practical restrictions on space and time. Institution is authority on FP knowledge; institution committed to involving the public policy decisions. Institution distributes roles and defines the targeted audience fulfills role of protagonist; reader implicitly fulfills role of antagonist
Argumentative Means	Argumentation for the proposed or discouraged course of action based on expertise facts in monological op-ed piece. Response to anticipated critical reactions by the reader.
Outcomes	Implicit resolution by research measuring correlations between policy claims and reader's reception/public opinion trends Possible return to initial situation for reaction from other "active" participants.

Table 5.1. Characterization of the FP op-ed piece as an argumentative activity type

5. 4. Preconditions for strategic maneuvering: mindsets and ideological frameworks

This section focuses on the FP experts' mindsets as preconditions constraining the performance of argumentative moves in the current two op-ed corpora. These preconditions impinge on the commitment sets managed and exploited by the two groups of arguers, as they draw on them as their institutionally and culturally shared resources to create material starting points for the communicative discussion. Examining the commitments that define the argumentative situation of the strategic maneuverings is the fourth parameter employed in Pragma-dialectics to determine the strategic function of a particular argumentative move (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2009). The material starting points to which participants (presumably) agree upon and put to use as commitments in discourse are explored here by looking at the experts' mindsets and the ideologies making up their frame of reference for policy professional practices.

Material starting points create the foundation for any argumentative exchange. They consist of the body of knowledge and values institutionally, socially or culturally shared, or even a combination of these depending on the argumentative situation. These starting points in the op-ed pieces activity type materialize in the institutional point for holding debate on foreign policy issues in newspapers (which is generally amounts to mobilizing public opinion to promote policies) and impinge on the discursive practices conventionally established both generally and specifically for each political cultural context. These kinds of starting points make up the participants' commitments and create the basic preconditions for strategic maneuvering. The next section explores these preconditions in the mindsets of FP experts in the two cultures and analyzes examples of their manifestation as commitments strategically established in argumentative moves.

5. 4. 1. Starting points in international relations and Foreign policy practices

Foreign policy results from a combination of leadership perceptions and domestic politics broadly shaped by the international distribution of power (Sawoski, 2011). The institutional environments in the op-ed pieces are defined by the practices of policy

actors based on fundamental and axiomatic beliefs on foreign policy making and on the state of art of international relations. In the American and the Arab international relations culture different factors directly or indirectly affect the way FP actors develop and maintain their discursive activities. The ideological foundations and the stances adopted by state actors in the bilateral relations between the US and the Arab world during various crucial periods leading to the war on Iraq are relevant elements in the construction of “facts” and “values” socially shared in the two cultures. Determining the kinds of facts and values developed within the macro-context of the op-ed activity type in both cultures help determine the kinds of starting points and commitments strategically established by the arguers in their argumentative moves.

Governments’ choice of policies, especially in democratic societies, definitely reflects the kind of ideologies behind the choice. Understanding the mindset behind the foreign policy debates as situated within a wider international relation context requires looking at how the foreign policy practices within a certain society or culture are managed by complex mechanisms involving, among others, the historical development of the country’s international relations, the institutional environment defining these relations and the mental paradigms within which they operate. Foreign policy actors behave within shared goals “rooted in the pursuit, protection, and promotion of their states’ interests” (Dorff, 2004: 5), governed by the dynamics of key international relations and behaviors. Indeed, the set of ideals and values that define how the state should behave internationally makes up the kind of political ideology or ideologies monitoring the state behavior. As Quinn rightly puts it:

what matters in deciding a nation’s foreign policy is not the material reality of the international environment, but the intellectual framework with which policy makers approach the environment (...) and the very activity of defining the national interest, and judging what it demands in terms of policy, is itself bound up in the mechanism of ideology

(Quinn, 2010: 23).

This account is compatible with a socio-cognitive approach and seems to situate the study of FP practices within a constructivist approach. The socially shared cognition in

FP plays a crucial role in the actors' practices. This means that foreign policy makers act within the shared interpretations of their states' relations which are the product of the historical events and circumstances and the outcome of domestic political negotiations, conflicts and reconciliations leading to consensual decisions and the formation of a common interpretation of interests. In other words, the body of knowledge they draw upon in their discourses is based on common historical conditions, common national reality and destiny and common interests.

As far as the specific institutional points, namely those aims related to specific cultures, it is important to take into consideration the specific aims of the various media, research and political institutions involved in a given debate and aims associated with each cultural group, the American and Arab. Indeed, as an argumentative activity type, op-ed pieces have their culturally-bounded institutional point. A broad-spectrum aim of FP op-ed pieces is the mobilization of public opinion, while in the US there are more publicly stated aims, such as to educate, inform, advise the public, etc. (See Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3. on the institutional goals in the current corpora). In the Arab context, a different common aim may be deduced from the fact of using English version as a media vehicle for the op-ed pieces. This choice indicates a specific audience targeting motivated by specific institutional aims. Targeting at the international and American audience in the Arab English-version op-ed pieces fulfills the institutional aims of seeking arbitration in the international community to resolve the conflict with the US within the Arab region.

The next section discusses the foreign policy orientations of each of the US and the Arab World. Examining a nation-state's FP orientation consists of determining the way its foreign policy elites view the world and their nation's role in it (See Hermann, 1980). The section starts with presenting the US general FP orientation and the one developed towards the Middle East some of which are related to the Iraq war and the number of policies implemented in the region. This is followed by an account on the Arab World FP orientations, at least those adopted by those Arab states regarded as influential players in the region. This cross cultural examination of FP mindsets as the resources from which the current discussions' starting points are created will guide the analysis of the arguers' commitments as manifested in their argumentation strategies.

5. 4. 2. The US foreign policy orientation

FP discourse in the US and more particularly discourse in the op-ed pieces published during the Surge is constrained by the US foreign policy general orientation and the orientation it adopted in its relations with the Middle East. The Iraq war debate presupposes three policy notions: interventionism, leadership and self-defense. These constitute major axiomatic beliefs socially-shared in the American political culture and constraining the argumentative practices of political leaders in general and those dealing with foreign relations in particular. These beliefs open up for the exigencies - situations that demand actions (Bitzer 1968) - addressed by decision makers and brought about for collective resolution. These three notions are expounded below with more details, first by outlining the circumstances of their development and then by delineating their characteristics as core principles in the American Foreign policy culture.

America's 21st century foreign policy orientation has grown from its relatively recent conception of its national interests. Americans chose to adopt separatist consensus from the balance of power system in Europe during the centuries which followed its independence. However, with its economic, territorial and military growth in the twentieth century and the external imperatives for more expansive policies after World War I, the US shifted attention towards a policy of global engagement. The new vision promoted by both presidents Roosevelt (1901-09) and Wilson (1913-21) and sustained by most subsequent US leaders insisted on the necessity for the US world role in expanding its values of freedom and liberal capitalism and that its growth into a great power legitimates its intervention into the affairs of other nations. Schonberg (2003: 6) argues that it was not just the changing international and domestic environments at these pivotal junctures that affected policy, but also the "national ideology", the culture and worldview specific to the United States, its leaders and policy-makers. Betts (2005) contends that the different FP schools which have vied for control of US policy since 1972 seemed quite different in principle, but less so in practice. These schools have often converged on similar initiatives for different reasons. Betts believes that the differences in substance are less than the differences in tone and style. He emphasizes that the clashes among schools of thought in the US "do not yet translate into a significant difference on the question of whether the United States should exploit its primacy in global power in the post-Cold War world (Betts, 2005: 5). The US legitimate

right to intervene in foreign affairs becomes axiomatic among FP leaders and experts and hence functions as a material starting point and a shared commitment in the culture of public debates on FP.

A number of international relations scholars, likewise, sustain that the US policies with their apparent changes in the late two centuries have kept the intellectual legacy of the past most of which are based on the belief of American potential to be a guide to the world to universal values such as freedom, democracy and liberal economy (see Cox, 2005; Quinn, 2010). Based on this central belief, the US has interpreted its interventionist policies positively as based on leadership, power and responsibility. Its policies are geared to achieving the ultimate goal of maintaining world peace and security by promoting and teaching its moral values, as the ideal universal values (this last point is further discussed within values). The adoption of interventionism and leadership support the naturalization of the third notion: Self-defense. Indeed, the three notions are interconnected and owe their justification to the American political values (discussed in this chapter, Sub-Section 5.4.2.1).

The US- led coalition forces invaded Iraq in 2003, and accomplished its mission of toppling the Saddam regime. The mission, dubbed “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, claimed to aim at freeing Iraqis from dictatorship, but also was part of the US “fight against terrorism” taken up after the 9/11 terrorists attack. Indeed, Americans adopted an interventionist foreign policy that is based on the pursuit of self protection against possible outside aggressions. This is often referred to as “Preventive War”, though its initiators claim it was a preemptive war (an attempt to defeat a perceived inevitable invasion). The preventive war is initiated under the belief that future conflict is inevitable and aims at shifting the balance of power by strategically attacking before the balance of power has a chance to shift in the direction of the adversary. Because of the speculative nature of preventive war, in which the adversary may or may not be a future threat, preventive war is considered an act of aggression in international law. Some advocates of aggressive wars have argued them to be justified as Preventive. Arguments can be very controversial as they are in effect arguments as to whether those wars were justified or not. Just- war thinking, Staub (1989) argues, is widely influential. It specifies what makes a war acceptable. It must be fought against enemy forces not unarmed civilians and for self defense not conquest. However, foreign policy discourse have created

common consensus with its rhetoric on the threats to the US nation, which is one cannot wait until an enemy actually strikes, it is necessary to prepare for war when others have hostile intentions.

The Iraq war was conducted in the context of a US foreign policy referred to as “the National Security Strategy” (NSS) issued by the Bush administration in 2002. This strategy was the outcome of the reactions on the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US and judged in some literature as a turning point in US foreign policy history and had “a dramatic impact on the US outlook” (Cox 2005: 17). This strategy is based on four key principles. First, the US should act preemptively to prevent terrorists’ attacks. This becomes the central concept of the NSS in the popular mind to which is linked the issue of non-state actors which are principally Islamic terrorists. Second, there is an absolute righteousness in American values, based on universal liberty and capitalism and that America has the destiny to inspire the world towards the fulfillment of these values, as in one of Bush’s inaugural address in 2001: “America remains engaged in the world, by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom”. Third, it is important for great powers to cooperate with the US which means that they should respect the legitimacy and inevitability of the US power and its role in the world. Fourth and in line with the previous principle, the US is committed to building its military power to protect Americans and allies from enemies and is assumed to maintain a power-hard hegemony globally and beyond challenges. These principles of the National Security Strategy have been central in the process of the US policy decision making during the crucial years of the Iraq occupation, and they are, in Quinn’s words, “connected to one another and are mutually supportive components in a cohesive ideological edifice”(Quinn 2010: 160).

The public debate undertaken on the Iraq issues aiming at gaining the support of public opinion took place within the boundaries of the NSS as an overarching policy even though the NSS was not, of course, approved of by all American political factions. Indeed, the harsh criticism the Bush administration received along the years following the invasion (including 2007) was mainly related to its war mismanagement and tactical errors. The core principles in NSS above mentioned were not really questioned, but critics rather deplored the arrogant manner and the messianic tone adopted by the president and his team which they judged to hurt the image of America and to blur its

true political intentions and credibility. Furthermore, the alleged change in the US foreign policy which is supposedly crafted by this administration was possible to carry forward only on the basis of some connection to the preexisting ideological framework in the US foreign policy. The NSS was, in fact, anchored in the principles which evolved during the beginning of the twentieth century with new domestic conditions and interests, along some international circumstances paving the way for America's decision to gradually move away from the long era of the Founding Fathers' isolationism to more global engagement in the international affairs. These conditions have impinged on the US FP behavior and geared its current orientation towards world leadership and interventionism. Next, the core US principles shaping the experts' mindsets are outlined along with the discussion of their manifestation in some maneuvering cases in the American corpus. The account on these FP principles may be helpful for explaining how the institutional tenets of the current foreign policy are deeply engrained in its argumentative discourses and its logic.

5.4.2.1. Core principles in American FP and constraints on the argumentative moves

The core principles outlined below constitute the set of constraints governing the argumentative situations in the op-ed pieces discussion of the Surge in 2007. Based on Bitzer's designation of the kinds of constraints affecting any rhetorical discourse (Bitzer 1968), these constraints constitute the shared "knowledge" and values of participants and the commitment sets upon which arguers draw in their strategic maneuvering. These core principles feed one another and constitute the basic schema of the current policy orientation of the US. They also reinforce the internalization of the notion of *mission* and *duty* within the American basic public and shared understanding of its actions. The constraints are discussed along with some examples from the corpus.




Figure 5.1. Main US FP constraints (opportunities) for strategic maneuvering in op-ed discourse

As shown in the figure, the core FP principles constraining argumentation in op-ed debates start from common US moral values and the belief of their universalism. This commitment motivates the faith in the US virtues and capability to lead the world. This uncontested position as global leader and the World superpower grants the US the right potential to define its interests and to identify threats (advanced by those who go against universal values). Along its moral and material “Engagement” with the world as a leader, the US intervenes in other territories to protect or to defend interests and values using policy instruments as its main resources. A sense of mission is then born and becomes the *endoxa* in the US public debate and an opportunity on which experts establish their commitments while maneuvering strategically.

Political and moral values as starting points

American political values, such as liberty, democracy and liberal capitalism, have constituted the core principles of the political culture since the creation of the US as a nation. In recent decades, these political values have become essential components of

the American FP rhetoric sustaining the new direction it has taken. Indeed, core principles and values have started to support the argument for the shift from isolationism to the post World War II policy of interventionism, officially referred to as Engagement. Key US presidents from then on have framed foreign policy as a fight for American values and an indispensable component of the US role in the world (Chollet and Lindberg 2008: 169). After the NY terrorist attack, the Bush administration heavily drew on these values to describe the attack as an attack to Americanism, and as a struggle between good and evil. The FP rhetoric based on American values also emphasizes the US exemplary role in preserving human rights, regarded as American ideals. Indeed, the US has the oldest continuous constitutional tradition of judicial enforcement of written bill of rights in the world today and that nowhere in the world are civil liberties more robustly debated and defended in public and in court (Moravcsik 2005: 147). Yet, The US is widely accused of using human rights to justify military exploits that are regarded as legally dubious and morally odious (Ruggie 2004, Steiker 2005).

Officially and within the mission statement elaborated in the US Department of state, the US takes responsibility for securing the spread of these values around the world, declaring that “The United States uses a wide range of tools to advance a freedom agenda” and to “promote democracy as a means to achieve security, stability, and prosperity for the entire world” (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, n.d.). The use and emphasis on these values is believed to be inspired by national identity. McCartney (2004: 400) argues that national identity relies on “an ideological construction of the nation that insists on the global relevance of the American project”. The Scholar believes that the FP in the US is very much connected to its nationalism, one that builds its essence not from ethnic or religious, historical common heritage but celebrates its belief in common human values.

American arguers in the current op-ed corpora use the audience’s commitment to the American moral and political values to their advantage. Indeed, these values are both exploited and implicitly and explicitly in all the discussions (30 pieces). The manifestation of these kinds of commitments in strategic moves is illustrated in the example below. The move has been used as an explicit material starting point in the

opening stage of an op-ed piece by Clifford May in support of the Bush “staying the course in Iraq” decision.

- (1) Americans liberated Iraqis from Saddam Hussein and gave them the right to vote. (Clifford May, *Houston Chronicle*)

The example stands for an assumption established explicitly within this proposition. The assumption is a maneuvering performed to remind the audience of common belief on the US reason for waging the war and to establish it as a starting point for the discussion. The starting point presupposes that American behavior with Iraqis is supported by the values of freedom and democracy and their universalism. These values are the commitments defining the rhetorical situation and they are the elements with which the function of strategic moves is determined (van Eemeren 2010).

The American FP reflects an ideological interpretation of both the nation and its place in the world, one, in McCartney’ s words, “that posits that the United States enjoys universal significance because it is an archetype of virtue and the locomotive of human progress” (2004: 401). The use of values in FP is due to the “increasing cynicism and doubt over government and politics at a domestic level, leading to party divisions and often public discrediting” (Chandler 2003: 299). An ethical foreign policy posture can be a powerful mechanism for generating a sense of political purpose and mission and provide a moral framework which can project a sphere of agreement and consensus within Americans.

Leadership and interventionism

Today’s US global leadership is sustained by a belief, shared by the main US political actors, in the US responsibility and role maintaining peace by teaching its moral and political values to other nations, acting as a mediator in conflicts and a model for all developing nations. The US foreign policy decision makers share the assumption that the US acts based on American benevolence and willingness to support people’s around the globe and protect their interests and needs. They also believe that the spread of American political values such as freedom, democracy and liberal capitalism should

guarantees universal prosperity and peace. Not only during the NSS periods which characterized G. W Bush stances, but also more recently under Obama's government, a central claim among foreign affairs officials has been that the "US has created a safer, more stable, and more prosperous world for the American people, their allies, and their partners around the globe than existed prior to World War II (Defense Strategic Guidance, 2012). Agreement on the universal validity of the American political values has characterized the US strategic defense departments for almost a century now in spite of the differences between major political parties. This is, indeed, sustained in this legendary speech by Woodrow Wilson in 1917: "We shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts, for democracy (...) for the right and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right". (Wilson, 1917)

Whether it is a strategy promoted by Wilson, Roosevelt or post cold war presidents, it would similarly point to common assumptions in the US international relations in the recent era. FP strategies have developed around common goals which place faith in the spread of American values and practices as the only path to a universal peace in the long term (Bush's second inaugural address January 2005). This premise in the American foreign policy tenets has been central in the US development of the ideological edifice supporting the course of its political decisions throughout the last decades. Nevertheless, the promotion of leadership and the pursuit of interventionism has been largely perceived and interpreted as imperialism and has been referred to by scholars and intellectuals as a strategy of power control. As shown in the next example, the righteousness of the US leadership and interventionism is not put into question by this critic of the Bush administration mismanagement of the war calling for troop withdrawal. Harold Meyerson draws on the socially shared commitment (of his audience) to the US leadership and its right to intervene. The example illustrates how this commitment is paradoxically exploited as a premise in a standpoint urging for retreat from Iraq.

- (2) There are, after all, civil wars and civil wars. In the carnage that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia, it was chiefly the genocidal aggression of Slobodan Milosevic's Serbian nationalists that needed to be checked, and in time U.S. forces and their allies did just that. But the slaughter in Iraq is the work of many hands on both sides of their religious divide. (Harold Meyerson, *Washington Post*)

Fervent critics of the American foreign policies (Bricmont, 2007; Chomsky, 2003; Said, 1997), affirm that the US claimed leadership and interventions are aggressions against other nations and act as a façade behind which the US carries out its imperial policies. However, no matter how these policies, rooted in the belief in the primacy of the US moral values and in its imperative role in the world to maintain peace, have been framed, their choice and promotion have prepared for a universally discernible fact. The US' possession of the most sophisticated FP instruments. Policy decisions over the last decades have grown into a set of conditions shaping the ideology and global orientation of the US strategies. The development of the US policy instruments, mainly its military power, which have been set up to provide practical policy solutions and to organize policymaking, have become highly relevant in its foreign policymaking practices and consequently in the construction of its discursive apparatus.

Military Policy instruments

Foreign policy debates and deliberations take place within a common sense created by the above mentioned situation: historical circumstances, mindsets and more importantly power. Since the US foreign policy in its recent era has focused on the construction of a military power (heavily with the Regan Rearmament era) to achieve its key objectives such as international cooperation, diffusion of American values of freedom and democracy and the safeguarding of the world peace, accordingly, the policy has equipped itself with hard power. Hard power, based on the use of military and economic means, is translated into institutional terms and systematized in order to be easily managed. The National Security Strategy explicitly stated that the United States must maintain a huge military system and the ability to project power quickly worldwide, in order to face “the growing technological sophistication of Third World conflicts” (National Security Council, 2002). Power is the stipulation that establishes and designs the institutional fabric of all related FP actors' activities including the discursive one. It is the potential which invents a more powerful account of ideology, namely “policy instrument” ideology as it is argued by Sylvan & Majeski (2008) in a critique of the simplified, mainstream definitions of ideology in foreign policy, mainly

that of Hunt (1987), which they criticize as ending up explaining very little about most phenomena in foreign policy (Sylvan & Majeski, 2008: 1).

Foreign policy instruments such as diplomacy, economic aid plans, treaties and military strategies are tools designed to resolve specific problems. These instruments, which have developed into templates or model plans judged to be efficient over generations of trial and usage, are supposed to provide the practitioners with a platform for generating adequate solutions necessary to solve policy problems. Policy instruments related to military machinery are in a sense the implementation of the most crucial segment of foreign policy practices. Generally, instruments are defined as the “organizations capable of carrying out specific activity sequence, typically put together from bits and pieces of preexisting policy instruments in order to devote greater resources to, or to concentrate more efficiently, on solving particular policy problems” (Sylvan & Majeski, 2008: 5). In this sense, strategies for intervention, nation building or disaster relief, for instance, come “prepackaged with their own built-in tasks” which makes the ideologies behind them a matter of “organizational and activity-sequential” phenomena linked to automated institutional behavior (Sylvan & Majeski, 2008: 5). This leads to the assumption that policy instruments, as institutionally organized tasks may represent a powerful precondition for policymakers’ discourse activity. The discursive practices are guided by the conditions available for actions and justifying decisions hence relies on the readymade logic offered by the instruments. The fact that foreign policy in the US has for decades argued for the military supremacy and has established it as central in its vision and practices may be sustained by organizational conditions which paved such a mindset. Along with the military policy instruments, persuasion instruments have developed over time to sustain and reinforce them, which is why policymakers’ “rhetoric consistently emphasizes a martial outlook for foreign policy which have become as a dogma” (Wittkopf et al., 2008: 76). This account of the core approach to US policies is intended to help explain how the institutional tenets of the current foreign policy have been shaped into a worldview spectrum within which argumentation on foreign policy issues is maintained and their problems are discussed. It is probably unfeasible for the involved players to conceive the issues outside the spectrum, simply because it has become deep-seated over the years through which the country designed its world leadership.

The role of FP experts' mindsets shaped institutionally along with the US policy orientation and ideologies is crucial in determining their performance of strategic maneuverings. This orientation may be summed up in three basic principles. The first principle is the belief in the universality of the US values, specifically freedom, liberal capitalism and democracy. The second is the US role in promoting these values all over the world to maintain peace and security. These two principles reinforced by strong nationalist sentiments legitimate the US interventionist policies. The third is the use of military policy instruments which organize policy decision making. It is based on these assumptions that most institutions and decision makers in the foreign policy discipline define their missions. Indeed, whether experts have conservative or liberal ideals in handling foreign affairs, their "American values can translate into a moral core that both sides can rally around" (Chollet & Lindberg, 2008: 1). This worldview overlaps with the specific aims and conventions of political institutions and the discursive activity they undertake and more particularly constrain the strategic maneuvering of FP debates participants.

5. 4. 3. The Arab States foreign policy orientations

The op-ed pieces written by Arab FP experts and issued in the English version Arab newspapers are also constrained by the Arab states' foreign policies orientations and mainly their relations with the US and other major world powers. These constraints shaping the mindsets of Arab opinion leaders in the foreign language press are explored in this section and their manifestation is discussed within some examples from the current Arab op-ed corpus.

Technically, one can speak of FP orientation only at the level of a single nation-state. The Arab world officially composed of twenty two states cannot possibly display a single or unified policy, in spite of the widely spread perception of a common destiny in the Arab world. The countries are of disparate conditions, both domestically such as their resources and wealth, their social fabric and political structures and internationally, in their regional relations, their economic and their military capability and mainly the nature of the relations they hold with the great world power. However, given their

highly shared historical and cultural conditions, these states are geopolitically treated as one unit.

The FP orientations described in this section only concern those Arab states relevant in the present study. These states are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Yemen (For more details see corpus description Chapter 4). Apart from Iraq –directly affected by the US occupation- and Syria -renowned for its overt hostility to US and Israeli policies in the region- the remaining states work under authoritarian regimes with more or less strong economic and diplomatic relations with the US. Although there is an undeniable difference between these states in the nature of their relationships with major policy players in the Middle East namely the US, Europe and Israel, they share many features mainly confined by their relatively similar power positions in the world as third world and postcolonial Arab nations.

The institutional aims preconditioning the op-ed pieces as an argumentative activity type are controlled by three main conditions. First, the op-ed specific institutional aims emanate from a more macro-contextual political aim, known as “Omni-balancing” pursued by most state leaders in the region. This condition is overarching and generates the other two conditions. Second, opinion leaders contributing in the English edition newspapers’ op-ed pieces are in most cases states’ spokesmen. Even though there are some notable exceptions, the authoritarian political system prevailing in these states exploits the media as a channel to promote their views to domestic and foreign public and as a policy instrument of diplomacy and political communication in times of crises and conflict (signaled by the choice of English as a medium for communication). These aims are in turn constrained by the international debate on the FP issue under consideration. The internationally-oriented interaction (as opposed to domestically-maintained debates in Arabic), is addressed to a wide-ranging audience and is based on goals specifically set for this purpose. The third condition is related to common “national” values and sentiments characterizing the opinion leaders’ political discourse. These values are generally activated in international communicative contexts, within the mechanisms of self perceptions and positioning. They underscore the weak position of Arabs as adversary in the international crisis (Iraq war) and generate an ideological stance of resistance and antagonism. These conditions constraining the resources Arab FP experts draw upon in their op-ed pieces to seek their antagonists’ commitments and

to establish as starting points for their discussions are illustrated in Figure 5.2 below and then explored later in more detail with examples from the corpus.




Figure 5.2. Institutional conventions and mindsets constraining maneuvering in the Arab op-ed pieces

The Arab states, in particular the authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf states perform a foreign policy, known as “Omni-balancing” (David, 1991), aiming not only at deterring external threats but also “legitimizing the regime at home against domestic opposition and mobilizing economic resources abroad” (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami, 2002: 15). Most of these regimes domestically face the challenge of the contradiction between their need to synchronize with local demands for autonomy from the West as a basic solution for economic growth and their need to maintain substantial economic and diplomatic relations with foreign powers (the US and Europe) for security purposes. The press in these regimes is generally categorized as a “mobilization press” ordained to “work out a moral system of authority in order to establish as much as possible different solidarities and identities (...) so that the new leadership will acquire legitimacy” (Rugh, 2004: 29). This situation complicates the foreign policy roles of these states in key issues, chiefly in the way they define their own state identities and their positions towards both neighbors and great powers. The policy certainly creates high challenges as well as opportunities for opinion leaders to exploit in their communicative practices. However, more importantly, it creates a situation of

duplicity that hinders the common and genuine consensus that values normally reinforce in policy orientations.

In the corpus under study, 20% of the op-ed pieces are issued in Saudi Arabian newspapers. However, counting the Saudi-funded newspapers this increases to 40% which means that nearly half of the corpus data are constrained by the same institutional conventions. Saudi Arabian FP op-ed pieces are undoubtedly regulated by the regime. The wealthy authoritarian family (or clan) regime, infamous for the lack of freedom of speech, has established in the last two decades a strong media empire, where it possesses the major Arab news and entertaining networks in many Arab countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, Emirates, etc. This has been regarded as a tool to control information flow about the regime and to naturalize its policies both internally and externally by creating a more favorable image. The official political discourse faces the challenge of two contradictory situations, which it deals with by “Omni-balancing”. The first is that the regime seeks to "appease domestic opinion and enhance legitimacy by indulging in anti-imperialist rhetoric" (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami, 2002: 15), as it does not want to be accused of being a US client in the internal and Arab public opinion. The second is the regime need to preserve the strong relations it maintains with the US and their privileges based on strategic military and economic cooperation and strengthened by signed pacts/conventions to protect foreign investments in the region.

Omni-balancing constrains the mindsets of those opinion leaders who under these circumstances freely engage in condemning the US policies and in framing them as policies of repression and assault. Under the cover of freedom of speech, the regime gives free reign to such practices, but do not endorse them in its official public communication in part to preserve the good unilateral relations with the US and also to dissociate itself from opinion leaders and give the impression that their opinions are impartial and independent. These preconditions are made prominent in the following maneuvering strategy enacted in the confrontation stage in an Al Sharq Al Awsat op-ed piece (example 3). The author, Hussein Shobokshi, identifies the Neoconservatives as liable for crime (for deception and lies) despite his loyalty (and business connection) to

the Saudi family who in turn maintain excellent relationships with President Bush and his team. In pragma-dialectical terms, this maneuver proves to be preconditioned by an institutional opportunity (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2009).

- (3) Today the mulberry leaves fall one after another in a flagrant, shameful manner that reveals the lies and deception by a group of the Neoconservatives in their stupid proposal on the "benefits" of liberating Iraq – this is what they labelled their military adventure -- and how that would lead to the birth of a new Middle East generation. (Hussein Shobokshi, *Asharq Al Awsat*)

This political situation establishes for Arab FP experts and columnists some of its most influential, though unofficially stated- institutional rules and conventions. Similar ideologically- bounded institutional conditions even apply to experts in Gulf States, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and Syria. Whether the political system reigning in those states is Islamic or secular, the authoritarian regimes resort to omni-balancing and double standards to manage the situations. The op-ed pieces offer for these regimes a platform for their diplomatic relations, even though most of this work is kept private among state leaders. Communication in internationally circulating media establishes debate with the international community, a wide public mostly empowered by democratic systems and able to change the course of crucial political events. With this mindset and orientation Arab experts adaptation to the audience is managed. Adapting to the audience is one of the three levels of strategic maneuvering in which the protagonist attempts to create communion with the antagonists or even gratify them. For this purpose, the Arab op-ed authors, with diplomacy in mind, show to the audience their adherence to political values of freedom and democracy as a strategy to secure credibility and gain the audience trust. The maneuver also attempts to take advantage from the audience commitment to these values and establish them as starting point in their respective discussion. In the following extract (example.4) from an op-ed piece issued in Azzaman, Najah Ali in a confrontational maneuvering describes the Iraqis' enthusiasm for establishing democracy in Iraq. The strategic maneuvering categorized as an adaptation to audience draws on the commitment of the international readership to universal values to incite their sympathy with the vulnerable Iraqis in their position of betrayed people. The appeal to democracy as a universal value attempts to create communion between Iraqis and the international community in their embracement of

this value and their hope in the US' role in achieving it. This strategy implicitly invites the international community to mediate in the conflict between the US and Iraqis.

- (4) Most Iraqis, among them those who had signed up to the U.S. project and those who supported it had hopes that George Bush's nice promises of establishing a democratic system that will be unique in the Middle East will be materialized. But the winds did not blow the 'democratic' way. (Najah Ali, *Azzaman*)

Other cases of maneuvering constrained by the institutional call to use op-ed pieces as an instrument for diplomacy manifest themselves in the arguers' focus on the US perspective and interests. The targeted audiences in most of these cases are the American citizens addressed as powerful decision makers in the US FP processes. Example (5) illustrates the adaptation-to-audience strategic maneuvering through which arguer Raghida Dergham established the US supremacy and interest as a prerequisite for solutions to the Iraq problem.

- (5) (...) it is possible to render the withdrawal useful, so that the US can re-occupy the driver's seat, reshuffle the strategic deck, and see itself, the only superpower, retain its standing. (Raghida Dergham, *Dar Al Hayat*)

The arguer's proposal for solution places the US interests and benefits at the center of the standpoint. The position is made attractive to American audience in general by drawing on US ideals, namely leadership and supremacy and enhancing the persuasive appeal of the proposal to withdraw from Iraq.

Within these constraints, the Arab political debaters struggle in their endeavor to influence the public opinion and seek to establish their credibility. Other than the diplomatic aspirations managed with the American and the international audience through op-ed pieces, Omni-balancing brings about Arabism as a prominent resource for values. Indeed, the strategy is typically encouraged by the regime in order to dismiss any suspicion of its compliance with the US occupation of Iraq. Opinion leaders maintain their nationalistic oratory, initially geared to their citizens, with international

audience probably as self identification strategy and a demonstration of a cultural and moral communion between Arabs. Their ideological references lie somewhere between the two major ideological poles: secular Arabism and Islamic fundamentalism. After the decline of any hope to create an Arab nation or at least union to strengthen the Arab position in the world, nationalists' enthusiasm started to weaken leaving more room for political Islam to take over. However, the aspiration to a unified Arab nation capable of confronting foreign assaults – the essence of the pan Arabism- has always survived in the mind of Arabs mainly during crises times. This longing to a common nation in the sense of the “imagined political communities” (Anderson, 1991: 6) has definitely influenced Arabs' attitudes and reactions to the recent events. Pan Arabists have always reproved the US and the West in general for their imperialistic behavior and regarded their policies in the region as suppressive of the Arabs ambition to achieve real independence and growth.

Arabism as a nationalist ideology has strongly shaped the Arab identity within international relations at least in the popular sense. Nevertheless, the political scenes in the region include quite diverse ideological orientations which in practice serve their economic and local (immediate) power interests. Drawing on these values in op-ed pieces qualify as a strategic maneuvering, regardless of the specific aims and intentions of each arguer. The maneuvering may be used as a self identification strategy intended to re-position Arabs within the debate and make justice to them by exposing to the world their positive values. It may also be interpreted as a smokescreen strategy encouraged by the regime for purely diplomatic reasons. In fact, drawing on values in political discourse represents a winning card in diplomacy and showing dignity and pride may enhance positive international reception of the arguers' standpoints and their proposals to solve the US-Iraq and “Arab” conflict. The state leaders in authoritarian regimes promote these practices as a moral edifice for their internal and external legitimacy. In example (6) below, the arguer, Sabry Shabrawi, uses Arabism as a main resource for developing his argumentation line. The strategy also draws on the audience commitments to universal human values of pride and dignity in order to delineate the situation of Arabs as victims of world powers' oppression.

- (6) The stance of the US and Israel was manifest in their support for dictatorships and repressive governments in the Arab world, slighting Arab pride and dignity, a basic value in Arab culture and a significant element of the Arab mindset (...) King Faisal is recorded to have said following the 1967 War: "we can forgo luxury and live in tents, eating milk and dates before we allow strong nations to push us around."

The example above mentioned is an argument from authority to support the claim that Arabs are dignified and proud people and that they cannot tolerate the humiliation caused by the US occupation. The premise from authority is a case in point of the hypocrisy of the regime (King Faisal's citation) and the pretence of its spokesmen (op-ed author). Mere observation of the family flamboyant lifestyle, their domestic policies of repression, the denigration of its Saudi citizens and the violations of basic human rights (Human Rights Watch 2013 World Report), indicates the double standard policies adopted by Arabia. These policies create constraints on the strategic maneuvering of Arab FP experts and precondition their argumentative practices.

5. 5. Summary

The chapter presented a brief account of the mindsets with which FP experts in the US and in the Arab world approach the Iraq issue and expose it publically for debate. Based on Pragma-dialectics, the macro-contexts of the FP op-ed pieces are explored in the two cultures in order to identify the kinds of institutionally-constrained preconditions that apply to strategic maneuvering in op-ed pieces as an argumentative activity type. Pragma-dialectics draws on the notion of activity type and urges for the characterization of the argumentative practices preconditioned by institutional conventions and aims. Institutional aims are derived from the empirical practices of conventionalized types of argumentative discourse and are expressed in terms of their contribution to social and political processes (Van Eemeren 2011). Exploring these aims in the context of the current corpora seeks to trace the influence of extrinsic characteristics of argumentative discourse basically those derived from its context-dependent institutional aims.

The chapter initiated with an examination of the institutional point of FP op-ed pieces in general and the role of the participants' different perspectives in determining these institutional goals. Three experts' professions were described: the FP analyst typically serving in think tanks, the politician of occasional contribution and the FP columnist. Their different professional perspectives create different institutional conventions which accordingly constrain their discursive practices. Section 5.3 provided a characterization of the op-ed piece on FP as a particular argumentative activity type. In this section, the institutional argumentative practices in this activity type were assessed in relation to the ideal model of critical discussion. The last section focused on the preconditions for strategic maneuvering in the American and the Arab cultures. More specifically, it looked at the participants' mindsets and their nation/states' ideological frameworks constraining the resolution process and influencing the maneuvering performed in the op-ed pieces. Discussion of the professional mindsets in each culture as constraints for maneuvering was coupled with examples.

CHAPTER 6: DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE IRAQ DEBATE IN THE OP-ED PIECES

6.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the findings from the analysis of FP experts' discursive construction of the Iraq debate in the American and Arab op-ed pieces issued between late 2006 and September 2007. Based on the sociocognitive approach of CDA, the analysis focuses on some crucial aspects involved in the contextually-controlled strategic production of the op-ed discourses, namely the arguers' choices related to their selection of topics and their construction of contexts. In the processes of their discursive production, arguers make choices from the mental models they construct of the war events, and, these choices, reflected in context models, enable them to produce their discourse in such a way that it is "optimally appropriate in the social situation (van Dijk, 2009: 7). The first strategic construction in discourse examined is the selection of topics and issues addressed in the debate. The semantic dimension (semantic macro-structures) is analyzed in order to determine both the disagreement spaces from which arguers select their positions and their goals behind these choices. Topic selection is also explored from a rhetorical perspective by identifying the stases and the oratory types of discourses. The second issue examined is the arguers' discursive contextual construction of setting and some aspects of participants' category such as identities and roles. The third choice examined is the discursive construction of purpose in actions and the arguers' modes of representing social actions in the Iraq problem. The three analytical levels were chosen for their potential in revealing the choices arguers make when discursively constructing the Iraq issue. The analysis of choices forming the arguers' stances and goals hopes to delineate the ideological foundations on which they are mapped.

6. 2. Discursive construction choices in topics

In any argumentative setting and, more particularly, in the context of the current political Iraq war debate corpora, the kinds of topics selected for debates do not only

point to the range of issues raised for discussion, but also to their significance for the debaters and, probably, to their purposes for choosing them. Political actors generally select those topics identified as problems and spell them out with the aim of resolving them or inciting action to deal with them. Selecting topics for public debates is a political decision that reflects the political group interests and it is definitely governed and controlled by their ideologies. The section presents the results from the analysis of topic selections where the focus lies in identifying the semantic and the pragmatic macro structures as well as determining the stasis and oratory types of the topics based on the rhetorical account. These findings allow for both determining the disagreement spaces from which the arguers selected their topics (the limits of the group debate in each culture) and identifying the goals of their issue framing.

6. 2. 1. Semantic macrostructures

The analysis of semantic macrostructures in the current corpora was carried out through discourse reconstruction, a Pragma-dialectics' analytic tool that employs semantic rules of inference to identify discourse semantic (and pragmatic) macrostructures. Reconstruction involves examining the points at issue and carrying out a transformation process after which the relevant parts of the discussion were made prominent, especially implicit propositions. By identifying the semantic macro structures the main purpose, of course, is not to merely determine the topics (a semantic dimension of analysis) but, more importantly, attempt to explain how these topics reflect the ideologically biased contexts from which the arguers make their discursive construction choices.

The results from data analysis point toward the difference between the American and the Arab arguers' approaches to the Iraq issue in its much contested Surge period. Indeed, the standpoints reconstructed from the critical discussions show a common line within the same corpus set and denote the kinds of disagreement spaces from which the arguers tend to select their topics. Table (6.1) displays the main topics selected by the American arguers and the points chosen for discussion from these topics.

Semantic macrostructures/ topics	%	Positions adopted	%
Withdrawing troops from Iraq	73.3	The US should not withdraw troops from Iraq	46.6
		The US should withdraw troops from Iraq	6.6
		There are alternative solutions to Iraq war	20
Decision-makers in the Iraq issues	16.6	Politicians are manipulative	10
		Politicians are incompetent	6.6
Morality in the Iraq war	6.6	US troops are innocent	6.6
The situation in Iraq	3.3	The situation in Iraq is dreadful	3.3

Table 6.1. Semantic macrostructures in the American corpus and positions related to each topic

As table 6.1 indicates, four topics have been identified as semantic macrostructures in the American op-ed corpus, which shows that there is a clear trend in the arguers' choices. Indeed, up to 70% of the discussions were advanced around finding the right solution to the Iraq deteriorating situation. This high percentage indicates that this was the most important issue in the corpus and probably in the public debate on Iraq in the US, hence constituting the main disagreement space from which the experts' positions were taken. The second most important topic is found in a relatively smaller percentage, in 20% of the pieces, and is related to decision-makers handling of the Iraq issue. The third topic is concerned with moral issues in the war and is only raised in 6.6% of the corpus, while only 3.3% seem to be interested in the fourth topic on the diagnosis of the situation in Iraq.

Finding a solution to the Iraq problem, as the number one topic in the semantic macrostructures in the American discourse corpus, hints to a hot issue in the Iraq debate. After four years of occupation in Iraq, the situation was alarming because of the escalating violence and the US forces remained unable to control the situation, nor to go on with its mission of reconstructing Iraq's infrastructure and assist the birth of its

democracy. Therefore, solving this problem was highest in the FP experts' agenda as it was crucial for the US global reputation. Around this main topic more than two third of the experts selected their views which have been divided into three different positions. On top of the list was the call against the US troops' withdrawal from Iraq, taking up almost half of the topics discussed (46.6%) as opposed to only 6.6% calling to withdraw troops from Iraq. The sum of 53.3% of the arguers' choice of this topic hints to the controversial positions among the American political elite on whether to withdraw the troops or stay the course in Iraq, while 20% of the experts suggest solving the situation through other policies and decisions. The three positions adopted around this topic illustrate the debaters' eagerness to make the right policy decisions and to promptly resolve the Iraq policy crisis. The examples below from the finding-solutions topic illustrate the controversy. While examples (1) and (2) show standpoints advanced against withdrawal from Iraq, example (3) calls for leaving Iraq.

- (1) There is enough good happening on the battle field of Iraq today that Congress should plan on sustaining the effort at least into 2008. (O' Hanlon and Pollack, *New York Times*)
- (2) We are not really in Iraq for Iraq' s sake now, but for our own. (Ralph Peter, *NY Post*)
- (3) It is time for the waiting to end and to our troops to start to come home (Byrd and Clinton, *The Daily News*)

The second topic identified in the corpus is covered by only 20% of the arguers who deal with the performances of politicians in matter of Iraq policy decisions. This is the second disagreement space, and it points to the FP experts' concern with the efficiency of US policies in Iraq. Within this space, the positions either go around politicians' manipulations of facts, as example (4) shows, or around the Bush administration's incompetence in dealing with violence in Iraq and the consequences of their poor behavior on the success of the US mission, as in example (5) below:

- (4) Our military is now being employed for political purposes (Ralph Peters *USA Today*)

- (5) Bush is still counting on a miracle that will allow him to jerk the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki around to his way of thinking and operating (Cragg Hines, *Houston Chronicle*)

The third topic in our corpus, which is concerned with moral issues in the Iraq war, points to a different disagreement space related to the justice of conducting the war on Iraq. It is surprising to find very few op-ed pieces with semantic macrostructures related to this disagreement space in the corpus, as only 6.6% chose to advance positions around this ethical issue, while the international public opinion was highly suspicious of the US intentions from invading and occupying Iraq and also from its troops' conduct with civilians. As example (6) shows, however, the positions taken from this space are supportive of the troop's behavior in spite of the increasing international condemnations of the US occupation and the impact of the troops' scandal on the Abou Graib tortures.

- (6) Second-guessing how Marines should act under hostile before the facts are known is not only unfair, but dishonors the immense courage required to survive in the midst of such an incommunicable experience (Kathleen Parker, *Chicago Tribune*)

The fourth and last topic in this corpus is about the situation in Iraq, a disagreement space that is represented here only in 3.3% of the pieces in the corpus. In this space, the arguments are expected to go around how the predicting future condition of the war from the analysis of current situation. The disagreement in this space may arise due to a difference towards facts and their sources, amount of access to these facts and the methods used in the diagnosis.

In the Arab corpus, there are five topics around which discussions have been raised. These topics indicate the kind of disagreement spaces from which the arguers selected their standpoints. The next table displays findings from the analysis of the semantic macrostructures in the Arab Op-ed discourse corpus.

Semantic macrostructures/topics	%	Positions adopted	%
The US actions in Iraq (morality)	46.6	The US is responsible for the Iraq disaster /crimes	43.3
		The world is the US accomplice in the crimes committed against Iraq	3.3
US agenda in Iraq	23.3	The US has hidden agendas in Iraq	23.3
Withdrawing troops from Iraq	20	There are alternative strategies to Iraq issue	13.3
		Americans should act against their politicians to solve Iraq	6.6
The situation/policy in Iraq	6.6	The US policy is going to fail	6.6
The US decision makers	3.3	Bipartisan decisions are hard to implement	3.3

Table 6.2. Semantic macrostructures and positions related to each topic in the Arab corpus

As Table 6.2 indicates, 46.6% of the op-ed pieces in the corpus discuss the US actions in Iraq from a moral perspective. The topic does not cover a specific policy as the one then employed in Iraq (named Counter-insurgency). Instead, it is related to the US policies in general in Iraq and in the Middle East, as part of an overarching policy in the region. The second most discussed topic is the US agenda in Iraq and is selected by 23.3% of arguers. The third topic is that of finding solutions to the Iraq issue. Within this kind of disagreement space, 20% of the arguers discuss the most efficient policies and decisions which could save Iraq from an eminent disaster. The fourth topic is related to evaluating the situation in Iraq and predicting its future course. Finally, 3.3% of arguers select the topic of decision makers to assess their behavior from an efficiency perspective.

The highly exploited disagreement space shown in the results on semantic macrostructures' analysis indicates the arguers' apprehension of the US actions in Iraq. The pieces concerned with the morality of the Iraq war amounting to almost half of the corpus (46.6%) belong to the disagreement space related to the question of justice in

conducting the war on Iraq. In this space, the Arab positions were mainly related to the way the US implemented its policies particularly the actions of the US forces and their role in the expansion of terrorism. This is illustrated in Example (7) below:

- (7) The U.S. removed one dictator and replaced him with scores of other dictators and Iraqis have to obey all of them (Najah Ali, *Azzaman*)

The second topic covered by 23.3% of the op-ed pieces is related to US agenda and mission in Iraq. In this space, the disagreement goes on the credibility of the US intentions and the character of the operations it was carrying out there. This theme of trust is widely covered across Arab media networks through extensive political debates. The debaters' positions were divided between those who see the US forces as essential in the fight against terrorism and in preventing it from reaching other Arab states and those questioning the US intentions in Iraq and its motivations behind the Iraq "reconstruction" mission. Example (8) illustrates the selection of this topic.

- (8) I believe that there are some undisclosed reasons for the launching and continuation of the war despite the knowledge that Iraq did not possess any weapons of mass destruction or never posed a threat to the United States. (Hassan Tahsin, *Arab News*)

Finding solutions, as a third topic of discussion, points to a different disagreement space, covered in the Arab corpus by 20% of the arguers. This is the same number-one space in the American FP debates in our corpus and definitely a hot issue in the US public debates during the "counter-insurgency" policy in 2007. From this space, the disagreement goes around bringing forth the right and most pertinent policy to save Iraq. FP experts discussed the US policy and their views diverged on whether to continue this policy, which only needed time to produce satisfactory results (in the views of some experts), or to change the course of actions and find other options to stop the disaster. In the current corpus, the positions selected from this space are only those proposing a change of plans, which means no case supports "counter-insurgency", as example (9) below indicates:

- (9) The success of Bush's new agenda in Iraq and the wider Middle East depends on whether it can be realized without necessarily engaging in another war with Iran or Syria (Asghar Kazemi, *Syria Times*)

The op-ed pieces dealing with this topic reveal the Arab experts' belief in their more perceptive estimation of the situation and their more pertinent perspective when it comes to solving policy issues in their region.

The fourth and relatively small amount of macro structures (6.6%) related to the US policy in Iraq belongs to a disagreement space involved with evaluating the efficiency of the policy according to technical standards. The space is also shared by US experts who seek to assess a present FP situation as a means to predict a future situation or as a basis for future decisions. This kind of topic is normally picked up by foreign policy analysts; those experts who are professionally trained to elaborate their assessment from research and analysis and based on scientifically testable data and methods. The objective-like stance typically characterizing this kind of perspective is manifested through the use of policy analysis (neutral) language, as shown in example (10) below:

- (10) Lately, the Middle East witnessed a number of important political, diplomatic and military developments which are worthy of research and analysis as they may well be the beginning of new policy issues in the region. (...) The recent developments are as follows: (...). (M. Akf Jamal, *Gulf News*)

These findings about topics may lead to the conclusion that the two groups have drawn on topics from different disagreement spaces. While the main disagreement space from which American arguers seem to select most of their topics (73.3%) is that of putting together efficient solutions for the crisis, almost half (46.6%) of the Arab arguers make their topic selection from a space related to the US invasion, occupation and military actions and policies in Iraq. This divergence in disagreements points to the fact that these two elite groups hold different kinds of apprehensions towards such a complex political issue, hence they have incongruent goals for advancing their respective argumentations.

The analysis of the semantic macro-structures of the op-ed discourses yielded insightful results on the strategies of topic selection and the reasons why they are adopted in the

discursive construction of the Iraq issue. Contrasting the two groups of arguers helped determining the differences between each group strategies and explaining the reasons behind them. The semantic analysis helped identify the disagreement spaces from which topics were selected in each cultural elite group and examine their scopes. It also pointed to the goals meant to be achieved by the discursive construction and reflected the arguers' most crucial contextual construction (aims). A discussion of these strategies is presented below.

As the results showed, the American arguers in the corpus focus on the topic of finding solutions to Iraq, which is identified as a monopolizing disagreement space in this debate. Discussing this issue in a public space is part of the deliberative character of political decisions in a democratic system and denotes the experts' engagement along with the citizens in the process of policy making. From a different space, other arguers in the same corpus focus on criticizing the performance of the politicians in charge of the Iraq decisions. The two disagreement spaces are different in that the first is on policy making and the second is on accountability. However, the same function has been appreciated from raising these two topics, namely that of calling to action, since promoting a policy, the first case, and reproaching politicians for policy mismanagement, the second case, may both be interpreted as a call to take political action. Calling to action, which is the discussion goal in 90% of the cases, points to the nature of the political practices of these arguers (including their discursive practices). The arguers are highly involved in FP decision making and they mostly aim at motivating the public to take political actions. Even more, it could indicate that the arguers are, indeed, the decision makers, on whom FP and the course of the Iraq situation in particular depend. This leads to the conclusion that no room seems to be left for other disagreement spaces to be addressed, discarding from debate such topics as the US occupation to Iraq or goals in Iraq.

In the Arab corpus, the topics raised for discussion differ from those raised in the American corpus in that they focus more on accountability than on providing solutions for the Iraq crisis. Indeed, up to 70% of the argumentations advanced around two topics (US crimes and US agenda) share the same goal of denouncing the US policies in Iraq by alleging their offenses and hidden agendas. Both topics are meant to expose the US actions in Iraq as criminal and as deviating from the benevolent image it is trying to sell

to the world, alleging that its mission is driven by imperialistic ambitions rather than the intention of rebuilding Iraq as the US officially claims. These arguers aim at holding the US accountable for its actions and policies through their public debate in the international space: They probably hope their voice could reach and change the US public opinion and the voters' decisions. Hence, by choosing these topics the arguers engage in an action of protest, as a form of contention to the US policies in their regions. Protest seems to be the only political opportunity left to this group in their attempt to take part in the international debate and make effect on public opinion.

By choosing these specific topics, the arguers seem to achieve their aims from participating in the debate on Iraq. While the American arguers here are decision-making- oriented FP experts, the Arab arguers come out as protest-oriented. Each group of experts certainly derives its orientation and stance from the kind of national power their states hold in the international order. Power refers, as in political sciences, to “a measure of influence or control over outcomes, events, actors and issues in international relations. The qualification of a state position in the world is measured from its weight, significance, or its (geo) political power or potential (Kegley & Blanton, 2011). American experts' topic selection reflects the kind of power position they enjoy, as masters of the situations, while Arab experts' topics apply to a weaker position in the system and more specifically in the context of the Iraq conflict. The decisions involved have the most effect on audience reception and understanding of the Iraq issue. More importantly, they may even shape public and international opinion and influence the collective attitudes and political actions affecting the course of events in this internationally critical conflict situation

6. 2. 2. Classical rhetoric perspective on topic selections

The rhetorical account contributes to our critical analysis of the choices made by arguers in their discursive construction of the Iraq issue by explaining the connection between the ways arguers find issues for discussion and their ambitions for making such decisions. The focus is not of course on the aboutness of discourses (as in semantic macrostructures) but rather on the situation created by the arguer for these topics to develop. Two levels of analysis were considered. The first was concerned with locating

the oratory types designed to optimize the purpose of the speech of the op-ed discussions and the second focused on determining their stases or their approach to problem identification.

6. 2. 2. 1. The oratory types

The oratory types of the speeches were identified while carrying out the discourse reconstruction of the two op-ed corpora. Each op-ed piece in the two data corpora was classified into one of the three oratory types: judicial (or forensic), deliberative or epideictic. Below, the categorization results for each data corpus are displayed and the ideological implications of these choices on the construction of the political debates about Iraq are discussed.

American data oratory types analysis

As can be seen from the findings in Table 6.3 below illustrating the distribution of the three different oratory types in the American corpus, up to 2/3 of the op-ed pieces topics are handled from a deliberative perspective, while 26.6% of the pieces are epideictic and focus on assessing policies and politicians. Only 6.6% are judicial types of oratory devoted to judge policies or actions as just or unjust. These findings show a clear inclination of this group of arguers towards deliberation as the decision making kind of argumentation.

Oratory types	%
Deliberative	66.6
Epideictic	23.3
Judicial	10

Table 6.3. Distribution of oratory types in the American corpus

A topic approached from a deliberative perspective orients arguments to the future and towards the advantages/benefits of making a particular decision. Deliberative rhetoric is regarded as “the most pragmatic kind of rhetoric” (Heinrichs 2008: 30), as it is illustrated in the two examples below. In example (11), the arguer attempts to dissuade

the audience (particularly Congressmen) from deciding to withdraw troops from Iraq (using “we should not), hence calls them to give an opportunity to the counter insurgency policy to continue, by listing all the success it was achieving. In example (12), the arguer encourages the audience to wait (give the policy a chance to prove its efficiency), as an only way to decide. The topic is oriented to the future state of the Iraq issue.

(11) But we should not allow individual atrocities to obscure the larger picture. A new campaign has just begun, it is already yielding important results, and its effects are increasing (Kimberly Kagan, *The Wall Street Journal*)

(12) The only way we will know for sure whether the tide can be turned is to continue the policy and wait. (Michael Totten, *Daily News*)

The choice of the very topic of finding a solution to the Iraq issue indicates a choice to make a decision. Whether arguing for withdrawing from Iraq or for staying the course to let the policy continue, the arguers who explicitly adopt a deliberative perspective make it clear they are supporting a future decision.

Most of the remaining op-ed pieces go about evaluating the actions of the people related to the Iraq endeavor. Indeed, around 23.3% of the topics are epideictic types of oratory, where arguers engage in blaming or praising people (politicians, opponents, soldiers, enemies, etc.) for their behaviors or their performances in relation to the Iraq issue. Many op-ed pieces focus on key decisions makers such as opponent politicians and blame them for their wrong doing or even more depreciating them for their immorality. Some epideictic op-ed pieces have a directive macro-act, as the ones calling for action. Still, their focus on judging the past performances of politicians, characterized by the use of the past tense and the focus on values, make them epideictic. In example (13) below, the arguer refers to the immoral behavior of politicians contemplating staying in Iraq. Even though the illocutionary force is interpreted as an urge for action (most probably a change in public opinion), the oratory focuses on blaming politicians for using troops to gain power. The behavior is seen from a moral power perspective, as an unpatriotic act. The call to action hence is not approached as a deliberative by

attempting to convince audience of the advantage of a decision, but it is rather taken from a moral perspective making the speech an issue of values and morality.

- (13) We owe that much to our troops. They don't face the mere forfeiture of a few congressional seats but the loss of their lives. Our military is now being employed for political purposes. It's unworthy of our nation. (Ralph Peters, *USA Today*)

Much less still is dedicated to the judicial kind of speech (only 10%). This means that there are very few arguers in this corpus who engage in making charges and in discussing the innocence or guilt of the people involved in the Iraq issue or in assessing the war policies and actions for the purpose of bringing to justice their actors, as example (14) shows.

- (14) We gave them a civil war? Why? Because we failed to prevent it? (Charles Krauthammer, *Washington Post*)

In this sequence of moves, while the arguer attempts to obtain a reaction from his audience (by means of directive speech acts of questions), he is definitely seeking to refute the accusations made to the American troops of allegedly provoking a civil war in Iraq. However, defending the US positions and actions against international accusations is inconsiderable in the American corpus. Indeed, the experts in this corpus show little interest in issues of justice or the lack of it of past actions of US actors, whether these actions are related to policies implemented in Iraq and the consequences caused by them or to the occupation itself as the one responsible for the high death rate. Ignoring the judicial approach clearly points to the fact that US actions in Iraq are not subject to guilt or innocence at least for the arguers in our corpus. The massive preparatory rhetoric legitimizing the war on Iraq, as a war to protect America from terrorism and to liberate Iraqis from despotism, has boiled down into the naturalization of occupation in the American public opinion to the extent that there is no need after four years of the invasion to approach such issues again.

Arab data oratory types analysis

The findings from the rhetorical analysis of the Arab op-ed corpus are illustrated in Table 6.4 below. Exactly half of the op-ed discussions are epideictic oratory type, which means that Arab arguers in this data corpus are keener on advancing criticism over the actions and characters of opponents than on proposing solutions to the Iraq problem. The 26.6% of arguers approaching the issue from a judicial perspective consider the justice or injustice of certain policies and actions and make charges or accusations accordingly. Only 23.3% focus on the choice to make to solve the Iraq problem, thus relatively few arguers participate in deliberation process by proposing policies and arguing for their implementations

Oratory types	%
Epideictic	50
Judicial	26.6
Deliberative	23.3

Table 6.4. Distribution of oratory types in the Arab corpus

Hence, even though research about this corpus arguers' institutional and professional profiles revealed that almost 50% are political analysts who are expected to assess political situations and propose solutions and decisions, the results from their oratory type analysis inform us that they are more engaged into criticism and more determined to raise their audience awareness on the magnitude of their American opponents' actions than in the role of the analyst who directs audience to decision making. Example (15) illustrates the case of a political analyst choosing to approach the topic of troops withdrawal from an epideictic angle, not exactly to advance any direct position on the decision but rather by means of discrediting the "decision-maker" bush) through blame and accusation

- (15) The historic reference (Bush warning from the Vietnam fate if troops were to withdraw from Iraq) is at best another display of Bush's ignorance and at worst a deliberate attempt to distort the truth. (Al Harthi, *Arab News*)

6. 2. 2. 2. The Stasis or finding the issue

In stasis analysis, the key points of disagreement raised in argumentation are examined. The stases allow us to determine the central kind of question the discourse addresses, which can be often established owing to the very choice of the topic. Since the stasis describes the logic inherent in the development of an issue, it powerfully hints to the conditions making the arguers choose the topics and further clarifies their goals from these choices (See examples below). The standpoints advanced for discussion in the American and Arab op-ed corpora have been analyzed and classified into one of the four stases.

American op-ed Stasis

Table 6.5, below, displays the distribution of stases in the corpora and their sizes in relation to the different topics raised for discussion. After classifying the American data, the results indicate the dominance of the translative type of stasis in this corpus, where more than half of the topics are approached from an action plan perspective. The use of this type of the stasis exclusively occurs with those arguers selecting the topic of withdrawal from Iraq. In the second place comes the qualitative stasis with a little above a quarter of the corpus (26.6%) approaching their topics from an evaluative perspective. Both conjectural and definitional stases have been employed by the arguers with relatively smaller degree, specifically 10% in each case.

Topic/Status	Conjectural	Definitional	Qualitative	Translative	Total
Withdrawal from Iraq	3.3	6.6	10	53.3	73.3
Decision-makers for Iraq	3.3	3.3	10	0	16.6
Moral issues	0	0	6.6	0	6.6
The war situation	3.3.	0	0	0	3.3
Total stases	10	10	26.6	53.3	100

Table 6.5. Stasis of standpoints/positions in the American corpus

The considerable amount of arguers' use of the translative stasis simply denotes that they seek action from the selected topics. The translative stasis asks the question of "What decisions should be made? This choice may be interpreted, as above stated, as an indication that a high number of arguers assume the existence of a problem, agree on its nature and on its quality and that they only seek taking action in its respect. Hence, by choosing to talk on withdrawal from a translative perspective, they presume a few things, namely that the current order in Iraq exists, (there is an activity), it belongs to a specific nature (a mission), and it is already qualified (as enduring trouble), and that what matters is the action to take in order to solve it. In this case, whether the activity is good or bad is not the issue, even though along the deliberation on decision, evaluation is usually provided but in this case as supportive argumentation for the claim, but not exactly as the main essence given to the topic. This stasis is illustrated in example (16) bellow, where the statement on the existence of a policy and what it is doing (presuming its nature (mission) and its quality (good) are to establish a starting point for the arguer's position. This positions (as one of the main components in the semantic structure of the text) is then advanced posing a question of action, in which the arguer asserts there is a choice to make in Iraq.

- (16) There, the battle of Baghdad is now under way. A new commander, Gen. David Petraeus, has taken command, having been confirmed by the Senate, 81-0, just a few weeks ago. And a new strategy is being put into action, with thousands of additional American soldiers streaming into the Iraqi capital. Congress thus faces a choice in the weeks and months ahead. Will we allow our actions to be driven by the changing conditions on the ground in Iraq--or by the unchanging political and ideological positions long ago staked out in Washington? What ultimately matters more to us: the real fight over there, or the political fight over here? (Joseph Lieberman, *Wall Street Journal*)

The arguer here chooses to talk on withdrawal, by spotlighting the decision to be made as the most important things in focus in the issue. As the rhetorical question he asks show, his position arises from his anger on the politicians' disagreement on the issue that in his view is an obstacle for the progress of the policy. Argumentation then may devote a great deal to the criticism of politicians (which it actually does) and to the

consequences of their ideologically based conflict, an argument chosen to discredit counter-positions (that calling for withdrawal). The main question posed however, is on the right action to choose, that of the translative kind of stasis.

The next example (17) is taken from an op-ed that shares the same disagreement space as example (16) on the withdrawal from Iraq. The op-ed has been classified as a deliberative type of oratory, that is, one that is geared towards the future and is calling for action. However, the stasis in this op-ed is conjectural rather than translative (as it is the case for the majority of the deliberative kinds). The question posed is not the action to take, but rather is to accept a fact, namely the existence of Al Qaeda as a main threat. The call to action in this op-ed piece is the macro speech act, as it is interpreted from the sequence of specific acts, but it remains implicit in the text.

- (17) Al Qaeda is in Iraq, intentionally inflaming sectarian hostilities, deliberately pushing for full scale civil war. They do this by launching attacks against Shia, Sunni, Kurds and coalition forces (...). Five weeks ago, I came into a village near Baqubah with American and Iraqi soldiers. Al Qaeda had openly stated Baqubah was their worldwide headquarters (...). Anyone who says Al Qaeda is not one of the primary problems in Iraq is simply ignorant of the facts. (Michael Yon, *Daily News*)

After making a conjecture (identifying Al Qaeda as responsible for civil War), the arguer devotes argumentation to proving the existence of a problem (conjecture), rather than assuming it already does and focusing on its bad consequences (qualitative) or moving forward to taking actions against it (translative). However, it seems that by choosing this initial kind of stasis, the arguer has been capable of going from there through the rest of the stases (define the problem, evaluate it and then translate it) the way he wishes to. This is what he actually does by choosing conjecture.

In example (18), the arguer grants the topic he selects (troops' withdrawal) a qualitative stasis. The main question posed is related to values, as the stasis is based on criticizing and blaming politicians even though, the aim is to change audience's position on withdrawal,. By qualifying the decision to withdrawal as a crime, he places justice at the

heart of the issue, while the call to action (audience opinion change and action) comes about as secondary.

- (18) Even as our troops make serious progress against al-Qaeda-in-Iraq and other extremists, Congress - including Republican members - is sending the terrorists a message: "Don't lose heart, we'll save you!" (...) for purely political reasons - next year's elections - cowards on Capitol Hill are spurning the courage of our troops on the ground. (Ralph Peters, *New York Post*)

The arguer here does not attempt to convince the audience on the advantages of staying in Iraq against the bad consequences of leaving, as decision making typically proceeds. He chooses to make it an issue of justice by takes judging withdrawal as criminal, making in the process his position (staying in Iraq) *the* only right option rather than a proposition (as it would be in a translative stasis) subject to justification and defense.

Arab Op-ed Stasis

As indicated in the results reported in Table 6.6, up to 60% of the stases chosen to approach the topics in this corpus are qualitative, bringing the issue from values perspectives. This kind of stasis is highly present in those op-ed pieces related to the actions of the US in Iraq topics. In the second position, 20% of the op-ed topics are taken from a translative, action- oriented stasis, most of which belong to the topic of withdrawal from Iraq. Finally, the distribution is equal between the two stases of conjectural and definitional with relatively low amount 13.3 for each.

Topic/Status	Conjectural	Definitional	Qualitative	Translative	Total
US actions in Iraq	0	6.6	40	0	46.6
US agenda in Iraq	10	3.3	10	0	23.3
Withdrawal from Iraq	0	0	6.6	13.3	20
Situation in Iraq	3.3	3.3	0	0	6.6
Decision makers	0	0	3.3	0	3.3
Total stases	13.3	13.3	60	13.3	100

Table 6.6. Stasis of standpoints/positions in the Arab corpus

As can be seen from the data in table 6.6, almost 2/3 of the qualitative stasis found in the Arab corpus op-ed are related to the topic of US actions in Iraq (the most frequently selected topic), while the remaining 1/3 is distributed over the US agenda, withdrawal and decision makers topics. Judging the US actions and policies are the number one topic stasis. In most cases and by choosing this stasis, the arguers focus on the condemnation of the US actions, while presuming they are recognized (international audience knows the actions are taking place) and also defined (presuming it an occupation even though very often engage in defining it). This may be perceived in example (19) below where the arguer talks on the US action and policies in Iraq as crimes.

- (19) Frightening people becomes a justification for an ongoing war. As long as victory over international terrorism is impossible, the only justification for the persistence of a condition in which American soldiers are killed daily is terrorism in itself. (Jihad el-Khazen, *Al-Hayat*)

Another case in point from the qualitative type of op-ed pieces comes below in example (20) where the arguer selects the topic of the US actions from a justice perspective, by asserting the devastating effects of the policies conducted by the Bush administration.

- (20) The overall demonstration effect has been one of imperial arrogance: awesome but incompetent superpower waging unwinnable colonial war, unable to stamp down resistance to its occupation, flouting international law, grossly violating human rights, while making hollow claims about promoting democracy (Adel Safty, *Gulf News*)

As for those op-ed pieces related to the topic of the US hidden agendas, stasis is equally distributed between the qualitative kind and the conjectural. The difference in stasis hints to a difference of the questions posed on the topic. While conjecturing the US has hidden agendas presumes that the audience does not recognize it as a fact and that the arguer from this perspective is drawing attention to its existence (as illustrated in example (21), the qualitative perspective adopted on the same topic (hidden agendas)

points to an already established controversy and to the fact that the arguer pleads justice (as in example 22):

- (21) Although Washington will never admit it, its troops are in Iraq because of oil. Oil is at the heart of the political and social struggles across the region. Iraq has the world's second largest oil reserves (...). Despite immense losses, Democratic pressure and the Baker-Hamilton proposals, Washington has no intention of withdrawing from Iraq. (Galal Nassar, *Al Ahram*)
- (22) Does anyone seriously believe this is possible at this stage or at any point in future? Instead of calling a spade a spade, the US media are turning to analyzing and assessing the scenario, as if Washington ever had any intention to leave Iraq, and how it is planning to quit the chaotic country. (Musa Keilani, *Jordan Times*)

In example (22), the arguer puts the blame on the media (and also on the Bush administration in other chunks of the discussion) accusing them of confusing the public (and his intended audience very probably) by talking about withdrawal while Bush, he asserts, has no intentions of leaving Iraq (as he has hidden agendas there). The main stasis in the op-ed piece takes assertions to a level of evaluation rather than simply limiting the question of identification of problem or contesting its definition (these two actually occur at some point of the discourse, as sub stases).

The classification of the op-ed pieces into the stases reveals a significant difference between the American and the Arab approaches in the corpora in selecting their topics from the Iraq issues. The graph below contrasts the findings from the stasis analysis of the two corpora.




Figure 6. 1. Contrasted stases in the American and Arab op-ed discourses

Figure 6.1 shows that the American arguers focus on action by choosing the translative stasis. In this type of stasis, the question typically asked is: what should be done about the problem? The Arab arguers, on the other hand, focus on values and justice by choosing the qualitative stasis. This stasis asks the “what-is-the quality-of-the-problem?” kind of question. This is significant in terms of how arguers in the two corpora make presumptions on the problems raised in the Iraq issue. As the stases have a hierarchical relationship, the questions would be posed in sequence, that is, starting from the conjectural (did something happen), moving to the definitional (what is its nature?) then to the qualitative (is it good or bad?) and finally getting to the translative stasis (what should we do about it?). Asking a higher level stasis question, for instance the translative one, presupposes that agreement has been reached on lower stases, namely presuming something has happened, consensually defined and judged. Therefore, the focus on the translative stasis in the American corpora entails that the arguers project a sense of agreement on all the questions from which the issue could be handled and take them as settled by engaging in discussing action. However, in the Arab corpora, and with the majority of arguers, up to 60%, adopting the qualitative stasis, the focus is on evaluation and on seriousness of the matter. This means that the question of whether the issue is good or bad is not settled for them and that the heart of the issue when picking their topics is to appraise the situation from a justice starting

point. The next two sections present in more details findings on stasis analysis for each cultural group.

The divergence obtained from stasis theory analysis, thus further explains the two groups' highly unequal perspectives on the situation in Iraq and more importantly their respective socio-political status or positions in the Iraq conflict reflected in this very public debate about the issue. The translative stasis points to the American arguers concern with resolution, which is indeed enabled by their positions as commanders of the Iraq situation and the actual decision makers in the global context. For most of them resolving the public crisis caused by the deterioration of the situation in Iraq is a priority as a practical approach to the issue rather than accountability. Hence, most of these arguers take settled/assumed many aspects of the issue, (or at least that is what they aim for) by not making them the forefront questions posed in their discussion. Conversely, most Arab arguers in the corpus focus on justice when bringing their issues to debate and, by their qualitative stasis approaches, they highlight their role as plaintiffs against the US alleged crimes and aggressions.

After examining topic selection as one of the main choices made by arguers in their discursive construction of the Iraq issue, the focus is shifted to exploring some of the arguers' context categories manifest in their discourse and how they could reveal underlying ideological structures probably inherent in the discursive practices of their respective political and culturally different groups.

6. 3. Contextual discursive constructions of the Iraq issue

This section presents the results from the contextual analysis of the op-ed discourses of the two cultural groups of FP experts. The analysis focused on constructions constrained by the experts' context models (van Dijk, 2008). Two schematic categories of contexts, setting and participants were explored in the way they seemed to control the discursive constructions of the Iraq war in the two corpora and attempted to determine the ideological basis of such context models. These categories, as part of the structure of context models, are significant instances' of the arguers' "definition of the relevant

aspects of the communicative situation” (van Dijk, 2008: 118). From these context categories, attention was devoted to some sub schematic categories, namely space (setting), identities and roles (participants). The main aim was to contrast the two cultural groups’ contextual constructions of political debate characterized by their respective “nations’” involvement in the armed conflict.

6.3.1. The construction of the debate space (Setting)

The critical look at the discourse structures of the opinion pieces in the two corpora has given some insight into the variety of place-related discursive construction that are contextualized by the arguers. The analysis explored the three types of places potentially contextualizing the discourses: the interpersonal, social, and the geographical. The findings from the analyses of context construction point to considerable differences in the patterns characterizing the definition of the communicative space for each cultural group.

6.3.1.1. Constructions of place/space in the American op-ed corpus

The spaces constructed in 93.3% of the op-ed pieces in the American corpus are predominantly a geographical type, i.e. the one providing a sociocultural dimension and identity to the space in which the communicative episode takes place (van Dijk, 2009: 51). Indeed, as most arguers contextualize their discussions within the op-ed space as a public space created to debate FP issues concerning the US interests with the American public, they take the US territorial space as a reference point in their contextual constructions. Despite the different approaches and their overlapping with interpersonal and social spaces constructions, this geographical space construction remains dominant. The context becomes national and even loaded with national sentiments (such as patriotism) through different discourse properties like narration, lexis and deixis. The construction is, for instance, perceptible from the recurrent use of pronouns (Us vs. Them) and deictic expressions like here and there, which apart from indicating identity, they create the boundaries to the spaces of communication. In example (23) Lieberman makes clear where the communicative event takes places by the following discursive construction of place:

- (23) The current wave of suicide bombings in Iraq is also aimed at us here in the United States, to obscure the gains we have made. (Joseph Lieberman, *Washington Post*)

Some other arguers make the space a national one by reference to the national positions from the US policies (whether as opponents or allies), while making little reference or inclusion of international participation in the debate. In example (24), as Scowcroft talks about the debate in Iraq, it becomes clear that the debate is about choices and decisions. This creates a kind of place/space exclusively American, where non-Americans are not addressed, hence not expected to participate.

- (24) The report accomplished a great deal (...) it helped catalyze the debate about our Iraq policy and crystallize the choices we face. Above all, it emphasized the importance of focusing on American national interests, not only in Iraq but in the region. (Brent Scowcroft, *New York Times*)

Moreover, they completely draw on national beliefs and values and seem to ignore the international audience positions or the Iraqi one (as directly involved in the conflict). This is semantically realized by reference to American voters, American political opponents and policy consequences on the American interests. The policy success or failure is perceived as having consequences only (or chiefly) on Americans. This is illustrated in examples (25) and (26), where Clark and Lieberman consecutively refer to Americans as the addressees and consequently demarcate the contextual space as relevant only for US citizen.

- (25) Instead of cutting and running or staying the course, it is time for us to begin to redeploy. But how can we do this and improve our prospects for success? (Wesley Clark, *USA Today*)

- (26) I understand the frustration, anger and exhaustion so many Americans feel about Iraq (...), but we must not make another terrible mistake now. (Joseph Lieberman, *Wall Street Journal*)

These references (among other discursive manifestations) have a pragmatic impact on the interpretation of context, as the very exclusive presence of American character in all the features of the Iraq issue makes it by default exclusion of non-American participants in this issue. It seems that being the protagonists in foreign policy debates (Iraq among other Middle Eastern issues), American experts are not actually aware of the participants other than American audience, despite the fact the newspapers have international reach. This is may of course be due to their goals from taking up media channels to advance their argumentation on political issues. These goals obviously do not consider other than peer citizens to address and convince, certainly the kind of audiences allowed to participate in the processes of decision making. With the American public being the only target audience, the space to construct for the debate remains within national bounds.

These constructions of space are definitely ideologically biased contextual constructions, since they draw on socially shared beliefs on a common geographical space demarcated by a common national destiny. For these arguers, the debate on Iraq is assumed to be exclusively American, as it involves American policies and decisions to be made by Americans according to American standards. These kinds of contexts further illustrate the US international position in the global relations as a powerful actor in this conflict and that its decision makers involve only the American public in the debates on FP decisions. And even though the debate is open to international audience, these latter are outsiders, acting as mere viewers of the democratic process, but are not invited in. There are some exceptions, however, where arguers seem to be willing to address a wider audience and choose to include international participants in the debate, as illustrated in examples (27) and (28), by construing participation location (of self and others) in a way that makes it possible for international audience to see the debate as taken outside of the US territory, as if maintained at a international space:

- (27) What troubled me about this statement--a commonly heard criticism of U.S. involvement in Iraq--is that those who say such things seem to forget the good U.S. arms have done in imposing democracy on countries like Japan and Germany, or Bosnia more recently (Bob Kerry, *Wall Street Journal*)

- (28) For the United States, the world is now, as a result of the Iraq war, a more dangerous place (...) The U.S. has probably not yet fully woken up to the appalling fact that, after a long period in which the first motto of its military was "no more Vietnams," it faces another Vietnam. (Timothy Garton Ash *LA Times*)

In example (27) the speech act as request makes it clear that the writer's stands at an American location but invites "outsiders" to comprehend his position/views. This proposition points to a context constructed in an international (geographical) setting and not exclusively American. Equally, example (28) illustrates a construction of place inclusive of international participants, since reference to the US makes it clear that the writer communicative space is not inside the US but wider and his vantage point is possible interpretable as looking from outside to the situation. These were the only 2 cases where writers locate themselves and their participants pragmatically outside the geographical space of the US and contextualize the debate internationally, as almost all the op-ed discourses are realized at homeland setting.

Apart from this geographical space constructions realized by different discursive means, as above mentioned, which generally characterize national territorial boundaries to the discourse, there are two cases where the models insert other aspects into this context schema in an interesting way. The first one is an op-ed piece written jointly by Robert Byrd and Hilary Clinton, where the arguers defend their position for troop withdrawal from Iraq and initiate their discussion addressing (implicitly and as typically inferred from op-ed texts) the public as audience. The arguers explicitly address President Bush as it is illustrated in example (29) from their op-ed piece:

- (29) This is not the fight Congress authorized Mr. President. If you want to continue to wage this fight, come to congress and make your case. Otherwise, bring our troops home. (R. Byrd and H. Clinton, *Daily News*)

This move not only converts President Bush to a participant, but also converts the spatial setting into a direct political confrontation space. This is done by drawing on contextual properties affecting other aspects of text such as the use of direct speech and the imperative. The use of “come to Congress” as a directive may indicate a professional and political kind of relationship which determines the place in which the speaker and hearers stand. Construing a context based on a direct face-to-face confrontation with a political opponent may intentionally and strategically guide all participants to join in at a conventional-like political speech space, such as those accommodating politicians’ dialogues or any type of institutional political debates.

In the second case, Joseph Lieberman addresses through his op-ed piece his colleagues at the Congress in a direct mode, hence contextually construct the debate at a political event space. This is may be seen from example (30).

- (30) I appeal to my colleagues in Congress to step back and think carefully about what to do next. (Joseph Lieberman, *Wall Street Journal*)

By reproducing contextual elements of political speeches, Joseph Lieberman’s construction of a space where politicians tend to make appeals for political decisions or missions. This type of context construction may function as a guide for the audience to eventually process discourse in the way desired.

The discursive contextualization of Iraq

Iraq as the object of debate is of course at the heart of the semantic dimension of the op-ed pieces in the corpora under study, as the data are specifically selected based on the Iraq topic criterion. However, pragmatically speaking and in relation to the contextualization of space in the discussion, the representation of Iraq seems to present a peculiar context case. For Americans in general, Iraq is the battlefield. In most of the op-ed pieces then, it is “there” or “over there”. This distance confirms that the space of communication is “here”, i.e. in “our” land (the US) as opposed to the outside space

“there” within which “we fight” to protect ourselves and our interest. But the fact the troops and interests and the battlefield are “there” makes this kind of space closer somehow to participants in the communication, mainly because of “American” presence “there”. The shortening of distance from Iraq is realized when some arguers speak about achievement in Iraq and use the inclusive “we”. What is accomplished in Iraq is constructed as a common action realized in the name of Americans and with their support and that is why success is to be collectively celebrated in the same way as failure is deplored. This is illustrated in the two examples below, where Tony Snow (31) and Kim Kagan (32) endorse military action (of killing enemies) as realized by the collective “we” as Americans

(31) We’ve killed and captured two thirds of its (Al Qaeda) senior leadership. (Tony Snow, *USA Today*)

(32) This is war, and the enemy is reacting. The enemy uses suicide bombs, car bombs and brutal executions to break our will and that of our Iraqi allies. (Kimberly Kagan, *Wall Street Journal*)

In example (33), however, Joseph Liebermann does not exactly put emphasis on military actions as the actions implemented by all Americans, as in the above mentioned examples, but locates himself within the US territory by explicit “deictic” features of “here” against “there” in Iraq, and at the same time bringing Iraq or the battle field closer by inviting audience to look at it. The move encourages the visualization of Iraq and the construction of proximity towards it, as an observable location.

(33) What ultimately matters more to us: the real fight over there, or the political fight over here? (...) If we stopped the legislative manoeuvring and looked to Baghdad, we would see what the new security strategy actually entails and how dramatically it differs from previous efforts. (Joseph Lieberman, *Wall Street Journal*)

One case however, makes a different contextualization by speaking from Iraq, from the battlefield. This construction does not mean that the communicative space is definitely Iraq, for both the arguer and the readers should be always aware that the newspaper space is the actual space for the op-ed discourse, but speaking from Iraq makes the Iraqi territorial space closer and emotionally friendlier.

- (34) Viewed from Iraq (...) the political debate in Washington is surreal. We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq. (M. O'Hanlon and K. Pollack, *New York Times*)

Below, example (35) illustrates a narration which affects the construction of context. The participants stand of course at an American location (the newspaper op-ed space), while Iraq "there" is made closer and vivid from the description. The battlefield is constructed as "close" to the communicative space. Certainly, the strategy is used to emotionally bring closer Iraq and distance the audience from the political debate in Washington on the verge of taking the decision to leave. This strategy is employed in all the op-ed pieces arguing against withdrawal.

- (35) I stood there, amid the crushing stench of death; (...) I can still smell the rotting corpses of those children. (Michael Yon, *Daily News*)

The results from the analysis of American arguers' discursive construction of space turn out to be significantly indicative of the ideological bias controlling their contexts.

6.3.1.2. Constructions of place/space in the Arab op-ed corpus

The results from the analysis of Arab arguers' discursive construction of space show the lack of a significant pattern in the data. There is hardly an explicit manner which may point to the spatial contextualization of the discussion, even though based on the inferences that could be made from the macro-speech acts, one can perceive that most discussions are held within an international geographical setting. The constructions probably implicitly draw on the contextual properties provided by the newspapers as a social space for their debates on the Iraq issue. Being English editions destined for

international audience, the contextual space is highly presumed to be an international space for FP debate. Therefore, space is not explicitly defined in discourse and is mainly left to interpretation from the whole pragmatic meaning of the op-ed. Most Arab arguers however, do implicitly gear space construction towards one location or another through various discursive moves. Some op-ed pieces invite themselves to be located at an American space; others distance themselves from the US territorial space, but remain within international contexts, while the rest seem to situate their discussions within the geographical space of the Arab world.

Those who choose to move to an US territory realize their constructions by different means such as assigning recipient roles to American people, warranting arguments from sources or authorities they trust and drawing on their norms and values, besides the use of some deictic expressions to consolidate even more an interpersonal space within the American national boundaries. The extracts below (36) and (37) from 2 op-ed pieces illustrate this type of context construction.

- (36) Here is war veteran Senator Chuck Hagel, of Nebraska, the heart of conservative America, strongly objected to President Bush's policy (Hussein Shobokshi in *Asharq Al Awsat*, Columnist)
- (37) The only justification for the persistence of a condition in which American soldiers are killed daily is terrorism in itself. This does not only represent my opinion. In fact, Admiral Michael Mullen, who was chosen by George Bush to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in Congress that there is no military solution in Iraq and the only way out is national reconciliation. (Jihad Al Khazen *Dar Al Hayat*, columnist)

Arguers as in the above illustrated cases contextualize their discourses in an American space by drawing on American sources in premising the arguments advanced and mainly by using them to substantiate and even validate their moral assessments of the US policies in Iraq. Indeed, there is a surprisingly high rate of arguments from authority based or relying on the opinion of American political figures. This is definitely a rhetorical strategy intended to the American people as political actors capable of

changing the course of policies. The strategies and goals powerfully control the construction of other categories also by limiting the debate setting to an American space.

In the following extract from op-ed piece by Raghida Dergham, the setting is defined through foregrounding the American benefits and leadership, which could easily hint to the arguer's construction of an American setting for the discussion, where Americans would feel the most adequate to fit in the setting as targeted audiences.

(38) It is possible to render the withdrawal useful, so that the US can re-occupy the driver's seat, reshuffle the strategic deck, and see itself, the only superpower, retain its standing. (Raghida Dergham, *Dar Al Hayat*)

With this reference to the US as beneficiary from policy decisions in Iraq, the arguer in example (38) foregrounds the US interests and makes them seem to be the most important thing to protect in this conflict. By doing so, she risks the exclusion of Arabs from participating in her discussion as it seems and takes it to an American geographical space with all its emotionally-loaded meaning of space by this very construction. The discursive representation of the Iraq situation automatically hints to a model that clashes with the prototypical Arab modeling of Iraq debates since their shared cognitions on US actions perhaps schematize negative attitudes and may not possibly have the goal of addressing Americans for the purpose of showing them the ideal way to succeed in Iraq or to regain their world leadership. Therefore, Arab audiences may clearly recognize that they are kept out of this communicative situation by the very context structure of this op-ed discourse, and that its cognitive-based categories, such as goals and shared knowledge (and values) are the ones which act on the construction of other categories such the debate space and permissions to access it.

Some arguers who harshly criticize Americans "indiscriminately" (not differentiating authorities from citizens) make it clear that they do not pretend to debate the Iraq issue with them, but rather to address an international audience for arbitration and assign the role of judge to them on their actions in Iraq or even construing them as victims of the US alleged assaults. Some examples of this adjustment of participants and their location

are listed below in examples (39) and (40) in which arguers seems to exclude Americans from the debate by referring to political actors as Americans (the American people in general) while probably intending to mean the US politicians or forces. This is coupled in (39) with the use of irony in the expression “very noble of them”. In example (41) the arguer position the international audience as judge for the atrocities committed by occupation authorities and allowed by the United Nation

- (39) When the Americans decided to build a wall around Al-Adhamiyah in Baghdad, they claimed that their main concern was to protect the inhabitants. Very noble of them, but was this the real reason? Are the Americans interested in protecting Al-Adhamiyah, or in protecting other areas from fighters based in Al-Adhamiyah? (Galal Nassar, *Jordan Times*)

- (40) The American discourse contains disturbing oversimplifications, (...) where all that is required is the removal of a ruler and the emancipation of a group from the chains of suppression, and then the Arab world will become a democratic paradise. (Tariq Alhomayed, *Asharq Al Awsat*)

- (41) When terrorism has universities, crime turns into a profession, mutilation becomes heroism, the humanity of a people is humiliated with the occupation rifles, (...) the innocents are driven to tents and the poor go astray over oilfields, can any Iraqi, Arab or Muslim be blamed if the Security Council and its major players are accused of racism and discrimination? (Zouheir Kseibati, *Dar Al Hayat*)

After inspecting and contrasting the two op-ed sets, one may conclude therefore, that some cognitive categories related to shared social cognition such as beliefs and values and knowledge may be responsible for the construction of the debate spatial setting. The findings showed that most American and some Arab arguers construe Americans as main audience and participants and locate the debate within an American space by drawing exclusively on American shared cognitions hence ignoring or negating the place/existence of other participants. By alienating some audience from participation or engaging others in it, arguers set the boundaries of a communicative situation that the

newspapers have left open and blurred hence an opportunity for the participants to subjectively (re)define them in accordance with their intentions.

6. 3. 2. Contextualizing participants' identity in the Iraq debate

The focus in this section is on the way the op-ed arguers discursively construct participants as a central category of the context models controlling their discourse on Iraq. More specifically, the section presents findings from the context analysis of the identities enacted by the arguers in the two corpora and the ways their roles and their relationships with others are defined. The analysis of the arguers' definitions of participants, as a major category in context models, seeks to determine the differences in the kinds of choices made by the experts in the two cultures and the ideological structures underlying their subjective construction of the debate on Iraq.

The analysis of op-ed writers' construction of identity was carried out to determine the types of (Self) identities most articulated in the debates whether the social, the institutional, the national or other and to identify the relational construction of Self, that is, identity constructions through a process of differentiation (in a Poststructuralist sense). The identities expressed by the arguers in the two cultural groups have been examined, categorized and then their occurrences measured across the corpora. In cases where the arguers activate a multiple-identity context model, the very identity which is consistent and remains highlighted throughout the critical discussion is categorized as the main identity. In some cases, two or more identities are equally and powerfully present in the discussion and probably in the context model the arguers are creating, and exceptionally in these cases, both identities as displayed are counted as main. Identity constructions were categorized based on the way they were signaled, namely either through style such as the display of facts and the absence of evaluative language or by means of referential expressions, lexical choices and deictic expressions such as "I", "we" or forms of address such as "Mr. President". The findings from the analysis of each expert group's construction of identity are displayed in the two (separate) sections below.

6.3.2.1. Identity constructions in the contexts of American FP experts

Table 6.7 below displays the findings from the discursive analysis of the contextual construction of the self as the central identity enacted by the arguers in their debates on the Iraq situation.

Self identity	Specific Self	%
Professional	Politician (decision maker)	23.3
	FP analyst	33.3
	Political critic	26.6
	War correspondent	13.3
Social	Social critic	20
National	Patriot	70
	War combatant	30

Table 6.7. The arguers' enactment of the Self in the American corpus

The American arguers in this corpus predominantly construe a national identity (in the sense of “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991), which they generally tend to combine with another identity or a mixture of several identities. Indeed, in 70% of the op-ed pieces, the arguers emphasize their national self which seems to concur with the professional or social self (or selves) while remaining an essential component of the complex contextual construction of the constructed self. The contextualization of the national identity is manifested in two ways: through the exaltation of American political ideals and through the celebration of martial values. The two approaches are often combined and together may hint to more elaborate national identity constructions.

Those arguers eulogizing the American political ideals such as freedom and democracy typically emphasize not only the singularity of these ideals as political principles proper to American people, but also their universality and the national duty to spread them in the world. Once these arguers instigate the American identity as a prominent self, one may recognize the kind of socially shared cognition they draw on, namely their Americanism. Americanism, as a nationalism rooted in the defense of political ideals (Kazin et. al., 2011: 12), is articulated here through recurrent reference to political values as a way of self-categorization and of connecting the speaker's self with the most collectively concerted self in the community. Americanism is made prominent in a number of cases through a compilation of discourse features such as narratives and

deixis, which, as in Billig's terms (1995: 11), "continually point to the national homeland as the home of the reader". These contextually controlled discourse structures, among others, appeal to national sentiments and patriotic values, and together offer a clear definition of the arguer's identity throughout the single op-ed piece. This contextualized American self is illustrated in the following examples where the arguers, in the two examples (42) and (43), defend the strategy in Iraq by reminding the audience of the common values as the goal pursued from launching the war.

(42) We must remember that our forces in Iraq carry America's cause, the cause of freedom, which we abandon at our peril. (Joseph Lieberman, *Wall Street Journal*)

(43) It has inspired a growing number of Iraqis to fight al Qaeda. That vindicates the president's faith in liberty as a common inheritance of mankind. (Tony Snow, *USA Today*)

The construction of self as American is, in some cases, the major identity projected throughout the discussion, mainly in those discussions meant to contrast the US position with that of its enemies and to justify the call to troops' permanence in Iraq.

Those arguers celebrating martial values also create a national type of self that is very much connected to Americanism. Boasting of military power, battlefield efficiency and acclaiming martial values, such as honor, nobility, bravery, and self-sacrifice are invoked of course in times of war when the state is in conflict with others. They equally point to a context model featuring a patriotic identity. Being patriotic is not only identifying oneself with the nation, as in nationalism, but it also involves social conditioning and acting in support of a state's decision and actions (Rothi et al., 2005: 136) especially when the state is involved in war. The most typical instances of these constructions are realized through reference to the battlefield. Therefore, military actions and achievements (hence failure or success) are represented as executed by the whole national community of Americans and even soldiers and US forces are more commonly referred to as a national common asset, as in "our fighting men" and "our soldiers". Furthermore, in 30% of the pieces, the arguers even activate a war combatant

Self which highly influences the communicative situation as whole and contextualizes participants and other categories as highly involved in the battlefield. This kind of contextualization is realized in the description of the fight in Iraq by using inclusive “we” to illustrate the operations implemented and the goals achieved. Indeed, military actions are mostly described as a collective kind of actions that symbolize the nation and involve inevitable patriotic sentiments acting as a moral apparatus in support of the confrontation with the enemies. Example (44) and (45) show the inclusive “we” and “our” in the description of the fight that contextually and jointly with other discourse structures construe the arguers as involved in the fight and as highly patriotic individuals.

(44) We have killed or captured two thirds of its (Al Qaeda) senior leadership (...) but it remains committed to killing Americans. (Tony Snow, *USA Today*)

(45) The valor of our enemies never surpassed that of our troops (Ralph Peters, *USA Today*)

In the process of defending their positions for or against the strategy put in place in Iraq, many arguers use the soldiers and troops as a means to emphasize their patriotic identity. The two examples below illustrate construction of a patriotic self through the narrative on troops’ bravery and their sacrifice. By choosing this kind of narratives, arguers give prominence to a source of national pride and hence construe themselves contextually as celebrating patriotic sentiments. Example (47) equally shows how columnist Krauthammer enacts a Self that is inevitably made patriotic by representing the actions of American troops in Iraq as venerable. The portrayal of the troops’ bravery and sacrifice obviously point to the arguer’s attempt to underscore his/her patriotic Self

(46) There, the battle of Baghdad is now under way (...) a new strategy is being put to action with thousands of additional American soldiers streaming into the Iraqi capital. (Joseph Lieberman, *Wall Street Journal*)

(47) Thousands of brave American soldiers have died trying to counter, put down and prevent civil strife. (Charles Krauthammer, *Washington Post*)

This kind of model, consequently, construes Americans as the exclusive participants in the debate as it is structured by categories made only relevant to such audience such as the activation of socially (or nationally)-shared cognitions, with mental associations symbolizing the love of nation, such as the vision of soldiers risking their lives in the battlefield. Despite the newspapers' (and op-ed piece) international reach, some foreign policy experts seem to target only national audience by the very fact of enacting a patriotic Self as the main identity. This is highly expected in political discourse produced in a context of war, as patriotism is "probably the sentiment to which political leaders most frequently appeal when seeking to mobilize the country for important national effort" (Nincic & Ramos, 2012: 374).

The national identity is also recognizable in its manifestations characterized by an "us" and "them" construction and the special focus on American values, norms and interests as the shared and most cherished resources of a social (national) group. This implies that they create the national Self by acts of differentiation from the outsider "Other", which makes this type of identity construction a relational one. The use of different devices such as "we" and "our" is juxtaposed with that of "them" and "their" which makes this national Self created particularly as a polarization strategy, serving at the same time to contrast participants actions for moral evaluation. The following are a few typical examples from the American experts' discussions.

- (48) We did give the Iraqis a unique chance to build a rule of law democracy (Ralph Peters, *USA Today*).
- (49) We will still be the greatest power on earth, indispensable to other regional states (Ralph Peters. *USA Today*)
- (50) No Surge can work unless we have a moral Surge that delegitimizes suicide bombers" (Thomas Friedman, *New York Times*)

The use of "we" as Americans in the three first examples occurs in the framework of the Self interaction with the "Other". In (48) and (50) Americans are constructed within

their relation with Iraqis or Arabs, while in (49), the national Self is seen grandiose in terms of its role and relationships with other nations. In all these cases, the use of presuppositions and the heavy polarization implicitly constructs the Self (American) as possessing assets which are inexistence for the “Other”. The writer refers to the lack of morality in the Arab character to justify why Americans were having trouble with winning the war. This may not be the object of controversy within the communicative situation of the debate, since the imagined participants may agree or disagree with these views, which is becomes a semantic issue, while they are induced to interpret the expressive speech act as a boast. Indeed, characterizing oneself in superlative terms creates two situations: 1) the audience is constructed as sharing the same virtues, hence as being exclusively American and the effect is to celebrate the pride collectively, or 2) the audience is inclusive of international participants who are reminded of these virtues but do not share them, hence excluded from celebrating the pride. Given the fact that the arguers are inevitably aware of newspapers international reach, they most likely create the second situation. Such an identity construction projects a swaggering posture due to the assumption of exclusively possessing such attributes as power and morality. Discursive structures involving these kinds of polarizations point to a contextualized self highly biased by Americanism and centered in the pride of adhering to it. The contextual construction delineates a kind of identity which is typically received in the communicative situation as arrogant and cast as uncooperative and ostentatious.

These arguers hence underline a deliberate disregard of the international audiences as potential participants in the communicative event. In spite of the US foreign policy discourse emphasis on the international benefit from the war on terrorism, the contextual set up of self in the discourse leaves the international audience out of participation, while creating an exclusively American contextual environment. This choice goes against the claim that staying in Iraq was mainly driven by the aim of protecting the international community from terrorism. These arguers probably do not perceive the “practical” use of engaging international opinion, the way they perceive immediate benefit from changing the domestic opinion. Knowing that these experts are elite groups involved, in various degrees, in the state key political decisions shaping the US foreign policies, they are in a sense the reflection of how “the state moulds *mental*

structures and imposes common principles of vision and division”. (Bourdieu, 1994: 7, italics in original).

The national identities are contextually construed in more complex manner when mingled up with other identities such as the professional or the social. As indicated in table 6.7, almost a quarter of the American arguers in the corpus (23.3%) construe a political identity by foregrounding their decision making characters. The politician identity is normally enacted by people holding office or those in opposition, and discursively made explicit through a politician style or reference to the power position. However, in this corpus, this type of political identity is enacted not only by in-office politicians, but also by some think tank pundits or even columnists some of whom are military veterans or retired politicians. In example (51) Bob Kerry, a think tank pundit and a retired politician performs the politician identity (Democrats) while activating his nationalistic/patriotic Self. Kerry argues that the US intervention in Iraq is a moral duty for Americans and that the decision to withdraw is a cowardly decision, typical adopted by Democrats, he says. As a Democrat, he implies that this position hurts the image of his party as Americans see it as an act of cowardice and lack of patriotism.

- (51) With these facts on the scales, what does your conscience tell you to do? If the answer is nothing, that it is not our responsibility or that this is all about oil, then no wonder today we Democrats are not trusted with the reins of power. (Bob Kerrey, *Wall Street Journal*)

Enacting a decision maker Self is not surprising knowing that those who waged the war in the first place, engaged in it and created policies and machinery to implement it, are the American. Signaling this identity as prominent Self points to a context structure centered in their role in shaping the international political order. This should also confirm the reason why they participate in this debate through the op-ed communication channel. The debate represents one of the opportunities they should employ as a political communication space, probably not necessarily to discuss and deliberate foreign policy issues with the public (as a democratic practice), but simply to explain, justify and promote their decisions and to legitimately gain their electorate’s support. Moreover, the analysis revealed that decision makers’ identity in most cases is

performed explicitly through setting category construction (the Congress, political meetings, etc.) or by some speech acts indicative of authority such as in example (52) from the piece written by Senator Joseph Lieberman and the way he addresses audience.

(52) I appeal to my colleague in Congress (Joseph Lieberman, *Wall Street Journal*)

Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in all the instances where the politician identity is activated, the arguer takes peer decision makers (politicians) as opponents and hence assigns to the audience the role of judge. By this choice, arguers possibly attempt to reconstruct a political debate setting with characteristics taken from political organization spaces such as deliberative assemblies or the Congress, hence replicating these setting properties in the contextual construction of their op-ed discourses. This debate context features categories such as an elite environment with authentic political participants and “direct” audience.

The discourse of those who enact an analyst identity is likewise controlled at the level of style and register (as part of the characterization of genre/or text types according to Van Dijk, 2008: 152), which makes it more formal, less evaluative and more factual than the politician style. Generally speaking, analysts are expected to provide a technical assessment of a conflict and recommend the best resolution channels, while their opinion is supposed to be free from moral judgment at least in the simple common understanding of the general public. Still, political analysis mixed with political posturing is likely to produce a political discourse that is chiefly controlled by the political identity of the arguer. A high proportion of American arguers do combine policy analysis discourse with political discourse which are different in genre and content. The discourse of policy analysis is characterized by technical lexis such as situation assessment (based on inferential statistics, systems analysis, forecast (Frei and Ruloff, 1989), whereas political discourse involves taking explicit political posture (endorsing political parties) to bring forward policies. The Self identity constructed in their model does not seem to be defined as that of the analyst any more. Indeed, it shifts the analyst identity from its feature frame as objective, impartial and neutral to create a complex identity that exploits some characteristics of each identity to depict a combined Self, probably one which would more relevantly fulfill the arguers’ aims of his/her

current discussion participation. For instance, examples (53, 54, 55) taken from the same op-ed piece, illustrate how two analysts, Michael O'Hanlon and Ken Pollack, who explicitly project their professional self on the context (in example 54) and at the same time make prominent their presence and participation in the battlefield. They discursively construct a complex identity featuring the war correspondent (example 53), the policy advocate and politician (Democrat) (example 54) along with the patriot, realized through an analysis-free style and an emphasis on a value/moral-based narrative (example 55), unmistakably indicative of a political discourse.

- (53) Viewed from Iraq, (...), the political debate in Washington is surreal.
- (54) As two analysts, who have harshly criticized the Bush administration's miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw.
- (55) We talked to dozens of military officers who before the war had known little about governance or business but were now ably immersing themselves in projects to provide the average Iraqi with a decent life.

(Examples from O'Hanlon and Pollack, *New York Times*)

The policy critic enacts a professional identity characterized by a critical stance that underlines the role as an appraiser of the foreign policy degree of efficiency. Only 26.6% of American arguers engage in a more morally-oriented level of policy analysis than the simple unbiased, objective assessment of the policy analyst. With this type of identity, the arguers draw on the hybrid combining the expert/analyst and the political actor (whether decision maker or opponent), to oscillate between two different discourse styles and genres in accordance with their needs. Furthermore, this identity is enacted by those arguers who combine the politician with the national self and engage in warning audience from the consequences of persisting in a failed policy. This complex outline of the self is mostly enacted within op-ed pieces issued in the newspaper with ranking highest in circulation rates such as the USA Today, Wall Street Journal and New York Times. It is also worth noting that in newspapers with lower circulations, such as the Boston Observer, arguers are more likely to exclusively display a policy critic identity, rather than a hybrid, creating a different kind of discourse which is less

ideologically biased, draw less on Americanism and projects a more discernible professional self.

Other arguers who seem to construct overlapping identities tend to enact the social critic professional identity and mingle it with other identities mainly the national one. They endorse this identity based on its function which is social criticism and the moral assessment of social behavior. The identity is intrinsically construed so as to highlight the role of the participant in the communicative event as “the initiator of the public learning processes” (Honneth 2009: 179). The social critic’s identity reflects a context model which draws on a socially shared cognitive repertoire based on morality and values. It controls discursive moves expressive of moral values such as bravery, honesty and political principles like democracy of American people, as opposed to politicians’ corruption and other cultures and people lack of civility. Some even connect national sentiments with the pride of belonging to a dominant state by praising the US global supremacy and military power, as illustrated in example (56) below.

- (56) But the war in Iraq is about a lot *more* than just Iraq. It's about America's power and influence in the world, indeed, our future. What happens in Washington - even something as mundane as a nonbinding congressional resolution - reverberates across the globe. It's time we fully recognize that. (Peter Brookes, *New York Post*)

In spite of the variety of approaches in discursive construction of context, there are certainly some common features within the American experts’ corpus. This is probably not only the political discourse legitimating foreign policy decision but also a discourse maintained at a privileged circle which only belongs to the world most powerful decision makers and their public as a supportive body and as main targets for an identity politics kind of discourse.

6.3.2.2. Identity constructions in the contexts of Arab FP experts

Table 6.8, below, displays the findings from the analysis of the contextual constructions of the self as the central identity enacted by the Arab arguers in their debates on the Iraq issue. The identities have been also examined in terms of how they established contextual relationships and roles between participants in the communicative event

under study. Three types of identities were discerned within the data corpus, the professional, the social and the national. Despite this variety, it was quite surprising to observe that neither identity is predominantly represented, as it has been the case in the American corpus. Indeed, the most recurring types of identity enacted by the arguers do not even reach half of the corpus, with the national being the identity most signaled (43.3%) followed by the political critic and the social critic made prominent in 40% each, along with the FP analyst identity. Equally significant is the fact that almost no Arab arguer seems to enact an identity underscoring their power position or hinting to a ruler role, even though some of them are then-current politicians -based on findings from op-ed pieces' bylines- and certainly active decision makers in their respective states.

Self identity	Specific Self	%
Professional	FP analyst	36.6
	Political critic	40
Social	War victim	20
	Social critic	40
National	Arab/Patriot	43.3
	Anti-American	

Table 6.8. Arguers' constructions of Self identities in the Arab corpus

Despite the fact that there is a variety of contextualized selves identified throughout the Arab corpus, there is a significant pattern in the realization of this context category. Indeed, in about 60% of the discussions Arab arguers tend to construe a particular self, which they make prominent and distinguishable throughout the whole op-ed contextual construction. By this single identity creation, the arguers do not alternate between identities (such is the case for most American arguers), but rather stick to one discernible identity which brings about the control of other aspects in their contextual constructions.

Arab arguers' performance of a national identity is surprisingly less significant, as only 43.3% construe themselves particularly as members of their "imagined community" and

do so, in some cases, in less visible modes. The enactment of a national self is realized in two (technically) different but sometimes overlapping manners: first, by appealing to Arabism as the source of pan-nationalist sentiments inspired by the self-perception as belonging to the Arab nation and second, by drawing on Anti-American attitudes and beliefs which come to form a sort of a socially shared cognition among people and (societies) exhibiting hostility to Americanism. These two forms of collective identities, based on socially-shared beliefs, equally exhibit processes of “othering” as it is common in national identities. However, while Arabism, as a kind of nationalism, focuses on belonging to a nation and its values (and the demarcation from the “other” remains implicit); Anti-Americanism is based on defining the self in opposition to the “other”. The two different ideologies hinge on a kind of self definition that seems to most successfully connect the arguers to the collective identity, the one they seem to contextualize in their interaction within an international communicative situation such as the one imposed by issuing an op-ed piece. In the contexts constructed by the Arab arguers, Arabism and Anti-Americanism seem to coexist or even feed each other to form one national identity, as “anti-Americanism is the ideology of enmity when wielded by nationalists seeking to strengthen their identity” (Tidwell 2007: 273). The enactment of a context based on these nationalistic identities obviously creates a polarized position towards Americans, and upholds the way these arguers position Arabs and Americans in this conflict.

Those op-ed discussions construing the national identity as belonging to the Arab nation or as the resisting the American policies and actions tend to signal this identity trait drawing on a pan-nationalism. Within decades of political turmoil that has disestablished the Arab states and the nature of the relationships maintained between them, Arabism has suffered a severe crisis and is typically referred to as a “mistaken identity” (Kramer, 1992). However, the Arab identity seems to submerge in this corpus as a pertinent kind of national definition, one that delineates the self against others. These arguers, indeed, build a case for their nationalism by acts of differentiation from Americans, which makes this type of identity construction a relational one. This is perhaps judged by the arguers as the most adequate contextual construction for international debates. In example (57) Nicola Nasser in a typical polarization between the position of Americans with that of the Arabs, signals his own identity through his

alignment with Arabism as the unifying sentiment of Arab people, especially by qualifying any aggression against Iraq as an aggression towards all Arabs.

- (57) For Americans, it is the usual political power struggle. For Arabs, it is playing American politics with Iraqi blood for oil. (Nicola Nassar, *Yemen Observer*)

Two similar examples from other op-ed pieces, (58) and (59), show how the arguers attempt to enact a Pan-Arab identity through semantic content featuring Arabs or Iraqis and Muslims as enduring the same condition of discrimination. This construction of sameness with their peer nationals and difference from their constructed other reinforces the construction of the self as part of this “us” group (Arabs)

- (58) Can Iraqis, Arabs or Muslims be blamed if the Security Council or its major players are accused of racism and discrimination? (Zuheir Kseibati, *Dar Al Hayat*)

- (59) How do frustrated Iraqis and Arabs make sense of “this” Democratic alternative? Large majorities of Arabs want U.S. troops to leave Iraq sooner rather than later. (Nicola Nassar, *Yemen Observer*)

The national identity enacted by the arguers in the corpus is mostly based on pan-nationalism, except for one case where the arguer is Iraqi and makes his national identity prominent by explicit reference to the suffering of his fellow citizens and his colonized nation. Construing an Arab identity by drawing on a pan-nationalism declared in crisis turns out to be a peculiar way of contextualizing self in discourse. It shows that in the cognition of these arguers this identity membership still feed their mental models despite the disparity between Arab nations’ conditions and their official political and foreign policies orientations, including their positions from the US policies in Iraq. These political conditions are too complex and diverse to be simplified into a recognizable socially shared cognition across the various states forming the Arab world. For instance, Saudi Arabia has officially reconciled its relations with the US after the crisis resulting from the 9/11 terrorists attack. The bilateral and diplomatic relationships

between the Saudi Arabia and the US contain more consensus than conflict around vital issues such as the US military interventions in the Middle East.

It is probably hard to draw any conclusions on the reasons why these arguers choose this self in defining the context of their op-ed discussions, but the findings pointing to a considerable amount of Arab identity enactment indicate the kinds of cognitive content controlling this particular construction. They illustrate constructions hinting to models defining the self within the socially shared cognition of Arabism (pan nationalism), rather than on the particular national identity of each arguer (nationalism). In any case, it is the choice they make when constructing context for an international communicative situation and in relation to an international audience. This choice may be revealing in that the arguers may find in this kind of self their more coherent definition of self, while other national selves may seem more vulnerable, more divided by too different political positions which are hard to identify with or probably overtly admit. In addition, most of these arguers work under the vigilance of authoritarian states, which undertake domestic policies based on a strategy of “omni-balancing”, that is, a save facing strategy by which they attempt to maintain their cooperation with the US in FP issues and opening up for opposing to the US interventions at domestic public spaces. Hence, it may be the case that choosing an Arab national identity presents an only choice in an institutional context that puts obstacles to freedom, mainly when it comes to opinion and find in their pan-Arabism in spite of its weakened condition a political ideology as a form of self definition in an international environment.

Arguers drawing on anti-Americanism tend to signal their identities by exhibiting discontent and opposition to the American political values, particularly those officially declared by the US as its fundamental foreign policy principles. They juxtapose devices such as “we” and “our” with “them” and “their” which makes this national Self created particularly as a polarization strategy, serving at the same time to contrast participants actions for moral evaluation. Indeed, their reference to freedom and democracy points to their enactment of Anti-American self, as it is charged with resistance to the meaning of these notions. Examples (60) and (61) typify an identity construction underlining their anti-American self, performed throughout each of the two the op-ed, but particularly signaled by means of these discursive moves

- (60) The US army invaded Iraq and Afghanistan and carried out an ill-famed policy based on fuelling sectarian and ethnic sedition in the region and across the world under the pretext of disseminating democracy and freedom principles!
- (61) The Americans aren't to train, but to control, Americans will not allow Iraq to survive only if it conforms to their expectations. Otherwise, they will encourage it to self destruct.

The assertion in this extract from the op-ed written by columnist Agha in Syria Times contributes to the arguer's self definition as advocate of anti-imperialism, which is the position taken in defiance to the US policies in the world. Anti-imperialism organizes its members around identifying themselves as against expanding states, those finding their prosperity in other peoples' territories. It certainly activates them their nationalisms as much as their instinctive sense of self-protection from these expanding states. The Anti-American identity, thus, comes about as part of a national identity as "there is nothing better than an enemy to strengthen their identity (Tindwell 2007: 273). Furthermore, most constructions of an anti-American self are signaled by expressing resentment of American policies characterized –in their views- with its favoritism to Israel. Indeed, the reference to Israel probably corroborates a contextualization biased by models controlled by Anti-Americanism. For instance, in their criticism to the US actions in Iraq, many arguers blame Israel for being the cause of these actions. While the relevance of Israel may be a debatable issue, it clearly signal a identity delineated as anti-American, as one not only rejecting certain US policies, but also repudiating their essence and speculating on the real intentions behind them while adhering at the same time to the widely-spread conspiracy theories. Example (62) shows a case where the arguer, through discourse content, contextualizes himself as an anti-American.

- (62) Bush has vowed to carry out his evangelical mission to enrich Raytheon and the other weapons manufacturers within the American military industrial complex and to ensure the fulfillment of Eretz Israel as Zionist demagogues envision it to be. (Hassan Al Haifi, *Yemen Times*)

An anti American self is also constructed by acts of challenge to the US policies. Showing challenge or defiance to the US is detected in those discourse moves performed as warning, threat or similar expressive acts, by alluding to retaliation against the US actions. These types of moves signal in a clear way the kind of identity featured in the arguer's context models. The extract in example (63) typifies a discursive realization of the Anti-American self, where, after a fact-based content on the military actions implemented by the US, the arguer warns from reprisal by asserting (in a form of a wishful thinking) that resistance will defeat Americans, while enacting all together an anti-American identity.

(63) Resistance can still make the American think again. (Galal Nassar, *Al Ahram*)

Turning to other kinds of identity construction in the Arab corpus, the professional political critic and the social critic identity come in the second most enacted identity position, as they are each made prominent in 40% of the corpus. In the next position comes the policy analyst identity performed by 36.6% of the arguers. This professional identity type shares many features with that of the political critic and most arguers tend to blend the two identities in one. This is probably due to their professional versatility that encourages them naturally to adhere to both. Political critics may come from different professional backgrounds, and are typically journalists trained in evaluating domestic or foreign policies and the degree of their efficiency. Analysts, on the other hand, are political scientists, experts in policy planning, conflict resolution and the technical assessment of political issues based on rational and value-neutral judgment. The two professional profiles sometimes overlap in the data, but they may be distinguished by the fact that political critics engage in a more elaborate level of policy analysis than the supposedly unbiased and objective assessment of the policy analyst.

Those 40% of Arab arguers, thus, who perform the political critic identity, take policy analysis a step further by passing judgment on the performances and competencies of relevant policy players. The political critic identity was identified thanks to three conditions. First, the discourse is relatively technical, in the sense that it follows policy analysis standards which is decision making-oriented, including problem recognition, goal prioritization and option assessments techniques (Hudson, 2005: 2), with a

substantial use of facts and references from accredited sources. Second, assessment is oriented towards policy instruments such as military actions and political postures, so judgment goes to decision makers and those responsible for those policies. Third, and this point is very much linked to the previous point, no generalizations are detected in discourse, as actions are framed as implemented by individuals rather by nations. In this case, the critic abstains from referring to Americans in general and refers to actors in their proper names and functions. This is illustrated in the following op-ed extract:

- (64) The Republican US president had to do something to rescue his legacy and the long-term credibility of his party on the one hand, and to respond to the public demand to disengage from the Iraq quagmire on the other. But the Baker-Hamilton document offered a set of bipartisan policy recommendations that could not wholly satisfy both objectives, while the new Democrat Congress could hardly place itself at the service of Republican success.

In virtually all cases, the arguers perform the political critic identity by enacting also a policy analyst identity. They do so by switching between a traditional policy analysis style, featuring value- neutral and scientific modeling approaches based on the theories of objectivism and instrumental rationality, and more contemporary approaches to policy analysis that define the role of the analyst as part of “a process of deliberation which weighs beliefs, principles, and actions under conditions of multiple frames for the interpretation and evaluation of the world” (Dryzek, 1993: 214). These professional identities are contextualized not only by a discourse style, such as drawing on causal-relationship- based conclusions, using referenced facts, but also through the assessment of specific political actions and actors instead of connecting morality to policies, as is typically the case for those enacting an anti-American/nationalistic self. Furthermore, they tend to focus on American politicians and their deeds and abstain from referring to them as American in general terms. In the following example (65), Baroud highlights his professional identity through the discursive choices of a highly technical analysis of the political situation in the US, reporting polls and research findings over the effects of the policies in most American political and public settings, reinforces his contextual realization of his identity by advancing a prediction of the consequences of the policy. The extract shows that he enacts a policy analyst self by drawing conclusions based on

professional analytic tools, while engaging in some ethical judgment of the actions that highlights his political critic self.

- (65) Considering these views, one can only predict that the Petraeus' report in September 2007, (...), will accentuate the duration of the anticipated war. An additional 10 years to suppress an "insurgency" is too long for a nation that is already growing weary from war. Many more will likely die if the Congress doesn't act forcefully to carry out the wishes of the American people and respect the sanctity of the lives of Iraqis and their own. (Ramzy Baroud, *Arab News*)

As the example shows, the arguer points to the consequences from the point of view of Americans and their interests, given that the term “nation” refers here to the American people. This means that the arguer undertakes his professional role of the critic/analyst as if serving the benefit of Americans. This choice, indeed, may probably be motivated by his goal to persuade American audiences to act in favor of troops’ withdrawal from Iraq. Nevertheless, it also clearly points to this hybrid professional identity with which the arguer attempts to achieve its critical and persuasive goals through a sophisticated construction that may qualify him for an internationally accredited contribution on the Iraq issue.

In the meantime, 36.6% of the arguers in the same corpus have opted for policy analyst as the only relevant self in their discussions. These arguers typically signal this choice implicitly by maintaining a highly professional, scientific and objective profile. Indeed, these arguers go about in the op-ed with a report-like kind of discourse, usually featuring a technical assessment of the conflict and some recommendations on the best resolution options and channels, while their opinion remains value-neutral and virtually free from moral judgment. Hence by abstaining from using any kind of evaluative language, they also contextualize their talk outside any national space whether geographical or social. This is typified in example (66) from the contribution of the Iraqi political expert, ex-deputy at the Iraqi Governing Council, Safa Hussein, who contrasts policy approaches based on their expediency in a nonaligned manner.

- (66) This approach clashes with the principle of counter-insurgency. A wiser approach might be to perform extensive clearing operations. (Safa Hussein, *Syria Times*)

Enacting these kinds of identities is quite surprising in the case of those directly involved in the conflict, as in the above mentioned example, first as an Iraqi and then as a politician. The construction may be indicated by other contextual categories obviously such as goals. Indeed, this identity type is the reflection of the traditional model of foreign policy professional, adhering to the “value-free investigation of causal relationships according to a fixed set of rules” (Dryzek, 1993: 213) and hardly is adopted by more contemporary and 21st century analysts. The arguer possibly attempts to enact an identity that most guarantees his impartiality and the appearance of detachment he intends to contextually cast on himself as a participant.

Now, those arguers performing particularly or exclusively a social kind of identity are those contextualizing the social critic identity (40%) and those highlighting a war victim self. The two identities share common features and may, indeed, be categorized under the same group, since they focus on the criticism of social phenomena and the assessment of human nature from an ethical perspective.

Some of them even create a mundane, universal kind self at the same time with which they attempt to challenge the politicians represented as malevolent and manipulative. This construction powerfully activates a collective kind of identity, one that features all other participants in the communications as approving and acting in a synergic and cooperative manner. Performing this identity also makes prominent the participant’s role in the communicative event. This role is driven by the aim to resist, oppose and protest against the dominant power and ideologies. In the following example (67), Najah Ali, columnist from Iraq, expresses his protest against the US liberation to the Iraq, by reminding the audience of the crimes the US committed against Iraqis in the past, which prove their falsehearted intentions.

- (67) Driven by a burning desire to end dictatorship, many Iraqis had even forgotten or tried to overlook the crimes the U.S. had committed against them. They knew

the U.S. was a major ally of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship during his war with the Islamic Republic of Iran. (Najah Ali, *Azzaman*)

However, arguers construing the victim identity generally move back and forth from this victim profile to the social critic, or to the nationalist and Arabist. They emphasize the suffering and losses the Iraqis endure in the war, but also the deceitful mission of Americans as the liberators from dictatorship. Some of them are Iraqis, and others are Arabs from different nationalities, but they all enact a victim status, which they highlight by a narrative on the Americans as a common enemy and violator of their dignity and security and lands and wealth. They mostly accuse the US of provoking division and fomenting sectarianism and terrorism. This type of discursive moves illustrated in example (68), expressing the arguer's exasperation from the fate of Iraqis after the US occupation, points to a contextual construction featuring a victim identity.

- (68) Now we're a model country, a living example of tragedy and despair. Now we offer encouragement to the most depraved of governments and opposition groups. (...) Three years of occupation have stripped Iraq of welfare and security, social fabric and infrastructure. Laws have been supplanted by orders from Paul Bremer. (Mohamad Hassen Al Khalesi, *Al Ahram*)

This identity construction also may possibly chose to fulfill a specific function in the discourse as it highlights the American's infringement of accepted behavior, and perhaps as a threat to the world" as the one betrayed, manipulated by the US or by some politician in the attempt perhaps to create the world as an ally to the Iraqi cause.

The results from the analysis of discursive construction of context in the two op-ed corpora revealed the different approaches with which the two cultural groups construct setting and participants' identities in discourse and hints to the dissimilarity of the makeup of their context models. While American arguers alternate between different types of identity, but mostly highlight their Americanism, the majority of Arab arguers attempt to contextualize one identity, which is why no identity is particularly extended throughout the corpora. A major difference between the two cultural groups is that American arguers enact their professional identities by emphasizing their decision

making, while Arab arguers do not foreground any decision-maker self, despite the fact that some are actual politicians. Even though in both cultures, the two groups of arguers are experts in FP who equally engaged in the enterprise of op-ed writing as an instrument for opinion change, the institutional requirements and more importantly their positions as foreign policy experts and the amount of power they each hold in influencing international relations and shaping world policies makes them stand on unequal grounds and hence make their discourses along with their contexts constructed in disparate ways.

By examining content which explicitly and implicitly signals the kind of identity activated, it has been quite interesting to observe that arguers' context models in the two cultural groups seem to equally draw on a wide array of identities. These identities may be reduced in fact to fit under fewer and broader categories which are: the professional, the social and the national identity. Table 6.9 contrasts findings on the identities enacted in the two corpora

Self	American	Arab
Institutional/professional	Decision maker	*N/A
	policy analyst	Policy analyst
	Policy critic	Policy critic
	war correspondent	*N/A
Social	Social critic	Social critic
	*N/A	War victim
National	Patriotic	Patriotic
	war combatant	*N/A

Table 6.9. Contrasting identities construction in the two corpora

As indicated in the table, there is a notable difference among the two groups in the way their constructions of self are realized. In fact, being a participant at a newspaper's opinion column on FP issues, as it is the discourse identity that may be chiefly interpreted from the communicative situation, does not outstand as the main kind of Self these arguers seem to enact in their contexts. American arguers mostly activate their

professional and institutional self along with their national one, while Arab arguers put more emphasis on their social identities both as critics and victims of the war. Most arguers, however, alternate between various kinds of identities in the same op-ed text and generally tend to mark out some types of self-identity which are recurrent all over each cultural group corpus.

6. 3. 3. Discursive constructions of purpose in actions

This section reports the findings from the analysis of purposeful actions- those which go with some purpose- expressed in the critical discussions standpoints or sub standpoints. Purpose and action constitute two schematic categories in the arguers' context models and they have been examined in the same discursive constructions. This is due to the fact that these two categories are regarded to be interrelated as the expressions of goals lie in the very representation of social actions.

The idea of focusing on actions and goals in standpoints is based on the assumption that standpoints are the most crucial moves in argumentative discussions, the ones in which arguers create a position to develop for defense. The results from the analysis of the purposeful actions in the corpora illustrate the difference between the two expert groups' approaches in realizing actions and goals in their discourses. Their modes of realizations are examined according to the systematic inventory- proposed by van Leeuwen (2008) (see Chapter 3) of the ways in which action can be represented in English.

A common feature characterizing the purposeful actions examined in the standpoints of the two corpora is that they are both predominantly American actions. The results indicate that the majority of American experts (93.3 percent) and the Arab experts (86.6 percent) similarly advance argumentative positions involving American actors and their actions. Most of the actions in the two standpoint corpora are of the instrumental type. Instrumental actions are those which represent people as interchangeable with objects, for instance through verbs like "use", "provide", "offer" and so on. Instrumentalization makes the other social actors who may be involved in the action appear as mere "objects", hence as if they are part of processes or organizational resources. This type of

action construction is commonly used in bureaucratic texts and serves to legitimate or delegitimize practices by references to their goals, uses and effects (Van Leeuwen 2008: 113). Below are examples from the instrumental actions of American standpoints (69) and from the Arab one in (70).

(69) We have to think past Iraq and above partisan politics, folding actions in Iraq into a strategy to protect broader U.S. interests throughout the region. (Wesley Clark, *USA Today*)

(70) US has an opportunity to turn the withdrawal into a device whose consequences can be used to frighten (Raghida Degham, *Dar Al Hayat*)

Nevertheless, there are some noticeable differences between the two experts' groups in the realizations of these actions which are, very probably, affected by their respective context models constructions. A large amount of the actions represented in the American corpus are activated in around 70 percent as opposed to less than thirty percent objectivated actions. They are also agentialized which means that "they are represented as brought about by human agency" (van Leeuwen 2008: 66). Accordingly, they emerge as performed by people in control of the situation and who are capable of influencing the situations owing to their powerful positions. Furthermore, they are represented as dynamic and are assigned the role of predicator/process in the verbal group of a non-embedded clause as in the following examples:

(71) We did give the Iraqis a chance to build a rule of law democracy. (Ralph Peters, *USA Today*)

(72) We worked to limit that authority to one year. (Byrd and Clinton, *Daily News*)

(73) The US ramped up its operations to stop Shia from cleansing Sunnis. (Barry Posen, *Boston Globe*)

The Arab experts' corpus, on the contrary, contains more deactivated actions through the use of more objectivations (58 percent) even though in most of the cases agency is preserved and can easily be recognized from the surrounding textual content. As one

may observe in the examples below, despite the fact the actions in (74) and (75) are both nominalized, they construct two different contexts around them.

(74) The US invasion has sparked a dirty Sectarian war (Hadi Marai, *Azzaman*)

(75) The new security plan is an attempt to contain Iraqis' fury (Akram Abdulrazzaq, *Azzaman*)

Actions such as “invasion” are a moralized type of action, where morality and ethics are brought to the construction by the very lexical choice, which evokes here “intrusion” and “harm”. This type of moralized realizations is a powerful legitimation or delegitimation tool in discursive constructions and of course in this case “invasion” activates a model of unjust and immoral values. To label the actions by its official name such as “Security plan” or “Insurgency policy” construes them within a sort of “neutral” model; hence no moral judgment is to be activated with the actions. Still, these actions are being delegitimated by a different means, namely what Van Leeuwen identifies as “theoretical legitimation”. In example (75), the theoretical delegitimation is enacted by means of a “definition”. The security plan as an action is defined by in terms of another, moralized activity: that of “attempting to contain fury”, which means that the security plan is being redefined in order to challenge its established meaning or goal and reconstruct a different model for it.

American experts do the same but in their turn they do it to legitimate “their” actions as in examples (76) and (77):

(76) There is one choice which protects America's security and that is to stand and fight and win. (Joseph Lieberman, *Washington Post*)

(77) Our entire strategy has been to fight one side then the other to try to prevent sectarian violence. (Charles Krauthammer, *Washington Post*)

The nominalized action in (76) is constructed as an object, a “choice”. It is then theoretically legitimated by means of an explanation. In (77), the action is similarly

legitimated theoretically by definition. All of the above mentioned realizations indicate constructions of contexts which assist legitimation. Whether moralized or rationalized, the context serves to lead the audience towards validated actions with immaculate goals in the case of American experts or to challenge these actions and denounce them in the case of the Arab ones.

Objectivated actions of American actors in the Arab corpus refer mostly to the US military actions in Iraq and are realized by nouns such as “security plan”, “invasion” and “occupation”. All of these actions fall under the scope of the US foreign policy in Iraq as a whole, and their objectivation makes them abstract. By means of abstraction, actions get away from the micro-level that makes them up and get constructed as macro actions, as in example 74 and 75 above.

The construction of actions as macro actions renders them more generalized by abstracting them away from the specific actions and therefore, allows them to be classified and labeled (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 69). By opting to use macro actions, the micro context is extended, in van Dijk’s terms (2010: 228) to a macro context and the construction may most likely include, at least implicitly, the micro actions making up the macro ones. It is probable that the very construction of the macro context is a sufficient condition for the activation and implicit inclusion of sub parts (micro actions) in the context models. This conclusion of course should not be arbitrarily advanced and has to have some foundations. Van Leeuwen argues that generalizations are not possible to recognize in isolated actions and that the level of abstraction may not be determined unless we examine different realizations of the same actions within one text or in comparing texts (2008: 69). Hence, let us examine the following examples from the Arab corpus:

- (78) The security policy would enable the US to extend its influence. From Darfur to West Africa and from East Timor to the Gulf, and perhaps even control China's oil needs.
- (79) It is part of the American policy which aims at deepening divisions.

(Examples from Galal Nassar, *Al Ahram*)

As one may note, actions such as “Security policy” and “American policy” are objectivated and abstracted to ultimately construct a context of the same macro action. Indeed, by examining the realizations of “policy” as an action across the corpus, one may presume that each time a specific aspect of it is distilled. In fact, it does not matter what micro actions belong to this macro one action named “policy” as long as they all have the same quality: control and hegemony. This is what van Leeuwen calls “distillation” (van Leeuwen, 2008: 69). Distillations not only highlight some aspect of an action at the expense of others, they also realize purposes through the quality highlighted (like in example 78) and legitimations or delegitimation through the evaluative associations which they cling to the term that establish the reference to the action (van Leeuwen, 2008: 70). By constructing the American policy in Iraq in this mode, Arab experts probably intend to define a context featuring not only the current communicative situation of the single critical discussion, namely of the specific events instantiating the debate about Iraq, but also at the same time more global information about the US actions in the Middle East. Therefore, by linking the micro actions to the global actions, Arab experts see any US action in Iraq as a realization or a contribution to American social structures. Here and based on Giddens’ understanding, “structures” refer to “the properties which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them “systemic form” (Giddens, 1984: 17). In the Arab experts’ mental models American macro actions are at the heart of their action constructions. This multi-level representation of social situations is made possible by means of the cognitive interface between social structures and discourse.

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, actions are examined along and concurrently with their purposes. The aim is to look at actions and goals, as they are significant schematic categories in context models and basic feeds in models construction. Again based on van Leeuwen’s valuable framework, the purposes of social practices have been analyzed to see how they are construed in the context models of both expert groups’ standpoints. The analysis of purpose constructions involves classifying the purposes of the social actions into one of three types: The first is the goal-oriented where actions are constructed “in people”. The second is the means-oriented which constructs purposes “in action” and actions are presented as a means to

an end. The third is the effect-oriented which construction emphasizes the outcome of actions. The table below summarizes the results from this analysis as following.

Purpose	American	Arab
Goal-oriented	30%	13.3%
Means-oriented	36.6%	70%
Effective	33.3%	16.6%

Table 6.10. Contrasted construction of purposes in experts' standpoints

Table 6.10 illustrates the ways purposes are constructed in the two expert groups' standpoints. These constructions differ considerably in contextualizing the Iraq war participants' goals. While American experts seem to carry out the construction of the three types of participants' purposes almost equally, Arabs opt for constructing purposes through the means-oriented type in seventy percent of the cases, hence avoiding the overt verbalization of human agency. A closer look at these constructions should help explain these groups' choices and the possible motivations behind them.

Despite the variety which American experts seem to display, however, the purposes they construct belong predominantly to American participants whether allies or opponents and delineate in most cases their visions of the ideal solution to the Iraq war. Hence, to "succeed", "win", "stop violence" or "fight" all articulate the ultimate goal of a warfare protagonist, that of victory. In these constructions agency is explicitly and implicitly realized or at least preserved in almost the entire corpus. In thirty percent of the constructions, purposes are to validate intentional goal-oriented actions. This entails that the actors are "discursively empowered as intentional agents- as people who can decide, and then succeed in, changing the world" (van Leeuwen 2008: 127). Intentionality and command on the situation is equally maintained in the mean-oriented constructions since agency is preserved explicitly in example 80 or implicitly 81 in the purposeful actions coded as circumstance of means, such as in the following instances:

- (80) Democrats support our enemies by undercutting our troops (Ralph Peters, *New York Post*)

- (81) Our entire strategy has been to fight one side then the other to try to prevent sectarian violence. (Charles Krauthammer, *Washington Post*)

In example (80), the purpose is fulfilled by means of an action whose agents are present and explicit, in example (81), though the purpose is of an objectivated action; agency of American is recognized and substantiated by means of the deictic expression “our”. Consequently, in the models which American experts seem to construct in standpoints, participants (whether self or other) are in control of the event situation (the war) and their actions possess articulate goals. Most importantly, even though actions belong to some specific players other than the arguers, their goals are constructed as the property of all Americans. Purposes here are moralized by linking them to values such as success, protection and security. Morality may be recognized in these values which American foreign policy experts seem to draw on in order to legitimate the US policies. They enact, therefore, a sort of “communicative action” in Habermas sense, and coordinate (fellow Americans’) actions and individual (or joint) goals on the basis of a shared understanding that the goals are inherently reasonable or merit-worthy. These moralized goals construed as common sense, belong to what once formed part of a discourse on American national interests and international role and has now become well established reservoir of American values.

In the Arab experts’ constructions, 90% of the purposes are the articulation the US endeavors in Iraq. Indeed, whether they are referred to as policies, strategies, or military occupations, the purposeful actions are closely tied to the US foreign policy enterprise mainly in the Middle East. For this reason, the purposes are associated to American actors even though actions are highly objectivated (as concluded above in action constructions). It is quite surprising that Arab experts construe their context models of Americans as intentional and powerful social actors only in 13.3 % of the cases. Their preference to build purposes as mean-oriented (in 70 % of purposes constructions) indicates that their attention is placed on actions rather than on human actors (see example 82). This action- based model may rely on a need to challenge these actions’ functions or even more their very existence, probably through the designation of

purposes themselves. In the Arab experts' construction of Americans' actions, goals seem to take an uppermost position and serve as delegitimation strategy. That could explain the very frequent use of moralization in the purposes such as "delude voters", "deepen divisions" to neutralize values". In all these realizations, a quality is distilled from the action and linked to a discourse of values. For instance, "delude" connotes a discourse of ethical values in which politicians' actions are represented as violating instead of respecting the trust of their voters (example 83).

(82) The current order in Iraq has contributed to opening Sectarian wounds. (Amr Elchobaky, *Al Ahram*)

(83) The security plan is a ploy to delude US voters. (Abdul Rahman Al Rashed, *Asharq Al Awsat*)

Delegitimizing the US actions in the construction of purposes is realized by various means. Apart from presenting purposes as moralized actions (as in example 2), Arab experts often objectivate the purposes themselves as in example (84) and (85) and this in turn makes the purpose be classified and labeled by way of nominalization. These US purposes seem to be part of a natural disposition or character in the US a nation rather than a specific, contextually -bound goal. In example (84), "oil" is an ultimate generalized purpose and is not realized with any verbal construction that may explain its use or limits. Oil seems to be sufficient for Arab experts (and enough informative) when constructing the US goals in their context models. More examples could illustrate the same idea (85).

(84) It is playing electoral politics with Iraqi blood for oil. (Nicola Nassar, *Yemen Times*)

(85) All the American misadventures of the Bush administration are actually for the love of Israel. (Hassan Haifi, *Yemen Times*)

Contrasting the findings from the analysis of the two experts' group corpora has helped to see a certain pattern in their respective constructions of participants' actions and goals in context models. American experts' context models feature activated actions produced almost exclusively by intentional and controlling American agents. Additionally, actions and purposes in this corpus are moralized, connected to warfare values and norms such as victory and success. This must be very probably a legitimization strategy of making their purposes seem to be those of all Americans and offered for their own good. Arab experts' models, however, are extended to macro contexts through the heavy use of abstracted actions, thus linking the micro actions of the American participants as main social players to their (American) macro actions, which are in fact, the expression of broader and more long-lasting actions.

6. 4. Summary

This chapter has presented the findings on the analysis of the discursive constructions of the Iraq issue performed by foreign policy experts in the American and Arab op-ed pieces issued in mass circulation newspapers. Two main discursive construction areas were examined: the selection of topics and the enactment of context. The arguers' choices in the selections of discussion topics were contrasted. The analysis of the op-ed pieces macro-semantic structures along with examination of the pragmatic dimension of the topic selections revealed the difference in the topical trends characterizing each op-ed corpus and indicated the kinds of disagreement spaces from which these topics were selected. American arguers focused on the same disagreement space in the debate-withdraw or stay in Iraq- goes hand in hand with the national consensus among opinion leaders on the urgency to find a solution to the Iraq problem. The topics were highly deliberative and denoted the group's power and eagerness for actions as typical for decision makers. This finding was confirmed by a clear trend in stasis, as the group mostly approached the issue from translative action- oriented perspective. The Arab experts' selections of topics pointed to a different direction. The variety of disagreement spaces from which they drew showed the lack of a common vision in their debate on the Iraq situation. Their topics were dispersed along different concerns characterized by an emphasis on protest. This explains the epideictic and judicial stances they tended to take by bringing the issues from a qualitative stasis value perspective to urge for the war

accountability. Drawing on Van Dijk's framework for context models (2008), the analysis of context construction explored two major schematic categories constituting the arguers' constructed models. These were setting (space) and, participants with a special focus on the constructions of self and its roles and relations with participants and finally and drawing on the framework of van Leeuwen (2008) purposeful actions were analyzed in the main standpoints. The results revealed the different approaches with which the two cultural groups constructed setting and participants' identities in discourse and showed difference in the structure of the two groups' context models. While American arguers switched between different types of identity, but mostly highlighted their Americanism, Arab arguers mainly attempted to contextualize one identity. Furthermore, American arguers enacted their professional identities by emphasizing their decision making character, whereas Arab arguers did not forefront their decision-maker self, as this might not seem to be relevant for the setting and goals imposed by the international debate situation. They seemed aware of their roles and positions as resistant groups to the dominating power. The systematic analysis of the topic selection and the contextual schematic categories revealed the ideologically biased constructions characteristic for each of cultural group of arguers and denoted the differences in their power positions in the debate controlled by their diametrically opposed positions as political actors in the international arena.

CHAPTER 7: MANEUVERING AND IDEOLOGICAL STRATEGIES IN OP-ED PIECES

7. 1. Introduction

This chapter presents the findings from the analysis of ideologies in the argumentative strategies of the op-ed discourses in the two cultural groups. Drawing on the notion of strategic maneuvering put forward by Pragma-dialectics, the analysis aimed to identify the ways with which the arguers survive the challenge they have in persuading their audience while being reasonable. The strategic maneuvers were identified and evaluated in the four dialectical stages and the results are presented following this introduction. Besides, in the final section of this chapter, results are reported on the analysis of the strategic derailments, namely, the fallacious moves which violate the dialectical rules for critical discussion proposed by pragma-dialectics.

Based on the pragma-dialectical model, each of the four critical stages (confrontation, opening, argumentative, concluding) identified in the process of a difference of opinion resolution is characterized by a specific dialectical aim. And since arguers generally want to accomplish this aim to their best advantage, they can be expected to make strategic moves that best serve their interests (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 1999: 484). The study of this type of strategic practices may be very insightful to how ideological aims and power positions shape or constrain policy experts' argumentative discourses.

7. 2. The Confrontation Stage

This section presents the results dealing with the strategies adopted by the arguers when exposing the nature of the dispute. The focus goes to the confrontation stage, the dialectical stage in which the arguers identify the issues at the origin of the conflict, advance their standpoints and contextualize their positions. In this stage, the strategic moves identified made it possible to determine the kinds of rhetorical aims arguers have and the ideological motivations behind them. Findings show that American and Arab arguers have very different confrontational strategies due in part to major differences in

their general rhetorical aims deduced from the kinds of oratory each group tends to adopt. Before exploring in detail the confrontational strategic patterns for each cultural group, it is essential to refer to the disagreement spaces from which the positions were selected in order to better explain how the strategic patterns were developed.

In chapter 6, the disagreement spaces representing the margins of the conflicting positions were identified. In this section, these spaces have been examined again to see how the arguers' confrontations are built from them. Indeed, the arguers have to make a number of strategic choices related to the general on-going public debate, namely place their views within the space they believe they belong to, decide on how to frame it against other virtual standpoints, including possible counter-positions, before adducing it to the audience. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 display the main disagreement spaces from which the standpoints have been advanced in both the American and the Arab data. The findings show that "withdrawing troops from Iraq", as the overriding disagreement space in the American corpus is shared by only 20% of the Arab arguers. This space indicates the deliberative nature of the positions, as they involve making a political decision. The rest of spaces and mainly the majority of the Arab topics tend to draw on different spaces, related to morality and justice.

Top 3 spaces	American	%
1	Withdrawal from Iraq	73.3
2	Decision makers behavior	16.6
3	War legitimacy	6.6

Table 7.1. Top 3 disagreement spaces in the American corpus

Top 3 spaces	Arab	%
1	The US actions in Iraq (morality)	46.6
2	The US agenda in Iraq	23.3
3	Withdrawal from Iraq	20

Table 7.2. Top 3 disagreement spaces in the Arab corpus

The disagreement spaces here do not only point to the positions adopted by the arguers, but they also indicate the nature of the dispute. Indeed, the prevailing space concerned with the troops' withdrawal designate a deliberative kind of debate, in which the dispute

focuses on either the expediency or the harmfulness of the proposed policy. Whether the proposal was equitable or not, a secondary consideration in this type of oratory even though in most cases American arguers did integrate other oratory types for a more persuasive effect. In the same way, the majority of Arab arguers who picked positions from a morally-based disagreement space seemed to show more concern for honor and justice than for future actions. Indeed, most of these confrontations were geared towards opening up a sort of “legal cases” against the US. The two approaches differ in their intended aims and this difference in orientation certainly affects the strategic maneuvers adopted in confrontation. In the next sub-section, the findings on the strategic maneuvers identified in each cultural group confrontations are displayed and discussed against the backdrop of the nature of the disagreement space from which the arguers have selected their positions. The presentational devices by which strategies are maneuvered are also discussed.

7. 2. 1. Confrontational strategies in the American corpus

As indicated in table 7.1, the majority of arguers (73.3%) in the American corpus draw on the same disagreement space in advancing their positions over the most practical policy to adopt in Iraq. This is the same space under which conflicting views on what to do in Iraq were discussed, either by defending staying or leaving Iraq or by proposing different types of action. Two different strategic maneuvers related to this disagreement space were identified. These were maneuvering by polarization and maneuvering by shifting the topic. In the first case, the arguers choose to present their positions by polarizing them with those of their opponents. This involves using moves which highlight a situation of disagreement in the debate and explicitly point to opposing views. The second kind of maneuvering, topic shifting, consists of starting confrontation on a topic and then moving from there to a different disagreement space. A third confrontational strategy was identified in the corpus within positions selected from various disagreement spaces, including those related to the politicians accountability and also to the withdrawal of troops from Iraq.

Polarizing

Most of the arguers setting about a position related to the topic of withdrawal from Iraq introduce their own views by means of polarization. Standard dictionary definitions of polarization emphasize the simultaneous presence of opposing or conflicting principles, tendencies or points of view. Indeed, these arguers introduce the disagreement in the debate as originating from two extreme positions rather than multiple differences. Furthermore, these opponents' views are often situated as irrational or extreme and balanced with moves emphasizing the credibility of the arguers. It is also somewhat surprising that, in the majority of these confrontations, reference to opponents' position is not followed by any refutation-based rhetorical strategy explaining the reason why the counter position is not valid in their views. A possible explanation for this strategy might be that the arguers aim to reduce the disagreement to a binary space by exaggerating one opponents' view and ignoring other alternative differences of opinion. By polarizing opponents' views, the arguers seem to accomplish two goals: weakening and disqualifying counter positions from being considered as valid positions and establishing their own credibility by means of discrediting opponents'. The latter goal may be recognized as an appeal to ethos, commonly used by arguers in this dialectical stage to establish credibility with the audience (Rhetoricae 2003). The recurrent polarizing maneuvering, a common confrontational practice among arguers in this corpus, may give insight into their group shared cognitions such as the kinds of common dispositions behind their discursive behaviors. The different functions of polarization are explored below in a number of revealing confrontational cases. In example (1) below, Kimberly Kagan initiates her debate with polarizing the opposing views with her own by means of dissociation.

- (1) In Washington perception is often mistaken for reality. And as Congress prepares for a fresh debate on Iraq, the perception many members have is that the new strategy has already failed. This isn't an accurate reflection of what is happening on the ground, as I saw during my visit to Iraq in May. (Kimberly Kagan, *Wall Street Journal*)

In this kind of polarization, the arguer does not seem to refute any counter argument or show predisposition to argue against any opposing views. Polarization here, realized

only at a confrontational stage, indicates that the arguer uses the maneuver for a different purpose rather than engaging in argumentation against opponents' claims. Indeed, using the term "perception" and "reflection" seems to be aimed at discrediting opponents' positions by representing them as subjective positions rather than well-founded views or positions. They are represented as mere perception as opposed to her factual knowledge reality implied from her reference to her visit to Iraq. By this strategy the arguer equally dissociates herself from her opponents by making a parallelism between her own advantage and her opponents' defect. The strategy risks derailment, even though it is widely adopted, as it can turn into the *ad hominem* fallacy recognized as the attack to the person rather than to the argument. This maneuver seems to be exploited by a great number of arguers where polarization is employed to discredit their opponents' positions and suggest their untrustworthiness. Example (2) is an extract from the confrontation advanced by Michael Totten in which he strategically maneuvers confrontation by polarizing his own positions with his opponents (those calling for withdrawal). The arguer dissociates himself from his opponents and frames their positions as a mere act of "bickering" which implies a state of unreasonable petty dispute, removed from the "real" event.

- (2) While American politicians bicker among themselves from eight time zones away about whether the Surge led by Gen. David Petraeus is working or not, I turned to Iraq to see for myself. (Michael Totten, *Daily News*)

The arguer, here, does not engage in refuting his opponents' positions, but rather frame them from this confrontation as worthless of arguing against. Indeed, the discussion argumentative core does not consist of refutation of counter-arguments, but rather focuses on proving that the Surge was working well based on factual evidence, presented as warranty to his defense to staying in Iraq and continuing the fight there. The confrontational maneuver strengthens one's position by weakening an opposing position. Furthermore, this move attempts to build the disagreement as binary, i.e. as representing two opposing poles rather than several. Example (3) further shows how Brent Scowcroft expresses his disagreement with the report on Iraq presented by the Iraq Study Group (ISG) on the situation of the war. In Spite of the fact that he recognizes the rigor and professionalism of his opponents (a strategy referred to as accommodation of counter views), he defines their position as a call for withdrawal and

a “dishonest” move (in the intention of blaming Iraqis for failure), while, in fact, the ISG recommends considering several alternative options to solve the Iraq issue (see ISG report summary in Baker & Hamilton 2006).

- (3) The report accomplished a great deal. It brought together some of America’s best minds across party lines, and it outlined with clarity and precision the key factors at issue in Iraq. However, (...) the report implies that we would have no choice but to withdraw and then blame our withdrawal on Iraqi failure. (Brent Scowcroft, *New York Times*)

Another example of maneuvering with counter-positions and presenting them as invalid claims is advanced by Peter Brookes in a confrontational move wrapped up into a series of presuppositions. The arguer presents the decision to withdraw troops as “surrender” and a declaration of “defeat” hence an act of cowardice.

- (4) Congress will *finally* deliver on the president's request for emergency war spending for Iraq and Afghanistan - after more than 80 days (*yes*, 80 days) of needless dithering with our national security. (...) it includes a *completely* arbitrary timetable for surrender in . . . er, I mean, withdrawal from Iraq. Sure, Congress has the constitutional power to declare "war," but since when does it have the right to declare "defeat"? (Peter Brookes, *New York Post*)

Polarizing, therefore, seems to fulfill a number of rhetorical aims. As seen in most of the above mentioned examples, one of the aims is to strengthen the arguers’ positions by attacking the authority and integrity of opponents and contrasting them with their own credibility. Another aim identified from this maneuvering strategy and may be obviously interpreted from the ways opponents’ views are generally reported. Polarized views are only referred to in negative terms but they are in many cases distorted. The misrepresentation of opponents’ positions is generally identified as a fallacious move producing what is referred to as a *strawman* fallacy. The fallacy may be detected in example (3) where the arguer falsely interprets the ISG position as a declaration of defeat. In the next example of polarized confrontations (5), Tony Snow brings up his opponents’ accusation to the US administration of being responsible for terror, but he does not show any disposition to reply to it. Here Mr. Snow merely rectifies the opponents’ claims and by saying “period”, he seems to decide there is no more

discussion to hold on the issue,. By this type of polarization, the arguer clearly does not aim at solving any disagreement on the issue mentioned, and even seems to exhibit his prerogative by claiming there is no room for more discussion, hence, derailing the maneuver, as it violates the second rule of critical discussion, burden of proof (see Chapter 4 on the rules for a critical discussion).

- (5) The most astonishing argument is the claim that the United States (or the Bush administration) is responsible for this terror wave. Terrorists are responsible for terror, period. (Tony Snow, *USA Today*)

Risking the maneuvers' derailment into a fallacy does not seem to be an obstacle, misrepresenting the opponents' views for the aim of polarizing them against one's position seems to be a widely accepted move, judging from the high occurrences of this practice in confrontations. A possible explanation for this might be that the activity type of op-ed argumentation gives room for such strategic maneuvers to become common practice. Indeed, the preconditions for maneuvering generally set by the institutional rules and conventions in which the arguers operate do not seem to place constraints on such fallacious moves. This is definitely due to the lack of any explicit formal or informal institutional restrictions or official conditions on how the arguers should formulate their opponents' views in the first place. However, the maneuver turns out to have more consequences than the ones outwardly perceived. Polarizing positions makes the disagreement space a two-dimensional kind of space and presented to audience as a choice between two options rather than contemplating more alternatives. The strategy reduces the disagreement to a more recognizable and manageable issue, by simplifying it for the audience. This increases the chance for persuading audience on one option against another rather than have to persuade them against many options or complex positions. Indeed, polarizing makes an "extremely diversified public coalesced into two or more highly contrasting, mutually exclusive groups sharing a high degree of internal solidarity in those beliefs which the persuader considers salient" (King and Anderson 1971: 244). Polarizing political views in the US has a long and established tradition given that the variety of political and moral value systems, ranging from traditional to progressive, from absolutist to relativistic, have often been reduced and categorized as falling either under liberal or conservative groups. Using this strategy in opinion pieces

may ostensibly be oriented towards producing the usual effect of political campaigns and discourses, which appeals to the solidarity and commitment of the group adherents based on sharing the same moral or political values.

Shifting the Topic

Confrontational maneuvering by topic shifts has also been identified in a significant number of American op-ed pieces. In this kind of maneuvering, confrontation initiates on a topic selected from a certain disagreement space and then moves on to another topic that seems to better serve the interest and goals of the arguers. In most cases, confrontation apparently draws on a topic selected from a small-scale disagreement space, but shifts (usually in a smooth manner) to a higher scale, more polemic disagreement space. Indeed, in most shifting the topics cases, the arguers tend to set off the debate from a previously settled disagreement, such as the issue of Islamic terrorism and the US leadership on the matter of fighting it (widely shared and accepted views among the American public), to later move to the controversial debate on troop withdrawal. This strategic maneuver is discussed in the examples below illustrated, by pointing to the ideological significance of these moves.

In example (6) Ralph Peters opens his discussion reporting some cruel terrorist attacks in Iraq, which powerfully relate to the kinds of images drawn upon in debates on terrorism linked to a larger space on the legitimacy of the war on Iraq and the very essence of the US interventions in “rogue” states. The arguer exploits the space to bring another issue to the table, namely that of the same predominant disagreement space of troops’ withdrawal, this time from a different angle and seemingly differentiating it from the deliberative debate over the decisions to make in Iraq.

- (6) Two days ago, al Qaeda detonated four massive truck bombs in three Iraqi villages, killing at least 250 civilians (perhaps as many as 500) and wounding many more. The bombings were a sign of al Qaeda's frustration, desperation and fear. The victims were ethnic Kurd Yazidis, (...) the reason for those dramatic bombings was that al Qaeda needs to portray Iraq as a continuing failure of U.S. policy. Those dead and maimed Yazidis were just props: The intended audience was Congress. (Ralph Peters, *New York Post*)

This kind of confrontational maneuver serves to initiate discussion from the topic of terrorism – related to war legitimacy disagreement space- and then shift to the topic related to the deliberation on whether to retreat or not from Iraq. Hence, by starting from a topic of shared agreement, the arguer seems to build a tension-free confrontation and engage in a concurring discussion on Al Qaeda's terrorism. The maneuver obviously is a case of strategic maneuvering at the level of audience adaptation typically aimed at securing communion with the audience (van Eemeren 2010: 108) before getting to the actual disagreement space from which the position is taken. Even though the strategy seems to undertake a positive function as it mitigates the difference of opinion, it may be identified as manipulative, as it distracts audience from the arguer's intended position. Furthermore, confrontation is initiated from the assumption of a common threat of terrorists' attacks, hence implies the inevitable obligation of Americans to fight. This kind of maneuver very probably functions as a smokescreen to the actual positions to defend in the discussion and may have crucial consequences on the audience processing and even reactions toward these standpoints.

A similar strategic maneuver by topic shift is illustrated in example (7) which seems to be ideologically biased by the arguer's aim of winning the debate to his favor. After an extensive description of some terrorists attacks in Iraq, Mr. Krauthammer advances a position consisting of refuting some opponents' views claiming that the US provoked a civil war instead of establishing democracy. The arguer makes a strategic move by means of a series of *erotema* (rhetorical questions) the first is the exact wording of the counter-argument and the next one is a re-formulation of this view (which very probably derails and produces a straw man fallacy). He uses this strategy of topic shift by placing his position within a different disagreement space, namely that of intervention and war legitimacy while in fact, the global speech act may be interpreted as part of the national debate on troops' withdrawal from Iraq.

- (7) Tens of thousands of Iraqis have died, the overwhelming majority of them killed by Sunni insurgents, Baathist dead-enders and their al-Qaeda allies who carry on the Saddamist pogroms (...). Iraqis were given their freedom, and yet many have chosen civil war. (...) We gave them a civil war? Why? Because we failed to prevent it? (...) Thousands of brave American soldiers have died trying to

counter, put down and prevent civil strife. (...) we've been doing everything we can to bring reconciliation. (Charles Krauthammer, *Washington Post*)

Indeed, the analysis revealed that the maneuvering by shifting topic served to foreground the threat of terrorism and the duty to fight against Al Qaeda in order to prepare favorably for the actual position defending the policies adopted in Iraq and eventually staying to accomplish the mission. This position is framed within the US global leadership and its mission of fighting terrorism as a major international threat, and shifted from the space of the deliberation over withdrawal from Iraq which evokes the mismanagement of the war and the public condemnation to it. Hence, by blaming Iraqis and Arabs for failure, the arguer recreates solidarity and consensus against others (here Iraqis) and implicitly absolves the Bush Administration from criticism. Furthermore, he shifts the attention away from the controversial issue of withdrawal and seems to initiate a discussion on the US mission and fight of terrorism, while, indeed, he advances (implicitly) a position against withdrawal. Confronting the audience on the basis of the accommodated topic of national values and virtues, rather than bringing up the responsibility of a political group, is a confrontational strategic maneuver aimed at avoiding the tension produced by the highly controversial topic of withdrawal. Nevertheless, it proves to be a case of manipulation, as the arguer's basic goals and intention become hard to infer from the discursive construction of a misleading confrontational situation in which the issue is defined in complex and evasive way.

Objections to opponents' positions

Around a quarter of the arguers choose to frame their confrontation departing from a counter-position of some opponents. Indeed, 24% of them advance argumentation as a reaction and resort hence, to refutation strategies. This strategy, widely used in mixed discussions where the participants hold a face to face argumentation and may easily intervene, points, in the case of op-ed pieces' non-mixed argumentation, to the explicit reference to disagreement and the disposition to exploit an existent discussion and expand it. This strategy is different from the cases of polarized views in the sense that arguers identify opposing views and commit to refute them within all discussion stages. In the all the objection cases inspected, the arguers show consistency when confronting

counter-arguments in the sense that they attempt to report the difference of opinion in a relatively “objective” or fair way, clearly stating their opponents’ views instead of hastily refer to them as “impression” or perception as is the case for polarizers. This does not mean that they do not harshly criticize them, a task they tend to reserve for the argumentation stage.

Confrontational maneuvering at the level of presentation

The presentational devices below displayed indicate the ways through which polarizing and topic shifting have been rhetorically accomplished in the confrontation stage. In practice, the strategic moves realized at three levels, topic selection, audience adaptation and the selection of presentational devices work together to produce the maneuvers aimed at. Table 7.3 below displays the top 5 presentational maneuverings in confrontations, headed by *propositio*, *apostrophe* and *enargia*, and illustrated with examples.

Presentational Device	Device characteristics	Functions	Example	%
<i>Propositio</i>	provides a summary of the issues, or concisely puts forth the charges or accusation	defining the origin of difference	The mission in Iraq is spiraling to failure. American voters have sent a clear message: bring our troops home, but don't lose. (W. Clark, USA Today)	46.6%
<i>Apostrophe</i>	directly address audience	evoke an emotional response	Keep in mind (...) (Clifford D. May <i>Houston Chronicle</i>)	33.3
<i>Enargia</i>	vivid, lively description. of an action	inherently moving evoke an emotional response	A female Sunni suicide bomber blew herself up amid students who were ready to sit for exams, killing 40 (T. Friedman, <i>New York Times</i>)	23.3
<i>Erotema/ Rhetorical Questions</i>	any question asked for a purpose other than to obtain the information the question asks.	affirm or deny a point strongly expressing wonder, indignation, sarcasm, etc.	Sure, Congress has the constitutional power to declare "war," but since when does it have the right to declare "defeat"? (P. Brookes, <i>New York Post</i>)	20
<i>Metaphor</i>	comparison made by referring to one thing as another	various effects/ deviations	When a lame duck, in his 45 th month of a failing foreign war and occupation bides his time with warning .(referring to G.W. Bush) (C. Hines, <i>Houston Chronicle</i>)	13.3

Table 7.3. Maneuvering strategies at the presentational level in the American corpus

It is, certainly, essential for arguers in such activity type argumentation to contextualize their positions within the debate and make it clearer for the audience to join the debate. The considerable use of *propositio* demonstrates that the arguers actually find it optimum to contextualize their claims for their audience by formulating the disagreement in a way that aligns the audience with their own position. Despite the fact that this rhetorical device is not commonly recognized for producing bias such as those devices appealing to emotions for instance, the choice for wording gives the arguers the opportunity to handle and present events the way that suits their interests by downplaying, exaggerating, highlighting or simply formulating the disagreement in their own terms. The remaining devices employed in the corpus, are equally significant as most are accomplished for emotional effect. A substantial amount of maneuvers have indeed been performed to appeal to the audience, namely through *apostrophe* (addressing the audience), *enargia*, (vivid description of events), and *erotema* (rhetorical questions). An extract from Ralph Peter's confrontation illustrates, in example (8) below, a case of a strategic move, maneuvered by the use of different presentational devices, probably aiming at having the maximum emotional effect on audience. The arguer talks directly to his addressees (*apostrophe*), states a potential doubt they may cast on his claim (*prolepsis*) and formulate it in the form of a question to shed verisimilitude on the interaction he is having with his antagonists and come across as close to them.

- (8) Wait a minute, you say: What about all those recent deadly bombings? (Ralph Peter, *New York Post*)

By involving the audience more directly into the discussion, these devices (among others) make explicit the dialogical nature of the interaction but also are supposed to produce positive reception of the positions in questions.

7. 2. 2. Confrontational strategies in the Arab corpus

The results from the analysis of confrontational moves in the Arab op-ed corpus indicated a different trend in the maneuvers adopted by the arguers. Indeed, these arguers do not draw on one major disagreement space as is the case for American arguers, who probably for practical reasons focus on one issue since they work under

the pressure and urgency of coming up with a solution to the Iraq deteriorating situation and the impending failure threatening it. Arab arguers exploit around three disagreement spaces the smallest of which is the same major space of in the American corpus. This means that Arab arguers identify further points of disagreement which they even estimate worthier to debate than troops' withdrawal.

However, the most revealing finding from the analysis is that most confrontations are objection-based. This means that argumentation is advanced in reaction to some opposing claims and the very standpoint should be considered as a countermove to these opponents' positions, which are considered as fundamental moves (see Amjarso 2010). In this case, the discussion (op-ed piece) should be inspected in light of a more extended argumentative exchange and taking into consideration the original discussions against which the current objections are advanced. This condition should put the op-ed piece in a context of a mixed discussion, which generally involve at least two active parties in the argumentative interaction. Based on these assumptions and in line with the pragma-dialectical model, the arguer seems to adopt the protagonist role to reject the same position for which he had presumably assumed an antagonist role in a previous discussion. Such a strategic maneuvering indicates a high level of engagement or involvement if we might call it so, into the wider international debate taking place among the most influential opinion leaders in the world and may also be considered an attempt made by the Arab arguers to take part in such a selective and hard to access international public debate.

More than three quarters of confrontations (76.6%) were identified as countermoves, i.e. consisting of challenging fundamental moves from previous discussions. Almost all these confrontations, (but one) were objections to American claims. These countermoves are advanced to fulfill one of the two following functions: maneuverings to express dissent, as the moves represent deep disagreement with the presumably established views of their opponents, and maneuvering to present strategic advice which consist of contesting some proposed policy decision in order to prove its inexpediency.

Table 7.4 displays the means by which the two main strategic maneuvers of objections were realized in confrontation. An example for each of these realizations is also

provided to indicate the manner with which the objection, whether coming out as dissent out as strategic advice is maneuvered.

<i>Maneuvering Functions</i>	<i>Means</i>	<i>Example</i>
Dissent	Accusation of distorting the truth	This is a distorted simplification (Tariq Alhomeyed, <i>Asharq Al Awsat</i>)
	Accusation of inconsistency	Washington was less ambiguous... (Galal Nassar, <i>Al Ahran</i>)
	Dissonance	Who are the real cold blooded killers? (Hassan Al Haifi, <i>Yemen Times</i>)
	Labeling	He uses this legend to compare wars. (Jihad Al Khazen, <i>Dar Al Hayat</i>)
	Shielded (presented as experts' position)	Political analysts believe....(Marwan Kabalan, <i>Gulf News</i>)
Strategic advice	Disagreement only with premises	Strategy for exit does not require timetables or bowing to Iran and Syria. (Raghida Dergham, <i>Dar Al Hayat</i>)
	Accommodating counter-views Recognizing their merit	The (ISG) report is serious, sound and non-partisan and reflects a clear awareness of its mission. (Hassan Nafaa, <i>Al Masry Al Youm</i>)

Table 7.4. Major functions and linguistic means of realization of the strategic maneuvers of objection in the Arab corpus

These maneuverings are discussed below from the examples illustrating each of the kinds of countermoves employed by the arguers at the confrontation stage of their discussions.

Maneuvering as the expression of dissent

As indicated in table 7.4, Arab arguers maneuver strategically in confrontation with the aim of expressing dissent from their opponents' positions. Dissent is a term used to refer to the kinds of objection strategies that designate a "deep disagreement" (Fogelin 2005) typically arising from the lack of common grounds between the arguers. The term dissent is originally used in legal context by those members of a jury who express their non-conformity with jury decision or a rejection to compliance. Results show that

around 70% of the objection-based confrontations are identified as maneuvers functioning as dissent. Dissent or deep disagreement may not be surprising in a discussion involving different cultures and mainly holding belligerent relationships. Objections against the positions, policies or arguments of American opponents not only reflect criticism and disagreement with their political actions, but also resistance to the compliance by their decisions and rejection to their values, since conflicts of interest and cultural differences provoke dissent and cognitive breaks (Kraus 2012). These maneuvers showing dissent from American positions in the Iraq war were realized by different strategic modes. The most frequently employed moves come out as an accusation to opponents for distorting some truth. Below, example (9) illustrates a confrontation maneuvered as an accusation, where Musa Keilani regards President Bush political behavior illusory and hiding his true intentions regarding the adjustments to make to his policy in Iraq

- (9) President G. W. Bush intends to keep in place the existing military strategy and troop levels there after the mid-September report from General Petraeus and Ambassador R. Crocker, but will do a few maneuverings in order to give impression that he is taking congressional pressure seriously. (Musa Keilani, *Jordan Times*)

Even if the opponent's positions are represented as "maneuverings" performed to deceive the public, these may be regarded as actual views and positions. In fact, during that period, as the Democrat majority Congress started to create pressure on the Bush administration, the President frequently responded by affirming his willingness to fulfill their wishes. The arguer here questions the truth of this position asserting that they are deceiving positions meant to manipulate the American people for political purposes. This accusation of distorting the truth here is obviously meant to demonstrate to the American audience the dishonesty of their president.

A similar case of objection-based maneuver showing dissent is the one illustrated in example (10) below. Galal Nassar in his confrontation refers to the Bush Administration official positions on the plans the US has in Iraq as producing confusion and as being contradictory and his maneuver comes as follows. The strategic moves defining the opponents' views and advancing objection to them are realized to prove the opponent's

argument as inconsistent, hence pointing to the shaky grounds of its premises. Inconsistency typically occurs when multiple statements which contradict one another are given.

- (10) The US administration feigned outrage when J Carter said (...) that some people in Washington wanted the troops to stay in Iraq for 10 years (...) Washington was less ambiguous about its goals when it first attacked Iraq. (Galal Nassar, *Al Ahram*)

These moves focus on the ambiguity of the position of the Bush Administration and point to the inconsistency in its arguments. Inconsistency is regarded fallacious, as at least one of its premises proves to be false and so is the case for the Administration talking about departure while having planned to remain in Iraq at least for 10 years. This confrontational maneuver is meant to reveal that Bush was lying to his people and that he was merely pretending to endorse their wishes for ending the war. Furthermore, the strategic maneuver is efficiently adapted to the audience, by referring to an American authority as a source for the advanced claim (Jimmy Carter) and by framing the issue from the perspective of the American interest and building his case against Bush and his integrity and not against America as a whole.

Other cases of countermoves advanced to express dissent from the American opponents' views emphasize the existence of some inconsistency by means of dissociation. By dissociating their own positions (or condition) from their opponents', some arguers attempt to establish a distinction between two states of affairs which apparently are widely regarded as being one.

- (11) Quite often Mr. George W. Bush uses the phrase "cold blooded killers" to denote the insurgents, he is supposedly challenging in Iraq and Afghanistan and just anywhere else in the world (...) who are the real cold blooded killers? (Hassan Al Haifi, *Yemen Times*)

The example shows that maneuver consists of challenging the claim Bush makes about insurgents by dissociating the fake and unjust definition cast by Bush from the real definition of the term. This dissociation realized at the confrontational stage prepared for the refutation strategies adopted in argumentative stages. Indeed, dissociation may

enhance dialectical reasonableness because at the basis of dissociation there are two speech acts, distinction and definition (van Rees 2007: 1)

Labeling is another means of showing dissent in objections. The arguers in these kinds of confrontational maneuvers report the views they reject and then cast a label on them to show their deep discontent and oppositions to all of their aspects. By describing someone or something in a word or short phrase, extreme overgeneralization occurs. The opponents' views are typically summarized into a unique term which acts as a definition of its characteristics and sometimes as a form of stereotyping. Labeling in this corpus indicates a deep resentment to the opponents' views, as the move, by default, reduces a state of affair into one concept and gives the positions an evaluative tagging. In example (12), Jihad el Khazen introduces his opponents' arguments by labeling them "a legend" in order to knock them down more forcefully in the argumentation stage after pigeonholing them at confrontation as a deviant behavior.

- (12) The war cabal in the American Administration has been promoting the idea that the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq will lead to massacres and genocides as was the case in Vietnam. It is normal that President George Bush uses this legend to compare the two wars. (Jihad Al Khazen, *Dar Al Hayat*)

Maneuvering to provide strategic advice

Arguers maneuvering for strategic advice in confrontation equally rely on objections to opponents' arguments and build their argumentation based on refuting these views. In these cases, objections are directed to an opponents' argument to reject some of its parts (premises or the conclusion), but not the entire position. The maneuver suggests that in spite of the disagreement the arguers presuppose some shared common ground as point of departure, as opposed to the deep disaccord expressed in dissent objections. Below, example (13) indicates confrontational maneuvering by objections to American positions, or discourse, (probably referring to politicians and elites) for their oversimplification of the task of democratization which led, in his views to the mishandling of this mission.

- (13) The American discourse contains disturbing oversimplification (...) where all that is required is the removal of a ruler and the emancipation of a group from the chains of suppression. (Tariq Alhomeyed, *Ashaq Al Awsat*)

Another example of maneuvering with objection for strategic advice is found in Raghida Dergham's confrontation. The arguer points to the weaknesses in the arguments of the opposing views, namely those considering withdrawal from Iraq a defeat for the US.

- (14) The Americans - Republicans, Democrats and independents - should not fall in love with the Baker-Hamilton Report as if it represents salvation from upon high, since most of its recommendations are, in fact, nonsense and fakery. There will be no honorable US withdrawal if bargaining and deals are concluded with countries the US has classified as sponsors of terrorism, and there is no room for a gradual withdrawal from Iraq. (...) it is possible to render the withdrawal useful, so that the US can re-occupy the driver's seat. (Raghida Dergham, *Dar Al Hayat*)

Ms. Dergham here objects firmly the proposal made by the Iraq Study Group (ISG) in which they recommended cooperation and negotiation with regional players. She rejects their argument for the US need to work with Iraq neighboring states to solve the issue of violence. Despite the fact that her rejection seems to be directed to ISG group, the countermove is a reaction to those campaigning against withdrawal in general. She demonstrates through confrontation, as well as in the remaining parts of her discussion, a great affinity with the core aspects of the issue shared with her opponents, as in "countries the US has classified as sponsors of terrorism" and "re-occupy the driver's seat" which both highlight US interests. By doing so, she shows communion with the US position in general and advances her position as one serving the benefit and interest of America as a global leader.

Presentational devices in Confrontation

The strategic maneuvers advancing objections in most of the op-ed confrontation were formulated in a variety of ways, most of them pointing to a rhetorical strategy referred

to as *apodioxis*. *Apodioxis* consists of rejecting of someone or something (such as the adversary's argument) as being impertinent, needless, absurd, false, or wicked (Rhetoricae 2003). In many op-ed discussions, arguers seem to address American and international audience for persuasion and at the same time they identify their opponents from the American background. This is a challenging goal for these arguers. It makes it crucial for them to set the boundaries between the hostile relationship maintained with their opponents and the relationships of communion constructed with their audience. This explains perhaps why there is an extensive use of pathos among the different presentational devices and the tendency even to combine many of them probably for more effect. Indeed, in the attempt to reflect their rejections of American opponents' positions, Arab arguers have the challenging task to maneuver strategically in confrontation by defining the issue of disagreement in a way that could likely favor their own positions. Arguers usually attempt to show confrontation for their debate using presentational devices which they judge most effective to prepare for audience best reception of the issue under discussion. Findings show that Arab arguers highly draw on rhetorical resources, more indeed that the arguers in the American corpus, as indicated in Table 7.5 below:

Presentational Device	Device characteristics	Function	Example	%
<i>Propositio</i>	provides a brief summary of the issues, or concisely puts forth the charges or accusation	formulate the disagreement	President Bush told US war veterans that if the American troops were withdrawn from Iraq before the "job is done" the country will experience the same collapse that followed when Washington abandoned its military intervention in Vietnam (AlHarithi, <i>Arab News</i>)	60
<i>Erotema</i> / Rhetorical Questions	affirm or deny a point strongly by asking it as a question. Has an emotional dimension	expressing wonder, indignation, sarcasm, etc.	Are two year enough? (A. Alrashed, <i>Asharq Al Awsat</i>)	50
<i>Exuscitatio</i>	stirring others by one's own vehement feeling (sometimes by means of a rhetorical question)	exciting anger	Who wants to live the fairytales of US liberation? (M. Khalesi, <i>Al Ahram</i>)	43.3
Metaphor	comparison made by referring to one thing as another	various effects/ deviations	Study is available day and night. The invitation is open to the "university of terrorism" in Iraq (Z. Kseibati, <i>Dar Al Hayat</i>)	43.3
<i>Anaphora</i>	Repetition of the same word or group of words at the beginning of successive clauses, sentences, or lines.	strategy of amplification and emphasis	Who wants his country to turn into another Iraq? Who wants his nations to suffer the fate of Iraqis (also <i>erotema</i>) (M Khalesi, <i>Al Ahram</i>)	20

Table 7.5. Maneuvering strategies at the presentational level in the Arab corpus

The findings presented in Table 7.5 designate the variety of devices used for this purpose in the Arab data set. Maneuvering by *propositio* is the most widely employed strategy (in around 60% of the corpus) of defining the disagreement and advancing standpoints. With *propositio*, the counter-arguments objected against were defined by the arguers mostly in negative terms as this is typically used to enhance ones' chances for presenting ones' views as more expedient and more acceptable. Furthermore, the high frequency of *erotema* (rhetorical questions) is significant, as these forms of addressing the audience are employed by Arab arguers here to provoke the audience reaction and stimulate emotional effects. They also tend to instigate sympathy by these devices of pathos, and frame them as an expression of indignation or protest, which they typically try to extend to other various discussion stages.

The discussion of the findings from the contrastive study of maneuvering strategies at the confrontation stage has outlined the different approaches with which the two groups perform confrontation in this argumentation on the Iraq war, more specifically how they recognize their difference of opinion and externalize it. The disparate maneuvers of the American and Arab arguers, indeed, seem to indicate the different rhetorical goals pursued by the arguers in this dialectical stage as well as the discursive dispositions they hold vis-à-vis the debate on Iraq and its participants. American arguers in this corpus displayed more hard-hitting strategies for advancing their standpoints, using problematic strategies such as polarizing the disagreement and shifting the topic. It is true that at the confrontation, "a speaker or writer will select or exclude in an attempt to dictate how the confrontation is defined" (Tindale, 2006: 449), but the means used by these arguers have derailing and arrogant features which probably draw on the political power positions enjoyed by this influential group and an established discursive culture sustaining their practices. Arab arguers on the other hand, performed more guarded maneuvers even though objecting to and challenging the opponents' positions turned out to be the trend. Indeed, whether maneuvers were meant to express dissent or to present a strategic piece of advice, the definition of disagreement follows a rhetorical strategy of objection which is generally maintained all through the discussion stages. Findings on presentational strategies also showed the effort made by these arguers to

define opposing positions in way that they should not be interfere with the intricate constructions of their audiences.

7. 3. The opening stage

Findings from the analysis of the op-ed openings display a further contrast between the ideologically biased strategic maneuverings realized in each cultural group. Two main strategic choices were the focus of the current analysis: (i) the distribution of participants' dialectical roles in the discussion, specifically the discursive construction of antagonists (presumably the audience) and (ii) the assumptions externalized as starting points establishing agreement on the discussion rules. Generally speaking, the opening is the dialectical stage in which the discussion participants decide to resolve their difference of opinion hence they determine their points of departure and agree upon the rules of the discussion (van Eemeren et al., 2002: 25). Equally important in this stage is the kind of roles assigned by the arguers to their "constructed antagonist" or imagined audience. The op-ed pieces present a case of a non-mixed discussion (proper to written argumentations) where the arguer/author takes the protagonist role by default and implicitly or explicitly assigns role of the antagonists to his (or the institution's) imagined audiences and sometimes even to his debate opponents. This situation gives the arguer the (relative) freedom of adjusting the position of audience and opponents the way that best suits his/her aims. The two subsections below contrast the results from the analysis of roles distribution and the use of starting points and assumption in the two op-ed discussions groups.

7. 3. 1. Distribution of dialectical roles

The analysis results revealed that both American and Arab arguers equally exploited this opportunity of dialectical roles distribution in order to create a more favorable setting for their discussion, by including or excluding their opponents and by carefully delineating the role of their antagonist public in the debate. However, arguers from the two cultural groups maneuvered differently with participants' roles in the discussions. Two kinds of participants' maneuverings were explored, that of positioning the

audience (being the main antagonists) and that of the roles granted to opponents in the debate.

Antagonists: The Audience

While American arguers seem to be more inclined to either harmonize with their audience or manipulate their positions, the Arab arguers, by contrast, highly accommodate their views to their audience. Maneuvering by adapting to the audience preferences or values seems to be of highest priority for the majority of Arab arguers in the corpus. This is probably due to the fact that their constructed audiences are generally identified as American or international and there is certainly a pressing need to make up for the consensus that is missing with this targeted audience. Figure 7.1, below, indicates the ways the audiences are positioned in the discourse and the type of antagonism assigned to them in the discussion, namely either a position of doubt or the position of opponent, the one holding a counter-position. Certainly, a position of mere doubt is assumed to be easier, in theory, to persuade than a counter-position. This may probably explain the reason why there is a high amount of manipulations of the kinds of roles assigned to antagonists. This finding is further discussed below.




Figure 7.1. How audiences are positioned in the debate in the American and Arab corpora

American and Arab arguers alike construct their respective audiences as allies. However, the percentage seems to be lower for the American corpus due to the detection of cases of manipulations. Indeed, as indicated in Figure 7.1, 40% of the arguers do present their audiences as in total agreement with their positions, while actually the issues picked up for discussion prove to be of high controversy. Through polarizing their views with those of their opponents' and presupposing their own righteousness with no proof (violating the burden of proof rule for critical discussion), some arguers attempt to ignore any possible disagreement with the audience. They presume the audience to completely agree with them through presupposition constructions. This may probably be an efficient persuasive strategy for some audience, but also may be offensive for others who becoming aware of this maneuvering would feel probably excluded from the discussion. In example (15), Joseph Lieberman makes a move which is a case in point of the manipulation of audience antagonism, shifting the assumed disagreement on the persistence of troops in Iraq to frame it as if it were a political fight limited to Congressmen, and not a public controversy in which the American citizens were indeed involved through political campaigns, petitions for withdrawal and many other forms of political actions.

- (15) Congress thus faces a choice in the weeks and months ahead. Will we allow our actions to be driven by the changing conditions on the ground in Iraq or by the unchanging political and ideological positions long ago staked out in Washington? (Joseph Lieberman, *Wall Street Journal*)

The fact that this kind of manipulation is widely employed by the American arguers is probably due to the freedom granted to arguers within this activity type (being a non-mixed type of discussion in which the protagonist/author is the only one advancing argumentation) to define their imagined audience the way they wish to, even though Arab arguers in our corpus do not seem to be willing to exploit this freedom. A more plausible explanation might be that the kind of aims the arguers have and the ideological positions they draw on motivate the performance of such strategies. Indeed, since the majority of American arguers have to deliberate over a policy decision, they seem to find it imperative to knock down any opposing views by any possible means.

That is why they tend to black out any alternative solutions and even reduce the disagreement to two unbalanced positions. Rather than arguing against their opposing position, they tend to ignore it and only engage in presenting the advantages of their own position, constructing their antagonists as exclusively taking positions of doubt and ignoring the eventuality of their opposition. The Arab arguers, on the other hand, pursue different strategies. Most of them recognize the opposing views as the ones to be refuted by means of argumentation; hence they respond to the implicit burden of proof assumed from this situation. In this case, they tend to carefully differentiate these opponents from their audience with whom they tend to create communion by explicitly adapting to their values and by other rhetorical means such as establishing shared assumptions (discussed below in sub-section on Starting points). In example (16), Hussein Shobokshi attempts to explicitly and clearly identify his opponents and accuse them of crimes (through a judicial oratory type). He, at the same time, differentiates them from his antagonists, the American public, whom are explicitly invited to position themselves as the addressees in this discussion, by means of a rhetorical strategy referred to as *encomium* which consists of “praising a person or thing” (Rhetoricae, 2003)

- (16) Because America is still a country that is governed by institutional ethics and rules and regulations— although the current administration has been endeavoring to neutralize many of these – anti-war voices have a powerful, resounding return even within the deep-rooted Republican Party itself. (Hussein Shobokshi, *Asharq Al Awsat*)

Some other arguers condemning the US intervention in Iraq take Americans in general as opponents. They attack their position as being unfair and led by greed, and take as antagonists the international community, in a position of doubt, to defend their claims and charges against the US as a nation. By excluding the Americans as potential audience through the use of rhetorical devices related to vituperation (blame), the arguer implicitly invites the non-American audience to take up the role of antagonists and to be the judge on the standpoints advanced,

7. 3. 2. Assumptions and starting points

The findings on the analysis of strategic maneuverings with assumptions revealed the difference between the two groups of experts in their approaches to how starting points should be established in the op-ed pieces. Starting points in the opening stage serve the purpose of establishing basic assumptions which generally consist of reminding participants of the ideas which are agreed upon by everyone. This is explicitly done in some (institutionally-based) activity types featuring a mixed discussion where the starting points consist of norms parties must abide by in the process of their resolution of their difference of opinion. In the case of our op-ed activity type, and being a non-mixed (written) argumentation, the author generally makes explicit the difference between his/her assumptions and the issues to be argued for or against. From these decisions, the externalized starting points were determined and results yielded insights on the arguers' respective shared assumptions and shared beliefs and provided us with a route to the makeup of their ideologies. Findings show that American and Arab arguers set very different starting points in their respective argumentative discussions. This discovery comes as no surprise indeed, as the two groups participate in the debate with very different power positions and very different perspectives and interests, hence may be expected to adopt opposed ideologically charged argumentative and discursive strategies. Results from the analysis of the assumptions put forward by American and Arab arguers are discussed below. These results are illustrated by some representative examples from the opening stages in the two corpora.

7. 3. 2. 1. Assumptions as starting points in American corpus

There are seven kinds of recurring assertions identified as the assumptions established as starting points in the American data corpus. The main and most widely established assumption focuses on recognizing the challenges facing the US in its mission of reconstructing Iraq and establishing its democracy. As indicated in Table 7.6 below, 80% of the arguers explicitly take the complicated situation in Iraq- the challenge Americans face and the urgent need to make the right decision to solve the issue- as their starting points in their argumentations. The extensive use of this assumption as a starting point indicates the experts' agreement on how critical and urgent the situation in

Iraq was and how important their contribution was to the on-going debate. Indeed, regardless of the nature of their discussion, namely whether the arguers call for or against withdrawal (deliberative) or engage in critical assessments of policies and actions (epideictic or judicial), the mission in Iraq is equally judged as undergoing a critical moment. Example (17) and (18) are an illustration:

- (17) The calamity in Iraq has hogtied the Bush administration, inviting disarray, if not instability, in neighboring countries. (Wesley Clark, *USA Today*)
- (18) By the time President Bush gets around to cooking up his next plan for Iraq and telling us about it in the new year, the U.S. military death toll in the conflict will quite possibly have topped 3,000.(Cragg Hines, *Houston Chronicle*)

Ranking	Assumptions	%
1 st	There are challenges in the Iraq mission	80
2 nd	US has a noble mission	56.6
3 rd	Terrorism in Iraq is a threat to the US/world	46.6
4 th	The US has to protect its interests	36.6
5 th	Bush mismanaged the war	36.6
6 th	There is a civil war in Iraq	33.3
7 th	Credibility in the debate is a norm	30

Table 7.6. Top 7 assumptions and starting points in the American op-ed opening stages

Other ideas are presented with lower frequency, but may still be highly significant, as they represent assumptions shared within more than a half of the op-ed openings. American arguers explicitly reaffirm their assumptions and agreement on the US noble mission in the world, its right to protect its interests and the threat of terrorism to Americans and the world. Detecting a high level of consensus in assumptions established by the arguers reinforces our identification of the kinds of beliefs shared and uncontested among the American FP experts debating in the media. Aside from

recognizing the challenges to the US mission in Iraq, assumptions ranking 2nd, 3rd, and 4th are concerned with ascertaining agreement on issues related to war legitimacy. A very significant common point about these assumptions is that most of them are generally used as the very premises supportive of the claims advanced (see *topoi* in argumentation stage section). Since they are shared by a relatively high number of arguers (either as starting points or premises), they may reveal (at least part of) the content of a shared political cognition and belief system among American policy experts. Maneuvering strategically with these very beliefs framed as facts makes a good share of the arguers' *endoxa* emerge and the structures of their political ideologies become more prominent. Indeed, for these arguers, the beliefs about the global war on terror, its legitimacy and its ongoing project come out as common ground or as beliefs that have previously withstood debate and argument, and now serve as the groundwork for their public debate on foreign policy. Underlying these very assumptions the principles and justification for the US interventionism in other states remains not only unquestioned but seems to be internalized by all the experts in this corpus. American arguers seem to underpin the foundations for the Iraq mission among them despite the grave situation in order to resolve their disagreement on the procedural details of the solutions to the Iraq crisis.

7.3.2.2. Assumptions as starting points in the Arab corpus

A large number of assumptions were identified as starting points in the Arab arguers' corpus. Table 7.7 displays a selection of these (various) assumptions and shows the relatively low frequency of each assumption in the corpus.

The results from the analysis of the opening strategic maneuvers summarized in Table 7.7 provide a modest evidence of consensus on assumptions among Arab arguers. Indeed, the corpus contains a variety of assumptions advanced as starting points, but shows no clear pattern in the kinds of beliefs put forward by this group as common ground.

Ranking	Assumptions	%
1 st	The US mission in Iraq is a total failure/US power questioned	33.3
2 nd	Iraq heading to disaster	30
3 rd	Presumptions on President Bush character	26.6
4 th	War is illegitimate	23.3
5 th	Iraqis welcomed the US democratization project	20
6 th	Decision to remove Saddam was right	16.6
7 th	The US policies are controlled by Israel	13.3
8 th	Americans positively characterized (practical, rational, etc.)	10
8 th	American perspectives on interests (war costly)	10

Table 7.7. Assumptions and starting points in the Arab op-ed opening stages

The most frequently established starting point is the US failure causing skepticism on its status as global superpower, as shown in example (19):

- (19) Both interventions (in Vietnam and Iraq) were misjudged and based on an unrealistic faith in the absolute supremacy of America's military might (...) have ended in humiliation for Washington. (Mohamad F. Alharthi, *Arab News*)

With almost the same frequency, assumptions on the pending disaster in Iraq come in the second position. References to the US endeavor and the Iraq situation rely on sarcastically and metaphorically worded expressions such as “quagmire”, “adventure” and catastrophe”. The frequent use of *enargia* (vivid description) and *anaphora* (repetitions of lexis) on war atrocities are maneuvered rhetorically with the attempt to transmit the pain endured by the Iraqi victims to the audience. Example (20) illustrates a discussion opening in which the emphasis is placed on the description of the Iraqi disaster.

- (20) Three years of occupation have turned Iraq into scattered cantons, divided the nation into sects and clans, squandered national wealth, dismembered the state,

and turned the country into an arena for terror and vengeance. Three years of occupation have stripped Iraq of welfare and security, social fabric and infrastructure. Laws have been supplanted by orders from Paul Bremer. (Mohammad Hassan Al Khalesi, *Al Ahram*)

Furthermore, the same assumption was detected in metaphorical expressions like “reached the worst impasse” and “waiting for grace” to represent a gloomy outlook on the war and to establish it as shared with the audience. The 3rd kind of assumption revolves around Bush and benefits from his reputation (within the international community) as a stupid president. Around 26.6% of the op-ed takes this assumption as shared even when targeting American arguers, possibly hoping that this “truth” would avail their estimation and views on the US policies in Iraq and convince American citizens to take action to their nations. War illegitimacy, established as a starting point in 23.3% op-ed pieces, manifest itself in explicit reference to failure in finding weapons of mass destruction and the lack of proof of the link between terrorism and Iraq. In some presuppositions such “Bush adventure” the same assumption was also identified. Around 20% of the op-ed emphasize the Iraqis’ enthusiasm for democracy and equally hint at the Arab endorsement of the egalitarian principles. This point along with propositions expressing approval of the Saddam’s removal are regarded strategic maneuvers chosen to shorten the cultural and consensual distance with their audience and to come across as resolution-friendly debaters with claims worth to consider. The fact that most of these maneuvers are externalized (in explicit propositions) further sustains this explanation. However, the overriding trend in this corpus, the low frequencies of these starting points, indicates a low level of agreement and also different rhetorical strategies. This phenomenon may probably denote the intricacy for Arab experts to decide which common ground to establish with a supposedly divergent-position audience other than trying to adapt to some universal human principles lost in the armed conflict and in its US-dominated international debate.

7. 4. The Argumentative Stage

The analysis of the argumentative stage in op-ed discussions reveals the extent to which this stage offers a substantial space for arguers to achieve their ideologically inclined

aims through maneuvering strategies. The results from the empirical analysis of the data have sustained the observation of some strategic patterns pertinent to each cultural group. In the following subsections, findings are reported on the three levels of maneuvering: the constructions of the lines of arguments, the adaptation to audience and the use of presentational devices. Two dimensions were explored in the construction of the lines of argument, the first is related to how arguers located their arguments, realized by means of *loci* and the second looked at how arguers built their arguments, a task brought about by *topoi*. These findings correlate with a discussion on the sociocognitive backdrop of these maneuvering decisions and their consequences on discourse.

Before getting to the arguments internal construction, an initial operation was carried out in the two corpora in which the main arguments advanced were identified and classified into the same semantic area or subject. Contrasting the main arguments with similar subjects in the two data groups has yielded interesting insights on the divergent manners with which the same argument subject was handled by the two groups of arguers. Table 7.8 below illustrates how three of the most frequent argument subjects in the data are articulated into actual arguments by the different arguers groups.

Arguments subject	American	Arab
War situation	There is progress	There is a disaster
US goals in Iraq	US has a moral duty in Iraq	US has a hidden agenda in Iraq
War Accountability	Arabs are an obstacle to victory	The US is responsible for crimes
	Politicians are manipulative	The US provoked civil war

Table 7.8. Top three argument subjects and the arguments generated from them in the two groups

It is hardly surprising that arguers from ideologically and culturally conflicting positions make opposing claims about the same issue. Indeed, as indicated in Table 7.8 above, the top three claims advanced around the same issue seem to completely diverge. For instance, when arguing about the US goals in Iraq, a high portion of the American arguers claim the US has a moral duty towards Iraqis and should stay in Iraq to accomplish it, while the Arab arguers assert that the US has a hidden agenda in Iraq and

is pursuing imperialistic policies there. These most frequent claims in the data are further explored to see what types of *loci* (or lines of arguments) were used in the argumentation advanced to support them.

7. 4. 1. Locating argument, *loci* or lines of arguments

Loci, or the process of developing arguments, are categories that help the arguer outline the relationship among ideas, hence make also an attempt to transfer acceptability. Five types of common *loci* are identified in both corpora to have been used by arguers in supporting their claims and these are: arguments based on facts (past or future), relationships of cause/effect or antecedent/consequence, testimony such as the use of authority opinion, witnesses or documents, analogy and finally the *locus* of definition.

Before getting to a more detailed account on the findings from the analysis of the lines of arguments relevant to each data corpus, an overview is presented below displaying the different ways arguers in the two groups have anchored or located their main arguments. The *loci* identified are related to the most frequent arguments or in most cases sub-standpoints and revealed the kinds of patterns characterizing the means used in the creation of those recurrent positions. The main arguments advanced, mainly those featuring complex structures were categorized based on related semantic themes. The findings reveal the focus on the two main themes in the arguments: the US policies/actions in Iraq and the US mission and goals there.

Figure 7.2 below displays the distribution of *loci* in the corpora in relation to the most frequent claims advanced by the two groups of arguers on the US policies in Iraq. In both cases, Americans and Arabs use their claims in order to support standpoints legitimating or delegitimizing the US policy in Iraq and both make use of a variety of *loci* to give shape to these claims. However, while the American arguers mainly draw on facts and relationships when they advance the claims that there is progress and that the situation is favorable for staying the course, the Arab arguers seem to count more on definitions and testimony in arguing that Iraq is heading towards a catastrophe.




Figure 7.2 Contrasting American and Arab *loci* the claims related to the policies in Iraq

The following example (21) below illustrates a claim related to the condition of the policies in Iraq advanced by think tank Clifford May from the American corpus. The example is part of a series of arguments advanced in support of his standpoint calling for staying in Iraq. The arguer establishes a relationship of antecedent/consequence to connect the premises (antecedent) to the unexpressed conclusion (there is progress). The conclusion may be inferred from the syllogistic reasoning that allows the enthymeme to be supplied from common knowledge.

- (21) Dramatic achievements are being made at the provincial level. Just a few weeks ago, traditional, tribal leaders in Diyala province signed an American-brokered peace agreement. They are now working with each other as well as with U.S. military forces against al-Qaeda, our common enemy.(Clifford May, *Houston Chronicle*)

By means of this *locus*, the arguer seems to invite one to consider events or consequences that follow given actions or conditions. Arguments based on the *loci* of relationships and mainly antecedent/consequence *locus* is closely associated with a form

of reasoning based on implied premises, referred to as the “enthymeme. This *locus* is a bit different from cause/effect in that the consequences, the peace agreement and cooperation with Iraqis, seem to naturally flow from the earlier conditions, namely what successfully was achieved in Iraq. The next example (22) presents a case from arguments advanced by Arab arguers to affirm the disaster in Iraq. Arguing that the persistence in Iraq is an act of terrorism, Jihad Al Khazen first uses the *locus* of definition by identifying the Bush administration persistence and defense of staying in Iraq as an act of terrorism against his own soldiers. Then, he reinforces this conclusion with a premise built from the *locus* of testimony, relying on an argument from (American) authority.

- (22) As long as victory over international terrorism is impossible, the only justification for the persistence of a condition in which American soldiers are killed daily is terrorism in itself. This does not only represent my opinion. In fact, Admiral Michael Mullen, who was chosen by George Bush to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in Congress that there is no military solution in Iraq and the only way out is national reconciliation.(Jihad Al Khazen, *Dar Al Hayat*)

The next graph (Figure 7.3) contrasts findings on the *loci* related to the second most frequently advanced claims on the US goals in Iraq. When tackling this issue, most American arguers make the claim that the US has a moral and noble duty towards Iraq and use this claim in most cases to legitimate the positions calling to stay the course in Iraq and warning against troops’ withdrawal. Most of the Arab arguers on the other hand, advancing argumentation on the US mission, claim that the US has a hidden agenda in Iraq serving its imperialistic goals.




Figure 7.3 American and Arab *loci* in the claims related to the US goals and mission

These two main claims are structured as follow: when discussing the US agenda in Iraq, American arguers rely almost exclusively on the *locus* of relationship, in 77% of the cases, in order to defend the claim that the US has an honorable duty to accomplish in Iraq. Indeed, the analysis shows a high level of “cause and effect” and “antecedent/consequences” types of conclusion drawing. Antecedent/consequences, being the *locus* most frequently used in the cases examined, typically generate enthymeme and highly relies on implied premises. These implied premises draw on given “knowledge” and on supposedly shared assumptions. In the American corpus, the arguers claiming that the US has a moral duty frequently build their argumentation on supposedly accepted premises which mostly remain unexpressed. These claims, in fact, come as sub-arguments to higher level arguments in the discussion structures and are mostly employed to support the dissuasion of taking any political actions leading to the withdrawal of troops from Iraq. Example (23) below, illustrates the use of this kind of locus, where Tony Snow claims that despite the terrorists’ threat in Iraq, the US actions succeeded in turning the events against them. The supportive premise, the US has a noble mission, remains unexpressed. In fact, along the argumentative discussion, progress and accomplishment presupposes a mission with honorable goals

- (23) More than anything, al-Qaeda wants the United States to leave Iraq and hand victory to the terrorists. Recent military action has inflicted serious damage on al-Qaeda in Iraq and has inspired a growing number of Iraqis to fight al-Qaeda.

Their Arab counterparts, on the other hand, build their claims on a variety of other common *loci*. Their claim that the US has a hidden agenda is established more on testimony (80%), followed by definitions (50%) then facts (42%). By drawing predominantly on testimony, arguers seem to be concerned with warranting their claims with solid sources, namely citing American authorities and referencing from official documents. This fact is probably due to their awareness that their positions may come across as highly contentious and harsh and risk immediate dismissal by the American or international audience whom they are supposedly addressing. In example (24), Hassan Tahsin advances his standpoint in the discussion on the US hidden agendas in Iraq which, for him, explain the reason why Bush administration refuses to withdraw troops after four years of occupation. The arguer goes beyond the typical speculations on the US imperialistic intentions and warrants his claim by reference to the bill draft of the oil law to be passed in Iraq. This document along with reports from the watchdog organization functions as a means for establishing acceptability of the claim by the *locus* of testimony.

- (24) The draft bill of the oil law contains such draconian provisions as prohibiting any Iraqi company to undertake excavations for oil and natural gas while, on the contrary, Washington will have the right to decide which foreign company can operate in Iraq. (...) According to Platform, an oil industry watchdog, “The law is permissive. All of Iraq’s unexploited and as yet unknown reserves, which could amount to between 100 billion and 200 billion barrels, would go to foreign companies”. (Hassan Tahsin, *Arab News*)

The reference to a legal document (or even to its draft) ensures more solid grounds for the claim, as testimony is widely recognized as very effective and represents “safe and sound” lines of arguments which the audience are given the opportunity to check upon.

7. 4. 2. Strategic maneuvering in the American corpus

7.4.2.1. The lines of argument

This section presents the results of the constructions of the lines of arguments analysis. Data was examined to identify the main arguments advanced in relation to the most important disagreement space (within which up to $\frac{3}{4}$ of the discussions were held). This disagreement space is mainly deliberative, as it involves negotiating decisions about actions and policies to take in Iraq. The following table presents a list of the most frequent arguments, or also referred to as claims, in the American discussions. These are listed from highest to lowest and grouped under main or sub-claims.

Main claim	Sub-claim	<i>loci communes</i>
There is progress	The is a difference (past/present) Security plan is efficient	Circumstances/ fact Testimony Analogy The good
There is a mission to accomplish	Security is a priority The US is responsible for Political reconciliation in Iraq The US forces are rebuilding Iraq	Advantageous The good
Withdrawal is a mistake	It means defeat It will produce catastrophes It emboldens enemies/means their victory Allies feel abandoned	Relationship Circumstances disadvantageous
Terrorism is still a threat	Al Qaeda is the major enemy Al Qaeda provokes civil war	Relationship Circumstance
Arabs are an obstacle to victory	They are socially degraded	Circumstances/facts
plan needs more troops	Troop size is key to success	relationship
The war is over	The US has no roles any more Bush misleads the people/incompetent Parties play political games over Iraq	Relationship

Table 7.9. Main arguments advanced in the American discussions (argumentation stage)

As indicated in Table 7.9, there are around seven recurrent arguments across the corpus supporting different standpoints related to the topic of withdrawal. Arguments defending the decision of the Bush administration on staying in Iraq and carrying on the military plan initiated by General Petraeus in the beginning of year 2007 come first on

this list. Those arguments listed towards the end belong to the positions calling for withdrawal. Despite the existence of opposite positions in this list, the arguments turn out to be connected with a common notion: victory. Achieving victory seems to be the overarching purpose of the political deliberation on policy decisions. Indeed, this goal turns out to be the most recurrent implicit premise reconstructed along the corpora. To illustrate this finding, two examples from different positions on troops' withdrawal are discussed below. Example (25) is part of a discussion in which O'Hanlon and Pollack argue against withdrawal by advancing a main claim asserting the effectiveness of Petraeus security plan. They advance a series of arguments, among which the claim that terrorists were eradicated from big cities in Iraq, which they support by means of two types of *loci*, that of comparison, and of circumstances.

- (25) Just a few months ago, American marines were fighting for every yard of Ramadi; last week we strolled down its streets without body armor. (O'Hanlon and Pollack, *New York Times*)

By linking the past fact to the present situation (circumstances) through comparison, the arguers locate their claim within the "possible", namely success. The "possible" is a *locus* related to the deliberative kind of speech concerned with demonstrating the viability of a state of affair which leads to perceiving the advantages of the proposal. What is implicitly premised as the possible, here and in many similar arguments is unmistakably success.

A significant number of opposite positions, namely those calling for ending the war are also premised with the implicit assumption of achieving success. In example (26), the arguers put forward a critical view to the Bush administration and its decision to stay the course in Iraq. The reconstruction of the argument made it possible to add the unexpressed premise to the conclusion that there is no progress. This premise is "if there is no progress, there is no success".

- (26) (...) little was done to rebuild the city. Instead, the leading parties maintained their predatory practices, scrambling to take advantage of available public resources, contracts, or jobs. (...) The public sector as a whole is rife with corruption -- instance of mammoth-sized projects that have delivered virtually

nothing are legion -- malfeasance and partisan hiring. (Malley & Harling, *Boston Globe*)

Through the description of the conditions of the Iraqi political culture, the arguers in the above example, attempt to transfer the acceptability of their claim by means of the *locus* of precedent/consequence, in which the “consequence” is the conclusion to the argument, namely the military plan failure. Hence the arguments against Bush policies also premise their conclusions on a presumed victory, which is in case it is not attained the call to withdrawal is due. The unexpressed premise in this reasoning (syllogistic in its essence) is the assumption that the US is in Iraq to achieve success. Indeed, all the op-ed pieces in the corpus calling for withdrawal do not put into question the ethical principles of waging a war. The US integrity on this matter is presumed, and no premise could be reconstructed as hinting at the immorality of occupation. They all presume that fighting is meant to accomplish a mission and that victory is the ultimate goal to achieve it. The notion of victory representing the most recurring unexpressed premise in this corpus seems to be the goal most shared by these foreign policy experts. The widely shared premise may also be interpreted as a distinctive component in this group shared cognition. The mental models from which they probably build their argumentation draw on success as a goal set by the axioms of war to become also the main goal in the communicative exchange in which they engage.

Now, close attention is paid to the top three arguments found in more than 2/3 of the American corpus where findings displayed in Table 7.10 show the high level of argument constructions using the *loci* of circumstances and relationship. In spite of the fact that in the third most frequent argument there is a considerable use of testimony mainly by reference to witnesses on the battlefield, the use of this *locus* happens to be relatively low. The *locus* of testimony includes resorting to authority and witnesses among other testifying instruments. But the arguers here perhaps find their own authority and expertise to be sufficient certifying means for their argument and do not need hence to have recourse to testimony to locate their arguments. Most arguments, indeed, are located by means of circumstances, mainly “facts” from the on-going political scenes negotiating the Iraq fate and by the *locus* of relationship, either by establishing the consequence from some antecedent or the effect from a certain cause.

Sub-standpoint/ Argument	<i>Loci communes</i>				
	Circumstances	Relation	Testimony	Analogy	Definition
There is progress	67	70	10	6.6	0
US has a duty in Iraq	16.6	77	6.6	0	0
Withdrawal is a mistake	43	60	30	3.3	3.3

Table 7.10. Top 3 standpoints or main arguments in the American corpus

The use of some specific *locus* powerfully indicates the kind of function to be attained by the argumentative move. Indeed, the extensive use of arguments schemes based on relationship and circumstances may denote the American arguers' keenness on pragmatic arguments (see Perelman & Tyteca Olbrecht, 1969: 18). Pragmatic arguments are practical in orientation, justifying actions that are thought to facilitate the achievement of goals, hence they are mainly decision-oriented whether deliberative or normative (legal). This is the kind of argument scheme used by the great majority of opened pieces in this corpus. The *loci* they employ emphasize a logical reasoning and generate pragmatic arguments which are not only decision-oriented but also benefit-directed.

The following sub-section presents results from the categorization of arguments based on their constructions and the functions they perform. Based on the above reported and discussed results on how arguments were constructed, the strategic maneuvers performed by the American arguers in the argumentation stages of their discussion were then identified.

The irreparable and the gain-loss maneuvers

The main *loci communes* used in the corpora, namely those of circumstances and relationship, were categorized according to the functions they performed in relation to the main standpoints. This operation revealed the higher-level *loci* by which the arguments were interconnected. The overall argumentation constructions in this critical stage seem to gear in most part the maneuvering strategies of the American arguers in

the corpus. Indeed, arguers maneuver strategically at the level of topical potential by either connecting their arguments by the *locus* of the irreparable or by framing them in terms of gains or losses.

The nearly 75% of the op-ed pieces advancing a call to take action in respect to Iraq (see results in Chapter 6, Table 6.1) construct pragmatic-based arguments which are benefit-oriented. Most of these benefit-oriented arguments, which are arguments “seeking to motivate the acquisition of a belief because of the benefits possibly generated by holding that belief” (Jordan, 2006: 93), maintain that the actions proposed are profitable. Their assumptions on benefit take two different paths. First, the path most pursued is the *locus* of the irreparable with up to 40% of the arguments structured on the irreversible character of some aim to be achieved. The second, established in more than 1/3 of the corpus, chooses to maneuver by framing the benefits as achieving gains or as avoiding losses. Table 7.11 displays findings on the distribution of these strategies within the American corpus. It specifies the loci most frequently exploited the maneuvers they signal and the general goal they leave evidence of.

<i>Loci communes</i>	Maneuvers	Goals	%
Circumstances/ Relationship	The irreparable	Plea for action	40
	Gain-loss	Plea for action	36.6
Testimony	Certification	Legitimizing	13.3
Others (analogy, definition, etc.)	Various	Prediction/self exoneration	10

Table 7.11. Strategic maneuvers indicated by the *loci communes* and the goals they signal in the American corpus

The table shows a clear trend in the American corpus in the strategic maneuvers employed in the argumentative stages. More than 75% of the op-ed pieces are directed to the pursuit of political action and seek to influence the audience’ reflection over the most convenient policy in Iraq. To achieve this goal, a sizeable number of maneuvers in the argumentative stages exploit the *locus* of the irreparable, or the “preferable” as

referred to by Perleman and Tyteca-Olbrecht (1969). This strategy establishes a situation or a state of affair as having a greater value than something else. Indeed, there are a number of issues qualified as valuable and irreparable across the data and these are primarily security, victory and glory.

Security is qualified in some op-ed pieces as irreparable by calling attention to its threats. Security threats such as terrorism and enemies play an essential role in making the action proposed necessary and urgent. In fact, establishing security in Iraq and the Middle East is understood to be one of the main goals to achieve from the war on terror declared in 2002 by the Bush Administration. The policies are set to accomplish a mission which should bring about security for Americans, their allies or probably the whole world, according to this framing. In example (27) below, think tank Kimberly Kagan describes the progress accomplished in Iraq and the “clearing” carried out in its different regions in order to secure it. Despite that the security mentioned here is established in Iraq, the reference is to signify security for troops and hence also for Americans.

- (27) For the first time, U.S. forces are working systematically throughout central Iraq to secure Baghdad by clearing its rural "belts" and its interior, so that the enemy cannot move from one safe haven to another. (Kimberly Kagan, *Wall Street Journal*)

Establishing security in Iraq means defeating the enemy and succeeding in beating and eliminating Islamic terrorists, being a major threat to the US since 9/11. Indeed, since the terrorist attack in the US, Americans have considered their security endangered by the threat of terrorism, which succeeded in reaching the shores of their country and in spreading fear among them. Whether in the War on Terror Campaign (initiated right after 9/11) or in the Operation Iraqi Freedom (dubbed by the US during the invasion in 2003) extensive political discourse made national security an imperative in foreign policy and the protection of Americans has become one of the most important aims. Security is made even more invaluable as threatened and made vulnerable by terrorism. This heightened value is made prominent by the locus of the irreparable, which use calls attention to the unique and precarious nature of some object or state of affairs, and

stresses the timeliness of our relationship to it” (Cox, 1982: 229). In this respect, the threatened security becomes irreplaceable and so the actions that should be taken to protect it.

The quest to victory is an essential premise in most of the arguments structures across the corpus. Argumentation is located from the principle of victory as the expected outcome of war. Victory is very often represented as irreparable by making its achievement conditioned by the opportune actions to be taken. By using this locus, the arguers place value on the timeliness of the relationship to it (Cox, 1982) and point to success as irrecoverable if fight were abandoned. Indeed, some of the arguers calling to stay the course in Iraq and urging to give General Petraeus the chance to continue his newly implemented security plan advance the claims on the urgency of sending more troops and not surrendering to the enemies and the threat. Values like courage, honor and humanity are drawn upon to emphasize the urgency to act to achieve success. Withdrawal for many arguers is unacceptable and is equated with surrender and defeat. In example (28), Joe Lieberman forwards a main standpoint in which he asserts that there is only one choice in Iraq. This choice is to keep fighting in order to succeed. He attempts to challenge his opponents claiming that the US should retreat from the Iraq Civil war and insists on the necessity to persevere with the fight against terrorism mission. Reminding the audience of the initial goal of the war is meant to redirect their attention to the need for victory

- (28) Just as Petraeus and his troops are working to empower and unite Iraqi moderates by establishing basic security, al-Qaeda is trying to divide and conquer with spectacular acts of butchery. That is why the suggestion that we can fight al-Qaeda but stay out of Iraq's "civil war" is specious, since the very crux of al-Qaeda's strategy in Iraq has been to try to provoke civil war. (Joseph Lieberman, *Washington Post*)

Another concept characterized as irreparable in the corpus is that of glory. In both an implicit and an explicit mode, this notion is placed in the heart of the reasons why certain actions should be taken. The *locus* of the irreparable in the notion of glory allows the military and political actions to derive their eligibility and to center the focus

on the “mission” to accomplish to preserve glory. Indeed, having a mission to complete activates a series of values which are at the core of the US foreign policy agenda (See Chapter 5, section 5. 4. 2. 1). These values are the US international leadership and its responsibility for promoting its more important political values, namely freedom and democracy, for the benefit of Americans and the international community (US Department mission statement 2007). Leadership and global governance represent qualities that are unique to the US. This uniqueness needs to be preserved and maintained while the US is facing the challenge of failure and the persistence of violence in Iraq. Bob Kerrey in example (29) below argues for the necessity to keep fighting by refuting his opponents’ criticism to carrying on a failing war. He attempts to knock down the claim that invading Iraq has led to more terrorism by maneuvering with the assumption on the US mission to spread democracies around the world.

- (29) Those who argue that radical Islamic terrorism has arrived in Iraq because of the U.S.-led invasion are right. But they are right because radical Islam opposes democracy in Iraq. If our purpose had been to substitute a dictator who was more cooperative and supportive of the West, these groups wouldn't have lasted a week. (Bob Kerrey, *Wall Street Journal*)

By this maneuver, the US role as a global leader is highlighted. The actions of enemies are juxtaposed with the US values while the audience is implicitly reminded of the unique and privileged role of the US in leading on such crucial issues as intervening in troubled states, removing dictators, establishing others or promoting democracy instead. The nobleness of the US intentions, it seems, made it choose a harder path instead for opting for sustaining a dictator, Kerrey claims. This, thus, makes leadership and all the related political values as irreparable, as requiring the urgent and efficient action to preserve them and to maintain them. Glory is presumed by arguers whether calling to stay or leave Iraq and the “noble goal of advancing a future of freedom, security, and prosperity for the benefit of the American people and the entire world” (US Department of State 2007: 4) seems to be a common irreparable *locus* in proposals for saving Iraq from disaster.

As far as the gain-loss framing, the maneuvers exploited in around 36.6% of the corpus draw on one of two scenarios which either highlights the positive (gains) or negative (losses) aspects of the issue. The first scenario invites the audience to contemplate the gains accomplished from the policy initiated by Petraeus. They emphasize the outstanding quality of the new commander in chief and his team and the efficiency of his plans. Some also describe in detail the outcomes of these plans and their effects on the Iraqis as indicative of the payoff for the effort made. Example (30) illustrates this kind of framing in which Mr. Yon enumerates the gains while calling audience to wait for Petraeus final report due in September 2007.

- (30) I, like everyone else, will have to wait for September's report from Gen. Petraeus before making more definitive judgments. But I know for certain that three things are different in Iraq now from any other time I've seen it. (Michael Yon, *Daily News*)

The arguer, then, develops this standpoint into three sub-points each devoted to one of the gains mentioned to suggest to the audience that success and benefit are approaching and that abstaining from calling to withdrawal would compensate all the waiting they would have to endure. The second scenario, on the other hand, brings the audience to think about the consequences of not making the right decision. This framing emphasizes the losses to be suffered if the proposed action is not taken. Arguers using this kind of frame attempt either to persuade the audience that staying has the momentous benefit of avoiding losses or dissuade them to adhere with the withdrawal decision. In both cases, the drastic losses are at the heart of the arguments and most moves are maneuvered around warning from the disaster (as opposed to listing the gains). The extract from Scowcroft's op-ed pieces, example (31), indicates a strategic maneuvering by loss framing.

- (31) An American withdrawal (...) would be a strategic defeat for American interests, with potentially catastrophic consequences both in the region and beyond. Our opponents would be hugely emboldened, our friends deeply demoralized. (Brent Scowcroft, *New York Times*)

The arguer's argumentation schemes, which follow his standpoint, are built, as one may observe, from the structure of the standpoint itself on a loss framing, by warning Americans from the damage to be suffered in case withdrawal is undertaken. In psychology, choosing gain-loss strategies for persuasion has a framing effect (See Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & Fredericks, 2002) that contributes to cognitive bias. This effect probably affects the processing of the op-ed opinion and its results in public opinion change. But what is mainly important here is that this widely adopted strategy in the corpus leads to the reflection on the role of emotional appeals in political discourse in general and mainly the function performed by the use of fear by US politicians in promoting their foreign policy campaign (see McMahon, forthcoming).

The remaining part of the corpus (23.3%) contained a variety of *loci* which indicated different types of strategic maneuvers and different ideological goals. Almost half of this part features the *locus* of testimony (in 13.3%) which employs arguments from authority or facts relying on documents. These lines of arguments were hence categorized as maneuvers by certification. Most of these strategies were, indeed, used for legitimation purposes mainly in cases rejecting some opponents' arguments about the legitimacy of some policy actions or behavior. These maneuverings are typically generated within judicial or epideictic kinds of argumentation, where the arguers engage in defending a (past or present) action in order to acquit or legitimize it. Columnist Parker, for instance, in example (32) refutes her opponents' claim that some US soldiers acted brutally in Iraq. She contends that soldiers should not be blamed for killing while they endure the stress of dealing with terrorists

- (32) But did the Marines kill in cold blood? (...) quoting the late Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Jr. who served as an infantryman in the Civil War and described war as an "incommunicable experience" (...) second-guessing how Marines should act under hostile fire before the facts are known is not only unfair, but dishonors the immense courage required to survive in the midst of such an incommunicable experience. (Kathleen Parker, *Chicago Tribune*)

By means of certification and some other means of locating arguments arguers attempt to license policies adopted in Iraq and defend their integrity. Other lines of arguments

with lower frequency were identified in some op-ed pieces located through a number of loci, namely, analogy, definition, etc, to perform various strategies, namely self-exoneration (exonerate themselves or whom they defend from charges or blame) and predictions (simply forecast the outcomes of some political action and with no any directive force in argumentation).

7.4.2.2. *Topoi* or building the arguments

The second dimension concerned with examining the construction of arguments in the current corpora is that of the *topoi*, the argument parts which play a “guarantee function” for arguments (De Pater 1968), as they provide arguers with the common ground needed to connect their premises with their conclusion or claim. The premises functioning as *topoi* in the American main arguments are reported in Table 7.12 below. These *topoi* are ranked based on their frequency throughout the corpus; hence the percentages may indicate the patterns of common grounds upon which these arguers attempt to guarantee their arguments.

<i>Topoi</i>	%
1. The US has a noble mission in Iraq	70
2. The US fights for its national security	56.6
3. The US is the greatest power on earth	40
4. Arabs are inept people (eg. See op-ed 15 “old rivalries”	23.3
5. Arabs (Iraqis) are violent (op-ed16 our troop in the middle of a fight between religious factions	23.3
6. Radical Islamists (started) declared the war on the US	20

Table 7.12 The top 6 *topoi* used in the American op-ed corpus

From the list of the top 6 *topoi* used in the American corpus, displayed in Table 7.12 above, one may observe that the *topoi* evolve around the attributes of either the US (as a nation at war) or Arabs (mostly as the object of war). The most frequent *topoi* or

premises used to justify arguments are based on the belief in the US integrity (70%), its right to self-defense (56.6%) and its grandiosity (40%). These premises are used both explicitly and implicitly. In the first case, the assumption on the war moral foundations is expressed in different ways, generally by linking the US “mission” to morally loaded lexis on American values namely, freedom, democracy, help, assist, rescue, protect (among others) all pointing to the belief in the humanitarian endeavor undertaken by the US in Iraq. In the second case, the implicit *topoi*, which sometimes rely on enthymemes (unexpressed premise, mainly in syllogism), are reconstructed from arguments based on premises describing the achievements of the US soldiers or praising their valor and accordingly hinting at the “noble” character of their mission. Example (33) illustrates an argument supported implicitly by the *topos* that the US is doing a humanitarian act in Iraq, namely that of liberating people from dictatorships and establishing democracy instead. Ralph Peters in this extract argues that Iraqis did not appreciate the opportunity offered to them and they opted for violence. The argument is also supported by the *topos* that Arabs are inept to embrace modernity and basic human values.

- (33) Yet, for all our errors, we did give the Iraqis a unique chance to build a rule-of-law democracy. They preferred to indulge in old hatreds, confessional violence, ethnic bigotry and a culture of corruption. It appears that the cynics were right: Arab societies can't support democracy as we know it. And people get the government they deserve. (Ralph Peters, *USA Today*)

This *topos*, as is the case for all the remaining *topoi*, is typically used as a premise to support a certain claim, most of them go about legitimizing not only the war itself (assumed in those cases as inevitable), but the decision to stay in Iraq after four years of invasion. They are used also to fight against any decision of withdrawal which is seen as a harmful move for the US interests in the Middle East and as a world leader in general.

7. 4. 3. Strategic maneuvering in the Arab corpus

7.4.3.1. The lines of argument

Strategic maneuvers performed in the Arab corpus indicate a certain pattern which is definitely different from that of the American corpus' strategies. The same analytic procedures were applied, namely reconstructing the argumentative structures supporting the main standpoints and grouping them into their relevant disagreement spaces. The most frequent positions advanced in 70% of the corpus revolve around two disagreement spaces (see Chapter 6, Table 6.2), that of the US accountability and that of its agenda in Iraq. These disagreement spaces are mainly epideictic and also judicial, as they involve criticizing opponents' actions and point to their violations. The following table presents a list of the most frequent arguments, or as also referred to as claims, in the Arab discussions. These are listed from highest to lowest and grouped under main or sub-claims.

Main claim	Sub-claim	<i>loci communes</i>
The Us is responsible for the disaster	The war mismanagement caused the carnage in Iraq The US forces provoked civil war The US does not do anything to save Iraqis The US forces commit crimes against civilians The Bush administration is criminal	Testimony Definition Circumstances/facts
The US has hidden agenda in Iraq	Bush administration has imperialistic plans The US invaded Iraq for oil The US is not going to retreat from Iraq The US strategies are to control and not to protect	Testimony Definition facts
There are alternative solutions to save Iraq	Americans can act to save Iraqis and rectify the mistake The UN has to assist in ending the war.	Testimony Relationship (cause effect)
Iraq is heading towards catastrophe	The situation is grave The current strategy is going to fail	Facts Predictions

Table 7.13. Main arguments advanced in the Arab argumentation stage discussions

Table 7.13 indicates the different and most recurring arguments supporting the main standpoints related to four main topics across the Arab op-ed corpus. These arguments have been developed by a variety of *loci communes*, with a clear inclination towards testimony and definition. Indeed, the two most recurring groups of arguments were essentially premised by arguments from authority or documents and by definitions. Building a line of argument based on definition involves “inviting one to consider the larger group to which something belongs, often as a way of referring to the similarities or differences it has with other members of that group” (Rhetoricae, 2003). Both types of *loci* have been mainly exploited in the context of the arguers objecting to some opponents’ claims or those pleading that the US is imperialistic. In the case of arguments constructed from an objection-based standpoint, the lines of argument pursue a general strategy of *apodioxis* by which the arguer rejects an opponent’s claim as “being impertinent, needless, absurd or false” (Rhetoricae, 2003). In the case of the conjectures, the lines of arguments are developed from accusations and attempts to expose the “real” nature of the US policies. As indicated in Table 7.14 below, the three most recurring arguments in the corpus basically show that arguers draw on the most qualifying types of evidence, testimony, in locating the evidence for their claims, with up to 80% of the cases in the arguments involving accusations to G. W. Bush of abusive actions and goals in Iraq.

Sub-standpoint/ Argument	<i>Loci communes</i>				
	Testimony	Definition	Facts	Relation	Analogy
The US responsible for crimes	60	63	33	13.3	3.3
US has a hidden agenda	80	50	42	16.6	6.6
There is a disaster	70	46.6	53.3	30	10

Table 7.14 Top three standpoints or main arguments in the Arab corpus

Furthermore, there is an extensive use of the *locus* of definitions to refute opponents’ arguments on crimes and to redefine them in their own way. The arguments seem to be driven by the goal to challenge the established truths and attempt to either prove them wrong or to redefine them. A high number of arguers also turn to the locus of circumstances, more specifically drawing on standard news coverage taken from. To

support these goals, arguers in the Arab corpus seem to choose from two paths when constructing their lines of arguments: the first is certification realized by means of testimony and the second is reframing, assisted by the *locus* of definition. Certification and reframing turn out to be the main strategic maneuvers opted for in this corpus.

Strategically maneuvering by certification

Most Arab arguers in our corpus maneuver strategically at the level of topical potential by certification. This means that the arguments take as warranty accredited sources which may be examined and verified by the audience. The arguers advance a variety of arguments and premise them with some certified medium, such as authority, witnesses or some credited sources like legal or official documents. The maneuver by certification is made strategic by using testimony from American or internationally recognized sources. This strategy is maneuvered at the level of audience adaptation by citing the kinds of sources they more probably give credence to. However, certification may also reveal a necessary maneuver for Arab arguers who have the challenge of voicing their accusations and pleas within a hard-to-reach international debate on such contested issue as the war in Iraq. Maneuvering by certified sources is probably a strategy adopted to enhance the chance of acceptance to their claims. Even more, premising their accusations of the US malevolence and imperialism from American sources seems to be the only feasible way to address international and mainly American audience for persuasion. In example (34), Mr. Baroud argues against the Bush administration claims of progress in Iraq, asserting that the American people are to pay a high price for the mismanaged war and reminding them that polls confirm his views on the inefficiency of the administration and the urgency to act against it.

- (34) (...) an Associated Press-Ipsos poll, conducted 9-11 July, 2007, shows that the American public approval of the Congress performance is as low as it was in June 2006 before Democrats took over both the House and the Senate. (Ramzy Baroud, *Arab News*)

The arguer uses a verifiable means of supporting his claim, namely one of the most prestigious and accredited American research companies: the Ipsos. Following the *locus* of the testimony in locating one's arguments represents a more efficient way for Arab arguers to support their claims which in some cases go against the mainstream elite opinion in the US. Promoting opinions against President Bush and his team for the purpose of influencing public opinion to remove him or even perhaps of bringing him to justice does not seem an easy mission mainly for a non-American and even more for an Arab. Opponents to Bush (at least in 2007) seemed to be content with merely calling to stop his mismanaged policies and asking him to retreat and no actual political impugnation was carried out by the opposition against him. Indeed, after President Bush announced his Surge strategy in January 2007, dubbed "The New Way Forward" and for which he asked the deployment of more soldiers and more funding, the decision was immediately challenged by Democrats who massively campaigned to gain public opinion against this decision. However, this opposition was identified by many critics to be simply a kind of political posturing, since no real measures (within the Democrats-majority Congress) were taken to prevent Bush from implementing his plans, but instead, he was allowed to put his policies to actions (See interview to Nancy Pelosi Speaker of the US House of Representatives in Sawyer 2007). Hence, in spite of the high unpopularity of Bush, the accusations advanced against him by the Arab op-ed authors may strike as being highly sharp or even ill-grounded for Americans, as they may seem to be an attack to the whole nation and its foreign policies. This is probably why the arguers strategically maneuver by certification from American sources, which may equally be considered topical potential maneuvering and maneuvering at the level of audience adaption, in order to nail down their claims and increase their positive reception.

The next example (35) is taken from an op-ed piece written by Hussein Shobokshi in which he harshly criticizes the occupation and the Bush administration policies in Iraq supported by the neoconservatives as he claims. He calls American people to rectify the mistake and save their country and values by acting against Bush. In the extract below, he supports this claim by drawing on the actions of an American politician and his threats to Bush.

- (35) Here is veteran Senator Chuck Hagel, of Nebraska, the heart of conservative America, strongly objected to President Bush's policy and in an unprecedented step warned the man, regardless of his position and background that if situations remained the same in Iraq, he would demand Congress remove the president from office. (Hussein Shobokshi, *Asharq Al Awsat*)

In similar cases, where the arguers advance accusations and blames against the American politicians and at the same time attempt to win the hearts of American audience and encourage them to change the course of action in Iraq, there is substantial use of certification. In the extract below (36), columnist Jihad El Khazen accuses President Bush of manipulating Americans and violating their basic rights for the sake of his imperialistic intentions. He highlights the violations perpetrated to Americans instead of spelling out, as most typically done, the atrocities committed in the battlefield by Bush's policies. Supporting the accusations of crime by these arguments developed from testimony may be considered an attempt the arguer makes in order to get his voice heard among American audience and possibly make some effect on their political decisions.

- (36) It [The Bush administration] pursues the politics of fear and warns the Americans of real and fabricated threats to hold up civil rights accumulated almost over two and a half centuries... Thus, we have seen the enactment of several laws such as the Patriot Act followed by the eavesdropping acts and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); all of which give the administration the right to disregard the laws and courts in watching the people of the United States and the suspects abroad, in addition to tapping the citizens' phones and scrutinizing their bank accounts. I have even read about an executive order issued on 17/7/2007 that 'blocks property of certain people who undermine efforts to promote economic reconstruction and political reform in Iraq'. I see in this order a breach of the first amendment of the Constitution and of the American's right to peaceful opposition and to the freedom of speech. (Jihad Al Khazen, *Dar Al Hayat*)

By this strategic maneuvering, performed through certification of an argument on Bush's fraud, the arguer adapts to the American audience for a double effect. The first is meant to convince the audience that the policies in Iraq are mostly damaging for them, hence raise their awareness on their own benefit from opposing to Bush. The second effect is using evidence from sources they identify with such as the acts of Congress (Patriot Act) which make the veracity of the claim authenticated.

Strategic maneuvering by reframing the argument

The second most exploited *locus* in developing the lines of arguments in the Arab corpus is definition. Arguments located by this kind of *locus* are in some cases generated from the refutation-based confrontation and in other cases advanced as a disclosure of some hidden fact. Indeed, in order to rebut their opponents' views, arguers generally attempt (with different means) to recreate the situation so as to change the perspective from which this should be regarded and prove the counter views wrong. By defining the views or actions of their opponents, they reinforce their own positions and make prominent by dissociating them from the refuted claims. As for arguments revealing hidden agendas and aiming at exposing the "real" intentions, arguers attempt to elucidate the actions of their opponents in a way that most possibly influences the inferences that the audience would make. The *locus* of definition plays an important role in both cases by producing a line of argument essentially maneuvered by a reframing strategy, which involves changing the frame of reference by looking at the situation from a different point of view.

Almost all the Arab arguers who advance objection-based standpoints have opponents from an American setting. These arguers engage in attacking the claims of some political decision makers so as to ascribe deceptiveness to them. Such standpoints typically follow a kind of argument scheme that involves exposing, determining and qualifying the ill-grounded nature of these claims. The following examples (37, 38, and 39) below listed, are extracted from arguments advanced by Mr. Agha in support of his objections to the Bush administration's declaration that the US seeks to establish peace in the Middle East through political actions. He calls ironically these actions "pax Americana", and develops argumentation to define this term.

(37) The killers of innocent people in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon can never be peace advocates. (Mohamed Agha, *Syria Times*)

(38) It is certain that when Bush talks about peace he means preparing for war. (Mohamed Agha, *Syria Times*)

(39) The recent tour of the Middle East by Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and their meetings with some Arab foreign ministers and leaders was part of the American policy which aims at deepening divisions and pouring more oil on the already troubled region (Mohamed Agha, *Syria Times*)

As the above mentioned examples indicate, the components of the arguments on “pax Americana” are developed from definition schemes. It seems that the arguer wants to assign a new meaning to this concept historically used in the post American civil war era and later in the 20th C post World Wars to designate the peace established among great powers. The stipulative definition, namely that of “assigning a new meaning to an old word” (Hurley, 2007: 87), certainly aims at challenging the established and widely accepted perception of American foreign policies. In example (37), the assertion is a premise created from definition by negation to support the argument that the American politicians are hypocrites. The assertion contains an implicit definition which comes in the form of presupposition (killers of innocent) to support the reframing effect strategically produced within this maneuver. In example (38), the arguer presents an interpretation of President Bush’s use of the term peace. He advances clarification of the intended meaning of peace by (re)defining it as a preparation for war. This is a strategic maneuver aiming at reframing the political tactics performed by Bush in order to expound them as false front. The maneuver consists in “shifting the issue away from its conventional ‘location’ within one set of shared assumptions and reconstruing it within a different set of knowledges (Macgilchrist, 2007: 80). Example (39) illustrates an argument built from the definition of the political acts performed by US politicians, Ms Rice and Mr. Gates, by identifying them as belonging to the American foreign policy in the region which he characterizes as oppressive. By means of this categorization, the arguer attempts to strategically reframe these politicians’ acts (traveling in the Middle East to call for peace) and induce the audience to filter their perceptions of them in different ways. Reframing consist essentially of “making some aspects of our multi-

dimensional reality more noticeable than other aspects (Kuypers, 2009: 181), and reflects a need to challenge the meaning established by the dominant ideology and to attempt to adjust it. Furthermore, these kinds of maneuvers respond to the arguer's aim to denounce and condemn and at the same time reveal the allegedly wicked intentions of their opponents, in most similar cases viewed as oppressors. Hence, in the next example, Nicola Nasser, advances his opinion on the Democrats' position on the Iraq war and their political campaign to end the war. Mr. Nasser argues that the Democrats' proposal, widely named "the alternative solution to the Iraq war", is a political ploy. He questions its claimed difference from the Republican position and attempts to redefine it for the audience as a "deceptive" political game.

- (40) Is this so-called alternative essentially different from the Republicans' strategy?
On the unity of Iraq, oil, long-term US military presence, civil war and the "benchmarks" set for the new Iraqi rulers both alternatives are essentially the same. (Nicola Nasser, *Yemen Observer*)

The assertion following the confrontational rhetorical question represents one of the main arguments supporting the main standpoint advanced by the arguer. This standpoint rests on the claim that both Republicans and Democrats are "playing American politics with Iraqi blood for oil". It is essentially sustained by definition-based lines of argumentation aimed at reframing the political posturing of supposedly "alternative" solution to the policies of the Bush team in Iraq and providing insight on its "actual" meaning and effect. The locus of definition is further supported by other loci, mainly by circumstances (facts), so as to reinforce the claim with more powerful premises. Definitions play the role of redirecting the audience attention to the categories under which the denounced actions should be classified. The arguer seems to exploit the strategic maneuver to support his accusations by assisting the audience in categorizing the acts of the Democratic politicians and in characterizing them as malevolent and as equally harmful for the Iraqi people as the Republicans' endorsed policies.

7.4.3.2. *Topoi* in the Arab data corpus

A closer look at the reconstructed structures of the main and sub standpoints in the current corpus revealed the kinds of premises most frequently utilized and adopted as

proofs in support of the conclusions drawn as claims. Table 7.15 displays the frequency of the seven most recurring premises identified as *topoi* in the corpus. The propositions focus on the US and possibly indicate the kinds of the socially shared beliefs drawn upon in discussions on Iraq or international politics in general. Next, some examples from the top 5 *topoi* are discussed.

Topic content	%
1. The US is responsible for the massacres in Iraq	63.3
2. The US is imperialistic	56.6
3. The war is illegitimate and based on lies	15
4. The US forces (intentionally) provoked Sectarianism	13
5. The US acts for Israelis and their interests in the Middle East	12
6. The US destroyed the Iraqi social fabric	9
7. The American are naïve and ignorant	2

Table 7.15. Top 7 *topoi* in the Arab data corpus.

As indicated in Table 7.15, *Topos* number one, the most frequently employed premise to support the conclusions of the claims, points to the belief in the US responsibility for the massacres in Iraq, based on the “truth” proposition (from a syllogistic argument) that “invaders and colonizers are responsible for war crime”. The premise, occurring in 63.3% of the corpus, may overlap with other *topoi* (4, 6 and 7), as it covers in fact a number of related (propositions) beliefs on the US mischievous actions/plans in Iraq and in the Middle East in general. These beliefs which are widely shared in the Arab societies and even considered as uncontested facts have typically depicted the US international policies as ruthless and ambitious and aimed at securing its control-related interests. For more than a decade and with the US involvement in the Middle East issues, the country has been awed and hated for its role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Gulf war and for its invasion to Iraq. The other *topoi* overlapping with *Topos* 1 postulate similar “truths” which may, in most cases, be identified as sub-types, as they conceive the US foreign policies in the same manner as being untrustworthy and abusive. In example (41), *topos* 1 is used to support the refutation-based claim that withdrawal from Iraq will not cause a massacre.

- (41) A million Iraqi have been killed because of war, either directly or because of the war. The American withdrawal cannot lead to the massacre of such a number of people or more. The warning of genocide is part of the frightening policy pursued by the Bush administration. (Jihad Al Khazen, *Dar Al Hayat*)

The extract illustrates more than one argument, as after advancing the main standpoint (a refutation of a warning of genocide issue by Bush) a supporting sub argument is advanced claiming that Bush's warning is just a manipulative political strategy. The premise that the war is guilty of the killing presumes that the US invasion and occupation is responsible for the crimes but does not say so explicitly. The arguer seems to refrain from stating agency and from being explicit about his accusation to the US by makes use of the word war. This can be interpreted as a strategic move of caution, given that his targeted audiences are American people whom he assigns the role of judge and strategically maneuver all over the discussion to adapt to their values and appeal to their ethical judgments. Despite his recourse to the negative ready-mades on American, the arguer, as many others seems to run an overall strategy as attempt to bring Bush to charge and to hold him responsible for war crimes through the mediation of his compatriots.

The same *topos* has equally served as support of some prominent maneuvering strategies. The maneuvering realized at the level of presentational devices in the following example relies on the support of *topos* 1 reconstructed as an unexpressed premise.

- (42) It is estimated that some 5000 car bombs have so far been used (...) all this happens and we are under the custody of the world's mightiest power which still has to boost its troops in order to pacify Baghdad which it occupied four year ago. (Akram Abdulrazzaq, *Azzaman*)

This is a sub-argument supporting a main standpoint asserting that the US security plan is a fake plan. The arguer maneuvers using sarcasm and the implicit proposition that "the US is implicated in the killing of Iraqis". The ironic being-under-the-custody-of-the-mightiest move indicates an underlying proposition postulating that the US *has* actual control over the situation and terrorism would not be possible to take place without its permission.

Topos 5, the belief that the US foreign policies are imperialistic is generally regarded as common ground in Arab societies. Such premise includes assumptions that the US maintains aggressive behavior against small nations and attempts to control their resources for its own benefits. This *topos* found in 56.6% was generally made explicit and in some few cases reconstructed from unexpressed premises. Propositions referring to oil, control and the US bilateral relations with some states such as Iran, Syria, Russia and China hint at the common beliefs on the US pursuit of global hegemony and strategic control. The argument in the following example is supported by this *topos*.

- (43) Although Washington will never admit it, its troops are in Iraq because of oil. Oil is at the heart of the political and social struggles across the region. Iraq has the world's second largest oil reserves, which is why the Americans keep pushing Nuri Al-Maliki's government to pass a new oil law. (Galal Nassar, *Al Ahram*)

The second and third propositions in the above example, identified as the supporting premises for the claim that the troops are in Iraq for oil, show a common employed “fact” to explain the reason for the US intervention in Iraq. This belief goes against all the reasons presented by the US foreign policy makers for their martial endeavour. It clashes ideologically with all the postulates of humanitarian mission and is even at odds with the fight against terrorism.

The next *topos* concerns the belief that sectarianism is a US-made phenomenon in Iraq. This belief underlies and supports most of the claims on the US guilt of war crime and is also used by those arguers calling the international community’s attention to the US hidden agenda in Iraq. Very frequently, the arguers refer to the US forces actions or to Paul Bremer’s reconstruction plan as an indication of the US hand in terrorism. Presidential Envoy to Iraq Bremer started a policy, infamously dubbed in the Arab media as the “ratio system”, that consisted of dissolving Iraq’s military and security structures and rebuilding them on ethnic-sectarian basis. This was widely accused of not only causing the dismantlement of the state and its capacity for national self-defense, but more importantly of initiating a political process based on sectarianism. The rise of violence and sectarian conflicts in 2006 and the belief (internationally shared world over) that Iraq was in a state of civil war was typically rejected based on the conviction

that sectarianism was caused by the US reconstruction plan led by Mr. Bremer and designed by the US government. Below, example (44) illustrates this *topos*.

- (44) The outbreak of sectarian strife in Iraq would give the occupation authorities more options and time. Civil war is what the occupation authorities and local collaborators want. (Mohammad H. Al Khalesi, *Al Ahram*)

The extract is taken from an op-ed piece that keeps using this premise with the same exact wording to back up his claims coordinated in support of the main standpoint warning the international community (audience) that terrorism is provoked by the US as part of war strategy and apparently for some strategic reason. The two propositions could be easily reconstructed as implicitly linked by “because” as an indicator of consequence and also of the relationship established between the premise and the conclusion. The same accusation of guilt directed to the US may be appreciated in the following example as built on the same *topos*.

- (45) The Iraqis should have realized that the American way of bulldozing the past entirely was not just a tactical error but a crime against Iraq and its people.

Finally, and occupying the 5th position among the most commonly used *topoi* is the belief in the US policies’ link with the Israeli interests in the region. This is by far the most established consensus among the Arab public opinion consisting of the belief in the power exerted by the pro-Israeli lobbies (see Anwar, 1998; Gustafson, 2005) in shaping foreign policy decisions in the Middle East. Indeed, studies show that around 75% of Arabs across different states believe that the protection of Israel’s interests is number one US objectives in the Middle East, while more than 80% think it is the control of oil resources (See Telhami, 2006). Pointing to Israel as an instigator of the US policies in Iraq is illustrated in the next example:

- (46) Surely, Mr. Bush is not hoping that the excessive use of the term "cold blooded" killers would be sufficient enough to exonerate him or his Israeli friends for all the thousands of civilians, who have lost their lives "for the love of Israel" over the years that Mr. Bush has vowed to carry out his evangelical mission to enrich

Raytheon and the other weapons manufacturers within the American military industrial complex and to ensure the fulfillment of Eretz Israel as Zionist demagogues envision it to be. (Hassan Al Haifi, *Yemen Times*)

This quite lengthy argument is brought here to illustrate more than the Israel-link-with-the-US-policies *topos*. The premises building up the argument may be reconstructed as beliefs linked to *topos* 1 (US responsible of war crime), *topos* 2 (US imperialistic ambitions) and *topos* 3 (illegitimacy of the Iraq war). The argument is put forward to refute and condemn Bush's reference to "freedom fighters" according to the arguers as "cold blooded killers" and accuse him (making careful reference always to him as a person) not as a US national. Accusing him to plot in the Middle East for the benefit of Israel and some US companies presuming the war has illegitimate foundations and no other reason than imperialistic and hegemonic purposes.

7.4. 4. Strategic maneuvering with presentational devices

The analysis of the maneuvers strategically performed at the level of presentational devices in the argumentative stages of the two data corpora gave way to the identification of a variety of rhetorical strategies and figures which may possibly indicate the ideologically biased experts' cognitions, namely their different aims and their roles as participants in the debate influenced by their power positions in the international arena in regards to the Iraq warfare. The presentational devices were classified in two categories: 1) development and arrangement, enclosing the devices employed to build up the reasoning process (*logos*), 2) form and effect, related to the way ideas are presented and includes schemes, tropes and figures of *pathos*. In the first category explored, strategic moves in the two corpora were maneuvered by a large variety of rhetorical figures especially those of opposition, division and including modes of discourses such as definition and narrative. The figures most frequently employed in the argumentation stages are illustrated in the next graph in which the two corpora strategic maneuvers are contrasted.




Figure 7.4. Contrasting the American and Arab arguers' use of presentational devices

The graph highlights the differences between the two groups of arguers' uses of figures and indicates the reasoning figures mostly exploited, namely those of opposition (*contrarium*) and those related to *commonplaces* (vituperation). The results show that American arguers mainly draw on 7 rhetorical figures of arrangement headed by *contrarium*, while Arab arguers mainly make use of 6 figures and focus on vituperation as “a composition expository of attendant evils” (Rhetoricae, 2003), hence bring into play figures related to divisions, comparison and the discourse mode of definition.

As for the presentational maneuvers performed at the level of form and effect, the two corpora draw on a variety of rhetorical resources in order to increase the persuasive effect of their claims and make extensive use of tropes and schemes. Tropes, or the “artful deviation from the ordinary or principal signification of a word” (Rhetoricae 2003), are exploited in around 64% of the American op-ed argumentative stages and in 73% of the Arab ones. These tropes range from changing the reference of one thing to another, such as in metaphor, to wordplay, substitutions and semantic inversions, such as rhetorical questions. The use of rhetorical schemes is equally significant in the two corpora. Indeed, the schemes, or the “artful deviation from the ordinary arrangement of words” (Rhetoricae, 2003), most frequently employed in the maneuvers of both groups

of arguers are figures of balance, figures of repetition and figures of pathos. The two categories of arrangement and form that enable the strategic maneuvers performed in the argumentation stages are further explored and discussed below of each of the two op-ed corpora.

7. 4. 4. 1. Arrangement and form strategies in the American corpus

The American arguers in the op-ed corpus highly rely on the figure of *contrarium* also known as *antitheton*, which consists of juxtaposing opposing statements in such a way as to prove the one from the other (Rhetoricae, 2003). Indeed, around 80% of the arguments are maneuvered by this figure which turns out to be closely related to the *locus* of relationship. Relationship, the *locus* most frequently used by these arguers, strategically brings into play the polarization highlighted in their confrontations and assists the maneuvers realized by the *locus* of the irreparable or the gain- loss frames.

The American arguers' extensive use of *contrarium* may indicate their keenness to make prominent their own proposal by contrasting it with an opposite course of action. For instance, their defense of staying the course in Iraq is systematically juxtaposed with its antithesis, withdrawal. The antithesis is generally framed by means of counterfactuals to highlight a vulnerable scenario that would put American interests at risk. This rhetorical strategy is mainly applied in the gain-loss maneuverings, not only in the cases where the losses are made prominent, but also in those framed by gains. Furthermore, the power of *contrarium* lies in bringing together opposite values, such as bravery against cowardice or efficiency against incompetence. There is a significant use of *contrarium* in arguments against troops' withdrawal where the representation of the enemy as an incarnation of evil is juxtaposed with the soldiers and their commander in chief Petraeus' demonstration of courage and efficiency. Example (47) illustrates a very frequent move strategically maneuvered with *contrarium*. Tony Snow argues that Al Qaeda is still a major threat and sets its brutal actions and intentions (hence values) against the American noble actions and goals in Iraq which may implicitly be inferred from the use of "inspired Iraqis".

- (47) Al-Qaeda doesn't have the strength it had six years ago, but it remains committed to killing Americans. It also wants to find a safe haven, (...). It wants to topple Iraq's emerging democracy and establish a base of operations in a land with vast oil reserves. More than anything, al-Qaeda wants the United States to leave Iraq and hand victory to the terrorists. But it will not succeed. Recent military action has inflicted serious damage on al-Qaeda in Iraq and has inspired a growing number of Iraqis to fight al-Qaeda. (Tony Snow, *USA Today*)

The passage displays a general rhetorical strategy based on opposition where the evil actions of the enemy are juxtaposed with the US military successful accomplishments. This rhetorical arrangement is reinforced by the use of figures of balance, namely *antithesis*, in the first proposition, and *climax* in the following statements enumerating Al Qaeda's intentions. By disposing the enemy's actions in an order of increasing gravity, the arguer underpins the antagonism between "them" and "us" implicitly invoking opposing values and natures and strengthens hence his argument on the US obligation to continue the fight.

Other cases using figures of opposition are manifest in arguments based on *syncrisis* that consists, similar to *contrarium*, in comparing and contrasting two entities, but in parallel clauses or structures. The arguers maneuver with this figure (identified in around the ¼ of the corpus) in contrasting past with the present situation Iraq to prove the change and progress achieved and to support their dissuasion to the decision of troops' withdrawal. In the next extract, example (48), columnist and think tank expert Michael Yon attempts to dissuade his audience from calling to withdrawal and to convince them of the efficiency of the new strategy put to work by Petraeus by correlating the past challenging conditions faced by the US forces with the present promising situation achieved by the Commander.

- (48) Al Qaeda is in Iraq, intentionally inflaming sectarian hostilities, deliberately pushing for full scale civil war. (...) As Al Qaeda is now being chased out of regions it once held without serious challenge, their tactics are tinged with desperation. (Michael Yon, *Daily News*)

These arguers also maneuver strategically with figures of definition and in equal percentage with *paromologia* (in almost 50% of the corpus). *Paromologia* consists of

admitting a weaker point in order to make a stronger one (Rhetoricae, 2003) and reinforces the adaptation-to-the audience level of strategic maneuvering by feigning humbleness. By means of this maneuver, the arguer attempts to put an argument into perspective by showing his/her awareness of the faults that may be attributed to it and make prominent its strength. The maneuver may enhance thus the arguers' credibility and the degree of their persuasiveness to the audience. In example (49), the argument is part of a discussion advanced by Bob Kerrey against some opponents' criticism to the US military intervention in Iraq. Kerrey invites the audience to reconsider the accusations of the Bush administration's mismanagement of the war by an argument strategically maneuvered by *paromologia*. He presupposes his admission of the mistakes and mismanagement of the war, to conclude that they are insignificant if judged against the danger of the enemy.

- (49) No matter how incompetent the Bush administration and no matter how poorly they chose their words to describe themselves and their political opponents, Iraq was a larger security risk after Sept 11 than it was before. And no matter how much we might want to turn the clock back and either avoid the invasion itself or the blunders that followed, we cannot. The war to overthrow Saddam Hussein is over. What remains is a war to overthrow the government of Iraq. (Bob Kerrey, *Wall Street Journal*)

Argumentation in the American op-ed is also maneuvered by other figures of reasoning such as *apophasis*, employed in almost the 1/3 of the corpus. The use of *apophasis* indicates a reasoning process that aims at reinforcing one's claim by discarding alternative options. In a deliberative kind of argumentation, the figure offers the opportunity to the arguer to assess the opponents' proposals then reject them as invalid options, making his/her claim the most compelling decision to make. The argumentative rhetorical arrangements above described are maneuvered by recurring kinds of tropes and schemes in the corpus. Very frequently, indeed, the references to the enemy are realized by metaphors, such as "beasts" and "butchers", while Iraq is very commonly referred to as the terrorists' "safe haven" or as the "theater" in the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, figures of balance, such as parallelism and *antithesis* are maneuvered with in around 30% of the corpus in structures such as "terrorism will fail and democracy will prevail" (producing rhyme) or "the world is worried about highly

enriched uranium, but the real danger is the highly enriched Islam” (T. Friedman, *New York Times*) which is a case of *antanaclasis*, consisting of repeating the same words to produce different meaning.

7. 4. 4. 2. Arrangement and form strategies in the Arab corpus

The strategic maneuverings performed by the Arab arguers in the argumentation stages focus on the vituperation-related figures as their main presentational resources. Vituperation is a composition exposing the vices of specific individuals (different from *commonplaces* which focus on general vices and types of people). In almost 70% of the corpus, vituperation-based arrangements of arguments are employed to sustain the maneuverings strategically used to reframe the view on the Iraq situation or to characterize the actions of the American decision-makers. The arguers exploit a wide array of related figures, mainly those useful for refutation and redefinition such as the figures of amplification (*climax*) and figures related to the *locus* of definition and division. Division is very close to definition as it is used to clarify the significance of some entity by describing a whole and its constituent parts, or the parts that make up a whole (Rhetoricae 2003). Example (50) below, is one of the arguments advanced by Tariq Alhomeyed to sustain his main standpoint that Iraq needs a strong army in order to survive. In this argument, he asserts that Americans erred in their approach to the Iraq liberation and that democracy should not have been introduced they way they did.

- (50) Democracy does not fall out of the sky above and is not genetically inherited nor will it grow without cultivation. Democracy is a practice and forces protect democratic action according to the belief that a unified country and guaranteed rights are the only key to stability. (Tariq Alhomeyed, *Asharq Al Awsat*)

The extract is connected to a series of refutation-based arguments attacking the claim advanced by Americans regarding their democracy assistance mission. The argument aims at clarifying our understanding of the concept of democracy by means of definition in order to reframe democracy and to expose his opponents’ alleged misunderstanding of it.

The arguments aimed at vituperation are generally maneuvered with figures such as *categoria* (opening the secret wickedness of the adversary), *apodioxix* (rejecting opponents' claim for being absurd and wicked), and *metastasis* (denying and turning back the opponents' argument used against one). Example (51) is an extract from the discussion of Najah Ali, who advances argumentation deploring the fate of Iraqis and postulating that the US is responsible for the disaster in Iraq. The extract starts with one of the sub-standpoints (the US had oppressed Iraqis in the past), and is followed by a maneuver with *categoria* in an argument from historical facts to prove the wrong doings of the US

- (51) Driven by the burning desire to end dictatorship, many Iraqis had even forgotten or tried to overlook the crimes the US had committed against them. (...) Many Iraqis tried not to remember the large-scale deprivation, poverty, isolation, malnourishment and social disaster the US-supported UN trade sanctions had caused. (Najah Ali, *Azzaman*)

Another example of *categoria*-based maneuvering is taken from Gallal Nasser' s discussion and it illustrates an argument constructed from the locus of circumstances (deducing future facts from past facts) and engages in revealing the "secret" strategic interests of the US guaranteed thanks to its occupation of Iraq. This argument is part of the evidence advanced to support the main claim that the US has hostile rather than good intentions in Iraq and to accuse of the politicians of manipulating public opinion by discussing withdrawal while the whole US endeavor is aimed at permanent control and exploitation, he argues.

- (52) The occupation of Iraq would give the US control over the Caspian Sea, the site of much of Iran' s oil. It would enable the US to extend its influence from Darfur to West Africa and from East Timor to the Gulf, and perhaps even control China' s oil needs. The US has a grand plan, and central to that plan is the protection of Israel' s security. The latter has been one of Washington' s top priorities for 60 years. (Gallal Nasser, *Al Ahram*)

The rhetorical figure of *apodioxix* is illustrated in the following extract, example (49), in which Mohammad Alharthi rejects President Bush' s comparison of the withdrawal from Iraq with the disaster in Vietnam and declares his argument to be an act of

manipulation by qualifying it as a display of ignorance or a deliberate attempt to distort the truth. The arguer attempts to prove the analogy as invalid through facts but also through vituperation and attacking the US actions and interventions as:

- (53) (...) misjudged and based on an unrealistic faith in the absolute supremacy of America's military might. (Mohammad Alharthi, *Arab News*)

Strategically maneuvering by the figure of metastasis is frequently used in the Arab corpora especially in the op-ed pieces advancing objection to American positions or claims. The figure consists of rejecting a claim, generally incrimination, and turning it back to the adversary in the form of accusation. Example (54) below is extracted from the discussion of Hassan Al Haifi advanced as a reaction to reference of President Bush to the insurgents in Iraq as the "cold blooded killers". In this extract, the arguer uses the same reference "cold blooded killer" to strategically maneuver the argument that Bush is a cold blood killer. The moves illustrate the rhetorical figures of both categoria, (referring to historical events showing evil deeds and intentions) and metastasis in order to convey an overall vituperation-based rhetorical strategy.

- (54) One only needs to look at Human Rights Watch, UN Human Rights and Amnesty International reports for the hundred of violations of international laws and conventions concerning the treatment of civilians free and under occupation that Americans and Israeli forces have inflicted over the last decades, just to get a sense of who the real cold blooded killers are these days. (Hassan Al Haifi, *Yemen Times*)

The arguer seems to endorse the Iraqi resistance and their arguments in their fight against occupation and considers Bush's reference to insurgents as an attack, which he turns back by arguments proving the adversary to be the one having the vice and not the insurgents.

Almost 80% of the arguers make extensive use of rhetorical figures generated from vituperation structures with maneuverings oriented to the adaptation to audience. Such moves, indeed, are maneuvered strategically to create communion with the addressed audience and to produce the intended persuasive effects in them. In these cases, the targeted audience is carefully constructed no matter whether the discussion was intended as a harsh blame or as a revelation of secrete intentions. In this respect,

accusation of mischievousness is not directed to a nation (the US) or people (Americans), but rather to individuals (politicians) who are clearly delineated. The arguers make frequent use of *conciliatio* as their chief presentational strategic maneuvering. *Conciliatio* is a strategy by which an opponent's argument is exploited for one's own benefit or even to approve and praise the virtues of the audience (Rhetoricae, 2003). The Arab arguers maneuver strategically with *conciliatio*, as they are their primary audience and the ones intended to persuade. They find in them their actual judge and the key in the resolution of their conflict with their opponents and more probably have hopes in their political power as voters. Indeed, the harsh criticism to politicians is paired with praise to America which is referred to as "system with fundamental moral rules" and a "country that is governed by institutional ethics". American people are in some instance referred to as "rational Americans" mainly those opposing the Bush administration policies. They are also depicted as victims of these policies, a strategy meant to incite the American audience interest by invoking the US political infringements going against them, such as "Americans right to peaceful opposition and to the freedom of speech", or "Americans are losing faith in both parties". The *conciliatio* maneuvers used by these arguers generally attempt to echo the critical voices coming from America or to eulogize the American political and cultural values. This kind of strategic maneuvering is indeed powerful because it points to the effort made by the arguer to identify not only the views and preferences of the audience, but also their values and exploit them to support his/her own presumably different positions.

In support of the vituperation maneuverings put into play as presentational strategies, a number of tropes and schemes were identified to be typically exploited in arguments with similar rhetorical goals. For instance, arguments accusing the US of plotting greedily in Iraq to exploit its wealth and to control its resources and strategic location characteristically make use of *erotema* as a main maneuvering strategy. *Erotema* or rhetorical questions seem to serve the purpose of questioning the adversary acts and in many cases casting irony on the US official discourse which claims humanitarian values and noble intentions in Iraq. This kind of questions, which are normally used in the confrontational stage to give the standpoint a rhetorical character, are employed here within the argumentative stages in support of the arguments' schemes forwarded as

warrantees of the claim on the falsity US discourse. Some rhetorical questions come in the form of *epiplexis*, i.e. as questions asked to express grief or to inveigh (Rhetoricae, 2003) and make strong appeal, similar to the *erotema* to emotions. The maneuvers are aimed at adding momentum to the accusations of deceptiveness and manipulation of the adversary. They are strategically geared to the audience and may serve as a means to involve them in the investigative endeavor on the secret actions of the US in the Middle East. A selection of some of the affirmations on the US duplicity presented as questions is listed below in these examples.

- (55) Why wait (and not leave Iraq) if Petraeus views are already well known? (Ramzi Baroud, *Arab News*)
- (56) Will the temptation of the Iraqi oil entice the US to come up with fresh thoughts on the matter of military bases? (Galal Nassar, *Al Ahram*)
- (57) How could they (terrorists) sneak through so many check points and road blocks US and Iraqi troops have set up in Baghdad? (Akram Abdulrazzaq, *Azzaman*)

The Arab arguers also perform their strategic maneuvering by means of other tropes such as *metaphors* and *simile*. They often highlight their criticism to the main tokens of the US mission, namely democracy and freedom through exaggeration. The US mission in Iraq is metaphorically referred to as the “quagmire”, “nightmare”, “farce” or “mirage” or even as being a “heavenly ordained messianic mission”. The US promises of rebuilding Iraq and establishing democracy are ironically invoked as plans to create a “democratic oasis” and Iraq as a “ghost”. The US in one case is referred to as “Satan” and its actions and policies characterized as oppressive and deceptive are compared in other cases to those of a “Shylock” (wicked Shakespearean character). The Arab corpus displays also a considerable use of schemes which are headed by parallelism and anaphora. Anaphora as a figure of repetition creates a desired effects for vituperations and for accusations and blame. The emphatic effects it produces increases the emotional affect the arguers seek to produce and the clamor of indignation they intend to convey to their audience.

The two groups’ different approaches in the use of rhetorical figures seem to go hand in hand with their overall strategic maneuverings in the argumentation stage. This means

that their maneuvering at the three levels, namely topical potential, audience adaptation and presentational devices, is generally coordinated.

7.5. The Concluding Stage

Reconstruction of the concluding stages of the critical discussions under study yielded significant insights into the maneuverings strategically performed by the two groups of arguers in their attempt to make conclusions on the way their difference of opinion is resolved. In this critical stage, the discussion parties ideally evaluate the resolution process of the initial difference of opinion and determine its outcome. The results reported below give an account of the way the strategic maneuverings are performed in each corpus at three levels: the topical potential, the adaptation to the audience and the use of presentational devices.

Before getting to these results, a preliminary inspection of the ways concluding stages were formulated is discussed below. Since in this type of activity (op-ed argumentation) there are no formal or official rules of how to determine the outcome of the resolution process undertaken throughout the discussion, the arguer, as the only protagonist seems to have a relative freedom in this endeavor. This is perhaps due to conventional practices in the non-mixed types of discussion where the author commonly evaluates the resolution process and strategically assumes the expediency and even success of his defense. Ideally, the resolution outcome is to be determined by the two parties involved in the argumentative interaction, in our case, the op-ed author and the audience, who both determine whether the defense of the standpoint put forward by the arguer stands against doubt or criticism. In practice, and in the context of the op-ed discussions, the audience decision can be roughly determined through research on media reception or public opinion (supported by internet platforms research in the recent decade). The concluding stage in op-ed pieces may be regarded as incomplete, as the real judgment is yet to be advanced by the real antagonists. However, this single-sided judgment on the outcomes of the resolution remains equally significant, as it involves the expression of the protagonist's decision on his/her own advanced argumentation. The way this dialectical stage is exploited is revealing of the protagonist attitudes as well and the roles taken up. The approaches taken in the concluding stage may indicate the ideologically-biased aims and agendas of the arguers. Table 7.16, below, displays the

results of the examination carried out on the approaches with which the discussions are concluded.

Concluding choices	American	Arab
Attitudes expressed	43.3%	50%
Standpoint(s) reiterated	33.3%	30%
Conclusion left unexpressed	13.3%	10%
Main standpoint expressed	10%	10%

Table 7.16 Resolution outcomes in the American and Arab arguers' discussions

The findings show parallel patterns in the corpora on the ways the arguers decide to resolve the difference of opinion and to determine the outcome of their discussion. Indeed, the same approaches have been adopted by both groups of arguers with slightly different frequencies though. Indeed, around half of the concluding stages in both corpora are devoted to expressing attitudes on the course of event in Iraq. The arguers' choices to express their personal attitudes on the war may be evaluated in different ways according to the oratory type established in each discussion. In deliberative (decision-oriented) discussions, expressing attitudes seems to be aimed at adding force to the decision defended which typically follows a rationalization path. The externalization of attitudes, in the final stage, may function as an interpretation of the arguer's policy decision but with more evaluative and affective terms that would be easier for the audience to process and remember. By contrast, in epideictic or judicial discussions, inherently based on the assessment of human behavior, the expression of attitudes may be interpreted as the reiteration of the main standpoints advanced for debate.

Around 30% of the concluding stages in both groups focus on the reiteration of their main standpoints. In some cases, the standpoints are made even more prominent and explicit than it is done in the confrontation stages, while in other cases mere paraphrase is advanced. In both cases, the choice seems to aim at reminding the audience of the position adopted and guarantee its adequate assimilation. Finally, the resolution outcome is left unexpressed in fewer cases (13% and 10%) resulting in the implicitness (absence) of the concluding stage. The arguers making this choice decide not to exploit the dialectical goals offered by this stage for the use of influential rhetorical tools such as those appealing to emotions or ethics to reinforce the acceptance of their positions.

They probably hope to leave the decision for audience or may judge the difference of opinion as already resolved within the argumentative stage.

The similarity found in the approaches adopted by the two cultural groups in regards to the dialectical opportunities of the stage were somehow unexpected. If not a mere coincidence, they certainly may lead to the assumption that they are due to constraints required by the op-ed argumentation activity type and its conventions and rules. This means that it may be common practice that FP op-ed resolution outcomes are sometimes left unexpressed, used to reinforce a claim, but more commonly to make prominent their personal voice in the discussion.

7. 5. 1. Strategic maneuvers in American concluding stages

The analysis of the three-level-strategic maneuvers carried out for the American op-ed corpus has revealed the kinds of rhetorical aims possibly motivated by these arguers' ideologically-biased cognition, as well as their professional goals mainly their persuasive ability to shape public debate. The first level of strategic maneuvering explored was the one related to the topical potential, i.e. the sides of the issue focused on. Table 7.17, below, displays the findings on the themes selected for closure and their frequency throughout the corpus. As indicated in the table, there are five maneuvering strategies chosen at the level of topical potential in the concluding stage, from which "commitment to the cause" and "blaming politicians" take the top 1 position.

Topical choices in Concluding maneuverings	Occurrences	Percentage %
Stressing commitment to the cause/ duty to fight	10	33.3
Blaming politicians for wrong deeds	10	33.3
Reminding of the risks/warning from the enemy	9	30
Focusing on victory as the ultimate goal for Americans	7	30
Calling for troop respect	5	16.6

Table 7.17. Frequency of themes selected for closure in the American corpus

Emphasizing the American commitment to its global role in the world and mainly its duty to fight against terrorism is a theme chosen by 1/3 of the arguers to strategically maneuver in the closure of the critical discussion. With an equal percentage, others focus on blaming politicians for their inefficiency or manipulation. The rest of the corpus is divided between warnings from the enemy, reminding of the ultimate reward and calling to respect the troops in the battlefield. Showing commitment to the fight, evoking enemies and boosting morale to seal victory have much in common. They are based on values and attempt to fix attention on future achievements and directly or indirectly venerate martial principles. They activate a number of culturally-shared images on national threats and the morally-loaded logic of the duty to fight. Being one of the reasons for declaring the war on Iraq, terrorism is at the heart of the US national debates and one of the main target goals to achieve from the war mission. This is somehow surprising, as four years after the invasion, the American public opinion reflected the bipartisan ideological divide over Iraq (Pew Research Center, 2007).

While news on the escalating violence and the Democrats' criticism of the war mismanagement increased skepticism over the reasons for war, Republicans and Bush supporters maintained the same eagerness to promote core the US values and sustain its leadership. Not only does the preponderance of value-based strategic maneuverings in these op-ed concluding stages demonstrate a clear pattern, but it also goes against the assumptions over the American people divide (at least in this sample). It shows that the level of consistency with the Bush administration's core principles is very high among opinion leaders, since over 90% of the types of maneuvers chosen for concluding the op-ed pieces are geared towards the very core goals of the war in Iraq even in the positions critical to Bush and those calling for troops' withdrawal. There is almost absolute agreement among policy experts, whether sustaining the fight or urging for abandoning it, on the righteousness of the American mission and its commitment to leadership in international policies. Furthermore, the initial reasons for the US intervention in Iraq seem unshakable and serve as common ground in the debate. No matter how different political goals and the party-ideology they may be defending, these arguers happen to be on the same wave when it comes to the belief in the US responsibility in the world as a role model and its duty to carry out policies that would

protect American interests, assist the world emancipation, as its foreign policy bipartisan creed says.

Maneuvering with commitment to the American cause, in promoting its values and protecting its people from enemies is illustrated below in example (58) extracted from the concluding stage of Joseph Lieberman's op-ed piece. After the appeal he launched -in the argumentation stage- to his colleagues in Congress for moral and financial support to Petraeus to continue the fight in Iraq, he makes, here, a special emphasis on the common national values and interests in Iraq using the inclusive "we" to create communion with his actual antagonists (the audience) and to reinforce their sense of solidarity and unity, hence their approval of his appeal.

- (58) We are at a critical moment in Iraq--at the beginning of a key battle, in the midst of a war that is irretrievably bound up in an even bigger, global struggle against the totalitarian ideology of radical Islamism. However tired, however frustrated, however angry we may feel, we must remember that our forces in Iraq carry America's cause--the cause of freedom--which we abandon at our peril.(Joseph Lieberman, *Wall Street Journal*)

By means of this kind of maneuver, many arguers take the opportunity to remind the audience of the overarching goals for the US endeavor in Iraq. The maneuver is strategic because it is rhetorically based on ethical appeal and makes the moral values of commitment and responsibility override any other conditions. The maneuver is an illustration of the ideologically-driven kind of discursive strategies widely used in the official American foreign policy discourse. It explicitly draws on patriotism as a crucial evidence with which American demonstrate their loyalty their political values and their pride of their international position as world leader. This strategy may also be appreciated in the following example extracted from Bob Kerrey's concluding stage where the reiteration of his main standpoints legitimating intervention in Iraq is underpinned with emphasis on the national commitment to the American cause.

- (59) We must not allow terrorist sanctuaries to develop any place on earth. Whether these fighters are finding refuge in Syria, Iran, Pakistan or elsewhere, we cannot afford diplomatic or political excuses to prevent us from using military force to eliminate them. (Bob Kerrey, *Wall Street Journal*)

Maneuvering with commitment, as in Kerrey's concluding stage, creates a dilemma-based situation. Dilemmas are rhetorical figures of divisions that present a state of affair as being of two options and moral values implicitly frame their alternative as the lack of morality, or other negatively viewed postures, such as cowardice and surrender. This maneuver generates in most cases from an argumentation structure based on the locus of the irreparable and the valuable that needs action because of threats. The irreparable is usually the "right" alternative in these dilemma-framed maneuvers mainly in the deliberative discussion, since the target goal (fighting) is associated with a cherished common property (or value) that has to be protected and safeguarded from threat and no other choice may be qualified as equally right.

Fixing attention on victory goes hand in hand with the appeal to moral values and to the commitment to them. The maneuvering consists of reminding the audience of the final prize and make them focus on the collective reward to earn after the struggle. Visualizing victory helps ease all the sufferings and gives strength to continue the fight.

Reminding the audience of the enemy is a maneuver strategically used to sustain the argument of the irreparable. Invoking threats and danger serves to incite for urgent action. It also creates dilemma in most cases, as the rhetorical move frames the threats as pending (rhetorically referred to as *ominatio*) and action as inevitable. It also characterizes opponents' positions (even implicitly) as irresponsible and unpatriotic (in the case of not acting to protect Americans from terrorists). Example (60), taken from Ralph Peters' discussion concluding stage, illustrates the threat maneuvering strategically put to use to incite the audience's to act in favor of staying in Iraq and to appeal to the national and communal commitment to fighting terrorism. This commitment is even presented as the only choice to make ("like or not") and no other option may be contemplated within this moral framing of the situation.

(60) And, like it or not, we have a moral responsibility as well as practical interests in refusing to surrender to the butchers in Iraq. (Ralph Peters, *New York Post*)

The move may also be characterized as fully-fledge, as the maneuvering is coordinated at its three levels: evoking the enemy as topical potential is adapted to the audience through appeal to national value and is presented with a strong trope by the use of the

metaphor “butchers”. The strategy indicates the underlying ideological assumptions of the authors which make up a significant part of the foreign policy makers’ shared cognition in the US. A group shared cognition that takes for granted the supremacy of the US and the justice of its international policies and naturally constitutes the common ground for its discourse.

The three different levels of strategic maneuvering are brought together in the major part of the corpus for more persuasive effects. Hence the adaptation to the audience and the presentational devices are generally put to use, as in the other critical stages, in order to obtain the effect intended from the ethical appeals to values, to common threats (enemies) and to mission targets (victory as the best reward). Table below 7.18 indicates the findings from the analysis of the maneuvering geared towards the audience as an attempt to adapt to their preferences, views or values.

Audience adaptation in Concluding maneuverings	Occurrences	Percent %
Appealing to values as national/common	10	33.3
Construing Americans as decision-makers/participants	6	20
Construing Americans as fighters in the war	5	16.6
Stressing the sacrifice and bravery of the troops	5.	16.6

Table 7.18. Concluding maneuvering geared towards the audience in American corpus

On top of the list, the appeal to common and national values is used in 33.3% of the corpus and indicates the degree of importance of these values to American audience, as the arguers assume they are sufficient reasons for stirring their approval. In the second position and in around 20% of the corpus, the arguer construes the audience as the actual decision makers, mainly through the use of the inclusive “we”, which frames the interaction as if it were actually taking place within a face-to face public debate. While involving the audience in political decision making relies on democratic principles, the current strategy may create some positive effect on the audience; however, the interactive-role granted to them remains unfortunately fake and analytically regarded as a common political scheme to create pressure and achieve popular consent.

7. 5. 2. Strategic maneuvers in Arab concluding stages

The results from the analysis of the strategic maneuvers carried out in the Arab op-ed corpus signals the arguers' pessimistic view on the war situation and their low faith in the conflict resolution. Indeed, despite their variety, the strategic maneuverings performed at the topical potential level either carry forward the accusatory claims against the Bush Administration or America in general or advance warnings from pending catastrophe in Iraq. Maneuvering at the level of topical potential involves that "arguers select materials from those available according to what they believe best advances their interests" (Tindale, 2006: 451). Table 7.19 below, displays the findings on the topics selected for closure and indicates the top five maneuvering strategies identified in the concluding stage.

Topical choices	Percent %
Affirming the US responsible for disaster/crimes	43.3
Warning from eminent catastrophe	33.3
Providing an Iraqi/Arab perspective about the situation	33.3
Asserting the US is obstacle to the war solution	20
Calling the US to redeem itself	20

Table 7.19. Most frequent topics chosen for concluding maneuverings in Arab corpus

The concluding stages in this op-ed corpus display diverse strategies with which the Arab arguers use the dialectical prospect offered by the stage to conclude the discussion to their own favor. Despite the difference in strategies, most topics point to a common concern: the involvement of the US in Iraq. The US involvement and military intervention seem to complicate the situation and the debate at the same time for most arguers, hence reaching agreement on this issue would help reaching the resolution outcome aimed at in the debate/critical discussions. With the exception of a few arguers expressing approval of the US intervention in Iraq (in two op-ed pieces), the majority manifest their protest against the American (or the Bush Administration) policies or in the least remain skeptical of the vowed policies achievements and apprehensive about their consequences. In Table 7.20.below, the strategic patterns of the maneuvers enacted

to adapt to the audience needs and/or values are displayed. These strategies along with their presentational dimension are discussed and illustrated with examples below.

Audience adaptation in Concluding maneuverings	Percent %
Framing Americans/international community as victims	43.3
Framing intentional community as moral judges	40
Framing the proposals as beneficial to Americans	33.3
Praising American values	33.3

Table 7.20. The main strategies for adapting to audience in Arab concluding maneuverings

The effort to adapt to the audience seems to be a strategic choice for many arguers in this corpus. This is confirmed with the high level of strategic maneuvers realized explicitly to forefront the audiences and locate them at the center of the difference of opinion outcome. As shown in the results from the opening stage analysis, most Arab arguers assign the role of antagonist to American audience or to international community audiences often explicitly. The task seems challenging for this group, given the low ideological affinity existing between them and their targeted audiences and the relationship of antagonism they have presumably maintained, mainly with Americans, since the terrorists attacks in 2001. Nonetheless, results point to consistency along the corpus in the effort made by the arguers to find compromise between their goals and their audiences' reference points.

The analysis also revealed an extensive and elaborate use of presentational devices in the maneuvering strategies both as figures (*schemes*) and *tropes*. The rhetorical strategies most frequently adopted in the four-stage discussions are vituperation and *categoria* (opening secret wickedness of adversaries), as around 70% of the corpus is blame-based oratory. The same line is maintained along the concluding stage, along with the effort to make the boundaries clear between declared opponents and the audience. Blame is coupled in many cases with figures of pathos for more dramatic effect, where emotions such as shame, disbelief and indignation are made even more

prominent in this stage than any other critical stage of the discussions. Table 7.21 displays the results from the frequency counts of the presentational devices in the corpus. These figures are illustrated within the discussion of examples coming up in the section along with Table 7.21.

Presentational Devices in Concluding maneuverings	Percent %
Tropes (<i>metaphors-irony-hyperbole</i>)	33.3
Figures of pathos (<i>pathopoeia, cataplexis, deesis, ominatio</i>)	33.3
Figures of order and repetition (<i>parallelism, syncrisis, anaphora</i>)	20
Figures of reasoning	20

Table 7.21. Main presentational devices in the concluding maneuverings in the Arab corpus

The analysis of the concluding stages of this corpus has led to the observation that the three levels of strategic maneuverings are intertwined, which may indicate that there is convergence in the maneuverings. The convergent strategic maneuvers have been located among the moves performed to add force to the main positions, adapt to the targeted audience and rhetorically intensify the effects. Convergence serves as a criterion for assessing argumentative effectiveness, according to Pragma-dialectics, as by fusing the three dimensions of topic selection, audience adaptation, and device presentation, the argumentation has more than just strategically maneuvered, it has “displayed a genuine rhetorical strategy”(van Eemeren & Houtlousser, 2000). Such conclusion may not be possibly drawn within the scope of this study, as it obviously requires an extensive inspection of the maneuvers with convergence in every critical stage of all discussions in the whole corpus. The next section discusses some concluding maneuvering strategies and identifies the strategic levels realized in them.

Those arguers attempting to hold the US accountable for crime in Iraq typically opt for reiterating these denunciatory claims in their concluding stages. Maneuvering by reiterating ones’ standpoints in the vituperation-oriented op-ed discussion may be interpreted as an act of challenge to the dominant power and a manifestation of

resistance to its hegemony. Hence, around 44% of the arguers insist on bringing the US to justice and find it most favorable to emphasize the judicial side of the issue rather than reflect on the right policy decision for Americans to make (as some do). For these arguers, the audience recognition of the US responsibility for crime in Iraq seems to be the expedient solution to the Iraq conflict as well as the condition for resolving their presumed difference of opinion with their audience (international community). Indeed, these types of maneuverings tend to adapt their concluding moves to international audiences and assign them the role of judge while making frequent use of figures of pathos such as, *deesis* and *cataplexis* and *ominatio*. The two examples below illustrate the choice of this topical potential which consists of a reiteration of standpoints advanced as accusation of the US of malevolence. In example (61) Hadi Marai,, turning to international community for assistance, repeats his standpoint with high emphasis using *anaphora*. Gallal Nassar, in example (62), discloses the real intentions behind building a wall in Iraq and balances them against the official reasons presented by the US which are to “protect” Iraqis from terrorists.

- (61) It is the occupation that is reason for our miseries. It is the occupation which plunged us into this vicious circle of sectarian infighting. (Hadi Marai, *Azzaman*)
- (62) Al Adhamiyah (building a wall in Al Adhamiyah area) is part of the US drive to restrain, not protect the Iraqis. The quest is likely to fail as it did repeatedly in the past. The days of the occupation are numbered. (Galal Nassar, *Jordan Times*)

The maneuver is coupled with a mix of *ominatio* (prophecy of pending evil) and *cataplexis* (threatening or prophesying payback for ill doing). The use of *cataplexis* may be interpreted from the argumentative stage content with the arguer’s repeated reference to resistant groups in Iraq, while apostrophe (addressing speech directly to audience) reinforces the communion constructed between the arguer and his audience as a strategy by which he seems to distance them from his opponent (the US).

Over 30% of the concluding stages advance warnings about the eminent disaster in Iraq and call (sometimes indirectly) for action to stop it. Most of these types of maneuverings either address American people to plead them to act against President Bush or turn to the international community for assistance against American

occupation. This difference is of course crucial for maneuvering strategies and involves different approaches to the adaptation-to- audience strategies and also different presentational devices. In the American audience-orientated concluding moves, maneuvering with the audience values focuses on praise and hope, while those moves adapting to international audience tend to use more threat or grief-based moves against Americans. These moves are mainly maneuvered with figures of pathos and tropes such as *cataplexis* (prophesying payback for ill doing), *deesis* (vehement expression of desire or indignation/as in “for God’s sake”) or *aporia* (expression of one’s inability to believe).

With the same percentage, other concluding strategies are dedicated to highlighting the arguers’ stances by expressing their attitudes towards the Iraq events and policies. The moves give emphasis to attitudes that delineate the Arab perspective as victims of the US policies. Finally, two strategies with equal frequencies 20% each contemplate some future solutions. One group places blame on the US for war atrocities and for being the main barrier for conflict resolution, inferring that the extensive rhetoric on democracy are a cover for strategic control in the region, the other makes an explicit call for Americans to politically act against their leaders and to redress the blunder committed. Table 7.22 below displays an example for each of the most frequent strategic maneuvering and specifically those featuring convergence at the three levels: topical potential, adaptation to audience and presentational devices.

Topical choices	Example	Adaptation to audience	Presentational device
Affirming the US responsible for crime	It beggars belief that a great country such as US which proclaim that it is driven by the noble principles of democracy and justice could be prompted by sheer greed to launch a war against a people who had been reeling under an oppressive regime	Praising American values	<i>Aporia</i> /metaphor (greed)
	So for the love of God, who are the real cold blooded killers of our times?	warring international community (framing as victims of Bush)	<i>Erotema</i> (rhetorical question)/ <i>Deesis</i> / <i>aporia</i>
Warning from eminent catastrophe	Many more will likely die if the Congress doesn't act forcefully to carry out the wishes of the American people and respect the sanctity of the lives of Iraqis and their own.	creating communion with Americans (framed as victims) appeal to human values	<i>Ominatio</i> (prophecy of evil)
Providing an Iraqi/Arab perspective	For Americans it is the usual political power struggle. For Arabs, it is playing American politics with Iraqi blood.	intentional community as moral judges	<i>Syncretism</i> (figure of parallelism)
Asserting US obstacle for solution	It is <i>Pax Americana</i> which runs counter to the international community's call for establishing a just and comprehensive peace in the Mideast	International audience as victim of US manipulations	Sarcasm (with <i>periphrasis</i> in " <i>Pax Americana</i> ")
Calling the US to redeem itself	The US should be awakened and return to its core values of freedom, justice and equity and become again a source of enlightenment to the world	Praising American values	Encomium as figure of speech of praise

Table 7.22. Strategic maneuvers examples in Arab corpus concluding stage

The results from the analysis of the concluding maneuvers in the Arab corpus have shown the tendency to accentuate all levels of strategic maneuvers for more rhetorical and persuasive effects. Convergent maneuvers in this corpus, indeed, come forth more unmistakably in this very concluding stage to add more momentum to the rhetorical strategy adopted all through the argumentative discussions. However, their efficiency remains hard to measure, at least within the scope of this empirical study, and may probably need the analyst's assessment of convergence be supported with the measurement of audience reception.

7.6. Derailment of strategic maneuvering: fallacies

This section reports the findings on the fallacious moves performed by arguers in the two cultural groups. Based on the Pragma-dialectical account of fallacies, these

fallacious moves are regarded as derailing strategic maneuvering realized by the arguers while attempting to keep balance between his/her dialectical and rhetorical aims. Maneuvering derailments are believed to frustrate the resolution process which is regarded as an ultimate goal for advancing argumentation. The moves violating one of the 10 rules for critical discussion were categorized as fallacious and the consequences of their deviation from the dialectical aims at each of the four critical stages identified and examined. The results from the analysis and categorization of fallacies are illustrated in Table 7.23 and Table 7.24, below, displaying a count of the maneuvering derailments in the two data corpora and of the kind of dialectical rule they violate.

As indicated in Table 7.23., the cases of fallacious moves in the American corpus were located mainly in the arguers' violations of three rules for critical discussion: freedom, argument schemes and validity. Arguers observe the freedom rule if they do not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from casting doubt on standpoints. The rule also applied in the non-mixed (written) discussion and consists of the arguer's respect to the existence of doubt or objection towards the standpoint he/she advances.

Discussion Rule	Fallacy	Occurrence/ percentage		Total %
Rule 1 Freedom	<i>Ad hominem</i>	8	26.6	
	<i>Ad miserecordiam</i>	2	6.6	
				33.3
Rule 2 Shifting the burden	<i>Ad ignorantiam</i>	0	0	
	Shifting the burden	0	0	
				0
Rule 3 Standpoint	Straw man	5	16.6	
				16.6
Rule 4 Relevance	<i>Ad verecundiam</i>	1	3.3	
	<i>Tu quoque</i>	2	6.6	
	<i>Ignoratio elenchi</i> /Red herring	2	6.6	
				16.6
Rule 5 Unexpressed Premise	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Rule 6 Starting point	Complex question	4	13.3	
				13.3
Rule 7 Argument Scheme	Hasty generalization	0	0	
	<i>Ad consequentiam</i>	1	3.3	
	<i>Non causa pro causa</i>	1	3.3	
	Slippery slope	1	3.3	
	Weak analogy	4	13.3	
				23.3
Rule 8 Validity	False dichotomy	7	23.3	
	Formal fallacies	2	6.6	
	Begging the question	0	0	
				30
Rule 9 Closure	<i>Ad ignorantiam</i>	0	0	
				0
Rule 10 Usage	Ambiguity	0	0	
				0

Table 7.23. Strategic maneuvering derailments in the American corpus

Cases of Rule 1 violation were found in around 1/3 of the American corpus derailing generally in their confrontational strategic maneuvers by committing the *Ad hominem* fallacy. This fallacy occurred in 26.6% of the corpora mainly in the confrontation stage and involved cases in which arguers seemed to discredit their antagonists' position of doubt or objection. To resolve the difference of opinion, arguers should "cooperate on the externalization of that difference" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 136) and should not assume the invalidity of opposing views without proper argumentation against them. In most of these fallacious moves, arguers act as if the opponent attacked

were not any participant in the current argumentative discussion, and pretending the counterview only belongs to “external” views rather than part of the audience’s positions. This may be observed in cases of *ad hominem* fallacies typically used in confrontation stages and in references to the opponents’ views. Moves like “Hope is dwindling, no honest observer can conclude otherwise” (Ralph Peters) or “Of all the accounts on the current situation, this is by far the most stupid” (Krauthammer), which in fact represent two opposing positions about the situation in Iraq, are strategically maneuvered to polarize ones’ position against the opponents’ and to enhance one’s authority and credibility (appeal to ethos) by attacking that of others. The maneuver derailment lies in the fact that the arguers here attack the credibility of the opponents rather than their arguments. The maneuver fails to assess the opponent’s claim on its merit, making the move irrelevant by referring to virtues and morality (hence the fallacy is also known as the fallacy of virtue) and representing opponents as dishonest and untrustworthy people.

Even though most cases of violations of Rule1 were determined as *ad hominem* fallacies, one case of derailment represented a peculiar manner of obstructing the debate and the flow of communication between participants. The derailment happens when the author mentions some opponents’ views but shuts down any prospective doubt to be Example (63) is a strategic move in which Tony Snow recognizes the existence of arguments going against Bush policies, mainly those blaming the policy for provoking violence in Iraq. His confrontation with these opposing views goes like this:

- (63) The most astonishing argument is that the United States (or the Bush administration) is responsible for the terror wave. Terrorists are responsible for terror period. (Tony Snow, *USA Today*)

By this move, Mr. Snow clear bans counter arguments from being advanced. The violation of the freedom rule is also an apparent manipulative move in which the counter-argument is framed as coming from outsiders. Indeed, by using “the United States” the counter-argument is attributed to non-Americans, or non-patriots who are against the US interventions and policies. The move denotes a defensive reaction some politicians typically adopt against criticism to foreign policies by attacking the opponents as Anti American. By this move the arguer prevents a counterargument from

qualifying as a claim worth refuting and the term “period” categorically leaves it out of the debate.

These cases of strategic maneuvering aimed dialectically at defining the origin of the difference of opinion or the distribution of discussion roles (confrontation or opening) generally derail when the arguers ridicules antagonists’ views, manipulates them (attribute them to outsiders) or misleads when distributing the discussion roles, assuming that the audience share his/her position while in practice opposing views are undeniable among public opinion. This derailing strategy is used as a smokescreen to make the audience perceive confrontational topics of high disagreement as agreed-upon issues and displace disagreement outside the debate sphere.

American arguers in the op-ed corpus also violate the argument schemes, mainly by committing the fallacy of the weak analogy. Indeed, 23% of the arguers make erroneous constructions of arguments’ structures producing as a consequence unacceptable schemes. The derailment is more prominent in cases where various analogy-based arguments are tied together to form the structure of a whole discussion. An argument establishes a weak analogy if the comparison on which it rests is shaky or unclear. In the corpus, weak analogies occurred mainly within the attempt to explain concepts, actions or situations by associating them by similarity to previous or culturally more accessible situations. Most of the derailing maneuvers are due inappropriate analogy in which the arguers evoke certain characteristics which have no relevance to the intended situation, such as the comparison of two historical events. In the following example (64) a strategic maneuver supporting the argument on the peculiarity of the Iraqi case of violence attempts to blame “sectarian” Iraqis for the persistent violence by making a hypothetical comparison between current situation Iraq and the Christian conflict in 17th Century Europe. This analogy based on a counterfactual may not stand the scheme test and it is prone to criticism. Its premises are questionable since the two conflicts have very different circumstances, the most obvious ones are that the conflict in Iraq was not a religious strife, as the analogy suggests, since it is a struggle for power, in spite of the sectarian divide, nor did the Christian conflict follow from any act of invasion or occupation.

- (64) And the role of American soldiers in an intra-Islamic conflict is impossible to plausibly articulate. (Imagine, for instance, that a small Islamic army had been plunked down in Europe during the Protestant-Catholic strife of the 16th and 17th centuries. Its mission would have been about as clear as ours in Iraq today.) (Harold Meyerson, *Washington Post*)

These types of derailments are generally related to maneuverings realized in the argumentation stage, where the lines of arguments are established and generally structured in connection to the main claim. Weak analogies may go unperceived because they are informal kinds of fallacies which are neither true nor false but may be misleading if the audience knows little about the compared entities. In foreign policy decision making, lessons learnt from the past are usually taken up when reasoning about current decision. While analogies from history is supposed to be a common practice in decision making, this kind of reasoning presents a real problem due to the risk of weak premises to support the intended comparison. In fact, “no two historical events are identical and that the future is more than a linear extension of the past” (Record 1998: 1).

The third type of strategic maneuvering derailment characterizing a great part of the American corpus (30%) is the one violating the validity rule. This rule requires the arguments to be logically valid, that is, their conclusion should be logically entailed by the premises. Most of the derailments indeed, occur in establishing false dichotomies. Also known as a false dilemma, a false dichotomy is a fallacy that involves a situation in which limited alternatives are considered, when in fact there is at least one additional option. A substantial number of arguments supporting a decision (in deliberative argumentations) develop as the only alternative to an eminent disaster. The strategy is commonly employed by politicians, mainly in times of crisis or crucial during policy deliberations, to reduce the attention of the public and limit their perspective in order to enhance the chance of the assimilation of their own proposals. The false dilemma strategies may be detected in most of the against-withdrawal-decision op-ed pieces as overall strategy developed in the line of arguments (see findings on the confrontation and argumentation stage analyses). However, when it comes to local argumentative

maneuvers, the false dilemma moves were detected mostly at the single argument level more often used in the concluding stage. The following example (65) describes a case of resolution outcome maneuvering provoking a false dilemma. Ralph Peter calls for the American public to support staying the course in Iraq, by asserting that there is no alternative other than a disastrous withdrawal which would, in his views, produce massacres and undermine national security.

- (65) I hate the long-mismanaged mess in Iraq. I wish there were a sensible, decent way to get out that wouldn't undercut our security and produce massive innocent casualties. But there isn't. (Ralph Peters, *New York Post*)

This “either this or that” reasoning suggests that there is no other solution than the one advanced by the arguer. It also represents a common practice that it is hardly believable in a an age of more public access to political information and resources, where citizens are supposedly knowledgeable about the on-going debate on national issues and aware of the variety of alternatives proposed as solution to the Iraq problem. Furthermore, the findings revealed that the mostly widely read newspapers scored high in false dilemma and ad hominem fallacies, which means that these derailment are committed by the most eminent opinion leaders. This discovery opens up questions on the kind of institutional preconditions for strategic maneuvering in these papers, which seem unrestrictive of certain kinds of (ideally) unacceptable maneuvers and render them conventional practice.

In the Arab corpus, the cases of strategic maneuvering derailments were mainly identified as cases of violations of the rule of relevance, the rule of argument scheme and the validity rule. Most violations to the relevance rule in the corpus occur in 26.6% of corpus and are mainly related to the conclusions drawn irrelevantly from the premises (occurring in the argumentation stage), while some of the derailments may also occur in confrontational strategies with the *tu quoque* or the appeal to hypocrisy regarding the opponent’s position, (identified in 2 American op-ed pieces).

Discussion Rule	Fallacy	Occurrence/ percentage		Total %
Rule 1 Freedom	<i>Ad hominem</i>	1	3.3	
	<i>Ad miserecordiam</i>	0	0	
				3.3
Rule 2 Shifting the burden	<i>Ad ignorantiam</i>			
	Shifting the burden	0	0	
				0
Rule 3 Standpoint	Straw man	0	0	
				0
Rule 4 Relevance	<i>Ad verecundiam</i>	1	0	
	<i>Tu quoque</i>	2	0	
	<i>Ignoratio elenchi</i> /Red herring	2	26.6	
				26.6
Rule 5 Unexpressed Premise	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Rule 6 Starting point	Complex question	0	0	
				0
Rule 7 Argument Scheme	Hasty generalization	1	0	
	<i>Ad consequentiam</i>	1	3.3	
	<i>Non causa pro causa</i>	1	3.3	
	Slippery slope	2	3.3	
	Weak analogy	1	13.3	
				20
Rule 8 Validity	False dichotomy	3	10	
	Formal fallacies	0	0	
	Begging the question	2	6.6	
				16.6
Rule 9 Closure	<i>Ad ignorantiam</i>	2	0	
				6.6
Rule 10 Usage	Ambiguity	0	2	
				6.6

Table 7.24. Strategic maneuvering derailments in the Arab corpus

As shown in Table 7. 24, up to 20% of the Arab arguers draw irrelevant conclusion and commit the fallacy of *ignoratio elenchi* known as the arguments whose premises have no direct relation with the claim at issue. The following derailing move is an example:

- (66) Said (referring to an Iraqi politician in 1950s) explained that Iraq was composed of various ethnicities and doctrines and how different it was from Egypt, a country with a homogeneous population and cohesive government. What Said's

words suggested was that Iraq needs a strongman to keep it together, someone like Al-Hajjaj, or Saddam. (Mustapha El Feki, *Al Masry Al Youm*)

The claim made here is that Iraq needs on strong ruler to be able to function as a state (basing this conclusion on the premise that “all various ethnicity and doctrine state needs a dictator”). The problem does not only lie in the fact that this syllogism may not be acceptable, because the unexpressed premise does not hold as a true, but also because the author uses this argument to support his main standpoint in favor of democracy. A standpoint stating that “a unified democratic country must be created” would not possibly be supported by a sub-argument claiming that dictatorship is the best option for Iraq, as this move is invalid because it advances contradictory arguments (illogical presumption fallacies). The strategic maneuvering in this example derails committing various fallacies, but it mainly violates the rule of relevance as it adapts an argument purporting to establish a particular conclusion and directs it to prove a different conclusion

Violations of the argument scheme rule were identified in 20% of the corpus realized in relation to different kinds of argument schemes hence resulting in different fallacious moves. The identified violations are derailments generating different kinds of fallacies such as the *Non causa pro causa* fallacy (6.6%), hasty generalization, *ad consequentiam*, slippery slopes and weak analogy.

Finally, some cases of validity rule violations were identified in 16.6% op-ed pieces in the Arab corpus, where the most prominent fallacy is the false dichotomy (10%) and begging the question (6.6%). Begging the question is a type of circular reasoning that involves drawing a conclusion that is included in the premises. A number of other fallacies are also identified and classified as violations of other rules for critical discussion that as the closure rule related in the concluding stage found in 6.6% of the discussions and exclusively related in *ad ignorantiam* or appeal to ignorance (asserting a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false or vice versa). The move, below, illustrates an example of derailment produced by circular reasoning (begging the question fallacy). The arguer asserts there are three things, but advances two, while the third is the same as second, but put in slightly different terms.

- (67) Here are three things that need to be done: First, a unified democratic country must be created, (...) Second, pluralism must be recognized, (...). Third, (...) pluralism is the only way forward. (Mustapha El Feki, *Al MASry Al Youm*)

The analysis and evaluation of arguments allowed the location of the maneuverings causing strategic derailments. This was carried out following the interactional-based Pragma-dialectics approach to fallacies, that gives insight into the kind of obstacles arguers –as protagonists- (intentionally or not) put forward against the resolution of their conflicts with their antagonists. Ideological structures probably play a significant role in motivating the use these kinds of maneuvers, as they emerge unmistakably with cases of abuse of the dialectical aims and show the arguers' keenness to win the discussion at any cost.

The cases of manipulations are probably made more prominent in some kinds of derailments/fallacies more than others. Indeed, maneuvering with *ad hominem*, false dichotomy and false analogies are generally interpreted as confusing, manipulative and deceiving. However, the same ideological structures seem equally dominant in the strategic maneuvering usage even in cases regarded as effective. From an analytical perspective, derailments in strategic maneuvering are generally easier to classify as acts of manipulation than the effective cases of maneuvering, as they can serve as material proofs for manipulations. They are, indeed, widely interpreted as misleading (false dichotomy), arrogant (*ad hominem*), confusing (arguments from ignorance) and they are regarded as deceptive moves. In practice, however, and in the context of the “international” debate on such a contested issue as the Iraq war, the violations of the rules for critical discussion within the strategic maneuvering may not be the only adequate criteria for evaluating argumentation taking place in a large and global public space. The role of the ideological structure underlying the shared cognitions of experts group in each culture may be a more powerful factor in determining the kinds of derailments that could be committed. The rules for critical discussion may of course remain ideally and universally relevant cross-culturally, while deciding whether the maneuvers are derailments or not (in case of informal fallacies where arguments are not judged as valid but rather as cogent) rests on the analysts knowledge of not only the political situations, actors and policies but also on his/her awareness of the ideological force underlying this very “knowledge”.

7.7. Summary

This chapter presented the findings from our critical analysis of the ideologically driven maneuvering strategies performed by the American and the Arab FP experts in their op-ed debate on the Iraq war. The analysis followed the Pragma-dialectical method and exploited its notion of strategic maneuvering to determine the kinds of moves that indicated the arguers' effort to reconcile between their dialectical and persuasive goals. Our data analysis and interpretation have taken into account the role played by the institutions within which these op-ed pieces were produced as an attempt to reach a well-grounded understanding of the rules and conventions constraining the participants' strategic maneuverings (See Chapter 5). This step is regarded crucial within Pragma-dialectics and also in CDA in dealing with strategies involving such abstract phenomenon as ideology and in meeting the challenge of linking the cognitive backdrop to the discursive practices. Strategic maneuverings, as ideologically-prone discourse moves, were examined in the four stages guided by the ideal model of a critical discussion and also inspected in cases of derailment and occurrences of fallacies. The results showed the different approaches with which the two groups of FP experts maneuvered and in handling and pursuing their rhetorical goals. Across the four stages, their manifested strategies pointed to their predispositions for manifesting opposing ideological positions and perspectives on the Iraq situations and the kinds of solutions to be brought about.

In the confrontational stage, American experts tended to polarize their views with one opposing view which they framed as invalid, reducing options for their audiences. Others chose topics of shared agreement in their confrontation from which they shifted to a more controversial issue. The topic shifting maneuvering often functioned as a smokescreen used to obscure the real position and to presume agreement rather than engage in the defense of an acknowledged difference of opinion. Arab arguers, in turn, typically maneuvered to express their dissent and to make their discontent prominent or attempt to advance some strategic advice to American or international decision makers. Both groups rhetorically maneuvered using *propositio*, a presentational device that lexically influenced the account on the disagreement to their favor.

In the opening stage, both groups take the audiences as allies even though in the American corpus a number of manipulative ways of assigning roles to antagonists was detected in which arguers heavily presupposed agreement and ignored the audiences' avowed oppositions on polemical issues. As for establishing starting points, Americans worked with the consensus over the US mission in Iraq and took as common ground its legitimacy, fixing explicit agreement on the gravity of the situation, while the Arab group's dispersed starting points indicated the challenge they faced in deciding what common ground to set up with international and heterogeneous audience. Most of the starting points focused on the misfortune of Iraqis and attempted to call into question the power of the US, while other resorted to other audience-oriented strategies such as making reference to the notorious reputation of George Bush (for instance as being "stupid") to be able to pave the way for argumentation against his policies.

In the argumentation stage, two points were found to be in focus when identifying the maneuvering strategies: the process of locating arguments through *loci* and the kinds of *topoi* drawn upon to support them. The same claim themes were inspected and contrasted in the two corpora. Findings showed that while the American experts heavily drew conclusions based on the *loci* of relationship or circumstance in delineating the US policies and mission in Iraq, the Arab experts relied on the avail of testimony and of definitions in developing their arguments. The *loci* of relationship (for instance cause/effect) generally rely on common assumptions and implicit premises and the frequency of their use among American arguers showed the affluence of the cognitive resources they socially shared with their audiences. Arab arguers not only needed testimony as the most reliable warranty for arguments but also arguments from American authority and documents to overcome the challenge of conjecturing accusatory claims against the mainstream's logic. The two groups of arguers adopted different maneuvering strategies while using these different *loci*. However, Arab experts tended to stick to certification in order to allow their dissenting positions to be accepted along with their general rhetorical strategy of vituperation, most American arguers maneuvered with the irreparable or the gain and loss *loci*. Those maneuvering with the irreparable tended to call attention to the urgency of defending national assets by referring to security threats, victory as a target and global leadership as the representation of glory. The gains or losses *loci* attempted either to make the audience

visualize a bright future gained with perseverance and commitment to American values or to warn them from the disastrous consequences of the erroneous policy decisions. In both cases, arguers proved to be consistent in their presentational maneuvers in the use of *contrarium* to contrast their views with some opposite scenarios framed as interests-threatening situations. These lines of arguments relied heavily on the ideologically loaded *topoi*, namely American humanitarianism and global leadership and exceptionalism. Arab experts tended to draw on the commonly shared assumptions in third world countries on the US double-standard policies and its arrogance.

In the concluding stage, the preliminary inspection of maneuvers found similar patterns in two corpora in their approaches to the discussions' closures. Most arguers expressed personal attitudes on the war, reiterated their standpoints or, with lower frequencies, left the outcome resolution unexpressed. Differences, however, were noted in the kinds of maneuvering strategies adopted by each group. American experts stressed commitment to the American cause, namely its fight to terrorism and leadership in the spread of democracy. Others placed blame on politicians for their inefficiency and emphasized the timeliness of their proposal by reminding Americans of risks, enemies or more positively of rewarding victory. Their adaptation to the audience consisted of explicitly involving them in the decision making process by implicitly drawing on the principles of democracy and the importance of the public opinion in shaping the nations' foreign policies. Arab experts underscored accountability as an essential element to settle war conflicts. They either affirmed that the US was responsible for war crime or an obstacle to any solutions. Some others warned from an imminent disaster and called for American people/international community for arbitration. This explained the maneuvers made at the level of audience adaptation which were made prominent by framing the audience as victims of the US policies and manipulations, making the proposals seem to be advanced for their benefits or by praising them for their admirable moral values.

Finally, the cases of strategic maneuvering derailments were presented and discussed for each group of experts. The evaluation of strategic moves was carried out based on the rules for critical discussion proposed by Pragma-dialectics. The violations of certain rules were consistent with the kinds of ideological disposition of each cultural group and its power position within the international debate. American arguers more often

violated the freedom rule and in some case prevented antagonists from their right to doubt. Most derailments in this corpus consisted of committing *ad hominem* fallacies- attack the opponents' person instead of the argument- weak analogies or creating false dilemmas. These kinds of derailments pointed to the experts' tendency to the use of arrogance and manipulative means in framing controversial issues. Arab arguers' maneuvering derailments were equally noticeable and more related to violating the rules of relevance and the argument schemes. They showed a predisposition to draw irrelevant conclusions committing the fallacies of *ignoratio elenchi* and *red herring* indicative of the inconsistency between their goals and the premise they attempted to draw upon.

The notion of strategic maneuvering has opened up for a systematic analysis of the ideological structures underlying the argumentative discourse of FP experts in the two cultures in conflicts. Indeed, across the four stages of the critical discussions under study, the maneuvers were identified within the discourse moves which made prominent arguers' effort to reconcile between their dialectical goals with their rhetorical goals. These maneuvers provided for the interpretation of the arguers' motives put forward through different dialectical moves, such as their briefing on the disagreement, their assignment of roles to the discussion participants, their development of the lines of arguments and the decision they make on the outcome of the difference of opinion resolution. The dialectical goals helped along the characterization of the experts' rhetorical moves and the ideological structures underlying them.

CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS

This cross-cultural critical study of the discursive practices of the FP experts in American and Arab op-ed pieces attempted to understand how these practices were shaped by the differences in the power positions of nations-states within the international system and in their ideological perspectives. More specifically, it sought to critically examine the ideological structures underlying the experts' discursive choices and their argumentative strategies when discussing the Iraq war. The thesis addressed the following research questions. The first was concerned with how the FP experts in the two cultures discursively constructed the debate on Iraq and what ideological structures underlay their discursive decisions in relation to their topic selection and context construction. The second question focused on how ideologies manifested in the argumentative strategies used in the op-ed pieces.

The study adopted a CDS stance in the analysis of FP op-ed pieces. The socio-cognitive approach proposed by van Dijk and his theories on ideology (1998a) and context models (2008) were the major theoretical foundation for the study. The study endorsed analytic tools and theoretical insights from argumentation theory and more particularly from Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004) as the main methodological guide for investigation. Pragma-dialectics offered a number of analytic tools for the critical inspection of the op-ed discourse, namely the reconstruction of discourse and the arrangement of argumentative moves and structures based on the critical discussion model and on the specification of critical stages organizing the discourse units. These have been fundamental analytic steps in the tackling of the different research questions and dimensions pursued in this study. The three analytic parts of the thesis were divided as follows. The first part, chapter 5, examined the macro-context of FP op-ed pieces as an argumentative activity type. The second part, chapter 6, reported the findings from the analysis of discursive decisions made by the arguers in the two corpora in terms of their selections of topics and their discursive construction of context and purposeful actions. The final part, chapter 7, focused on the

argumentative strategies in the two corpora and reported the analysis carried out on the strategic maneuvering performed in the four stages of the critical discussions. It also devoted considerable attention to cases of fallacious moves in discourse.

The analysis of the FP experts' mindsets and ideological frameworks has shown that they form the institutional preconditions for the strategic maneuvering in their argumentative discourse. Following the Pragma-dialectical method guidelines for contextual inspections and its parameters for identifying strategic functions of argumentative moves, the institutional constraints were explored. First, the FP op-ed institutional point was determined in relation with the diverse professional backgrounds of active participants in the discourse and their different predispositions towards the purpose of mobilizing public opinion for policy decision addressed within FP debates in op-ed pieces. Then the op-ed pieces as an activity type were characterized based on the ideal model of critical discussion. Following the four focal points of critical discussions, the initial situation is prompted by the institution goals mediated by an authoritative arguer, the procedural and material starting points are party codified rules related to FP knowledge and international conventions, the argumentative means stem from the authors' expertise, and the outcome of the discussion is checked through research methods on public opinion. The final focus of the chapter was the nations' policy orientations constraining strategic maneuverings in the two cultural groups. The policy orientations of the US and the Arab nations were explored and their role in creating the preconditions for strategic maneuvering in each culture was substantiated with examples from the cultural groups' corpora.

In the American context, the section argued that FP experts' mindsets shaped by their institutional practices constrained their performance of strategic maneuverings through three main FP notions: interventionism, leadership and self-defense. These notions, generally translated into actual policies, were found to be based on core political values that constitute the set of constraints governing the FP experts' argumentative practices. The belief in the universality of the US values and in the US leadership and responsibility for promoting these political values in the world as a guarantee for peace and security has been strengthened by strong nationalism. These beliefs have

legitimated the use of military power as policy instruments and encouraged the US interventionist policies and the discursive practices developed to sustain them. In fact, these assumptions shaping the institutional and decision making conventions in the foreign policy discipline define the decision makers' sense of mission regardless of the political ideology they endorse (Chollet and Lindberg 2008). The analysis has revealed that these mindsets overlap with the specific aims and conventions of political institutions and constrain the strategic maneuvering in FP debates. This characterization of the American macro-context was coupled with analysis of institutionally constrained maneuvering cases from the American corpus.

As far as the Arab context is concerned, the exploration of the institutional conventions in the Arab nations as preconditions for strategic maneuvering was carried out along with analysis of cases of institutionally constrained strategic moves performed by Arab arguers in the corpus, in the commitments they drew upon with audience and the starting points they chose to establish in their discussions. The Arab FP op-ed pieces were found to be constrained by three political conditions. First, the op-ed specific institutional aims derived from "Omni-balancing" policies, which are political strategies practiced by most authoritarian state leaders in the Arab region. This condition has created a macro-contextual institutional aim for op-ed pieces discourse. Second, the English edition newspapers allowed most state leaders to use experts as their spokesmen. The international public space of the op-ed piece is exploited as a policy instrument for diplomacy and political communication in times of crises and conflict. Third, the promotion of national values and sentiments is institutionally encouraged in the international communicative contexts, as mechanisms of self-positioning and means to show resistance and conceal the actual policy orientations of cooperation with the US undertaken by states leaders. With these mindsets FP experts strategically maneuvered in their op-ed pieces. The institutional conventions in each cultural context shape differently the main reserve for the experts' maneuvering strategies with audiences' commitments and the preconditions for establishing their starting points in the op-ed pieces.

The findings from the analysis of discursive constructions of the Iraq War in the op-ed pieces presented in Chapter 6 showed two main dimensions: topic selection and context. The examination of topic selection choices started with the analysis of macro-semantic structures in the op-ed pieces along with examination of the pragmatic dimension of the topic selections. Findings revealed the difference in the topical trends in each op-ed corpus and the disagreement spaces from which these topics were selected. American arguers advanced positions from the same disagreement space and focused attention in the debate on withdrawal from Iraq whereas Arabs evoked a variety of disagreement spaces which showed a lack of consensus between them in the debate on Iraq. American choices matched well with common national consensus of the experts' community focusing on the urgency of solution. Their highly deliberative topics denoted their power and decision makers' stances, confirmed by a clear trend in stasis forwarding their action-oriented perspective. The Arab experts' topics on the other hand, were based on protest but scattered along different concerns. They mainly adopted epideictic and judicial oratory from a qualitative stasis to call for holding the US accountable for the disaster in Iraq.

Drawing on Van Dijk's framework for context models (2008), context construction analysis focused on two schematic categories of context models: setting (space) and, participants' identities, roles and relations. The results revealed the different approaches with which the two cultural groups construct setting and participants' identities in discourse and hinted at the differences in the structural bases from which the two groups constructed context models. Indeed, American experts tended to switch between different types of identity, while preserving their recognizable national identity of Americanism. They also made prominent their professional identities through a decision makers' stance. Arab experts on the other hand, tended to contextualize one identity and abstained from showing any decision-maker self (given the fact that they were decision makers in their cultural contexts), and enacted their roles as resistant groups to the dominating power acting, therefore, in accordance with the setting and goals imposed by the international debate situation. The final section of the chapter focused on the purposeful actions discursively constructed in the main standpoints. These discursive constructions were analyzed based on the theoretical framework proposed by van Leeuwen (2008). The systematic analysis of the topic selection and the contextual

schematic categories revealed the ideologically biased constructions characteristic for each of cultural group of arguers and denotes the differences in their power positions in the debate controlled by their diametrically opposed positions as political actors in the international arena.

Chapter 7 reported the results from the critical study of the maneuvering strategies performed by the two FP experts' groups in their op-ed pieces and their underlying ideologically dimensions. The strategic maneuverings performed by American and Arab FP experts were examined in the four stages distinguished in the ideal model of a critical discussion and also evaluated according to the rules for critical discussion to uncover fallacious moves. Findings indicated that in the four stages, each group of experts manifested different strategic maneuverings which underscored their opposing ideological positions towards on the Iraq war and their different perspectives on the stakes related to the international crisis.

The analysis of the maneuvering in the confrontational stage revealed how American experts polarized their views with one opponent or shifted topics to avoid conflict while Arab experts expressed their dissent or advanced some strategic advice to American or international decision makers. In the opening stage, the two groups of experts chose a position of doubt for their audiences rather than disagreement. American experts tended to ignore existing disagreement and such maneuvering was considered manipulative. Americans relied on the commitment of audience to the US mission in Iraq and on the agreement on the magnitude of the situation as their starting points. The Arab experts' maneuvering, in contrast, showed the challenging task of finding common ground with international audience and some resorted to audience-adaptation strategies in order to enhance their argumentative appeals.

The findings showed that in the argumentation stage the American experts tended to develop arguments based on the *loci* of relationship or circumstance in describing the US mission in Iraq, whereas the Arab experts drew more often on testimony and definitions in their arguments. This was explained by the fact that the American arguers'

rich cognitive reserve which they socially shared with their audiences opened up for their use of the implicit premises within the *loci* of relationship. The Arab arguers in turn pursued the most reliable warranty for arguments, testimony, mainly arguments from American authority to substantiate their accusations and to make up for the lack of common ground. The two groups of arguers adopted different maneuvering strategies while using these different *loci*. Most American arguers maneuvered with the irreparable or the gain and loss *loci* by either appealing to the audience to act quickly to protect national interest or by arousing audience excitement for future achievement or raise their awareness on the disastrous consequences of adopting flawed policy decisions. Conversely, Arab experts maneuvered by certification from sources trusted by their targeted audiences in order to enhance the chance for their dissented voices to be heard while adopting a general rhetorical strategy of vituperation and harsh criticism. American experts developed these lines of arguments while drawing on the ideologically biased *topoi* of American humanitarianism and global leadership. The Arab experts, in contrast, relied on the culturally-shared beliefs of the US abuses and arrogance in the international arena.

In the concluding stage, experts in the two cultural groups concluded the outcome of their discussions with disparate manners. American experts focused on commitment to the American cause, and they explicitly involved the audience in the decision making process. Arab experts warned from the eminence of more disastrous consequences and for called for American people/international community for arbitration.

The results from the analysis of the strategic maneuvering derailments were presented in the final section of the chapter. The evaluation of argumentation in the two corpora followed the norms established by the rules for critical discussion proposed byPragma-dialectics. Findings confirmed that the cases of derailments were consistent with the kinds of ideologies engrained in the practices of each cultural group and enhanced by its world power position. The strategic maneuvering of American experts derailed by committing *ad hominem* fallacies- attack the opponents' person instead of the argument- and by establishing weak analogies or creating false dilemmas. These findings conform

to the use of arrogance and manipulative means detected in as strategic trend used by this group in framing controversial issues. The strategic maneuvering of Arab arguers derailed when violating the rules of relevance and the argument schemes. Their repeated fallacious moves in drawing irrelevant conclusions (*ignoratio elenchi* and *red herring*) indicated the blatant inconsistency between their goals and their premises.

The findings from the three analytic parts offered a quite extended insight into the ideologically-biased discursive and argumentative practices of two groups of opinion leaders in two nations at “war”. Their different strategic maneuverings and their discursive constructions of the debate delineated not only their different perspectives and priorities, but also their antagonistic interests and the role of their world power positions and institutional political cultures in shaping the debate on Iraq.

The thesis has dedicated special attention to the argumentative dimension of the discourse of foreign policy experts in the American and the Arab cultures and attempted to elucidate the ideological foundations of the approaches adopted by the two cultural groups of experts to defend their positions along their interests on Iraq through a public debate of global reach. This endeavor attempted to make the following contributions. First, from a discursive research perspective, this work joins the everlasting commitment of CDS scholars to inter-disciplinarity and more particularly to the call to arms to benefit from theoretical and methodological insights of argumentation theory for the analysis of argumentative discourse (See Fairclough & Fairclough 2012; Ihnen & Richardson 2011; Zagar 2010). Second, the thesis has centered on the socio-cognitive dimension of the experts’ discourse and attempted to bring Pragma-dialectics along with the exploration of ideologies despite some presumed theoretical barriers between van Dijk’s sociocognitive approach and van Eemeren’s Pragma-dialectics, which are probably due to different research interests rather than different conceptual understanding (see Chapter 3 section 3.3.4). Third, analysis of op-ed pieces as an argumentative activity type followed the guidance of Pragma-dialectics while attempting to place special emphasis on maneuvering constraints of higher level in the macro-context of foreign policy. Indeed, while the seemingly little saliency of the

institutional constraints for maneuvering in op-ed pieces presented great opportunities for the arguers to maneuver at their wish, the foreign policy orientations and core political principles reigning in each culture seemed to set the boundaries for argumentative moves.

To my knowledge, the present research is the first in CDS to attempt to critically investigate argumentation in the discourse of FP experts from a cross-cultural perspective and, as such, several limitations deserve comment. First, the study focused on op-ed pieces and did not include other media channels where FP experts usually operate more visibly. The op-ed piece hence as an argumentative activity type offered little access for research to the constraints and preconditions for participants' strategic maneuvering. Empirical investigation of how this influential social group manages discussions and strategically maneuvers within more accessible activity type situations such as broadcast debates is an important next step. Second, the contextual construction strategies uncovered in this work did not devote attention to participants' knowledge, despite the fact that it is a central category in mental models schemas and a crucial element of the group social cognition. Discursive construction of knowledge may very powerfully signal the speaker's ideology and indicate the underlying socially shared belief system upon which this knowledge is drawn. Promising results may be obtained from critical analysis focusing on contextual constructions of knowledge in discourse. More importantly, insight from argumentative theory on how to systematically locate knowledge in discourse should offer invaluable support for such an endeavor. Furthermore, the critical analysis of the FP experts' construction of knowledge in discourse may be linked to the strategic maneuvering they perform both at a macro and micro-levels. Since the principal function of context models is "to produce discourse in such a way that is optimally appropriate in the social situation" (van Dijk, 2009: 7), their manifestation in discourse should not only point toward the discourse participants' understanding of a given state of affairs but also explain the reason behind their strategic maneuvers. An integration of the socio-cognitive dimension into the analysis of discourse participants' strategic maneuvering may render the researcher's interpretation more expedient.

The practices of FP experts and the impact of their discourses on the development and the shaping of international relations definitely require more attention from CDS scholars. Research is needed, indeed, on the discourse and the argumentative strategies used by this group of opinion leaders in order to implement vital decisions which dictate the world order, shape nations-states relationships and the lives of ordinary people. Critically examining the belief systems controlling these kinds of discourses is still a challenge for CDS.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: AMERICAN OP-ED PIECES

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THESIS SUMMARY

IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE STRUCTURES IN OPINION ARTICLES: A CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY

I. Introduction

The present thesis is a cross-cultural study of the discourses of foreign policy (FP) experts in op-ed pieces discussing the war in Iraq. It explores the underlying ideologies guiding the discursive practices of two FP expert groups from two nations involved in the armed conflict. The study draws upon the stances of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) and Pragma-dialectics and analyzes the discourses of American and Arab op-ed pieces and aims to unveil the ideological structures constraining the discursive constructions of the Iraq war as well as the argumentative strategies used in the discussions of the policies in Iraq. Ideology in this kind of political discourse has been critically approached from a sociocognitive perspective to CDS as “the basis of the social representations shared by members of a group” (van Dijk 1998a: 8). The sociocognitive approach emphasizes the role of cognition in the study of ideology and the belief in the cognitive interface mediating discourse and society. The systematic analysis of the argumentative strategies in the op-ed pieces is based on the method of Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004) and its notion of strategic maneuvering. This work aims to bring more attention to the discourse of FP experts as influential social groups and main actors in international relations and to better understand the role of their ideologies in the communicative processes they undertake in media of global circulation.

II. Objectives

The main aim of the present cross-cultural study is to examine and contrast the ideological structures underlying the discourses of the FP experts in the American and Arab op-ed pieces dealing with the Iraq war during the period referred to as “the Surge”

(from late 2006 to September 2007). This project hopes to explore the ideologically constrained backdrop of the discursive practices of these FP experts and opinion leaders in two cultures at war. The critical analyses of the discursive and the argumentative strategies of these experts in each culture aim to unveil their underlying ideological structures. Research is prompted by two research questions. The first is concerned with the strategic choices that FP experts in the two cultures make in their discursive construction of the debate on Iraq, in terms of their selections of topics and construction of context in discourse. The second seeks to explore the argumentative moves in the op-ed pieces that indicate ideologically driven decisions.

To answer these questions, the study takes the stance of CDA and integrates the van Dijk's sociocognitive approach with Pragma-dialectics. The thesis draws on the theories advanced by van Dijk on the concept of ideology and its manifestation in the discourse of the powerful elite and their role in reproducing dominance or resistance. The systematic method of Pragma-dialectics, as proposed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), assists in the analysis and the evaluation of argumentative strategies and the characterization of op-ed discourse as an argumentative activity type. The study mainly draws on the notion of strategic maneuvering (van Eemeren, 2010) which may be regarded as a resourceful analytic tool for the study of ideologies in argumentative discourse. It also focuses on the constraints created by context, mainly ideologically ingrained practices, that shape the argumentative and discursive choices made by the FP op-ed authors.

The first research question related to the discursive constructions of the debate on Iraq focused on three aspects: the arguers' selections of topics, their definition of context and their construction of purpose in actions, the latter draws on the framework of van Leeuwen (2008). The second research question concerned with the ideological strategies underlying the experts' argumentative practice focused on the strategic maneuverings performed by FP experts in each culture in light of their respective group-shared cognitions. Examining the discursive constructions and the argumentative maneuvers should expose the strategic choices of the experts and the ideological foundation of their social cognition.

III. Results

The results from the analysis of the discourses of the two groups of FP experts are presented in three different chapters: five, six and seven. Chapter five has reported the findings from the analysis of the FP experts' mindsets and their ideological frameworks. Based on Pragma-dialectics and its tools for examining the discourse activity type the strategic functions of argumentative moves and the institutional constraints have been explored. First, the FP op-ed institutional point has been determined in relation with the professional backgrounds of the different participants their purposes of mobilizing public opinion for policy decision addressed within FP debates in op-ed pieces. Then the op-ed pieces as an activity type have been characterized based on the ideal model of critical discussion. Following the four focal points of critical discussions, the initial situation has been prompted by the institution goals mediated by an authoritative arguer, the procedural and material starting points have been party codified rules related to FP knowledge and international conventions, the argumentative means stemmed from the authors' expertise, and the outcome of the discussion was the object of research methods on public opinion. The final focus of the chapter has been the nations' policy orientations constraining strategic maneuverings in the two cultural groups. The policy orientations of the US and the Arab nations have been explored and their role in creating the preconditions for strategic maneuvering in each culture has been substantiated with examples from the cultural groups' corpora.

Chapter 6 presents the findings from the analysis of discursive constructions of the Iraq War in the op-ed pieces. The results are related to 1) topic selection (semantic macro-structures, oratory types and stasis) 2) context (setting and participants' identity) and 3) the construction of purpose in actions, based on the theoretical framework proposed by van Leeuwen (2008). The analysis of semantic macro-structures in the op-ed pieces reveals the difference in the topical trends in each op-ed corpus and points to different disagreement spaces in each cultural group. American arguers advance positions from the same disagreement space and focus attention in the debate on withdrawal from Iraq. Their topics match well with common national consensus and with their need of the experts' assistance in finding solutions. Their highly deliberative topics denote their power and decision makers' stances, confirmed by a clear trend in stasis forwarding their action-oriented perspective. The Arab experts, on the other hand, select their topics

from a variety of disagreement spaces and show a lack of consensus among them in the debate on Iraq. Their choice of oratory and stasis indicate their concern with protest and their interest in holding the US accountable for the disaster in Iraq.

The results from the analysis of the construction of context focus on two schematic categories of context models: setting (space) and, participants' identities, roles and relations (based on Van Dijk's (2008) framework for context models). The results reveal major differences in the way each cultural group construct setting and participants' identities in discourse and in the structural bases from which the two groups construct context models. The American experts alternate between different types of identity, but make their national identity and their professional identities more prominent. The Arab experts, on the other hand, tend to contextualize one identity and show no decision-maker self (despite the fact that they are decision makers in their respective states), and enact their roles as resistant groups to the dominating power acting. They seem to take into account the international dimension of the communicative setting. The final section of the chapter deals with the contextual construction of purpose in actions. Focusing on the main standpoints, these discursive constructions have been analyzed based on the theoretical framework proposed by van Leeuwen (2008). The findings reveal that American experts construct activated actions produced almost exclusively by intentional and controlling American agents. The moralized actions and purposes in this corpus reflect a legitimation strategy, as they are connected to warfare values and the protection of common national interest. The Arab experts, however, make extensive use of abstracted actions which are mainly concerned with Americans. Their moralization in the construction of Americans' actions and purposes reflect a delegitimation strategy

Chapter seven presents the findings from the analysis of the ideologically driven maneuvering strategies performed by the American and the Arab FP experts in their debate on the Iraq war. Strategic maneuverings have been examined in the four stages guided by the ideal model of a critical discussion while paying attention to the cases of derailment recognized as fallacies. The results show the differences between the two groups of FP experts in maintaining the balance between their dialectical goals and their

rhetorical goals. In the confrontational stage, the American experts tend to either polarize against their opponents' views or to use a topic shifting strategy as a smokescreen to hide their actual positions. The Arab arguers maneuver to express their dissent or attempt to advance some strategic advice to American or international decision makers. In the opening stage, the American arguers work with the national consensus on the legitimacy of the US mission in Iraq and focus on the seriousness of the situation. The Arab experts, on the other hand, maneuver with different starting points which indicate the challenge they face in establishing consensus within an international and heterogeneous debate context. A major part of these starting points focus on the misfortune of Iraqis and attempt to call into question the power of the US.

In the argumentation stage, findings show that while the American experts heavily draw conclusions based on the *loci* of relationship or circumstance in describing the US policies in Iraq, the Arab experts rely on testimony and definitions in developing their arguments. The *loci* of relationship are generally based on common assumptions and implicit premises and the frequency of their use among American arguers confirms the high level of common ground socially shared with their audiences. Most of the American arguers maneuver with the irreparable or the gain and loss *loci*. The *loci* of the irreparable indicate the arguers' emphasis on the urgency of defending national interests through reference to threats, victory and global leadership. The gains or losses *loci* attempt either to depict rewards to commitment to American values or to warn the audience from the devastating costs of using the wrong policies. These lines of arguments rely heavily on the ideologically loaded *topoi*, namely American humanitarianism, global leadership and exceptionalism.

The Arab arguers, however, make use of testimony, arguments from (American) authority and documents in the accusatory strategies they use against their opponents. Indeed, the extensive use of these certification *loci* supports their dissenting positions and their general rhetorical strategy of vituperation. These experts tend to draw on *topoi* which are commonly shared assumptions in third world countries namely, the claim that the US is arrogance and that it employs double-standard policies.

In the concluding stage, most of the arguers in the two groups express personal attitudes on the war, reiterate their standpoints or, with lower frequencies, leave the outcome

resolution unexpressed. However, there are noteworthy maneuvering strategies which distinguish the two groups. The American experts stress their commitment to the American cause and urge their audience to make the “right” decision by reminding them of risks, enemies or a rewarding victory. The Arab experts underscore accountability as an essential element to settle war conflicts. They either affirm that the US is responsible for war crime or is an obstacle to any solution. Some others warn from an imminent disaster and call Americans or the international community for arbitration.

The last section of Chapter 7 devotes attention to fallacies. It presents and discusses some cases of strategic maneuvering derailments performed by each group of experts. The strategic moves have been evaluated based on the rules for critical discussion proposed by Pragma-dialectics. The strategic moves violating the rules of critical discussion match with the kinds of ideological disposition of each cultural group and its power position within the international debate. American arguers are found to commit more violations of the freedom rules with *ad hominem* or false dilemmas fallacies. This signals their arrogance and their manipulative means when framing controversial issues. Maneuvering derails in the Arab corpus through violations of the rules of relevance and the argument schemes. The fallacies of *ignoratio elenchi* and *red herring* indicate the contradiction between their goals and the premises they attempt to draw upon.

IV. Conclusions

This thesis aims to study the discursive strategies of opinion leaders in the field of FP. This project attempts to elucidate the discursive practices of the FP experts in American and Arab op-ed pieces discussing the war in Iraq. More specifically, this cross-cultural study seeks to critically examine the ideological structures underlying the experts’ discursive choices and their argumentative strategies presumably shaped by their respective power positions within the international system and their ideological perspectives towards the Iraq conflict. The study adopts the stance of CDA, more specifically the socio-cognitive approach proposed by van Dijk (1998a; 2008), and employed the analytic tools and theoretical insights of Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004) as the main methodological guide for investigation. Results are presented and discussed on the analysis of 1) the macro-context of FP op-ed pieces as

an argumentative activity type, 2) the arguers' selections of topics and their construction of context and purposeful actions, and 3) the argumentative strategic maneuverings performed in the four stages of the op-ed pieces.

The systematic analysis of the topic selection and the contextual schematic categories reveals the ideologically biased constructions characteristic in each group of arguers and denotes the differences in their power positions within the debate which were controlled by their opposed positions as political actors in the international arena. The analysis of strategic maneuvering consists in identifying the discourse moves which make prominent the arguers' effort to reconcile between their dialectical goals with their rhetorical goals. These maneuvers shed light on the arguers' motives throughout different dialectical stages and the ideological structures underlying them.

There are several avenues to extend this study. Particular interest should be paid in CDS to these groups of opinion leaders in matters related to international relation and FP and to their discursive practices in different media channels. Furthermore, more critical inspection is needed of the structures knowledge employed within the discursive construction of context. Participants' construction of knowledge should signal their underlying socially-shared belief systems and their ideological foundations in each culture. The integration of methods from argumentation theory with the sociocognitive approach could reinforce the analysis and the interpretation of the various discursive strategies used by FP experts and opinion leaders in their debates aimed at influencing the course of events around the world.

RESUMEN DE LA TESIS

ESTRUCTURAS DEL DISCURSO IDEOLÓGICO EN LOS ARTICULOS DE OPINIÓN: ESTUDIO CULTURAL COMPARATIVO

I. INTRODUCCIÓN

La presente investigación analiza críticamente las estructuras ideológicas del discurso de los expertos en política exterior sobre el tema de la guerra de Irak. El análisis se centra en comparar el uso de las estrategias discursivas utilizadas por los expertos en los artículos de opinion publicados en prensa estadounidense y árabe durante el periodo denominado “The Surge” (desde finales de 2006 hasta Septiembre 2007). El estudio está basado en el marco del Análisis Crítico del Discurso (ACD) y las teorías de la argumentación y pretende alcanzar dos objetivos. En primer lugar, intenta examinar la construcción del contexto en el discurso de los artículos de opinión, entendiendo éstos como una producción controlada por los modelos mentales o contextuales de los expertos. Los modelos contextuales representan la interfaz cognitiva entre discurso y sociedad (van Dijk 2000). En segundo lugar, el estudio trata de identificar las ideologías que subyacen a las estrategias de argumentación usadas por los expertos y que juegan un papel importante en el desempeño de la labor de debatir y tomar decisiones en temas de guerra.

El método analítico combina herramientas del ACD, concretamente el enfoque sociocognitivo propuesto por van Dijk (1998, 2008), con las de la teoría pragmático-dialéctica de van Eemeren & Grootendorst (2004) y también las de la retórica clásica para investigar sesenta artículos de opinión de circulación internacional (treinta artículos de prensa estadounidense y treinta de prensa árabe). El análisis se enfoca en lo siguiente: 1) la selección de temas y la construcción discursiva de características contextuales tales como escenario (especialmente del lugar) y las identidades de los participantes en la situación comunicativa, 2) las maniobras estratégicas de argumentación que los expertos suelen emplear para mantener el equilibrio entre sus

objetivos dialécticos de razón y sus objetivos retóricos de persuasión. Como se verá más abajo, los resultados muestran patrones recurrentes en las prácticas discursivas de cada grupo de expertos en política exterior y revelan que sus estrategias están ideológicamente sesgadas y determinadas por la posición de poder de sus respectivas naciones y sus posturas en el conflicto armado en Irak.

II. SÍNTESIS: OBJETIVOS Y RESULTADOS

Las decisiones y acciones en política exterior que implican guerra y paz no solamente afectan a los intereses comunes de una nación, también pueden cambiar el destino de terceros países. En este sentido, la contribución de los expertos en política exterior, y, más concretamente, sus prácticas comunicativas, juegan un papel importante. Las disposiciones políticas de estos agentes emergen del escenario cognitivo de sus prácticas profesionales, es decir, de su “cognición social compartida”, como sus valores, actitudes, creencias, identidades colectivas, cogniciones políticas (objetivos y valores) e ideologías. Estas posturas se reflejan en sus artículos de opinión y, de manera más específica, en las prácticas argumentativas que utilizan para justificar, legitimar, autorizar y condenar políticas, y sobre todo, para poner en práctica decisiones políticas que pueden tener consecuencias trascendentales. Esta tesis está motivada por el interés en el poder del discurso argumentativo de los expertos en política exterior y en su base sociocognitiva como indicadora de sus agendas políticas e ideológicas.

El discurso de los expertos políticos se ha estudiado en ACD como parte del discurso político de la élite (Van Dijk, 1993; 1995), pero se ha investigado poco sobre cómo sus procesos de razonamiento están condicionados por su cultura e ideología. El enfoque de ACD ha estado siempre interesado en examinar los discursos de los actores sociales poderosos, tal como muestran los trabajos en el ámbito del discurso político en distintos escenarios institucionales, tanto a nivel nacional (véase Chilton, 2004; Chilton & Schäffner, 2002; Van Dijk 2002; Wodak 2009) como internacional (Chilton, 1995; 1996, Mussolf, 2004). No obstante, se ha prestado poca atención al discurso argumentativo de los actores de la política exterior (a excepción de Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). Los líderes de opinión en general merecen más atención porque

interpretan y divulgan mensajes políticos para el público con motivo de ayudarlo a entender asuntos políticos complejos. Sin embargo, en el ámbito de asuntos exteriores, estos líderes de opinión actúan según sus propios objetivos políticos, aunque en algunos casos su “trabajo ideológico” no siempre se percibe fácilmente, y, por tanto, puede tener un gran efecto.

Las tres partes analíticas en esta tesis están divididas de la siguiente manera. La primera parte, Capítulo 5, examina el escenario mental con el cual los expertos en política exterior operan y el macro-contexto de los artículos de opinión de política exterior como tipo de actividad argumentativa. La segunda parte, Capítulo 6, expone los resultados del análisis de las decisiones discursivas tomadas por los expertos en las dos culturas en cuanto a su selección de temas y sus construcciones discursivas del contexto así como del propósito de las acciones. La última parte, Capítulo 7, examina las estrategias argumentativas en los dos grupos de expertos y presenta los resultados del análisis de sus respectivas maniobras estratégicas realizadas en las cuatro etapas de las discusiones críticas. Además, el capítulo se centra en las violaciones de las normas dialécticas en las maniobras y en las falacias que éstas producen en el discurso.

El resultado del análisis del escenario mental de los expertos en política exterior y sus marcos ideológicos muestra que estos últimos forman las precondiciones institucionales que facilitan el uso de las maniobras estratégicas en el discurso argumentativo. Las restricciones institucionales se examinaron según las directrices del método de Pragma-dialéctica, especialmente, la inspección del contexto y sus parámetros, con el fin de identificar las funciones estratégicas de los movimientos discursivos. En primer lugar, se determinó el objetivo institucional de los artículos de opinión escritos sobre política exterior con relación a la intención de los participantes de movilizar a la opinión pública para la toma de decisiones políticas.

Los artículos de opinión se analizaron de acuerdo con el modelo ideal de la discusión crítica propuesta por el método Pragma-dialéctico. La última parte de este capítulo se centró en la orientación política de las dos naciones y en las restricciones que provocan en las maniobras estratégicas de argumentación empleadas por los expertos de cada cultura. Estas orientaciones políticas y sus efectos sobre el discurso argumentativo se ilustraron mediante el análisis de ejemplos relevantes del corpus.

Los resultados del análisis de las construcciones discursivas de la guerra de Iraq en los artículos de opinión presentados en el capítulo 6 se dividen en dos partes: resultados sobre la selección de temas y resultados sobre el contexto. La investigación sobre la selección de los temas a debatir comenzó con el análisis de las estructuras macro-semánticas en los artículos y ha mostrado tanto diferencias en las tendencias de cada grupo de expertos en elegir los temas como diferencias en los espacios de disenso. Los expertos norteamericanos presentan argumentos desde el mismo espacio de disenso y centran el debate nacional en la retirada de las tropas de Irak, mientras los expertos árabes evocan una variedad de espacios de disenso, lo cual indica su falta de consenso respecto a su participación en el debate internacional sobre Irak.

El análisis de las construcciones del contexto recurre al marco teórico propuesto por van Dijk (2008) y se centra en dos categorías esquemáticas de los modelos de contexto: el escenario (concretamente, el espacio) y las identidades de los participantes. Los resultados muestran los diferentes enfoques adoptados por cada grupo de expertos en sus construcciones del contexto, e indican diferencias en las bases estructurales a partir de las cuales se desarrollan las construcciones del contexto. De hecho, los expertos norteamericanos tienden a alternar entre varios tipos de identidad si bien mantienen su reconocida identidad nacional basada en el “Americanismo”. Manifiestan también su identidad profesional como agentes a cargo de la toma de decisiones. Los expertos árabes en cambio, tienden a contextualizar una sola identidad y evitan mostrar una postura de responsables de la toma de decisiones a pesar de que en su región son en la práctica agentes influyentes en materia de política exterior. Escogen desempeñar el papel de la resistencia frente al poder dominante y actúan de acuerdo con el escenario y los objetivos dictados por el espacio público dedicado al debate internacional sobre Irak. La última parte del capítulo presenta los resultados del análisis de las construcciones discursivas del propósito que subyace a las acciones. Este análisis está basado en el marco teórico de van Leeuwen (2008) y se centra en las posturas principales del texto argumentativo.

El capítulo 7 presenta los resultados obtenidos del análisis crítico de las maniobras estratégicas llevadas a cabo por los dos grupos de expertos en sus artículos de opinión y revela el sesgo en sus dimensiones ideológicas. Estas estrategias se examinaron atendiendo a las cuatro etapas propuestas por el modelo ideal de la discusión crítica y a

sus normas establecidas con el fin de desvelar los movimientos discursivos que producen falacias. Los resultados indican que cada grupo manifiesta maniobras distintas en la exposición de sus posturas ideológicas enfrentadas respecto a la guerra de Irak y en sus posiciones mantenidas respecto a este conflicto internacional.

Se destaca, en estos resultados, el uso de las estrategias de confrontación. Mientras los expertos norteamericanos tienden a polarizar sus posturas contra sus oponentes o a cambiar de tema para evitar un posible enfrentamiento con su audiencia, los expertos árabes expresan su disenso o proponen consejos estratégicos a los responsables norteamericanos o internacionales. En la etapa argumentativa de la discusión crítica, los resultados indican que el hecho de que los expertos estadounidenses tiendan a desarrollar argumentos con referencia a los lugares (*loci*) de relación o circunstancia pone de manifiesto que comparten un amplio conjunto de recursos cognitivos con su audiencia, lo cual facilita el uso extenso de premisas implícitas. Además, estas líneas de argumentos se basan en los tópicos (o *topoi*) empleados para promover el liderazgo internacional estadounidense y su presunto humanitarismo. Los expertos árabes, en cambio, hacen uso de los lugares (*loci*) más fiables para sostener sus argumentos. Sus líneas argumentativas dependen sobre todo de referencias al uso de las autoridades estadounidense para validar sus acusaciones y para compensar la falta de intereses comunes con sus lectores (la comunidad internacional).

La evaluación de las maniobras y de los casos de su descarrilamiento, que se resumen en la última parte del capítulo 7, ha seguido las normas de la discusión crítica establecidas por Pragma-dialéctica. Los resultados confirman que los casos de descarrilamiento están en consonancia con los tipos de ideologías arraigadas en las prácticas discursivas y sociales de cada grupo. Las maniobras de los expertos norteamericanos descarrilan con las falacias de *ad hominem*, -atacar a las personas en vez de atacar su argumento- y las de crear dilemas y analogías falsas. Podría decirse que estas maniobras señalan la arrogancia de los expertos para respaldar sus recursos manipulativos orientados en sus estratagemas a crear controversia en el debate político. Asimismo, se ha visto que las estrategias de los expertos árabes violan las normas de relevancia y del esquema del argumento, sobre todo al sacar conclusiones irrelevantes de tipo *ignoratio elenchi* y pista falsa, las cuales indican las incongruencias evidentes entre sus objetivos y el uso de las premisas.

III. CONCLUSIÓN

La tesis ha dedicado especial atención a la dimensión argumentativa en los artículos de opinión de los expertos en política exterior en los EEUU y en los países árabes y ha intentado desvelar los fundamentos ideológicos utilizados por cada grupo de expertos para defender sus posturas y sus intereses en Irak como parte de un debate público de magnitud internacional. El análisis de los artículos ha adoptado el marco teórico del ACD y del método y las herramientas analíticas de Pragma-dialéctica. De este modo, el estudio ha intentado, además, fomentar el interés en la investigación del discurso político internacional desde una perspectiva interdisciplinar.